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Abstract
This thesis examines the performance of the Tanzanian judiciary in 
enforcing human rights both during the colonial period and after 
independence. The study focuses on the period after the enshrinement of the 
Bill of Rights in the Constitution, in 1985. The aim of this work is to appraise 
both the present attitude of the judiciary and the reaction of the government to 
court decisions relating to human rights issues. In order to achieve this I 
conducted a six months field study in Tanzania during which I examined more 
than a hundred cases (the majority unreported) and interviewed a large number 
of people involved with the administration of justice.
The conclusion we draw from this research is that the government's 
reluctance to amend its laws to bring them into conformity with the Bill of 
Rights, underscores the need for judicial activism in Tanzania. It is a 
disservice to human rights for the majority of Tanzanian judges to adopt a 
positivist approach which prevents meaningful developments of human rights. 
Paradoxically, despite this conservatism, the government's attitude towards 
court decisions remains distrustful. Without a change in the attitude of both 
the courts and the government towards human rights, the Bill of Rights in the 
Constitution may not serve any meaningful purpose. Thus this thesis serves to 
remind both the Tanzanian judiciary, and the executive, of their obligation to 
protect individual fundamental rights.
After four chapters dealing with the administration of justice prior to the 
enshrinement of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution, chapters five and six 
examine respectively, the relevant courts decisions in criminal and civil 
matters. Chapter seven considers the government's response to these judicial 
decisions and chapter eight contains our conclusions and also makes 
recommendations as to the way forward.
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Introduction
Aims and Objectives
This study seeks to examine the role of the Tanzanian judiciary in 
protecting human rights, traced from the colonial period to the present day. A 
major focus is on the period after 1988 when the Bill of Rights became 
justiciable. We attempt to examine whether or not the judiciary in Tanzania is 
prepared to protect human rights as expected both by its citizens and by the 
international community. A survey of the Court of Appeal and High Court 
decisions suggests that there is room for optimism but more has to be done by 
the courts in terms of attitude to enable the effective realisation of individual 
fundamental rights in Tanzania. It is argued that human rights in Tanzania 
cannot be meaningfully realised unless the judiciary abandons the outmoded 
positivist and self-restraint tendencies and takes a more liberal and activist 
approach.
By nature and set-up the colonial government in Tanganyika was 
oppressive and most of its laws were designed to support a repressive state. 
Therefore the people expected the nationalist leaders to fulfil their promise for 
change and give respect to human rights on attaining independence. Instead, 
contrary to common expectations, the inclusion of the Bill of Rights in the 
Independence Constitution was successfully resisted by the nationalist leaders 
and infringements of individual fundamental rights by the executive 
unjustifiably increased after independence. It was after three decades since 
independence that the Tanzanian government allowed the enshrinement of the 
Bill of Rights1 in the Constitution in 1984. Today the Tanzanian Constitution 
guarantees basic rights which include equality before the law, the right to a fair
iSee Appendix.
1
hearing, the presumption of innocence, the right to due process, prohibition of 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, and personal freedom.
The absence of a Bill of Rights in the Constitution provided a fertile 
ground for authoritarianism and enabled the government to take a number of 
unwarranted measures as part of the “fight” for “development” without court 
intervention. In some instances the courts appeared to be more executive than 
the executive itself and people could achieve little of significance when the 
government was taken to court for its actions. Thus, most of the executive and 
legislative actions which disregarded individual fundamental rights remained 
unchallenged. In 1988 the Bill of Rights became justiciable but, paradoxically, 
laws inconsistent with the Constitution continue to operate in so far as the 
government has not amended or repealed them. It should be noted that the Bill 
of Rights’ justiciability was suspended for a period of three years2 and the 
government was supposed to have used that period to amend or repeal all 
laws which were inconsistent with the Constitution, but nothing was done. 
The responsibility is now on the judiciary to declare such laws unconstitutional 
and to protect the rights and freedoms of individual. Otherwise the people may 
fall victim to unrestricted executive powers. Such responsibility can only be 
taken by a bold and activist judiciary. How the Tanzanian judiciary has taken 
up this responsibility, is the purpose of this study.
A number of laws appear to be inconsistent with the Constitution and 
many key international conventions and covenants on human rights that 
Tanzania has acceded to. For example, the Criminal Procedure Act, 1985 
restricts the right to bail for persons charged with a wide range of offences, 
some of them trivial, notwithstanding the presumption of innocence. The 
Corporal Punishment Ordinance, 19303 allows the administration of corporal 
punishment to adults and juveniles notwithstanding that this is arguably in
2See The Constitution (Consequential, Transitional and Temporary Provisions) Act No. 16 of 1984.
3 Cap. 17.
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violation of Article 13 (6) (e) of the Constitution which prohibits cruel, 
inhuman and degrading punishment. Some of these laws have been challenged 
and tested in court but the outcome tends to demonstrate a judicial failure to 
protect individual fundamental rights.
It can be argued that judges in Tanzania are not accustomed to 
measuring the constitutionality of Tanzania’s law by the provisions of the Bill 
of Rights. This argument raises many other questions like, why is this mainly 
the problem of the Court of Appeal, and why shouldn’t the judges leam from 
other Commonwealth jurisdictions? This study provides answers for these 
questions by looking into possible reasons.
Since, the provisions of the Constitution are supreme, any other law 
which is inconsistent with those provisions, ipso facto , must be 
unconstitutional to the extent of its inconsistency. It follows that any law 
inconsistent with the enshrined rights guaranteed by the Constitution must be 
unconstitutional. However, in practice, this appears not to be the case. The 
Constitution has several provisions which save potentially unconstitutional 
provisions from being void. For example, it is stipulated that the right to 
personal freedom may not be violated save in certain circumstances, and 
subject to a procedure, prescribed by law.4 Also the provisions of Article 30 
(2) of the Constitution appear to be so general that if  improperly applied they 
can save virtually every law no matter how much it infringes upon guaranteed 
rights and freedoms. Here is the problem. The Constitution itself takes away 
with one hand that which it has given with the other. The existence of these 
saving clauses has caused controversies where a law has been challenged 
before the court and the state has maintained that it is constitutional. It is at 
this stage the attitude of the judiciary in interpreting the provisions of the 
Constitution to give them the meaning of human rights protection has to be 
assessed. The statements and tests on derogation and claw-back clauses laid
4The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977, Article 15 (2) (a).
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down by the Court of Appeal5 are not themselves free from ambiguity. At best 
they are statements which require jurisprudential development in subsequent 
cases as well as analysis and comment by academic scholars.
Literature review
Scholarship on human rights is as old as the concept of human rights 
itself. There is so much literature about human rights ranging from global, 
regional to national levels. Tanzania has not been ignored in the literature. 
Many people have written about human rights in Tanzania especially after 
independence. Few of these works are in form of books or PhD theses but 
most of such literature consists of articles in different journals.6 The vast 
majority o f writers have concentrated their attention on constitutionalism. It 
was KABUDI, P. J., (1995 A) that attempted to compare the relationship 
between the major organs (executive, legislature and judiciary) of the three 
East African states and human rights. He did not specifically focus on the 
judiciaiy of any of these countries and his examination covers the period 
between independence and 1995. Also he did not discuss the right to 
participate in public affairs, the area that has been significantly developed by 
the Tanzanian judiciary. Since that work was published Tanzania has 
undergone considerable changes in the development of its human rights 
jurisprudence
Regarding the performance of the Tanzanian judiciary after the Bill of 
Rights became justiciable, the earliest scholarly work is that of Peter.7 That 
work endeavoured to compare the performance of the government on the one 
side and that of the High Court and the Court of Appeal on the other side 
during a period of five years since the Bill of Rights became justiciable. 
However, that brief review like many other articles did not address itself to
5In D.P.P. v. Daudi Pete, infra., and in Kukutici OlePumbun and Another v. Attorney-General, infra.
6See also MWAKYEMBE, H. G., (1995) and MWAIKUSA, J. T., (1995).
7PETER, C. M., (1992).
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possible causes for such unsatisfactory performance, nor did it suggest some 
measures for reform.
The article by Mwalusanya, J.,8 attempted to criticise the Tanzanian 
judges' positivist attitude towards issues of human rights nature. However, 
Mwalusanya, J., does not suggest the solution for the existing problems nor is 
he concerned with the cause. By addressing issues such as the causes for the 
unsatisfactory state of judicial performance and making recommendations 
thereof this work makes an important contribution to the existing knowledge.
The latest publication about human rights in Tanzania is a case book by 
Peter.9 This work deals with various aspects of human rights in Tanzania as 
supported by relevant selected court decisions. However, some of the Court of 
Appeal decisions about certain rights have been left out, especially if, in the 
author's view, their reasoning does not assist in the development of human 
rights jurisprudence. This makes the author look obsessed with positive 
developments of human rights, for according to him, any court decision 
frustrating the development of human rights is not worth consideration. Peter's 
work does not analyse the decisions of the courts but leaves it to the readers to 
make their own assessment. In fixture the work can be used as a supplement to 
the law reports for it is the only publication containing wide coverage of 
human rights cases in Tanzania.
Most of the works by Issa Shivji10 have largely been an exposition of 
the use of unlimited powers by the state in Tanzania to restrain individuals and 
organisations from exercising their rights and freedoms, and in the process he 
analyses the judiciary. Thus as regards the Tanzanian judiciary's special role in 
protecting human rights, that area remains virtually untouched. The above 
stated literature and many other writings;11 most of them having been written
8MWALUSANYA, J. L.
9PETER, C. M., (1997).
10See the Selected Bibliography.
n Ibid.
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before the Bill of Rights became justiciable, have prepared the ground for this 
study.
The Tanzanian judiciary therefore as one of the arms of the state, has 
not been given the attention it deserved. The reason for this can be assumed to 
stem from the fact that for about thirty years after independence there was no 
clear recourse for any infringement of human rights by the executive or other 
organs of the state. Perhaps before the Bill of Rights was enshrined in the 
Constitution people thought there was no justification for criticising the 
judiciary whenever it exhibited passiveness on matters related to infringement 
of human rights. Secondly, it is only ten years since the Bill of Rights became 
justiciable and people have not been sufficiently able to appraise judicial 
effectiveness in protecting human rights save for few academicians. Thirdly, 
many decisions of the court remain unknown to the people for no law reports 
have been published since 1983. These three factors have contributed to the 
dearth of literature particularly about the judiciary vis-a-vis human rights in 
Tanzania.
Methodology
This work is based on the material gathered through library research, 
field research and participation in seminars. We first conducted a library 
research and reviewed various literature about human rights that laid a 
foundation for this study. The SOAS library was very useful in providing the 
background information from different books, periodicals and journals. 
Journals and other materials which could not be found in the SOAS library 
were obtained from a specialised library of the Institute of Advanced and 
Legal Studies. The library of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies and the 
library of the University of London (Senate House) removed the possibility of 
missing any important material and information. The University of Dar Es
6
Salaam library (East Afficana and Law Collection) provided us with some 
materials that could not be found in the above mentioned libraries.12
The library research strengthened our six-months field research in 
Tanzania. The field research involved interviews and a physical search of 
court records. A wide range of people including senior judges, magistrates, 
leading advocates, senior police officers and top government officials were 
interviewed. Among those interviewed was the Minister of State in the Prime 
Minister's Office responsible for government policy and information, 
Kingunge Ngombare Mwim (MP),
Since law reports in Tanzania have not been published since 1983, and 
due to the fact that cases decided by subordinate courts are not reported, the 
only reliable means to get access to relevant information was to read the 
original court records and other sources available in the various libraries of the 
High Court. In order to achieve this we visited eight High Court centres in the 
country (Dar Es Salaam, Arusha, Mwanza, Tabora, Mbeya, Dodoma, Tanga 
and Mtwara) in the course of which many relevant and interesting cases were 
unearthed.
A seminar on Good Governance organised by the British Institute for 
International and Comparative law in April 1996 placed us in contact with 
groups of people whose literature have significantly contributed to the human 
rights discourse. Issues of human rights were discussed and participants from 
various Commonwealth countries shared ideas which provided this work with 
more comparative materials. While in London we also established a resource 
link with the AIRE Centre and used this link to gain access to the very best 
and committed human rights personnel.
12For example the Tanzanian parliamentary debates (Hansard) and a number of statutes.
7
Scope and structure
The United Republic of Tanzania is the result of the union between 
Tanganyika and Zanzibar. Following the said union Tanganyika was known as 
Tanzania mainland covering the area of about 363,000 square miles. Since 
then the islands of Pemba and Unguja that covered the area of 1,020 square 
miles were collectively identified as Zanzibar. These two countries practise 
different legal systems and Zanzibar enjoys full autonomy in all matters that 
are not classified by the Constitution as union matters. The judiciary or the 
administration of justice in general is specifically stated as a non-union matter 
and the Constitution establishes one such independent institution in every 
country.13 However, appeals from the High Court of Zanzibar lie to the Court 
of Appeal of the United Republic, the only union court.14 In order to control 
the size and the scope of our work we confine this study to Tanzania mainland 
(Tanganyika) from colonial period to date.
This work is divided into four chronologically arranged parts namely : 
the introductory part, the post-independence period covering the years 1961- 
1988, the post-1988 period and the conclusion. Each part is divided into 
relevant chapters. Chapter one is about the administration of justice during the 
colonial period. The discussion in this chapter lays down a foundation for full 
understanding of the development of human rights in Tanzania, and provides 
good ground for a comparative study with the post independence situation. 
This particular chapter is concerned with the set-up of the colonial judiciary 
and how it addressed the human rights related issues. Here we deal with the 
racial element of the colonial court system, and how colour (whites, coloureds, 
natives) formed the basis for the colonial legal system.
The post-independence policy covering the whole of pre-bill of rights 
period is discussed in the two chapters of part two. It covers the period 1961-
13 Article 4 (2).
14Item number 20 of the First Schedule to the Constitution.
1988 during which the Bill of Rights was successfully resisted by the 
independence government and when it was enshrined in the constitution its 
justiciability was suspended for three years. In this part we endeavour to see if 
there was any shift by the independence government from authoritarianism to 
a more democratic government governed by rule of law as people expected.
The discussion in chapter two examines the early Constitutions and 
what the Tanzanian government considered alternatives to the Bill of Rights, 
and assesses whether they effectively worked or qualified to take such a place. 
It is concluded in chapter two that the government's refusal to enshrine a Bill 
of Rights in the Constitution was a disservice to the world-wide campaign to 
promote a universal respect for the observance of human rights, and that it 
provided fertile ground for violations of human rights in Tanzania under the 
cover of African socialism and national ideology. An examination on the 
judicial set-up, background of the judicial officers in terms of training and the 
procedure leading to their appointment is made in order to asses their 
performance as judges or magistrates.
The behaviour of the three organs of the state (the executive, the 
legislature and the judiciary) vis-a-vis human rights during the pre-Bill of 
Rights period is discussed in chapter three. Adoption of colonial legislation, 
the enactment of new authoritarian laws, one-party policy and villagisation 
sharply demonstrate the state’s infringements of individual fundamental rights. 
While discussing and expanding on these measures special attention is paid to 
the reaction of the judiciary and how the background of judges affected their 
decisions.
Part three of this study covers the post-Bill period from 1988. In the 
light of the problems pointed out in parts one and two, part three visits and 
explores at length whether or not after the Bill of Rights became justiciable 
there has been any meaningful realisation of individual fundamental rights in 
Tanzania.
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Any account of the post-Bill period must include a full understanding 
of the background to the Bill of Rights. In other words we have to show in 
chapter four the circumstances which led to the previously resisted Bill of 
Rights being enshrined in the constitution. Was the government willing to 
include it in the Constitution? The answer to this fundamental question, 
perhaps to be deduced from the contents of the Bill of Rights, throws more 
light about the government’s general attitude towards the individual 
fundamental rights.
Because the duty to protect individual fundamental rights has been 
vested in the judiciary, we examine in chapters five and six the judicial 
decisions in criminal and civil cases of a human rights nature especially when 
the state was a party or had an interest to a particular case. This includes an 
examination of the judicial attitude when called upon to review the legislative 
as well as executive actions challenged for infringing the individual 
fundamental rights. Inevitably we have to analyse the individual judge’s 
decisions.
In chapter seven we look closely at the government’s reaction to 
various decisions of the court. Then we make our assessment of the way the 
amendment of laws was carried out following the court decisions and the 
effect of such reaction on the future of individual fundamental rights in 
Tanzania.
Part four is made up of chapter eight that represents our observations, 
conclusions and recommendations. In the conclusion we make an account of 
what this work set out to do and proceed to make an appraisal of the problems 
highlighted earlier as affecting the protection of individual fundamental rights 
by the judiciary in Tanzania. We rely on the analysis made in the preceding 
chapters to answer the questions whether or not the judiciary has effectively 
protected human rights in Tanzania and whether the Constitution has provided 
sufficient safeguards for human rights. Finally, we develop general proposals
10
for reform and make specific recommendations to the judiciary as to its role to 
interpret laws which potentially appear to violate the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights. Decisions fi*om the European Court of Human Rights and 
Commonwealth jurisprudence have buttressed our recommendations in this 
chapter.
11
PART ONE: THE COLONIAL PERTOD
CHAPTER ONE
THE JUDICIARY AND COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
This chapter examines the ways in which the two successive colonial 
powers ignored human rights in Tanganyika, despite the fact that it would have 
been hard for a government either in Germany or Britain to survive without 
giving respect to human rights. We pay more attention to the British colonial 
administration than the German one because the former provided the ground 
upon which the territory's future administration of justice was based. In 
Tanganyika, human rights were not important in determining relationships 
with the colonised. On the contrary, of particular importance was the role of 
the judiciary in furthering colonial aims. That is to say, courts were one of the 
main mechanisms through which the colonial government exercised its 
domination.15
Because of the strong resistance by many African chiefs to the colonial 
conquest, the new rulers designed a ‘divide and rule5 type of administration. 
This was also extended to the administration of justice and it minimised the 
room for further resistance.
1:1 The Colonial State
1:1:1 The German conquest
Tanganyika experienced two successive colonial regimes during the 
period 1885-1961. It was under German rule up to 1918 when the British took 
over the colony as ‘Mandate’ of the League of Nations. Together with other
15JAMES, R. W., and KASSAM, F. M., p. 26.
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European powers like Britain, France and Belgium, Germany joined the 
‘scramble for Africa’ but in an exceptional style. Initially it did not involve 
itself with the direct colonisation of East Africa but assisted the German 
companies, to administer the colonies on behalf of the government. This is 
because according to Bismarck, ‘colonies would be expensive to govern and 
defend and would bring international complications threatening German’s 
security.’16
Thus Carl Peters toured round Tanganyika in 1884 to lure the 
traditional leaders (chiefs) into signing agreements whose consequences they 
could not fully understand. Through this method the German merchants in East 
Africa colonised Tanganyika. However, increased awareness helped to stir up 
hostility between the Germans and the chiefs which culminated in resistance, 
riots and attacks throughout the colony.
As native resistance increased, Bismarck authorised German military 
operations which resulted in the mass slaughter of Tanganyikans. The 
Germans were then committed to ‘full scale colonial rule’.17
1:1:1:1 The German administration and justice
The Germans started their colonial administration with land alienation 
by which all land in the colony was placed under the control of the Governor. 
Since then ‘areas for cultivation and stock raising could only be acquired by 
leasing from the state.’18 This created a conducive environment for colonial 
extraction of necessary labour. However, natives were not prepared to provide 
the colonialists with surplus labour in the required amounts and this 
culminated in confrontation between the ‘colonisers and the colonised.’19 
Because of this confrontation the Germans sought a solution in taxation. Land
16ILIFFE, J., p. 89.
17Ibid., p. 97.
18COPONEN, J., p. 290.
19Ibid.,p. 321.
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alienation and taxation subjected the Africans to economic compulsion in that 
lack of money and higher needs compelled them to offer their labour to the 
German settlers' plantations. They were strictly supervised ‘in a military 
style’20 and flogging was a general rule.
The early German regime used soldiers to maintain authority over the 
native population and any protest was suppressed by force. Eventually they 
found solution in indirect rule. Under indirect rule it was easier to control the 
masses because they were placed under the supervision of local traditional 
chiefs who had already pledged their loyalty to the Geiman government. These 
chiefs were like school prefects and they were answerable to the colonial 
government through the supervision of the Akidas and they could suffer the 
consequences for failing to enforce colonial directives. In those areas where 
chiefs loyal to the colonial regime could not be easily obtained or in sensitive 
areas like the coastal area, Liwalis were appointed to look after the interests of 
their masters. Administratively, the country was divided into Districts under 
the District Officers and the Governor, usually a soldier, at the top.
The District Officers apart from being administrators they exercised full 
jurisdiction over the indigenous people, by using their own wisdom and 
discretion and the Governor, who was also a commander in chief of the armed 
forces, was practically, above the law. It was a brutal military colonial 
government manifested by injustices as can be deduced from an account by 
one African teacher.
“...they are forcing everyone to work without pay, 
neither wages nor food...Poor us! The people have no 
way to escape, they fear to be beaten ... Truly this is 
not justice.”21
20COPONEN, J., p. 325.
21Ibi<±, p. 135.
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Monetarisation and the imposition of taxes were the most important 
German innovations in the colony. People were forced by these policies to 
grow cash crops like coffee, cotton or to offer their labour in the settlers’ 
plantations in order to obtain the cash payment necessary for the settlement of 
tax liability and to survive in the new money economy. To some extent it 
helped to divert the people from resisting the government.
The people’s refusal to work on the government plantations sparked the 
Maji-Maji rebellion which resulted in the slaughter of many local people.22 
After the Maji-Maji war an enquiry was made into its cause. This led to the 
appointment of a new Governor23 and the forced labour in the settlers’ farms 
was stopped.
The German colonial government and the German settlers were racist in 
that they regarded the local people as descendants of wild animals and 
therefore deserving no respect whatsoever. According to them:
"The African is a bom slave, who needs his despot 
like an opium addict needs his pipe. Only compulsion 
made such creatures work".24
This attitude of the German government towards Africans justified the 
flogging of Africans by the settlers and the authorities.25 It caused fear, anger 
and hatred among the people. Racial groups in the colony were officially 
created and colour was an important factor which determined one's value and 
treatment. Coloured persons included indigenous Africans, Arabs, Indians and 
Baluchis but excluded Goans. They were considered insufficiently advanced to 
come under German law. This particular group of people had its own court 
system manned by the colonial administrators who applied native customary
22Soldiers were specially brought from Germany and South Africa to destroy crops and starve the 
rebels.
23For tlie first time the Governor was not a soldier.
24ILIFFE, J., p. 150.
25It is estimated tiiat between 1901-1913 die government sentenced 64,652 Africans to coiporal 
punishment. For details see ILIFFE, J., pp. 149-150.
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law provided it was not, ‘from the point of view of a civilised nation, contrary 
to healthy common sense and good morals.’26 It was substantially distinct 
from the normal court system which was staffed by trained magistrates and 
judges who applied German laws to Europeans and other non-nativesP
Cases involving coloured persons were heard by a Liwali, Kadhi or 
Akida who exercised both executive and judicial functions at the lower level of 
the administration hierarchy. Only more serious cases were taken to the 
District Officers, or officers in charge of military stations, and appeals lay 
direct to the Governor who could make orders referring such cases to a 
superior judge28 but he rarely did so. It was the Germans’ deliberate policy to 
equip the administrators also with judicial powers, to enable them preserve 
law and order in their respective areas. They were also armed with powers to 
inflict punishment, especially corporal punishment, which was regarded by the 
people as an instrument of terror.
The group of non-natives included Europeans, Goans and Parsees29and 
were subject to German laws within a court system manned by lawyers, 
magistrates and judges. No matter how rich an Asian merchant was, to the 
Germans he was a native since he could not observe German civil law.30
1:1:2 The British colonial government
After the First World War ended with the German defeat, Tanganyika 
was officially taken over in 1918 by Britain as a ‘Mandated Territory’ under 
the supervision of the League of Nations which had just been established. 
Britain undertook to develop the country’s infrastructure which had collapsed 
during the German regime and agreed to make a report to the League of 
Nations every year about the mandate territory.
26Gemian Foreign Office Decree of 15th January 1907.
27COPONEN, J., p. 361.
28MOFFET, J. P., p. 18.
29 Section 2 of the Imperial Decree of 9th November 1900.
30ILIFFE, J., p. 140.
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The Germans were rightly accused of mismanagement that left little 
space for law-making in the administration of the colony.31 Horace Byatt, the 
first Governor, was required to destroy the Germans’ presence, and indeed he 
ruthlessly deported the German settlers. His second assignment was to 
discourage new settlers from coming into the territory because there was 
insufficient African labour. Third he was to re-establish order which the 
German regime had helped to erode.
Immediately after taking over from the autocratic German regime the 
British established formal institutions of government. Guidelines in the form 
of proclamations provided for temporary measures in the war-torn colony 
until 1920 when the Tanganyika Order in Council came into force providing a 
framework for British administration in Tanganyika. At the apex was the 
Governor who was given extensive powers and was above the law.32 Under 
him were the Provincial Commissioners and District Commissioners who had 
full control over their respective provinces and districts
1; 1:2:1: Law making
The Legislative Council (LEGCO) was created in 192633 charged with 
the making of laws in the territory, a function which was previously 
discharged by the Governor alone between 1920-1926. Because of the 
structure of the colonial regime and the powers which the Governor retained 
over the appointment of members of the LEGCO, it is valid to say that 
legislative authority over the territory was still in the hands of the Governor. 
Members of the LEGCO, official and non-official34 including the Speaker,
31 COLE, J. R., and DENISON, W. N., p. 6.
32Tanganyika Order in Council, 1920, section 28 .
33See Tanganyika (Legislative Council) Order in Council, 1926.
34Non-Official members were persons not holding office of emolument under the Crown in the 
territory as the Governor might from time to time appoint. Official members included such persons 
in the service of the Crown in Tanganyika nominated from the Executive Council or outside the 
Executive Council.
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were appointed by the Governor.35 He retained the power to terminate their 
membership36 since they held their seats during the pleasure of His Majesty.37 
The appointment of the LEGCO members by the Governor was not necessarily 
done with the best interests of the people in mind, nor did they officially 
represent any particular section of the population at the beginning. For quite a 
long time the non-official minority in the LEGCO was drawn from the 
immigrant communities and no African secured a seat in there.38 Even when 
the situation changed to give the members of the Legislative Council a 
racially representative character there was no significant change as to their 
effectiveness in the Council nor were they elected by the people of the races 
they purported to represent. They were all appointed by the Governor to advise 
him on matters related to the enactment of laws in the colony. Arguably such 
an institution could not be objective in performing its duties because its 
members could not risk offending the Governor if they wanted to retain their 
positions.
Furthermore, official members of the LEGCO, most of them being 
members of the Executive Council, always outnumbered non-official 
members.39 This enabled the government to table any Bill confidently as it 
could obtain a majority of votes guaranteed by the official members. Also, 
under the Tanganyika (Legislative Council) Order in Council 1926 no laws 
could take effect until assented to by the Governor who did so in his 
discretion.40 More interesting was the inferiority of the LEGCO in the law­
making process whereby its role was merely advisory to the Governor41
3 5 Article V.
36Article VII C (3) and (4).
3 7 Article VII A.
38MORRIS, H. F., and READ, J. S., p. 7.
39See Article V and also the Statutory Rules and Orders, 1945, No. 1371.
40Articles XV and XVI.
41Article XIV.
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Since most of the LEGCO official members were administrators in the 
colonial government, the British could conveniently use the LEGCO as its 
administrative institution.42
1:1:2:2: The court system.
The British attitude towards the administration of justice in Tanganyika 
did not differ very much from that of the Germans.43 Under British rule the 
two parallel court systems were maintained with a slight modification. On the 
one side were the magistrates’ courts subordinate to the High Court and on the 
other side were the native courts.
1:1:2:2:1 Native courts/Local courts
These courts catered for natives only and were presided over by
administrative officers including chiefs at the lower level. As Morris and Read
argue, these were vehicles through which the proponents of indirect rule
implemented their policies.44 Initially native courts were linked to the High
Court with power to revise any of the proceedings of such courts.45 This
system did not last long and was changed by Sir Donald Cameron, Byatt’s
successor. According to Cameron this system conflicted with indirect rule
which he wanted to promote through native authorities under the local chiefs.
By preferring indirect rule Cameron had no intention to adopt chieftainships,
but he simply wanted to utilise the existing institutions as a foundation on
which he could easily build his political structure.
He started by tracing the chiefs whose powers had previously been
taken away by the German regime. In some areas where it proved difficult to
trace such chiefs the Governor would appoint one, usually from the largest
42For a discussion about District Commissioners as administrators cum legislators see MORRIS, H.
F., and READ, J. S., p. 18.
43MOFFET, J.P.,p. 18.
44MORRIS, H. F., and READ, J. S., p. 21.
45See die 1925 Proclamation made under the Court's Ordinance No. 6 of 1920.
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tribe in a particular area. The German system of administration relied upon 
appointed Arabs and African officials who were inevitably alien to the tribes 
they governed. This resulted in the failure to create a harmonious atmosphere 
in the colony. Having realised the many weaknesses of the German form of 
indirect rule, Cameron insisted on the restoration of the chiefs with their 
powers and gave them autonomous legislative authority over their areas.46 The 
Governor’s reasoning on breaking up the link between the High Court and the 
native courts and on establishing two distinct court systems was inter alia that:
“The judges of the High Court know nothing of the 
language, customs, the modes of life and thought of 
natives, whereas, on the other hand, the natives know 
nothing of the High Court and do not understand its 
intervention between themselves and their 
administrative officers.”47
According to Cameron, placing the native court under the High Court 
supervision would ‘shake a native administration to its foundation’48 because 
the chiefs would consider themselves as having no power if their decisions 
could be scrutinised and later revised by the High Court. This would be 
contrary to the Governor’s plan of giving autonomy and powers to local chiefs 
in order to use the traditional respect they commanded to exert colonial 
dominion without alarming the colonised people. The basic assumption of 
indirect rule was that traditional political systems existed prior to the advent of 
colonialism. These systems were 011 a ‘scale and in a form reasonably 
adaptable to their incorporation into a modem colonial system’ 49
The Governor’s views were vehemently opposed by the then Chief 
Justice, Sir Alison Russell who cited the way in which the native courts in 
Uganda operated effectively under the supervision of the High Court. He did
46See the Native Authority Ordinance of 1926.
47MOFFET, J. P., p. 19.
48RALPH, A., p. 589.
49BEIDELMAN, T. O., p. 119.
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not see why the same should not work in Tanganyika. His argument was 
essentially against the colonial desire to make justice for Africans a matter of 
executive discretion. He argued:
“Native courts should be trained in the standing 
principle of British administration - that justice should 
be done according to the law. The law is the only sure 
foundation upon which a British administration can 
take its stand; and ... it is my duty to express my 
respectful and earnest protest against a proposal to 
supersede the reign of law by that capricious 
executive discretion which often causes discontent 
and sometimes leads to disaster.”50
The Chief Justice was supported in this regard by most of the non­
official members of the LEGCO but nevertheless in 1929 a Bill was passed51 
giving birth to the Native Courts Ordinance of 1929. It was virtually 
impossible for the Governor’s proposals to be rejected by the LEGCO given 
its weaknesses. Thus the native court system was placed under the Governor 
at the apex.
50MOFFET, J. P., p. 20.
51 After Sir Joseph Sheridan took over from Sir Alison Russell as Chief Justice.
Governor
District Officer
Superior Native Court 
(Appellate Court)
Provincial
Commissioner
Native Court 
(Court of First Instance)
Table 1: The Native Court System
The Governor’s main concern in this court system was the political 
substance rather than the legal form which the Chief Justice was emphasising.
In his endeavour to prevent executive abuse of power while 
discharging judicial functions, Cameron prepared a guide in the form of a 
memorandum.52 It contained instructions for the supervision of the courts, the 
prevention of abuses, and the inculcation of the principles of British justice.53 
However, the Provincial Commissioner under whom control of native courts 
was placed had power to suspend or dismiss any native court officers who, in 
his view, were unfit or unable to exercise their powers.
52The Native Administration Memorandum No. 2: Native Courts.
53MOFFET, J. P., p. 21.
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After the enactment of the Tanganyika Local Courts Ordinance, 1951 
native courts were renamed Local Courts54 but remained under the untrained 
government appointees. Also the chiefs’ judicial functions were gradually 
minimised and it was planned that in future they would retain only executive 
functions. Nevertheless, the District Officers and the Provincial 
Commissioners continued to discharge both judicial and executive functions. 
The system consisted of Local Courts of First Instance, from which appeals lay 
to a Local Court of Appeal, and then to the District Commissioner and finally 
to the Central Court of Appeal after obtaining leave of the Provincial 
Commissioner.
With leave o f Provincial Commissioner
Local Court of Appeal
District Commissioner
Central Court of Appeal
Local Court of First 
Instance
Table 2: The Local court system
Central Court of Appeal was composed of a High Court judge, the 
Local Court Adviser and one nominated member. This composition was
54By The Tanganyika Local Courts Ordinance No. 14 of 1951.
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allegedly designed to improve the standards of justice in the native courts, 
albeit only at the highest appellate level. The whole native court system was 
tainted with injustices expressed by its racist outlook, the deliberate non­
separation of powers between the judiciary and the executive, and by the fact 
that there was no legal representation allowed in the native courts except in the 
Central Court of Appeal after 1951.
It is hard to see how the mere inclusion of a High Court judge in the 
apex court could improve the standards of justice if  the rest of the system 
remained intact, for injustices were more likely to occur in the lower courts 
rather than in the upper court. Provided they decided cases in a manner which 
facilitated colonial control, native courts operated without intervention from 
above, no matter what injustices were done to the natives they were supposed 
to serve.55
Very few cases reached the Central Court of Appeal since access was 
only possible with the leave of the Provincial Commissioner, a senior colonial 
administrator. Moreover, judicial officials, and in particular the chiefs, were in 
possession of administrative sanctions which they could sometimes use against 
those who disputed decisions by lodging appeals.
Although the original proponents of indirect rule might had intended the 
native courts to be a school for political ideas and training but they became a 
private closet of political cynicism and tribalism and 'an arena for seizing 
personal profit and power'.56
1:1:2;2:2 Subordinate courts and High Court
All non-natives were covered by this distinct court system. Subordinate
courts were divided into various classes of magistrates under the direct
supervision of the High Court to which all appeals lay.57
55For specific incidents see BEIDELMAN, T. O,, p. 31.
56Ibid., p. 40.
57See the Subordinate Courts Ordinance, 1941 (Cap. 3), section 17.
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High Court 
(Judge)
2— Class Subordinate 
Court: 
Administrative Officer
3— Class Subordinate 
Court:
Administrative Officer of 
Cadet rank
1~" Class Subordinate Court: 
1 .Provincial Commissioner
2.Resident Magistrate
3.Deputy 
Prov.Commissioner
4.District Commissioner
Table 3: Subordinate courts system.
Trained judges presided over the High Court proceedings whereas 
subordinate courts were presided over by trained magistrates and some 
administrative officers. The only trained magistrates in the subordinate courts 
were Resident Magistrates found in the first class subordinate courts. The 
Provincial Commissioner, Deputy Provincial Commissioner and the District 
Commissioner were also regarded as first class magistrates. The 
administrative officer of cadet rank presided over the third class subordinate 
court while an administrative officer other than those mentioned above would 
preside over the subordinate court of second class.58
The High Court judges were appointed by the Governor in accordance 
with such instructions as the Crown could direct. Magistrates and other 
principal officers of the High Court were appointed by Governor or the Chief 
Secretary. Both judges and magistrates held their offices during the pleasure of
58Ibid.} sections 3 and 17.
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His Majesty.59 This helps to explain how difficult it was to think of an 
independent judiciary during the colonial period.
1:1:2:3: The law applicable.
The law applicable in the subordinate courts and the High Court was the 
statute law enacted either by the LEGCO or by the Governor as well as the 
received law. According to the ‘reception clause’, courts were to apply the 
law in conformity with the substance of common law, doctrines of equity and 
the statutes of general application in force in England in 1920.60 Furthermore, 
courts in the territory were bound by the decisions of the English courts up to 
1920 when the Tanganyika Order in Council came in force. The law of the 
land also included written laws from British India, where they had been tested 
and proved effective. Thus, the Criminal Procedure, Civil Procedure and 
Penal Codes and many others were imported wholesale from India to 
Tanganyika.
Customary law, otherwise known as native law, was recognised but its 
application by the court was subject to conditions. It applied only in cases, 
civil and criminal, to which natives were parties. Courts were guided by 
customary law so far as it was applicable and it was not repugnant to justice 
and morality or inconsistent with any Order in Council or any Ordinance or 
any Regulation or rule made under any Order in Council or Ordinance.61 With 
all these limitations native law was seldom used in Subordinate Courts and the 
High Court, in the colonial Tanganyika.
Native/local courts which were staffed by untrained colonial 
administrators applied customary law and bye-laws made by chiefs. The 
received laws (Statutes of General Application or other laws as provided for 
under the reception clause) could not be applied for the reason that native
59Tanganyika Order in Council, sections 19 and 23.
60Ibid., section 17(2).
61Ibid., section 24.
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courts were not part of the ordinary judicial machinery of the territory but 
mere representatives of the executive. Also, native courts staff who were often 
illiterate were completely ignorant of the procedure and practice observed by 
courts of justice in England.
The reception clause, did not allow the British colonial government to 
import into the territory anything other than the law and substance of common 
law and equity applicable in England before 1920. Paradoxically, the 
fundamental democratic rights in the English law were simply excised during 
its transportation to the colonies and a number of authoritarian laws were 
enacted. In his attempt to explain the reasons behind this, Professor Seidman 
points out:
“In East Africa and West, the imperatives of Empire 
as perceived by the colonial rulers required 
authoritarian government in order to maintain the 
control of ca few dominant civilised men5 over ‘a 
multitude of the semi-barbarous’. In East Africa in 
addition, the small but insatiable demands of settler 
enterprises for cheap African labour required the 
invocation of a whole set of compulsions, applied 
through state power guided by law."62
Actually it was for the few English men and other foreigners that 
English law had to be imported for the rule had developed among the settlers 
that an English man carried with him English law and liberties into any 
unoccupied country where he settled.63 What readily catches the eye is the 
extent to which the British colonial government ‘was willing to pervert its own 
“civilised” standards in order to achieve its political aims.’64
62Ibid., p. 78.
63SEIDMAN, R. B., p. 49.
64MARTIN, R., p. 10.
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1:2 The colonial legislation.
The British colonial regime was characterised by oppressive legislation 
aimed at subjecting the indigenous population to continued colonial rule. Laws 
reflected the colonial policy and courts were used to enforce them for they 
were predominantly designed to make the administrative process easy for the 
colonialists. This common characteristic of the colonial courts made people 
view them as cone of the mechanisms through which the metropolitan power 
exercised its dominion’65 and as such they could not be depended upon to 
protect individual rights against the government of the day. Furthermore the 
decisions of the Privy Council66 ‘resulted in a set of rules that employed the 
awesome power of the colonial state to achieve the exploitative objectives of 
British imperial policy’.67
Apart from the received law the colonial government in Tanganyika 
enacted many authoritarian laws through the Governor and the Legislative 
Council. It is said that between 1920-1926 the Governor by the power vested 
in him under the Tanganyika Order in Council 1920 enacted about 180 
Ordinances.68
1:2:1 Land ownership and peasantry
With the colonialists’ strategy of creating a money economy in order to 
provide labour for the settlers’ plantations, African social formations changed. 
In addition, the introduction of cash-crops cultivation caused land shortages. 
Land as well as labour power were given both economic and commodity value 
capable of being marketed and this altered the existing traditional land tenure. 
Above all, the Governor enacted the Land Tenure Ordinance69, later renamed
65Ibid., p. 79.
66A private advisory council of His Majesty in matters that related to his overseas dominions, having 
its head office in England. The Council's Judicial Committee was the highest appellate tribunal that 
dealt with appeals from all British colonies.
67SEIDMAN, R. B., p. 48.
68COLE, J. R , and DENISON, W. N., p. 39.
69No. 3 o f 1923.
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the Land Ordinance.70 By this Ordinance the Governor ‘nationalised all lands, 
except for those alienated by the German administration, by declaring the 
whole of the lands in mandated territory, whether occupied or unoccupied, 
public lands’71 under his control.
Later on the land held under native law and custom was regarded as 
held under a ‘deemed right of occupancy,’72 the title not subject to payment of 
rent or to compliance with specific development conditions which are the 
distinctive features of the ‘granted right of occupancy.’73 Africans were not 
secure in their customary rights of occupancy because under the Land 
Ordinance the Governor could at any time alienate any land in what he 
considered to be the public interest and compensation in terms of money 
would be made to those affected. In this way Africans were deprived of fertile 
land, and food production decreased. On one occasion the Director of Lands 
and Mines issued instructions to all Provincial Commissioners that on matters 
of land ‘European claims took precedence and that if land alienation involved 
the disturbance of Africans, they should be forced to move and compensation 
would be paid’.74 The culmination of this policy was the famous Meru Land 
Case where people in Meru area challenged the alienation of their land in 
favour of colonial settlers. The case was highly contested and publicised in 
the United Nations.75 However, international publicity of this land dispute did 
not prevent the colonial authorities from carrying out the eviction of 3,000 
Meru people in order to make way for some settlers76. Actually the Land 
Ordinance infringed the indigenous people’s land rights and restricted their
70Cap. 113.
71LOUISE, C. S., p. 66.
72Following the 1928 amendment of the Land Ordinance ‘right of occupancy’ was re-defined to 
include die title of an individual African or native community lawfully occupying the land in 
accordance witii customary law.
73Specific grant of land by the Governor widi conditions a breach of which attracted revocation of the 
right.
74LOUISE, C. S., pp. 70-71.
75See SEATON, E. E., and KIRILO, J.
76WILLIAMS, D., (1973), p. 113.
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free expansion. It is said that in Morogoro, for example, many Africans were 
left landless, and many clan members were left to exist on precipitous rocky 
hillsides which became more barren by erosion every year despite the 
precautions taken by the cultivators to hold up the soil.77
The colonialists wanted the natives to provide cheap labour for the 
settlers’ plantations but at the same time to grow food crops for subsistence 
and cash crops for export.78 In a bid to promote commodity production in the 
various sectors of the peasant economy the colonial state introduced a large 
number of rules.79 These rules, orders and directives were important to the 
colonial regime, especially after a significant number of able-bodied Africans 
had opted to work for wages in towns and plantations rather than growing the 
introduced cash crops. Those who opted to stick to the land and grow cash 
crops, resented the new regulations and sanctions by carrying out acts of 
sabotage. Thus colonial legislation ‘gave extensive powers to government 
boards to subject recalcitrant growers to criminal sanctions for failure to 
comply with government seed growing, marketing and other policies.’80
1:2:2 Freedom of movement and vagrancy laws
Inevitably people started drifting to settlers' plantations and towns to 
work for money. This was precipitated among other factors by the Africans’ 
search for means which would enable them enter the newly introduced cash 
economy. Also, following the introduction of European goods life in the 
towns was very attractive and much better compared to rural life in terms of 
infrastructure like electricity, running water, roads and leisure activities. The 
drift of Africans from the countryside to the towns was very alarming and it 
raised the colonial officials’ concern, since towns were not developed enough
77LOUISE, C. S., p. 73.
78SHIVJI, I. G., (1982), pp. 41-43.
79For example, Cotton Ordinance 1920 (Cap. 362), Native Coffee (Control and Marketing) Ordinance 
1937, Native Tobacco (Control and Marketing) Ordinance 1940.
80WILLIAMS, D., (1973), p. 109.
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to offer sufficient opportunities for the big number of job seekers from rural 
areas. As a result there developed a crisis of urban unemployment in major 
Tanganyika townships beyond the expectations of the colonial government. 
Again the British used the law to alleviate a problem which they had created 
for themselves.
The early British colonial state found a solution for these problems by 
enacting the Destitute Persons Ordinance, 1923.81 Interesting is the definition 
of a destitute person as defined under the Ordinance. Any person who lived in 
the township ‘without employment' and was unable to show that he had 'visible 
and sufficient means of subsistence’82 was a destitute. The law gave discretion 
to the magistrates to order the detention of such people in police custody as 
remandees while work was being found for them, or to return them to their 
place of origin.83 This was not a solution to the crisis as young men vacated the 
rural areas and flocked into the towns in large numbers. It was difficult to 
move freely in the territory without being harassed by the police and in some 
places like Dar Es Salaam barriers were fixed at every main entrance to the 
city where everyone from the hinterland was required to present a movement 
permit issued by his local authority. Failure by the natives to produce these 
necessary credentials on demand at the check points, enabled the inspectors 
to refuse them entry to the city and the people nicknamed the check points 
Lango la Jiji.u
Because of joblessness many of the young men in townships engaged 
themselves in crimes like stealing, drinking liquor and different kinds of 
hooliganism, hence the Townships (Removal of Undesirable Persons) 
Ordinance, 1944.85 Under this legislation the Area Commissioner was given 
power to order any undesirable person to leave the town or any other area and
81Cap. 41.
82section 2.
83 Section 3.
84Swaliili phrase meaning ‘Main gate to the city’.
85Cap. 104.
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proceed to such place as the order might require him.86 Such an order could be 
issued where a person had no regular employment or other reputable means of 
a livelihood or where he had been convicted of an offence against property 
(theft) or liquor intoxication. Thus scores of unemployed were rounded up and 
some taken to work in the settlers' plantations. What is interesting is the way 
the Ordinance allowed arrests without warrant and the detention of suspects 
for a month pending inquiries by the Area Commissioner87
The colonial government considered repatriation the best way of 
dealing with the influx into towns of uneducated young men.88 The critics 
describe it as ‘a great folly and an act of desperation to believe that social and 
economic problems like unemployment could be solved by criminalising 
them.’89 Both pieces of legislation90 famously known as ‘vagrancy laws’ 
interfered with the freedom of movement and residence of the individuals and 
they allowed the detention of suspects without trial.
1:2:3 Inhuman and degrading treatment
Although they were harsh, punishments like imprisonment and the 
payment of fines were considered by the colonial government as inadequate to 
discipline the native. Thus the Corporal Punishment Ordinance, 193091 was 
enacted. This was a most oppressive piece of legislation and it reminded the 
people of the bad German days when a man could be flogged for anything. 
Under the Ordinance anybody, excluding females and adult males more than 
forty-five years old,92 could be flogged on his bare buttocks in execution of the 
punishment pronounced by the court. It was institutionalised violence whereby 
one man was authorised by law to inflict physical violence on another and it
86Ibid., section 3.
87Ibid., section 7(1).
88LUGALLA, J. L., p. 136.
89LEGAL AID COMMITTEE, p. 74.
90Cap. 41 and Cap. 104.
91Cap. 17.
92Ibid., section 8.
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was aimed at instilling fear among the natives. Since then courts have 
frequently sentenced convicts to suffer a number of strokes over and above 
other retributive punishments93.
1:2:4 Detention and deportation without trial
The Governor passed laws giving himself enormous powers to deal 
with anybody whom he considered to threaten the security of his regime. 
Under the Deportation Ordinance, 1921,94 the Governor could deport any 
person, whom he considered to conduct himself in a manner that endangered 
peace and good order, from one place to another within the territory.95 This 
legislation attempted to silence the would-be dissidents. Most interesting was 
the ouster clause that any order made under that Ordinance could not be 
subject of inquiry or challenge in any court of law and that the person awaiting 
deportation would be detained in custody or prison until a fit opportunity for 
his deportation occurred.96 Similar powers were vested in the Governor by the 
Expulsion of Undesirables Ordinance, 193097 which contained similar ouster 
clauses as to the court’s jurisdiction over any order made under that 
Ordinance.98 The Governor could use that piece of legislation to expel, with 
similar consequences as in Cap. 38, a person who prejudiced public morals.
1:2:5 Arbitrary punishments
Perhaps one of the most unreasonable and authoritarian pieces of 
colonial legislation was the Collective Punishment Ordinance, 192199 which 
gave power to the Governor to hold responsible and punish the whole village, 
tribe or sub-tribe for a crime committed within the boundaries of their
93In chapter five we examine corporal punishment against the Tanzanian Bill of Rights.
94Cap. 38.
95 Section 2.
96Section 5.
"Cap. 39.
"Section 20.
"Cap. 74.
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village.100 Here the Governor was given power to hold every villager 
responsible for a crime whose perpetrator could not be discovered. It was 
against two well-established principles of criminal justice that ones’ guilt has 
to be established beyond reasonable doubt before he can be made to suffer for 
it; and that the punishment should be directed to the offender only since a man 
should only ‘suffer or be punished directly either in person or in property for 
some wrong which he has done himself.’101 To make matters worse such 
punishment under the Ordinance was not appealable.102
1:2:6 Government revenue and forced labour
Another example of oppressive legislation was the Hut and Poll Tax 
Ordinance, 1922103 that applied to natives. The system was introduced by the 
Germans104 and because it was also in conformity with the British colonial 
state's interests they carried it forward and developed it when they took over. 
Any owner or occupier of ‘any building, or structure of a description 
commonly used by natives as dwelling’105 was required under the Ordinance to 
pay tax to His Majesty. As for polygamous men, they were under obligation to 
pay tax for every hut occupied by each of their wives and they were inevitably 
forced to put together all their wives in one hut in order to avoid hut tax. 
However, this was responded to by the colonial state through amending the 
law and putting a tax on each wife even if all lived in one house.106 Following 
these amendments the hut tax assumed a different character and began to look 
more like a "women’s tax" than anything else.
100Section 2.
101See Gwao Bin Kilimo v. Kisunda Bin Ifuti (1921-1952) 1 T.L.R. (R) 403 at p. 405.
102Cap. 74, section 7.
103No. 22 of 1922.
104By the Taxation Ordinance, 1897.
105Definition of a ‘hut’, vide the Hut and Poll Tax Ordinance 1922, section 2.
106Ibid., section 3.
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Any failure to comply with this piece of legislation attracted a sentence 
of three months in jail.107 The mandatory legal obligation imposed on 
polygamous households and every able-bodied native of sixteen years or more 
who owned no hut108 shows that taxation of the native by the colonial 
government was essentially aimed at something else other than raising 
government revenue. The motive behind hut tax can be found in a comment by 
one of the East African Protectorate Governors, Sir Percy Girouard who was 
quoted saying:
‘We consider that taxation is the only possible method 
of compelling the native to leave his reserve for the 
purpose of seeking work. Only in this way can the 
cost of living be increased for the native...and it is on 
this that the supply of labour and the price of labour 
depends .’109
In these circumstances, migrant labour or Manamba110 became an 
inevitable result of the Hut and Poll Tax. For example, it is argued that 
because of the Hut and Poll Tax the proportion of Bena tax payers absent from 
home rose between 1926 and 1945 from 20 to 40 percent.111 The migration 
was traumatic and accompanied by all kinds of difficulties, as Shivji amply 
explains:
“They travelled on foot or packed like cattle in 
railway wagons or motor lorries, braving the harsh 
climate and hostile environment, rarely with full 
stomachs and often without shelter. On the way some 
would work a few days for food, others would spend a 
few days either in the tick-infested huts of the rest 
camps or in dispensaries convalescing and finally
107Ibid., section 9 (1).
108The Hut and Poll Tax Ordinance, section 4.
109SHIVJI, I. G., (1982), p. 43. See also SHIVJI, I. G., (1975), at p. 32.
ll0Common Swahili word for migrants meaning 'number' in that immigrant labourers were identified 
at work by their respective numbers.
m ILIFFE, J.,p. 305.
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arrive at their destination starving, emaciated and 
most probably disease-ridden.”112
Indeed as Coldham observed ‘it was, perhaps, the introduction of 
taxation more than any other measure, that ultimately dictated the ways in 
which African societies would develop.’113 However, there was a general 
reluctance to move permanently into cash-crop production or into wage 
employment. Even with the introduction of taxation, people went to the 
plantations just to earn enough to meet the states’ demands and then they 
returned home.
The colonial courts were very much relied on by the government to 
implement the policy laid down under the provisions of the Hut and Poll Tax 
Ordinance by sending defaulters to jail or ordering them to effect payment by 
offering labour to any authorised public works projects in lieu.114 Tax 
defaulters had to engage in this kind of forced labour for a number of days at 
the current rate of wages in order to discharge their tax obligation.115 It is said 
that in Tanganyika in 1948 some 3,423 natives discharged their tax dues in this 
way.116 Usually courts operate within the specified limits of territorial 
jurisdiction but in all matters connected with the payment or non-payment of 
tax there were no territorial limitations on the jurisdiction of the court. Thus 
arrears of tax were recoverable with costs in the Magistrates courts which were 
vested with power to try such cases whether they were within or outside their 
local limits of jurisdiction.117 In the case of a delay over six months in 
discharging tax liability the court had the discretion to increase the sum by 10 
per cent of the arrears.118 The court behaved as an instrument of terror and it
112SHIVJI, I. G., (1982), p. 45.
113COLDHAM, S., (1972), p. 10. Quoted also in LOUISE, C. S., pp. 64-65.
114For 1935 statistics on labour in lieu of tax see SHIVJI, I. G., (1982), p. 46.
115It is said that each tax defaulter providing labour in lieu of cash worked an average of thirty six 
days.
116THE AFRICAN STUDIES BRANCH, p. 34.
117Ibid.
118Usually such arrears would be recovered by distress on property through the court order.
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was very much feared by the natives because of the severity of punishments 
imposed for non-payment of tax.
Non-natives and natives who worked as agents of indirect rule like 
chiefs and Liwalis together with members of the police and armed forces were 
exempted from the application of this Ordinance. These were salaried 
employees used by the government to collect tax by forceful means. The 
exemption to pay tax accorded to them reinforced the view that the Ordinance 
was a legal mechanism designed to obtain cheap labour for the colonial state.
Most interesting was the government's reliance in the use of penal 
sanctions to control the otherwise civil contractual relationship between 
master and servant and the positivist application of such law by the court. In 
many cases the court proved to be one of the key institutions in the 
administration of the colonial state since it enforced all colonial legislation 
without looking into its oppressive character. The Master and Native Servant 
Ordinance, 1923 regulated the relationship between master and servant and it 
applied only to natives119 as a targeted group. The Ordinance is remembered 
for its catalogue of penal sanctions against any native labourer who in any way 
behaved in a manner likely to frustrate the colonial ambition for cheap labour. 
Quite a large number of natives suffered the consequences.120
It should be noted that although the Master and Native Servant 
Ordinance provided for punishment for offences committed by employers in 
their relationship with servants, very few were penalised by the court. The 
penalties attached were very lenient and ranged between small fines and 
several months of imprisonment in default. The High Court would always 
search for means to exonerate the otherwise guilty employer. In Drossopoulos 
v. Rex121 the High Court relied on simple technicality to release the employer. 
The Greek employer was charged and convicted by the lower court of an
119Master and Native Servant Ordinance, No, 23 of 1923, section 2.
I20por statistics of convictions under the Ordinance see SHIVJI, I. G., (1982), p. 53.
121(1921-1952) T.L.R. (R) 175.
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offence of withholding wages of his labourers.122 In his defence the accused 
person alleged that he had no money to pay those labourers at that time but he 
expected shortly to get some money as a result of the sale of his cotton. The 
trial magistrate was not convinced by the accused person’s promise to pay his 
labourers out of prospective proceeds. On appeal against conviction the High 
Court allowed the appeal on grounds that if the employer had no funds to pay 
his labourers he could not be said to have ‘withheld’ wages.
Such leniency could not be experienced whenever a native promised to 
pay his tax liability after selling his crops or obtaining money from his debtor. 
This interpretation shocked even the colonial government itself. As a result the 
law was amended to penalise the employer who failed to pay wages to his 
labourers, by replacing the phrase ‘withholding wages’ with ‘failure to pay 
wages.’123 The Ordinance remained in operation from 1923 until 1957 when 
the Employment Ordinance, 1955124 came into force to deal with the increase 
in workers’ collective actions like strikes and demonstrations.
1:2:6 Freedom of association and trade unionism
In order to control all political activities which were increasingly 
becoming widespread after the Second World War, the colonial government 
enacted the Societies Ordinance, 1954.125 Under the Ordinance all local 
societies were required to be registered126 and the Governor in his absolute 
discretion could declare any such societies unlawful if he considered it 
essential in the public interest.127 A society so declared unlawful by the 
Governor suffered de-registration as it was stripped of its legal personality. 
This was one of the colonial government’s method of silencing the political
122Under section 47 (a) of the Ordinance.
123See Ordinance No. 35 of 1931.
124Cap. 333.
125Cap. 337.
126Ibid., section 7.
127Ibid., section 6.
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parties that demanded self-determination. Also, the colonial government used 
its discretion under the Societies Ordinance to reject any application for 
registration128 thereby making it impossible for a particular society or political 
party to carry out its activities. Similarly trade unionism was curtailed by the 
enactment of the Trade Union Ordinance129 whose restrictive prerequisites 
were not different from those imposed by the Societies Ordinance. In this 
environment, the formation and survival of trade unions were made very 
difficult.
1:3 Interpretation of the law by the colonial judiciary
Over and above the positivist judicial interpretation of the laws most of 
such laws enacted in the period under study contained an ouster clause of one 
form or another.130 This could potentially deny even a progressive judge a 
place in the process. It all depended on the attitude of the judge to such ouster 
clauses.
The courts adopted a passive attitude towards oppressive and 
authoritarian pieces of legislation. They found refuge in conservatism and self- 
restraint for fear of encroaching on the legislative domain. The colonial 
judiciary therefore was excessively positivist in its adherence to the deeply- 
embedded tradition of the English judiciary that judges do not make the law 
but they merely apply it. Robert Seidman points this out while assessing the 
colonial judges’ performance:
“Judges trained from their professional infancy that 
courts not only do not, but ought not to make policy 
judgements - even when in fact they cannot avoid so 
doing - will snatch at any pre-existing rule available in
128Cap. 337, sections 6 and 8.
129Cap. 381.
130For example the Deportation Ordinance, section 5; the Collective Punishment Ordinance, section 
7; the Expulsion of Undesirables Ordinance, section 20. They provided that any order made under 
the Ordinances could not be subject to inquiry in any court of law.
39
preference to violating their most deeply-held 
professional commitment. It was but to be expected 
that judges so trained would find a refuge in the 
current English decisions, which they could safely 
follow upon the ground that they were binding upon 
them.”131
It was in this context that Wilson, J., in the case of Mohammed Juma v. 
Rex132 gave a warning to magistrates who attempted to go beyond what the 
statute itself stated.133 Such magistrates in the judgement of Wilson, J., were 
unjustifiably questioning the wisdom of the legislature. In his own words:
“The magistrate may not agree with the wisdom of 
that, but his duty is to administer the law as he finds it 
and not attempt to override the clearly expressed 
intention of the legislature...”134
Whether the law was oppressive, or in violation of cherished English 
principles of administration of justice, the court was under instructions to 
apply the law as it was and leave it for the law-making bodies to repeal or 
amend. Because of judicial restraint people’s rights as well as justice itself 
were at stake and the most oppressive colonial legislation remained 
unchallenged.
In Rajabali Ganda v. Township Authority o f  Dar es Salaam135 the 
appeal was dismissed simply because the law stated it clearly that no appeal 
should lie in such circumstances. The appellant was aggrieved by the Resident 
Magistrate's order prohibiting him to use the premises as a dwelling house
131SEIDMAN, R. B.,p. 62.
132(1921-1952) 1 T.L.R. (R) 257.
133The magistrate had sentenced the appellant to pay Shs. 250/= or serve imprisonment for three 
months for having illegally tapped the palm trees contrary to section 32 (1) and 41 of the Native 
Liquor Ordinance, 1924 (Cap. 77). The fine penalty was too big for the appellant to pay and the 
trial magistrate was aware of it but he issued such a severe sentence to deter further commission of 
such offence. This is what the judge regarded as questioning the wisdom of the legislature which 
had provided that substantive imprisonment should only be awarded for subsequent offence of that 
kind. The fine was reduced to Shs. 75/= or two months imprisonment
^M oham m ed Juma v. Rex, op cit., at p. 258.
135(1921-1952) 1 T.L.R. (R) 189.
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since they lacked sanitary facilities. The magistrate had acted upon a letter sent 
to him by the Township Authority and, without giving chance to the applicant 
to defend himself, proceeded to grant the order as requested by the Township 
Authority. The appellant challenged the magistrate's order for being made 
without giving him an opportunity to show cause.
Indeed it was contrary to the principles of natural justice as undoubtedly 
was well known to the judge, for the Resident Magistrate to condemn the 
appellant unheard. After carefully selecting two English decisions136 to 
support his findings, Gower, J., dismissed the appeal simply because the law 
did not allow any appeal against the decision of the Township Authority. He 
forgot that he was presiding over a court of justice and not only the court of 
law when he remarked thus:
“It is well settled that a right of appeal from any 
tribunal must be given by statute or similar 
authority”137
A similar positivist approach was taken by the judge in the case of 
Bhag Singh v. Rexu % when he defended the practice by District 
Commissioners functioning as magistrates and at the same time being officers 
in charge of Police in the Districts. The accused person applied to the High 
Court for transfer of his case from Loliondo Subordinate Court that was 
presided over by a District Officer to the Resident Magistrate Court in Arusha. 
The main ground in his application was that the same District Officer who had 
taken part in the investigation of the case in his capacity as a person in charge 
of the police in the district could not fairly and impartially try the accused 
person. Wilson, J., referred to a particular section of the Police Ordinance,
136In Sandbank Charity Trustees v. North Staffordshire Railway Company 3 Q.B.D. 1 at p. 4, 
Bramwell, L. J., held that an appeal does not exist in the nature of things; a right of appeal from 
any decision of any tribunal must be given by express enactment. See also Attorney-General v. 
Sillem, 10 H.L.C; 138 E.R. 382.
137Rajabali Ganda v. Township Authority o f  Dar Es Salaam (1921-1952) 1T.L.R. (R) 189 atp. 190.
138(1921-1952) 1 T.L.R. (R) 133.
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1937 that made the District Officer in charge of police in the district and 
picked the proviso to that section which spelled that nothing in the Police 
Ordinance should be deemed to render such an officer a police. He concluded 
that:
“While section 7 (3) makes a District Commissioner 
an officer in charge of Police it does not make him a 
Police Officer”139
The judge could not take trouble to examine the validity and effect of 
the enabling provision of law but he simply took the plain meaning of the 
proviso to the section and dismissed the application.
Adherence to some of the English principles governing the 
administration of justice was found at the High Court which was the only 
judicial institution entirely constituted of trained judges. The white 
administrative officers and cadet officers who discharged judicial functions as 
magistrates in subordinate courts were ignorant of even the basic principles of 
justice. They were usually motivated by the desire to promote the state 
interests rather than to do justice.
Occasionally the High Court revised the subordinate courts’ decisions,
quashing and setting them aside for having attached too much emphasis to
government policy at the expense of justice. For example in Rex v. Sokoni Bin
Chinyanga and Others140 the accused persons were convicted by the
subordinate court for having deserted work when the employer cut off food
supply unless they completed the work. The High Court had to quash the
decision of the lower court on the ground that, among others, it was practically
impossible for the labourers to perform work while hungry. It was the decision
of the District Commissioner in his capacity as the first class magistrate that
was quashed by the High Court. The District Commissioner’s decision came in
139Ibid., at p. 135.
140(1921-1952) 1 T.L.R. (R) 3.
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the wake of desertions from work and strikes following the workers’ 
mistreatment by their employers. Desertion had adversely affected the settlers’ 
agricultural industry which entirely depended on natives’ cheap labour. In 
order to check such desertions and provide a lesson to the rest the District 
Officer used his judicial powers to convict the natives.
In some instances the subordinate courts’ officers confused judicial 
functions to administrative functions in their districts. The confusion 
developed to the extent that some officers conducted court sessions on 
Sundays,141 the dies non juridicus. Such decisions were quashed by the High 
Court. This is clear evidence of the injustices occasioned by a system of non­
separation of powers in subordinate courts and the importance of High Court 
supervision. We can now imagine the injustices in the native courts which 
were also presided over by administrative officers but were not under High 
Court supervision.
1:4 Conclusions
This chapter sought to analyse the administration of justice during the 
colonial period. We saw how the unprecedented opposition the colonialists 
experienced from the colonised posed a big challenge to the administration of 
the colony. Use of force and discriminatory harsh laws were resorted to so as 
to enable the governments achieve their objectives regardless of their adverse 
effects on the people.
The foregoing examination of colonial administration and the entire 
justice process shows that human rights were not part of the colonial agenda. 
Everything was done to make sure that the judiciary was protecting the 
colonialist interests. Interesting is how the judiciary interpreted the oppressive 
colonial laws. Nevertheless in some instances the High Court through its 
supervisory role over subordinate courts acted as a check to the injustices
141 See Bhag Singh case.
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occasioned by the double functions of the colonial administrative officers cum 
judicial officers. However, wide use of ouster clauses by the colonial 
government precluded the court from taking an active role, and a great number 
of judges took a conservative attitude to interpretation of legislation. Many 
injustices remained unchecked in the native courts since these courts 
functioned as administrative institutions responsible for enforcing indirect rule 
and not as ordinary courts of law.
The absence of trained judicial staff, the non-separation of powers 
between the judiciary and the executive, and the importance of political 
considerations in the judicial process contributed enormously to the 
unsatisfactory nature of the lower courts. Thus given the court structure, the 
nature of the colonial state, the motive behind colonialism it was virtually 
impossible for the courts to protect human rights.
The development of colonial legislation as illustrated above indicates 
how authoritarian and oppressive the colonial state was. The methods used by 
the colonial government formed part of the colonial legacy and have 
significantly influenced the post-independence government.142
142See the discussion in chapters two and three.
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PART TWO: POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD (1961-19851
CHAPTER TWO
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
This chapter examines the performance of the post-colonial government 
in relation to human rights and how the Constitution was manipulated to 
restrict popular attempts to limit the power of the executive. For almost thirty 
years since independence the idea of having a Bill of Rights enshrined in the 
Constitution was successfully resisted by the government. Official arrogance, 
authoritarianism, and the unrestricted violations of fundamental rights and 
freedoms were defended by reference to economic progress143 or 
e developmentalism. ’144 It is intended in this chapter to illustrate how the 
government dealt with the issue of fundamental rights by providing ineffective 
alternatives to the Bill of Rights.
We shall examine the extent this policy was supported by the post­
independence judiciary that was staffed with judges whose majority, like their 
colonial predecessors, were positivist and conservative. It is our argument that 
apart from structural changes and the removal of racial tendencies in the set-up 
of the court system, the post-independence judiciary remained ineffective 
when confronted by common infringements of human rights by the executive.
2:1 The Independence Constitution.
The Independence Constitution was preceded by two important pieces 
of legislation. The first one was the Tanganyika Independence Act, 1961 by
143KIBWANA, K., pp. 43-57. See also McCHESNEY, A., pp. 163-205 and MWAIKUSA, J. T., 
(1990), pp. 75-105.
144A term referred in SHIVJI, I. G., (1985) and McCHESNEY, A., p. 175, to represent desire for 
urgent economic development at the expense of individual rights.
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which the United Kingdom Parliament abrogated its previous rights to 
legislate for Tanganyika. All legislative powers were vested in the independent 
Tanganyika Parliament. However, the Act imposed on the legislature a 
requirement not to repeal, amend or modify the new Constitution, ‘otherwise 
than as might be permitted under the Constitution itself.’145 To some extent, 
the power to amend or modify the Constitution was limited by the Act in 
order to bring about certainty, the basic character of any Constitution.
A few days after the enactment of the Independence Act, 1961 there 
followed the Tanganyika (Constitution) Order in Council, 1961 making 
provision for a new Constitution for the independent Tanganyika. This 
particular Order in Council ‘revoked all existing Constitutional Orders in 
Council’146 and prescribed in their place the various matters set out in the 
second schedule which bore the title “The Constitution of Tanganyika”147 
otherwise known as the Independence Constitution or Dominion Constitution.
It should be noted that upon attaining independence, the nationalist 
governments which acceded to power in all British colonies in Africa were to 
operate within a framework provided by the Constitutions, agreed upon by 
both sides. This meant that the independence of any particular British colony, 
Tanganyika not being an exception, was always preceded by constitutional 
negotiations between nationalist leaders on the one side and the departing 
colonial master on the other. The British made it compulsory for the majority 
of its colonies at independence to include in their Independence Constitutions 
provisions limiting the powers of the government and introducing an 
enforceable Bill of Rights which safeguarded human rights and freedoms.148 
These Constitutions were drafted in England but unlike other British colonies, 
the Tanganyika Independence Constitution had no Bill of Rights.149
145 See paragraph 5 of Schedule One to the Independence Act, 1961.
146See Tanganyika (Constitution) Order in Council, 1961, section 2.
147COLE, J. R., and DENISON, W. N., p. 14.
148READ, J. S., (1979 B), p. 160.
149READ, J. S., (1973 A), p. 41.
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In most unusual circumstances the nationalist leaders persuaded the 
British government not to include a Bill of Rights in the Tanganyika 
Independence Constitution. Actually ‘through all the major amendments of the 
constitution, the ruling Party and government leadership doggedly maintained 
its stand until 1984.'150 There were two main reasons behind this refusal. First, 
that a Bill of Rights would have hindered the government's 'dynamic plans for 
economic development1 whose implementation needed revolutionary changes 
in the social structure. Second that the judiciary was still staffed by expatriates 
- mainly whites engaged by the former colonial government.151 Judges were 
suspected of taking advantage of the Bill of Rights, should it be enshrined in 
the Constitution, to frustrate the new government by declaring many of its 
actions illegal.
We can rightly conclude that the absence of a Bill of Rights in the 
Constitution was not an accident, but, in fact, was the actual policy of the 
independence government. This is supported by Rashid Kawawa of TANU 
who told the National Assembly that a Bill of Rights would invite conflicts 
which the leaders could hardly entertain.152 Instead of a Bill of Rights there 
was a token reference to rights in the Constitution's preamble.
Under the Independence Constitution the chief executive was the 
Governor-General appointed by Her Majesty the Queen as her representative 
in Tanganyika.153 The Constitution established a cabinet of ministers charged 
with a duty to advise the Governor-General.154 The said Governor-General 
was bound by the advice given to him by the Cabinet, or a minister acting 
under the general authority of the Cabinet.155 This was a very important
150SHIVJI, I. G., (1987), p. 130.
151See MARTIN, R., pp. 40-41. See also Proposals o f  the Tanganyika Government for a Republic, 
Government Paper No. 1 of 1962 which is partly reproduced in FRANCK, T. M., p. 96; Report o f  
the Presidential Commission on the Establishment o f a Democratic One-Party State, Dar Es 
Salaam: Government Printer, 1965, pp. 30-31; COLE, J. R., and DENISON, W. N., p. 113.
152See Parliamentary Debates, Hansard, 1962, p. 1088.
153 Section 11.
154Section 43.
155Section 46.
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safeguard and limitation on the Governor-General’s powers under the
Constitution. He was, in effect, a ‘symbolic head of state’.
A Parliament was established consisting of Her Majesty through her 
representative and a National Assembly to discharge legislative functions.156 It 
was vested with power ‘to make laws for the peace, order and good 
government of Tanganyika.’157 Members of the National Assembly were to be 
elected or nominated. For the first time the Legislature was given a semblance 
of popular representation, unlike during the colonial period when members of 
the Legislative Council were appointed by the Governor in a racially-exclusive 
manner. However, there was one unsatisfactory requirement regarding elected 
members of the National Assembly. This was in relation to the candidates' 
qualification. Only citizens of Tanganyika who were twenty-one years old or 
above and who were 'able to speak, and to read the English language with a 
degree of proficiency sufficient to enable them to take an active part in the 
proceedings'158 qualified for election to the National Assembly. Naturally, 
most of the indigenous population were denied the opportunity to contest 
these positions because of the language barrier. Most of those who qualified 
therefore, were Tanganyikans of Asian and European origin.
Under the terms of the Independence Constitution the High Court 
ceased to be Her Majesty’s High Court159 and by their appointment judges 
were no longer Her Majesty’s Judges.160 Apart from puisne judges appointed 
by the Governor-General acting in accordance with the advice of the Judicial 
Service Commission,161 for the first time the Independence Constitution 
provided security of tenure for all judges.162 This aimed at promoting the 
independence of the judiciary which had been previously curtailed by the fact
156Section 14.
157Section 29.
158Section 18. See also section 19 for a list of those who were disqualified.
159Tanganyika (Constitution) Order in Council, 1961 section 8.
160Independence Constitution, sections 58 and 59.
161 Ibid., section 59 (2).
162Ibid., section 60.
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that judges during colonial period held their office at the pleasure of the 
Crown. During the colonial period judicial office was as insecure as that of 
other servants of the Crown whose employment could be terminated any time.
In a bid to increase judicial confidence and the promotion of justice, 
the Independence Constitution fixed the retirement age at sixty-two, but with 
the possibility of extension to sixty-five. However, a judge could be removed 
from office if  he was unable to perform his functions either because of bodily 
infirmity or due to misbehaviour. A strict procedure for the removal of a judge 
from office was also laid down.163 The Constitution placed the initiative to 
remove a judge from office upon the Prime Minister, the only person who 
could set the legal machinery in motion by representing to the Governor- 
General that the possible removal of a judge from office should be 
investigated.164 The Governor-General would then appoint a tribunal 
consisting of judges from the Commonwealth to investigate the matter and 
recommend to him whether it should be referred by Her Majesty to the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council. If after such reference the Judicial Committee 
was of the opinion that the judge should be removed because of inability or 
misbehaviour then the Governor-General had to remove the judge from office.
It should be noted that in the whole process of removal of a judge from 
office the Prime Minister played a major role in that neither the Governor- 
General nor the Chief Justice could talce steps to have a judge removed from 
office.
The Independence Constitution established a Judicial Service 
Commission consisting of the Chief Justice, the Chairman of the Public 
Service Commission and one puisne judge charged with the appointment, 
removal and discipline of the holders of certain judicial or quasi-judicial 
posts below the level of a puisne judge.165 Previously, this function could only
163Ibid., section 60 (4) - (7).
164Ibid., section 60 (5)
165COLE, J. R., and DENISON, W. N., p. 23. See also section 65.
be discharged by the Governor. Therefore, the Independence Constitution 
removed the injustices perpetrated by the colonial legal system which had 
never been based on the doctrine of separation of powers and the 
independence of the judiciary.
The nationalist leaders were not comfortable with this Westminster- 
style Constitution. They described it as the Dominion Constitution because it 
preserved, for the most part, the influence of the Crown over the otherwise 
independent state of Tanganyika. It was the nationalist government’s proposal 
for a Republican Constitution which marked a dramatic separation from the 
British power and provided for the complete independence of Tanganyika. 
The people of Tanganyika expected the independence government to provide 
better general administration, better justice and the restoration of long-lost 
rights and freedoms.
Essentially, the Republican Constitution transferred the sovereignty 
from the Crown and permanently vested the power of the government in the 
elected head of state, the President. After substituting a President for the 
Governor-General and Queen the Republican Constitution went on to vest 
enormous powers in the President. It was later acknowledged by President 
Nyerere during an interview with a BBC correspondent that these powers were 
sufficient to provide for a dictatorship.166 Indeed, the Republican Constitution 
of 1962 created a very strong President with wide executive powers. As head 
of state and commander of the Armed Forces, in exercising his powers the 
President was not obliged to follow the advice of any person or body.167 This 
was in sharp contrast with the Independence Constitution,168 which, as a 
safeguard against authoritarianism, made it mandatory for the Governor- 
General to act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet. With regard to the
166MWAKYEMBE, H. G., and RUSEMA, T. K., p. 73. See also SHIVJI, I. G., (1981), p. 20.
167Republican Constitution, 1962, section 3.
168Section 46 (1).
50
appointment and control of judicial officers there were no significant changes 
under the new Constitution.
Again, in the Republican Constitution a Bill of Rights was not included. 
Some of the reasons advanced for the exclusion of such a Bill in the 
Independence Constitution were repeated and that it was enough to preserve 
rule of law by providing for security of judges' tenure.169 The government 
proposed some more other changes in the Republican Constitution regarding 
the appointment of judicial officers that:
"In future, judges o f  the High Court should be 
appointed by the President... after consultation with 
the Chief Justice. The power to appoint Resident 
Magistrates and other judicial officers working under 
the jurisdiction of the High Court should also be 
vested in the President. In the case of these 
appointments, the Judicial Service Commission 
should act in advisory capacity to the President unless 
the President, in respect of any appointment or class 
of appointment, has delegated his function to the 
Commission."170
Arguably the Government misconceived the idea of an independent 
judiciary. In their minds, security of tenure was enough to preserve the 
independence of the judiciary. The Government could not appreciate the fact 
that an independent judiciary must be placed in an environment suitable for it 
to dispense justice without fear or favour and free from pressure or influence 
of any kind. A judiciary without these attributes may open up the law to 
ridicule.
Also, the mechanism for judicial appointments has a great impact on 
attempting to provide for an independent judiciary. Vesting these powers in 
the executive makes it difficult for the judiciary to be independent. It should be
169See the Government Paper No. 1 of 1962, Government Printer, Dar Es Salaam, 1962, p. 6. See also 
COLE, J. R., and DENISON, W. N., pp. 113-114.
170Ibid.
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noted that the Governor-General was required to act in accordance with the 
advice of the Judicial Service Commission when appointing puisne judges. 
This was not the case under the Republican Constitution that vested in the 
President the power to appoint judges after consultation with the Chief Justice. 
However, under this Constitution the President was not necessarily required to 
act in accordance with the advice of the Chief Justice. No wonder that in some 
instances the Chief Justice was not consulted at all when the President 
appointed judges. Although the judges seemed to enjoy security of tenure, they 
were likely to act in a manner which would not offend the appointing authority 
and this defeated the idea of an independent judiciary.
Even this security of tenure, which is a common feature in modem 
constitutions, has not guaranteed retention of office in Tanzania whenever the 
powerful executive decided to remove a judge. There have been a number of 
attempts by the executive in Tanzania to interfere with judges’ security of 
tenure by way of assigning them to new administrative duties not related to 
adjudication.171 Fimbo warns that such practices have the effect of seriously 
undermining the independence of a judge if they are made without full 
consultation and the consent of the judge in question.172 It is our submission 
that whether or not such practices are done with consent of the responsible 
judge the effect of undermining the independence of the judiciary remain 
intact.
Two more Constitutions followed: the Interim Constitution of 
Tanzania, 1965 after the formation of Tanzania,173 and the Constitution of the 
United Republic of Tanzania, 1977. Most interesting is the period during 
which Tanzania remained under the Interim Constitution and which made
171For example Justice Julie Manning was given Ambassadorial duties abroad and in another 
incident the late Justice of Appeal Mwakasendo was appointed Chief Corporation Counsel of the 
Tanzania Legal Corporation. Also Justice Patel was assigned to the Tanzanian High Commission 
in India.
172 FIMBO, G. M., (1989), p 237.
173The union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1964, formed Tanzania.
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some critics question whether it was a permanent Constitution.174 During that 
period the constitution was amended so much that it looked like a dress with 
patches of different colours. The amendment exercise continued haphazardly 
even after 1977. Indeed, it was during that period that infringements of 
individual rights by the government were the order of the day.
To the State, the High Court was the only court which deserved a 
conducive environment for the operation and promotion of the independence 
of the judiciary. By ‘conducive environment’ we refer to, among other factors, 
security of personal emoluments which was accorded to only High Court 
Judges by placing their salaries, allowances, pension and gratuity in the 
Consolidated Fund of the United Republic.175 Furthermore, under the 
Constitution the judge’s salary could not be altered anyhow to his 
disadvantage.176 The junior judicial officers such as magistrates who worked in 
the courts subordinate to the High Court were not, and have never been, 
similarly treated although they are the ones who are closer and more easily 
accessible to the people and, therefore, attending to more cases than the High 
Court judges. Furthermore, these were the courts where miscarriages of justice 
as well as executive abuses were most likely to appear177 if  a conducive 
environment was not provided. That to some extent explains the incidents of 
injustices and complaints against the performance of these lower courts. It is in 
this context that Mwakyembe observes that ‘subordinate judicial officers are 
denied of the facilities and benefits commensurate to their heavy and sensitive 
job, and end up being effective administrators of corruption and not justice’.178
174Tanzania was under the Interim Constitution from 1965-1977.
175Interim Constitution of Tanzania, 1965, section 77.
176Ibid., section 77 (3).
177See for example James Bita v. Idd Kambi, 1979 L.R.T. No. 9. For a discussion about the executive 
manipulation of justice and their influence to Subordinate Courts, see PETER, C. M., (1977).
178MWAKYEMBE, H. G., (1995), pp. 137-138.
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2:2 The Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a Democratic
One Party-State.
At independence Tanganyika was a multi-party state with a supreme 
Parliament. The dominance of TANU in Tanganyika was significantly felt but 
still there were other political parties though they were young and weak. These 
included: the ANC, the UTP, and others such as the PDP, the PCP, the NEP, 
and the AMNUT. Some of these were formed immediately after 
independence.179 All these political parties came to be proscribed by the 
government of TANU and under pressure they disintegrated leaving TANU as 
the single political party in the country.180
As a result, TANU developed into a state party, and the sole political 
party in the country. Other political parties were suffocated through the 
intimidation of their respective leaders, some of whom were detained and 
deported, and their rights to register and to hold meetings were curtailed.181
In this way the path was paved for the declaration of a one-party 
political system. It all started with the National Executive Committee of 
TANU the ruling party. While conducting its proceedings in camera, the NEC 
passed a decision that Tanganyika should be a one-party state and authorised 
the President who was also TANU chairman to form a Commission to that 
effect.182 It is said that Nyerere was always the initiator and engineer of 
decisions which were passed by the NEC and this decision must have been 
Nyerere’s own strategy to stifle the political opposition in Tanzania. The 
Commission was charged with responsibility to seek views from the people 
and what the pre-determined policy of a one-party state should look like in a 
democratic state. Actually, the Commission members and the public at large 
had been forewarned by Nyerere that the decision to become a one-party state
179PETER, C. M., (1987), p. 243. See also MLIMUKA, A. IC., and KABUDI, P. J., p. 62, and the 
Nyalali Commission Report, Vol. l,pp. 15-30.
180About the Tanzanian government’s infringements of the right to associate and to form political 
parties see WELCH, C. E., pp. 639-656.
181PRATT, C.,p. 187.
182MSEKWA, P., p. 20.
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had already been taken by the Patty. Their duty was to comment on what type 
of one-party democratic state they would like for Nyerere had forewarned:
“I think I should emphasise that it is not the task of 
the Commission to consider whether Tanganyika 
should be a one-party state. The decision has already 
been taken. Their task is to say what kind of one-party 
state we should have in the context of our own 
national ethic and in accordance with the principles I 
have entrusted the Commission to observe,”183
Debate was therefore restricted. People had no say on what type of 
government they would like, one party or multi-party. The Commission came 
out with a report containing recommendations which marked the inauguration 
of authoritarianism by the state in Tanzania. Among the Commission’s 
recommendations which gained governmental support were alternatives to an 
enforceable Bill of Rights namely: placing a statement of ethical principles in 
the Interim Constitution in the form of a preamble, establishing the Permanent 
Commission of Enquiry and introducing the Leadership Code.
Arguably a Bill of Rights in the Constitution would have prevented a 
One-Party State from emerging, because that would have amounted to an 
infringement of the people’s right to form associations. Actually it is not easy 
to draw a line between the philosophies of one-party rule and authoritarianism 
since both practices impose restrictions on human liberty.
2:2:1 The Preamble to the Constitution.
As the Commission was asked by the President to recommend the best 
way of observing individual rights and the rule of law in a one-party state, the 
idea of human rights was reconsidered by the Commission. However, this was 
a mere formality.
183See the Report o f the Presidential Commission on the Establishment o f  a Democratic One-Party 
State, p. 2. See also NYERERE, J. K., p. 261.
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In its recommendations the Commission did not differ much from 
previous thinking in rejecting the idea of constitutional guarantees for the 
protection of individual fundamental rights by way of a Bill of Rights. The 
arguments against a Bill of Rights as contained in the recommendations of the 
Commission were not new. First, the Commission believed that a Bill of 
Rights would invite conflict between the Judiciary and the Executive and 
Legislature for the Bill would have overriding legislative effect. Second, it 
was feared that the government’s dynamic plans for economic development 
would be held up by the courts declaring such means of bringing about 
national economic development as unconstitutional. Thirdly it was also the 
Commission’s belief that the rights of the individual in any society depend 
more on the ethical sense of the people than in formal guarantees in the law.184 
However, it is notable, as Shivji observes, that the “sensitive” government and 
national ethics to which the Commission attached emphasis as the best means 
for protecting rights in lieu of an enforceable Bill of Rights did not exist in 
Tanzania.185
The Commission’s report raised more problems than it could solve. It is 
not clear why a government committed to act reasonably was resentful of the 
Bill of Rights. For a third time the Bill of Rights failed to secure a place in the 
country’s Constitution despite popular demands.186 Instead the Commission 
recommended that ‘a statement of the ethical principles which bind together 
leaders and people should be included in the new Constitution in the form of a 
preamble.’187 Indeed, the recommended statement of the ethical principles was 
included as the preamble to the Interim Constitution.188
184See the Report o f  the Presidential Commission on the Establishment o f a Democratic One-Party 
State, pp. 30-32.
185SHIVJ1,1. G., (1987), p. 130.
186Tanganyika Law Society proposed to the Commission that a Bill of Rights be included in the 
Constitution but the proposal was conveniently shelved.
187Report o f  the Presidential Commission on the Establishment o f  A Democratic One-Party State, op 
cit., p. 32.
188Act No. 43 of 1965.
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Today some people criticise the Commission for having allegedly 
misunderstood the terms of reference or invented its own, since it failed to 
appreciate the President’s primary concern over democratic governance.189 
These criticisms are directed at a wrong target. From the outset the 
Commission was warned by the President that it should operate within the 
confines of the terms of reference which embraced one-party policy as the 
founding principle. Already, individual rights had been infringed and yet the 
Commission was assigned to seek public opinion and recommend how 
individual fundamental rights could be respected under the One-Party policy. 
This was a contradiction in terms because One-Party policy was, in itself, 
enough to express the government’s position in relation to individual 
fundamental rights. Furthermore, the Commission’s recommendations were 
what the appointing authority wanted to hear; although the government was 
free to reject them (since they were not binding on it), it never did so.
The One-party policy was followed by Tarty Supremacy’, the concept 
which replaced Parliamentary Supremacy. Ten years later after making 
Tanzania a One-Party State,190 all political activities were to be conducted 
under the auspices of the party191 and the Parliament became effectively a 
committee of the ruling party. Policies were decided by the NEC and brought 
to Parliament for rubber stamping. The importance of the Party was 
demonstrated by the inclusion of the Party’s Constitution as a schedule to the 
Interim Constitution.192 TANU’s constitution articulated the protection of basic 
rights. It seems that those who suggested the inclusion of the Constitution of 
TANU in the first schedule to the Interim Constitution, did not know that 
unlike the Preamble, the Schedule to any legislation is also part of that 
particular legislation. Beyond their expectation, the ‘conflict’ which the
189MWAKYEMBE, H. G., (1995), p. 59. For similar views see ZIMBA, L., p. 133.
190Interim Constitution, section 3 (1).
191Ibid, section 3 (3). See also Act No. 8 of 1975.
192Ibid., section 4.
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Commission sought to avoid, by recommending that Bill of Rights should not 
be included in the Constitution, could be caused by the Constitution of TANU 
in the Interim Constitution.193
2:2:2 Permanent Commission of Enquiry.
Instead of a justiciable Bill of Rights the Commission also 
recommended the establishment of the Permanent Commission of Enquiry.194 
The PCE (Tanzania Ombudsman) was consequently recognised by the Interim 
Constitution.195 It was endowed with a special power to decide on the arbitrary 
action or abuse of power by members of the ruling party and civil servants.196 
However, the PCE could not be an effective substitute for the Bill of Rights for 
among other weaknesses it lacked real independence.197 It was subject to 
complex bureaucratic rules requiring it to report the proceedings of every 
enquiry, and its conclusions and recommendations thereon, to the President, 
instead of being answerable to the Parliament.198 The President was at liberty 
to accept or to reject the Commission’s recommendations.199 Indeed it was 
more of a presidential instrument than an independent quasi-judicial tribunal 
capable of protecting individual fundamental rights. The President’s ‘own 
attitude’ to the Commission’s report ‘remained decisive’200 and he could not be
193See the case of Thabit Ngalca v. Regional Fisheries Officer [1973] E. A. 341 and 1973 L.R.T. No. 
24.
194See Report o f  the Presidential Commission on the Establishment o f  A Democratic One-Party State, 
op cit., p. 32.
195See Article 67.
196See Interim Constitution, section 67 (1). See also Proceedings o f  the International Seminar on 
Ombudsman Idea and System in Africa held from the 3rd - 7th December, 1990 in Arusha 
Tanzania, pp. 28-29.
197This fact is also admitted by the Commissioners themselves. About the Commission’s 
ineffectiveness see MJEMMAS, G. J., pp. 53-55.
198Under the Permanent Commission of Enquiry Act, 1966 (Act No. 25 of 1966), section 17, the 
Commission’s report could in a form of government report be read to the National Assembly as a 
matter of information. It usually contained the bare outline of how the Commission did its work 
but its investigations and recommendations remained strictly confidential.
1 "interim Constitution, section 67 (3).
200GHAI, Y. P., p. 35.
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compelled to take measures against any of those whom the Commission’s 
enquiry had revealed to have abused their authority.
Records have shown that there were many abuses of power and 
violations of individual rights by those in authority in Tanzania such that 
people ‘looked at the Commission as their last hope.’201 We cannot forget that 
the President was the appointing and disciplining authority of the members of 
the Commission,202 a fact which subjected its independence and impartiality to 
question.
In addition there were limitations too as to whom the PCE could 
investigate. For instance it could not investigate the President of Zanzibar. 
Also the President could stop any investigation at any time and could also 
refuse the PCE access to any information when he so desired. It should be 
noted that the PCE was bom and bound to operate in an environment which 
was already polluted by the undemocratic policies of TANU the ruling party. 
As such, the PCE being a part of the state machinery could not operate 
contrary to an appointing authority.
Therefore, the PCE could not check government actions or legislative 
measures which were violative of individual rights in the way the courts 
could have done if there had been a justiciable Bill of Rights in the 
Constitution. The Commission was a watchdog of government policies and 
laws and it could not examine their validity nor could it be critical of them 
even if such policies and laws were the cause of the abuse being complained 
against. This can be seen in the words of the State Attorney and Legal Officer 
to the Permanent Commission of Enquiry:
“...where an investigation has been carried out and it 
is found out that the act or omission complained 
against was rightly done according to law, Regulation
201MJEMMAS, G. J., p. 43.
202Interim Constitution, section 68.
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or Government policy, it ought to be counted as a 
success on the work of the Commission even if the 
complainant did not get what he wanted.203
The PCE never considered as wrong any act which was supported by 
the law even if  that law was passed by the Parliament to ‘justify dictatorship 
based on tyrannical but perfectly legal principle.’204 It is therefore a gross 
misconception of the idea of human rights for the government to think that the 
PCE could be an alternative to the Bill of Rights whereas the two concepts 
differ in terms of functions and operation. Whereas the Ombudsman, being 
an organ of the state, would like to mediate between the oppressed and their 
oppressors while the ‘oppression continues unabated,’205 the Bill of Rights 
would be against such mediation or compromise of the individuals’ 
fundamental rights. In fact neither of them can substitute for the other and 
perhaps that is why the Zambian One-Party State Constitution gave 
recognition to both institutions.206 This argument is also confirmed by the fifth 
constitutional amendment of 1984 whereby both the PCE207 and Bill of 
Rights208 were provided for with clear and distinct functions. As Zimba argues, 
to speak of the PCE in Tanzania as an alternative to a Bill of Rights is nothing 
but a mere paradox and a move calculated to leave the government free from 
the inhibitive effects of a legally enforceable Bill of Rights.209
2:2:3 The Leadership Code.
The establishment of the Leadership Code was intended to be another 
way, of instilling discipline and controlling the leaders from abusing their
203MJEMMAS, G. J., pp. 44-45.
204WADE, H. W. R., p. 37.
205See the Proceedings o f the International Seminar on Ombudsman Idea and System in Africa, op. 
cit., p. 192.
206por protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual see the Constitution of Zambia 
sections 13-31, as amended by Act No. 29 of 1972; and for the Commission for Investigation 
(Ombudsman) see the Constitution of Zambia, section 117.
207Tanzanian Constitution, Articles 129-131, as amended by Act No. 15 of 1984.
208See Ibid., Articles 12-33.
209ZIMBA, L., p. 134.
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powers. The move was more political, stemming from TANU’s desire to 
promote African Socialism. Socialism and self reliance were regarded as the 
only ways of building a society of free and equal citizens. It was believed that 
if Party leaders as well as government leaders could abide by the established 
rules of conduct, the new ideology of African socialism could successfully 
lead the nation to economic development. On 5th February 1967 TANU 
formulated and announced what came to be known as The Arusha 
Declaration, a blue-print of socialism and self-reliance. Among other things 
the Arusha Declaration did set out the conditions of leadership which every 
leader had to fulfil. These conditions as stipulated under the Declaration210 
constituted what is known as the Leadership Code:
(i) Every TANU and Government leader must be either a 
peasant or a worker, and should in no way be 
associated with the practices of capitalism or 
feudalism.
(ii) No TANU or Government leader should hold shares 
in any Company.
(iii) No TANU or Government leader should hold 
Directorships in any privately-owned enterprises.
(iv) No TANU or Government leader should receive two 
or more salaries.
(v) No TANU or Government leader should own house/ 
houses which he rents to others.
(vi) For the purpose of this resolution the term ‘leader’ 
should include the following people:-
Members of the TANU National Executive 
Committee; Ministers, Members of 
Parliament; Senior officials of Parastatal 
Organisations; all those appointed or elected 
under any clause of the TANU Constitution; 
all those appointed or elected under the 
provisions of a Constitution of any 
Organisation affiliated to TANU; Councillors
210See also the Second Schedule to the Civil Service Regulation, 1970 (GN. No. 228 of 1970).
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and Civil Servants in high and middle cadres.
In this context, ‘leader’ means a man or a man 
and his wife; a woman or a woman with her 
husband.
Once again political interests and ambitions took precedence over 
individual fundamental rights. The right to own private property was regarded 
as capitalist ideology and therefore in conflict with the already chosen socialist 
path of development. Under the Arusha Declaration, businessmen, apart from 
being considered capitalists, were categorically excluded from participating in 
the affairs of their country for they could not pass the test of the Leadership 
Code. Only peasants and workers having no association with the practices of 
capitalism or feudalism could stand for election. It is interesting to note that a 
person would not qualify to stand for constituency election if  his/her spouse 
practised capitalism.211
Most interesting was the extended effect of the Code on the otherwise 
innocent spouse merely because his or her partner was bound by the said 
Leadership Code. The most important aspect of the Declaration was ‘to ensure 
that leaders are not contaminated by the practices of capitalism’212 without due 
regard to their fundamental rights which the policy attempted to infringe. 
When the Leadership Code was promulgated, most Party and government 
leaders were engaged in businesses and they were therefore required to dispose 
of them213 or ‘rearrange their affairs’214 within a specified time215 or be 
disqualified from leadership. In a bid to make sure that traces of capitalism 
were removed among the leaders, every member of Parliament was required to 
submit an annual statement of his affairs to the Speaker specifying all the
21 ^ ee  the Interim Constitution, section 27 (2) (h)-(l).
212READ, J. S., (1967), p. 163.
213This included also the share or house vesting in an individual by inheritance. The leader was 
supposed to lodge a formal undertaking to dispose of it early.
214READ, J. S., (1967), p. 167.
2 ^ Between March 1967 and March 1968.
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property he owned.210 Most of them developed different ways of owning 
private property and still complied with the direct stringent requirements of 
the Code.217 This prompted the government to establish the Commission for 
Enforcement of the Leadership Code218 to enquire into the behaviour and 
conduct of any leader for the purposes of ensuring compliance with the 
requirements of the Leadership Code. Undoubtedly, the Commission for 
Enforcement of the Leadership Code was ‘specifically established to protect 
socialism, the political ideology of the country’219 and had nothing to do with 
the protection of individual rights.
Like the PCE, the Commission for Enforcement of the Leadership 
Code, after investigating the leaders who were suspected of violating the 
conditions of the Code, presented its confidential report and recommendations 
to the President.220 It had no power to sanction those found in breach of the 
Code. The Commission Chairman had the power to sign a warrant of arrest 
‘for the apprehension of a recalcitrant witness’221 and bring him before the 
Commission within twenty-four hours. Again, the President was not bound by 
the report nor was he ‘obliged to accept the Commission’s 
recommendations.’222 For example, out of 83 leaders investigated by the 
Commission and reported to the President between 1974 and 1986, 41 leaders 
received stern warning, 14 were summarily dismissed from leadership, 16 
received simple warning and transfers, 2 were demoted with reduction in 
ranks and salaries, and 10 leaders were referred to the Party Disciplinary 
Committee for necessary action.223
216por details about the effect of the Leadership Code see READ, J. S., (1967), pp. 162-166.
217They registered their houses, shares and other private property in their children’s names some of 
them being too young to own such property.
218See the Commission for the Enforcement of Leadership Code Act, 1973 (Act No. 6 of 1973), and 
the Tanzanian Constitution, Article 132.
219MWINYIGOGO, A. M„ p. 272.
220Act No. 6 of 1973, section 8.
221READ, J. S., (1973 B), p. 139. See also Ibid., section 5 (4).
222MWINYIGOGO, A. M., p. 271. See also Ibid section 10.
223Ibid.,p. 273.
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The measures taken by the President upon receiving the Commission’s 
report suggest that the Commission was the President’s organ responsible for 
the examination of the leaders’ loyalty to him. This is corroborated by 
President’s unique control of the Commission which gave him the right to 
certify that certain information be withheld from the Commission on various 
grounds. The President was the only one with access to the inquiry report224 
and he could warn or transfer the person reported of violating the Code; only 
the most unfortunate leaders were summarily dismissed. We are not told the 
criteria used by the President to determine who should get what punishment. 
All remained subject to his discretion.
Today, the Leadership Code is in a shambles after the dramatic change 
in the country’s policy regarding the private ownership of property, which 
came about after Nyerere’s retirement from the Presidency and Party 
Chairmanship. The change in the national policy was received with relief by 
the leaders who secretly owned property contrary to the prescription of the 
Leadership Code. This is a clear indication that the Leadership Code was 
disliked by the rest of the leaders and was bound to fail; very few complied 
with the Arusha Declaration’s requirements. The provisions of the Leadership 
Code appear to be too ambitious, unrealistic and stringent for people, living in 
a country whose economy is very weak. Those who complied like Chief Adam 
Sapi Mkwawa, the former Speaker, found themselves unable to cope at the 
time of retirement. The Parliament had to consider him particularly in relation 
to housing. He was given usufructuary rights to the Government House on 
condition that it reverts to the government upon his death. His family was not 
considered as also having been a “victim” of the Speaker’s commitment to the 
leadership Code. Leaders who supplement their incomes through acquisition 
of shares in private companies or renting houses, are no longer disqualified 
from being leaders in Tanzania. Instead, now the practice is to declare their
224Act No. 6 of 1973, section 9.
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property interests when they are appointed leaders.225 The President and all 
members of Parliament established this practice before it was codified. The 
Commission for Enforcement of Leadership Code was replaced by the 
Secretariat for Public Leaders Ethics now charged with the power to 
investigate on the conduct of public leaders. In fact today it is more of a rule 
that in order to become a leader one has first to violate the Leadership Code as 
announced under the Arusha Declaration. This can be clearly explained by the 
large amounts of property owned by the leaders.
All this demonstrates the independence government’s rigid desire to 
‘liberate’ itself from the patterns of colonial economic policy while sacrificing 
individual fundamental rights. Institutions expected to act as a substitute for a 
justiciable Bill of Rights turned out to be ineffective and to a large extent this 
contributed to the growth of state authoritarianism and corruption among 
leaders who needed to supplement their low income.
2:3 The judiciary at independence.
At the time of independence the judiciary was staffed by foreigners, 
particularly British judges, as there were no Tanganyikans qualified for such 
professional office. The lack of trained Africans in Tanganyika necessitated 
the continuance of British nationals and Africans from other countries, trained 
in Britain, in the higher posts of the judiciary and Ministry of Justice.226 This 
was one of the situations which placed the new government in a dilemma, for 
it was thought that among the indicators of true independence was the taking 
over of all offices which were previously manned by foreigners. In order to 
achieve this goal Nyerere called for Africanization of the civil service, a move 
which was unsuccessfully criticised and challenged in the court for its
225See Article 132 (5) (b).
226See CASTELNUOVO, S., p. 68.
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discriminatory character.227 As for the judiciary it was difficult to bring such 
move into immediate effect.
For a long time since independence the TANU leadership was 
harbouring the unjustified belief that the expatriate judicial officers would 
take advantage of the presence of a Bill of Rights to frustrate the new 
government by declaring many of its actions illegal.228 The government’s 
suspicion of the judiciary actually continued even after the judiciary had been 
Africanised. It was manifested by the creation of tribunals and other quasi­
judicial bodies to discharge the functions of the court. Most of the tribunals’ 
decisions were made final and non-appeallable.229 This will be discussed in 
extenso in the following chapter.
Parallel with this suspicion was the government’s desire to create a new 
judiciary that would function as an appropriate institution for the enforcement 
of development policies. The government had to train its own judges as well 
as magistrates, while in the meantime it relied upon foreign judges from other 
Commonwealth countries like Nigeria and Trinidad.230 It was not by accident 
therefore that when the University College of Dar Es Salaam, the country’s 
first university, was opened, the Faculty of Law was the first to be established. 
It was purposely opened to provide training for lawyers who were urgently 
needed to take over from the expatriates.
2:3:1 The judicial system.
Some changes to the judicial system of the country were effected 
immediately after independence. The most important of these changes related 
to the total integration of the courts and the abolition of appeals to the Privy
227See Hatimali Adamji v. East Africa Posts and Telecommunication Corporation, 1973 L.R.T. No. 
6 .
228PETER, C. M., (1987), p. 250.
229See our discussion in chapter three pp. 95-100.
230For example Georges, C. J., came from Trinidad.
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Council after the High Court was made the highest appellate court in the 
country.
In 1961 the local courts, like subordinate courts were integrated and 
placed under the supervision of the High Court.231 Nevertheless two racially 
based court systems were maintained only that the Central Court of Appeal 
which was the highest court under the Local Courts system was abolished and 
replaced by the High Court. The District Commissioners continued to 
discharge both judicial232 and administrative functions but the Provincial 
Commissioner whose leave was mandatory for an appeal to lie to the Central 
Court of Appeal, was replaced by the Local Courts Appeals Officer233 acting 
under the directions and control of the Chief Justice. The continued existence 
of a “dual” court system of justice based largely on race, is illustrated by the 
following diagram:
with leave o f  L ocal Courts 
A ppea l Officer
Local Court
High Court
Local Court of 
Appeal
District
Commissioner Subordinate Courts
Table 4: The Court System immedeiately after independence
231See Local Courts (Amendment) Ordinance, 1961. (No. 38 of 1961). 
232Ibid., section 38 (3) (b).
233Ibid., section 38 (3) (c).
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Essentially the Independence Constitution had not changed anything as 
far as appeals were concerned.234 Appeals would still lie from the Tanganyika 
High Court to the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa and then to the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council in some instances. This was not favoured by 
the independence government which was determined to break the connection 
between Tanganyika and Britain.235
It was the Magistrates Court Act, 1963236 which completely removed 
the colonial “dual” and parallel court system that was based on racial 
discrimination. Instead, a unified and integrated three-tier court system was 
established for all people in the country irrespective of their race, religion, 
colour or origin.237 With the abolition of the former parallel court systems all 
courts were amalgamated into a single hierarchy of courts. Replacing the 
Native Local Court at the lowest level was the Primary Court, from which 
appeals lay to the District Court which was 011 the same level with the 
Resident Magistrate Court, and thence to the High Court which was the 
highest appellate court in the country. Unlike the Native Local Court the 
Primary Court was vested with jurisdiction over all persons and it was not 
restricted to customary law. It was no longer lawful for the executive to 
exercise judicial functions which were exclusively vested upon the judges and 
magistrates only. All courts were to be presided over by ‘full-time stipendiary’ 
who ‘replaced the dual functioning executive of local authorities.’238 However, 
these rapid changes brought about by the Magistrate’s Court Act, 1963 faced 
one significant problem; the unavailability of appropriately trained personnel.
At one time, Rashid Kawawa (a senior government official) suggested 
that a solution to such a problem was to recruit as many magistrates as
234The provisions for appeals remained as contained in the Appellate Jurisdiction Ordinance, 1961 
(No. 55 of 1961).
235See the proposals as contained in the Government Paper No. 1 of 1962.
236Act No. 55 of 1963.
237PETER, C. ML, and BIERWAGEN, R. M., p. 400. See also SAWYERR, G. F., p. 226.
238CASTELNUOVO, S., p. 84.
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possible by simply picking from the jobless Africans in the country and 
handing them the office after a short briefing. The idea to appoint judicial 
officers haphazardly was objected to by the Chief Justice. This problem 
together with the inadequacy in the number of courts enormously affected the 
administration of justice in the country. Cases took too long to be determined 
and because of the lack of office-space, most of the court sessions were 
conducted in the ruling Party’s buildings. This practice gave room for 
interference by the party in the court’s decisions, and sometimes it was 
difficult for the court to decide impartially when the ruling party had an 
interest in the case. In fact it had reached a stage where it was practically 
impossible, especially in rural areas, to distinguish between the court’s 
decision and the party’s decision following the strengthening of the party, as 
we shall see in the following chapter.239
Another development alongside the Magistrates Courts Act, 1963 was 
the application of codified customary law. It should be noted that during the 
colonial period every Local Court (Native Court) applied the indigenous 
customary law of the African tribe where the parties came from. It means 
therefore that the customary law applicable was not codified and it differed 
from one tribe to another. Since 1st January, 1964 when the Magistrates Court 
Act, 1963 came into force the customary law applicable in court was unified 
under the guidance of Mr. Hans Cory, the government sociologist in 
Tanganyika.240 After considering Cory’s unified version of the customary law 
the government codified it to be known as the Local Customary Law 
(Declaration) (No. 4) Order, 1963.241 Consequently, customary criminal law 
was abolished. As we shall see in chapter six, some of the rules set out under
239For an account of the early problems in the judicial process caused by the sharing of buildings 
between executive/party leaders and judicial officers see JAMES, R. W., and KASSAM, F. M., 
pp. 18-19.
240Hans Cory was in Tanganyika from the colonial period recording customary law. He wrote and 
published his works on the Haya, Sukuma, Nyamwezi, Gogo, Hangaza, Zinza, Kuria and Sambaa 
customary laws.
24lGN. N o. 436 of 1963.
69
the said Order, as the result of the unification of customary laws, were 
discriminatory and indeed in gross violation of human rights.242
It seems the unification of customary laws was done for political rather 
than legal reasons, and as Twining observed, ‘the motivating force behind the 
scheme was the desire to cement national unity’243 and eradicate division 
among societies which tend to ‘threaten the independent state with conflict or 
dissolution.’244 No other country except Tanganyika had attempted to unify the 
customary law of various tribal groups within the country.245 All this related to 
Nyerere’s ambitions to make Tanganyika a secular socialist state by removing 
anything that tended to promote tribal loyalty against common and collective 
identity.
2:3:2 The magistrates: appointment and terms of service.
The Republican Constitution conferred on the President the power to 
appoint the Registrar of the High Court and his deputy, all Resident 
Magistrates and all other Magistrates.246 Under the Constitution all judicial 
officers were presidential appointees but the said president could not exercise 
direct disciplinary control over them nor could he terminate their 
appointments. This power was vested in the Judicial Service Commission247 
which was also constituted of presidential appointees. The position hitherto 
has not changed. It reduced the likelihood of judicial officers making decisions 
in favour of the appointing authority at the expense of people’s justice, in 
order to remain in office. Nevertheless, it is contended that it was not
242See Peter Byabato v. Pastoiy Rugaimukamu, High Court of Tanzania at Mwanza, Civil Appeal 
No. 252 of 1986, unreported ; Gabriel Valery v. Birungi Balilemwa, High Court of Tanzania at 
Mwanza, Civil Appeal No. 49 of 1988, unreported ; Bernardo Ephrahim v. Holaria Pastory and 
Another, infra.
243TWINING, W., p. 225. For similar views see CASTELNUOVO, S., p. 69.
244KUPER, H., and KUPER, L., p. 21.
245COTRAN, E., p. 26.
246Republican Constitution, section 53.
247See the Judicial Service Act, 1962 (Cap. 508). See also the Interim Constitution, section 61; and 
the 1977 Constitution, Article 113.
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necessary to vest in the President the power to appoint these officers. Under 
the Independence Constitution, 1961 the power to appoint such judicial 
officers was vested in the Judicial Service Commission, including the power to 
control, discipline and to remove from office.248 As a means of maintaining 
independence of the judiciary, this was better than the latter attempt which 
vested in the President also the power to confirm appointments and to 
promote his appointees.249 In appreciation of such appointments and in order to 
have their appointments and promotion approved, chances for judicial officers 
being partisan were very high; thereby increasing the possibility of the erosion 
of the independence of the judiciary. However, the President has delegated the 
power to appoint Magistrates to the Judicial Service Commission.250
With regards to security of tenure, the President could not exercise his 
power to abolish any office in the service of the United Republic251 in respect 
of any office of a magistrate while there was a substantive holder of that 
office, unless the Judicial Service Commission concurred in such abolition.252 
Furthermore, a judicial officer cannot be dismissed by the Commission unless 
a disciplinary charge has been preferred against him and he has had an 
opportunity to answer the charge and there has been an inquiry into the charge. 
The terms of service and security of tenure provided under the Constitution are 
not enough to make the judicial officers independent in their function of 
dispensing justice. Also, the question of remuneration has to be considered if 
the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary are to be seriously 
protected.
As for primary court magistrates, a very long process leading to their 
appointment was devised allegedly with the intention of bringing their office
248Independence Constitution, section 65. See also the Judicial Service (Appointments and other 
Presidential Functions) Regulations, 1964 (GN. No. 665 of 1964).
249See the Interim Constitution, section 61 (1) (a) and the 1977 Constitution, Article 113 (1) (a).
250See the Judicial Service Act, 1962.
251Section 18 of the Republican Constitution. See also the Interim Constitution, section 21 (a).
252Interim Constitution, section 61 (3).
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closer to the ideal of the independence of the judiciary. Although it is argued 
in some quarters that primary court magistrates were also appointed by the 
Judicial Service Special Commission,253 the cumbersome procedural 
conditions through which the appointment had to be channelled does not 
support this hypothesis. First of all it was the minister responsible for legal 
affairs in whom the power to appoint Primary Court Magistrates was 
vested.254 The role played by the Judicial Service Commission in the process 
was to write a recommendation to the said minister about the names selected 
by the Regional Boards. It is therefore obvious that the selection was being 
done by the Regional Boards under the chairmanship of Regional 
Commissioners. It is the recommendation report of the Regional Board that the 
Judicial Service Commission has to act upon before preparing the final 
recommendation for submission to the Minister, who makes the appointment. 
In actual fact it was the minister, the political figure, who finally made the 
appointment since he could object to the Commission’s recommendations as to 
the selection. It should be noted that to date that continues to be the procedure 
followed in appointing Primary Court Magistrates, where the Judicial Service 
Commission remains the disciplining authority.
The appointment procedure for Primary Court Magistrates had many 
loopholes which allowed political considerations to be taken account of. The 
chair of the District Board which interviewed the applicants was the District 
Commissioner (a politician) who forwarded the recommendation to the 
Regional Board under the chairmanship of the Regional Commissioner. 
Finally, the person who had final appointing power was the minister, also a 
political figure. To be appointed a Primary Court Magistrate one had to show 
support for the ruling party’s policies, and it was the duty of the interviewing 
team to scrutinise the applicants so as to avoid appointing those who could
253See the ideas of the Chief Justice P. T. Georges in JAMES, R. W., and KASSAM, F. M., at p. 54.
254See the Magistrates Court Act, 1963, Sixth Schedule, Part IV.
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turn hostile to the ruling party and still remain protected by the doctrine of the 
independence of the judiciary.
As a safeguard against the threat posed by magistrates who were 
suspected of turning hostile, assessors were made part of the Primary Court in 
deciding cases. They were given judicial powers to sit with magistrates in 
court and the decision of the court was by the majority (whereby already the 
assessors were the majority for they were two and the magistrate was one). 
The magistrate was bound by the decision of the majority of assessors who 
were not judicial officers but mere lay persons and members of the ruling 
party. Assessors were nominated by the TANU Branch Executive Committee 
and selected by the TANU District Executive Committee without security of 
tenure to exercise such power over magistrates. They could be removed at 
any time for any cause255 when it was deemed necessary according to the 
party’s wishes, possibly when they failed to protect the party’s interests in the 
court. This has contributed to the bad performance of Primary Courts and 
perhaps encouraged the corruption which is being complained of. As Fimbo 
observes, majority decisions in Primary Courts do cost the nation heavily in 
terms of unmerited acquittals and unjust convictions.256
Undoubtedly the appointment procedure and terms of service for 
magistrates were very far from building a free and impartial court in Tanzania. 
They left too much space for the party leaders who also exercised executive 
powers to interfere with the administration of justice. This threatened the very 
foundation of rule of law and independence of the judiciary.
3:3:3 The judges: background, appointment and tenure.
We discussed earlier about the appointment of puisne judges at the time 
of independence and also the changes brought about by the Republican
255See the Primary Courts ( Assessors ) Regulations, 1972 (GN. No. 233 of 1972).
256See FIMBO, G. M., (1990), p. 24.
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Constitution.257 The effectiveness of the new mechanism under the Republican 
Constitution depended on the weight which the President attached to the 
requirement to consult the Chief Justice. The President under normal 
circumstances took into account political considerations in appointing judges 
for he knew that once appointed a judge, matters of discipline and 
determination rested with another body which he had little influence. He was 
therefore careful in this sensitive exercise to appoint those people whose 
background he already knew. Such judges were trained outside and most of 
them had been on the bench in their countries of origin. Being mindful of the 
shortage of suitably qualified Tanganyikans, the Constitution provided for the 
appointment of judges from outside the country that a person should not be 
qualified for appointment as a judge of the High Court unless:
(i) he is, or has been, a judge o f a court having 
unlimited jurisdiction in civil and criminal 
matters in some part of the Commonwealth that 
may be prescribed by Act of Parliament, or a 
court having jurisdiction in appeals from any 
such court; or
(ii) he holds one of the specified qualifications and 
has held one or other of those qualifications for 
a total period of not less than five years.258 
(Emphasis added).
The term ‘specified qualifications’ referred to above meant the 
professional qualifications specified by the Advocates Ordinance and to be 
held by any person before he could apply for admission as an advocate in 
Tanganyika.259 It was one of the specified qualifications and indeed a 
condition sine qua non over and above working experience that one had to
257See footnotes 167 and 168.
258Independence Constitution, section 59 (3) (a) (i) and (ii). See also the Interim Constitution, section 
57 (3) (a) (i) and (ii).
259See the Interim Constitution, section 57 (3) (b).
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hold a degree in law in order to qualify being appointed judge. The condition 
of five years working experience in a legal profession, would if applied 
strictly, have prevented indigenous people from qualifying and this would 
have contradicted the President’s campaign to Africanise the judiciary. In 
order to remove these contradictions the President was given power to 
dispense with the requirement of five years working experience, if he was 
satisfied that by reason of special circumstances such person was worthy, 
capable and suitable to be appointed a judge of the High Court.260 It was under 
this saving provision that indigenous law graduates could be appointed judges 
despite the fact that they had not been working as legal practitioners for five 
years. In fact some of them became judges, through promises by the 
government, before starting undergraduate studies at the University. They 
were encouraged to study law at the University so that they might be appointed 
judges on completing their studies. There is evidence that some students who 
were selected to take other degree courses abandoned them in the process 
following the government promise to make law graduates judges on 
successfully completing the studies.261 Others who graduated in other subjects 
were sent to the United Kingdom for the Bar course in order to be introduced 
to law and practice. On going back home they could be considered for a 
judgeship post. It is tempting to say that the appointments procedure and the 
desire to Africanise the judiciary meant that the strict scrutiny of candidates 
was often ignored and this threatened the very foundation of the independence 
of the judiciary.
Following the changes brought about by the Independence Constitution, 
the tenure of judges was constitutionally secured except on misbehaviour or 
inability to perform duties which allegations were to be established to the
260Ibid., section 57 (4)
261 For example Hon. Kwikima, former judge of the High Court, during the interview in 1994, 
admitted having changed his admission at the University and studied law following the 
government's promise to consider him for a judicial post on completing his studies.
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satisfaction of a tribunal of judges from Commonwealth countries.262 
Furthermore, security of judges’ personal emoluments was provided for under 
the Constitution such that it was out of the Consolidated Fund their salaries, 
allowances, pensions and gratuity were to be paid, nor could the salary be 
altered to the disadvantage of the judge.263 These were safeguards extended to 
all judges including the expatriate judges with a view of equipping them with 
confidence to act fearlessly and impartially. This was not enough taking into 
account other factors which were in sharp contrast to the intended objective. 
Like other judges, expatriate judges could be removed from office for bad 
behaviour or failure to perform their duties. Also the threats posed by the 
campaign to Africanise264 civil service offices never excluded the judges. In 
fact all expatriate judges could any time be given a six months notice by the 
President if  there was any indigenous Tanganyikan to take up the office. The 
expatriate judges as well could give the same notice to the government if  they 
needed to vacate the office.265 Arguably the overseas judges felt a threat of 
their appointments being terminated any time albeit by six months notice. It 
was difficult for such judges to be independent in their performance as they 
would be careful not to offend the appointing authority .
2:4 Conclusions
The main thrust of the argument of this chapter, has been that the post­
independence government used the Constitution to create a very strong 
executive, reminiscent of an authoritarian government. In the process, a weak 
judiciary staffed by insecure officers was brought into being.
262Interim Constitution, sections 60 and 58.
263See footnotes 175 and 176.
264Under the Tanganyika ( Compensation and Retiring Benefits) Order in Council, 1961 (GN. No. 
398 of 1961); and the Republic of Tanganyika (Consequential, Transitional and Temporary 
Provisions) Act, 1962 ( Cap. 500), section 17.
265Interestingly the government never terminated the services of any foreign judge.
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It has been shown that from the beginning the post-independence 
government was not prepared to translate respect for human rights into action 
by giving it a place in its municipal legislation. All efforts were made to 
frustrate the people’s desire for an enforceable Bill of Rights and reasons were 
given to that effect. We pointed out that what the government considered as an 
alternative to the Bill of Rights was rather ineffective. By merely making 
reference to human rights in the Preamble to the Constitution and establishing 
a Permanent Commission of Enquiry or the Leadership Code, the government 
did not create a proper substitute for an enforceable Bill of Rights.
The major changes brought about by the post-independence 
government in the judiciary related to the creation of one court system for all 
people under the supervision of the High Court. However, the judiciary was 
treated with suspicion by the nationalist leaders. As a result a deliberate move 
was made by the government to create an environment propitious for executive 
interference thereby eroding the concept of the independence of the judiciary. 
The effect of all this will be revealed in chapter three when we shall examine 
the performance of the judiciary during the period when the Bill of Rights was 
not part of the Constitution.
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CHAPTER THREE
HUMAN RIGHTS IN PRACTICE AFTER INDEPENDENCE
After successfully rejecting the demands for a justiciable Bill of Rights 
in the Constitution the government felt uninhibited in the implementation of its 
development policies. In this chapter we examine the various measures used 
by the post-independence government to bring about development and their 
consequential disregard to fundamental individual rights. Here again, our focus 
is on the role and reaction of the judiciary in the wake of such government 
policies which potentially contravened fundamental rights and freedoms.
3:1 The Position of the government on human rights
To a considerable extent the government of Tanzania has responded 
positively to the United Nations call which requires all member states to 
accede to or ratify the international instruments for the protection of human 
rights. In attempting to comply with this requirement, Tanzania became a 
signatory to the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Not 
only that, up to 1995 Tanzania had acceded and became signatory to many 
other key international conventions and covenants as well as regional 
instruments covering human rights, such as: The International Convention for 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966; The International Convention for 
Civil and Political Rights, 1966; The Convention for the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1965; The Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, 1989; The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide, 1948; The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination
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against Women, 1979; The Convention on the Political Rights of Women, 
1953; The Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, 1957; and The 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.266
From this commitment to protect human rights as exhibited by 
ratification of international and regional instruments, one would be tempted to 
argue that the government’s practice also accorded with these conventions. 
We would expect the government to incorporate these international norms into 
domestic law, since the tradition had been to incorporate international 
instruments into municipal law before they could be domestically applied.267 In 
addition to its commitment to observe and respect human rights, each United 
Nations member state accepting these obligations was expected to employ the 
basic legislative method showing recognition of human rights, by adopting 
enforceable bills of rights in the Constitution. Despite its commitment on 
paper, Tanzania simply offered lip service to human rights when it came to 
practice.
Right from the time of independence the government expressed blunt 
unwillingness in its administration to incorporate the world wide cherished 
principles of human rights. The leaders described the enshrinement of the Bill
of Rights as being ‘neither prudent nor effective’268 and individual freedoms
appeared somewhat luxurious in the socio-economic context of Tanzania269 for 
they were suspected of delaying economic development.270
Many institutions of democracy in the country were destroyed. This 
state of affairs, observes Ong’wamuhana, was a 'fertile ground for breeding 
government arrogance'271 and subsequent infringement of individual
266HATCHARD, J.3 (1992), pp. 186-192; and HATCHARD, J., (1995 A), p. 239. See also UNESCO, 
1996.
267See R. v. East African Community. [1970] E. A. 457. For an account of the application of 
international instruments by municipal court in East Africa see SHIVJI, I. G., (1990 A), pp. 2-14. 
See also SEATON, E. E., and MALITI, S. T., p. 99.
268READ, J. S., (1979 B), p. 161.
269READ, J. S., (1973 A), p. 29.
270See our discussion in chapter two.
271ONG'WAMUHANA, K., (1981).
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fundamental rights and freedoms. A similar view is expressed by Mwailcusa 
while summing up his assessment of the independence government’s position 
in relation to human rights when he observes:
“The regime was not prepared to tolerate resistance to 
its actions, irrespective of whether or not such actions 
would amount to violation or infringement of 
individual rights. ...the executive in Tanzania was 
keen to establish itself as an institution whose power 
and authority had no lines of circumscription other 
than those conceded by itself.”272
The accuracy of Mwailcusa’s observation can be clearly found in the 
government’s policies and the manner in which they were implemented during 
that period when the Bill of Rights was yet to be enshrined in the Constitution 
as illustrated by the following discussion.
3:1:1 Adoption of colonial legislation
During the struggle for independence the nationalist leaders were very 
critical of the draconian colonial laws. To many people's surprise, after coming 
to power the same leaders were to adopt and preserve the same laws which 
were designed to serve a repressive state.273 They were saved and adopted 
through a piece of legislation which stated:
“Without prejudice to the repeal and revocation of 
existing law with effect from the date which this Act 
comes into operation, the existing law shall continue 
to be the law of Tanganyika after commencement of 
the Republican Constitution”.274
272MWAIKUSA, j. T„ (1991), p. 685.
273For a discussion about the inheritance of the colonial repressive laws by the independence 
government see WAMBALI, M. K., (1990), p. 35.
274Tanganyika (Consequential, Transitional and Temporary Provisions) Act, 1962, section 5 (5).
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By adopting colonial laws the independence government expressed its 
determined desire to step into the shoes of its predecessor, giving no respect to 
human rights. It was indeed a “return to the autocratic system of government 
which existed during colonial era.”275 Most of these laws are still in force 
today despite their gross infringement of human rights.276 In many instances 
the independence government used these laws in the same way as they were 
used during the colonial period. For example, in 1984 the President used his 
powers under the Collective Punishment Ordinance, 1921277 to penalise the 
Wataturu tribe on allegations that they were responsible for the deaths of 49 
persons and the theft of a large number of heads of cattle, goats, sheep and 
donkeys. The President ordered every family in the village to pay such 
number of cattle, goats, sheep or donkeys as would realise the stolen 
animals.278 The actual culprit could not be traced and the President resorted to 
punishing the whole tribe collectively contrary to the principles of trial and 
sentencing. Actually the executive became stronger while the judiciary and the 
legislature 'grew weaker and eclipsed.'279
3:1:2 Enacting new authoritarian laws
Further to the wholesale adoption of colonial laws, the state at the early 
period of independence, enacted new laws to suit its interests. The new laws 
included the Preventive Detention Act, 1962, Regions and Regional 
Commissioners Act, 1962, and the Area Commissioners Act, 1962. The 
government justified their enactment but the people in the opposition, such as 
Kasanga Tumbo, opposed them for they almost amounted to a “declaration of
275MARTIN, R., p. 9.
276For example: Deportation Ordinance as amended by Act No. 3 of 1991; Witchcraft Ordinance, 
1928 (Cap. 18); Expulsion of Undesirables Ordinance, 1930; Corporal Punishment Ordinance, 
1930; Collective Punishment Ordinance, 1921; Destitute Persons Ordinance, 1923; Township 
(Removal of Undesirable Persons) Ordinance, 1944,.
277 Cap. 74.
278 SeeGN. No. 163 of 1984.
279SRIVASTAVA, P. B., pp. 20-24
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state of emergency” on the peaceful people of Tanganyika. The legislative 
process continued and gave birth to other more objectionable laws, like the 
Government Proceedings Act, 1967280, the Economic Sabotage (Special 
Provisions) Act, 1983281 and many others that we illustrate in the following 
discussion.
3:1:2:1 Detention without trial
The first post-independence authoritarian law was the Preventive 
Detention Act, 1962.282 This is a piece of legislation which gave unfettered 
discretion to the President to detain any one without trial while at the same 
time denying the affected party or any one right to challenge the President in a 
court of law whenever he exercised this power.283 The court had no power to 
entertain any action which sought to challenge or question the legality of such 
detention. Detainees were governed by severe regulations284 restricting them 
from receiving visitors, writing or receiving letters or any other written 
communications unless prior written authority from the Minister for Home 
Affairs was obtained.285
Dr. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana was the architect of the preventive 
detention law in the post-independence Africa. It was deliberately designed to 
deal with any attempt to overthrow his government and interference with state 
security.286 After independence Dr. Nyerere of Tanganyika also copied it for 
the same reasons.287 The law stated that:
Where:
280 Act No. 16 of 1967.
281 Act No. 9 of 1983.
282Act No. 60 of 1962.
283Ibid., section 3.
284Made under, section 4 (2) of the Act.
285See The Preventive Detention (Communications with Detainees) Regulations, 1963 (GN. No. 203 
of 1963), section 3.
286BENNION, F. A., p. 222.
287KALUNGA, L. T., p. 284. For a detailed discussion see HOWARD, R. E., pp. 157-158.
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(a) it is shown to the satisfaction of the President 
that any person is conducting himself so as to 
be dangerous to peace and good order in any 
part of Tanganyika or the security of the Sate; 
or
(b) the President is satisfied that an order under 
this section is necessary to prevent any person 
acting in a manner prejudicial to peace and 
good order in any part of Tanganyika or to the 
defence of Tanganyika or the security of the 
state, the President may by order under his 
hand and the Public seal direct the detention of 
that person.288
It was enough to be suspected of conducting oneself in a manner 
dangerous to peace and good order for one to be caught by this section. It was 
the President alone who could assess and determine the individual’s conduct, 
whether it was dangerous to peace and good order or the State security. The 
President relied upon the information given to him by his agents or 
subordinates about the person to be detained289 such that he ended up detaining 
people most of whom were suspected of committing petty crimes notably 
bribery, stealing, cattle rustling, vagrancy and drinking illicit liquor.290 
Undoubtedly this law was abused, especially by Regional and District 
Commissioners and the Police.291 At one time the chairman of the Permanent 
Commission of Enquiry expressed his concern over such abuses when he 
spoke publicly that, 4many persons were being held in preventive detention 
who should properly have been either brought to trial for criminal offences or 
released.’292
288preventive Detention Act, 1962, section 2(1).
289Section 2 (2) of the Act requires that the information leading to detention of a person be given on 
oath unless it is not feasible to do so.
290See LUGAKINGIRA, K. S. K., (1990), p. 109; MARTIN, R., pp. 92-93; McAUSLAN, J. P. W. B., 
(1964), pp. 564-566 and KABUDI, P. J., (1995 A), pp. 227-229.
291See the Nyalali Commission Report, 1991, Volume Three, p. 3.
292READ, J. S., (1973 B), p. 138.
83
According to Dr. Nyerere, the existing criminal laws did not give him 
power to detain without trial since they required evidence of the offence 
alleged to have been committed by the accused person. Arguably this law was 
designed to punish those people who were merely suspected of having 
committed crimes, there being insufficient evidence to bring them to trial. 
Under normal circumstances this situation would lead to acquittals if the 
suspects were taken to court for trial.293 This comes out clearly in his words:
“The principles of individual freedom and the rule of 
law require that no person is arrested and held without 
quickly being convicted of illegal actions. But we 
know that we cannot always get the proof necessary 
for conviction, especially in cases of subversion, 
corruption and intrigue.”294
By the Preventive Detention Act, the presumption of innocence on the 
part of suspects was completely ignored. Many people fell victim to this 
law.295 They were just imprisoned by the President for an unspecified period 
without trial and without a hearing. It is contrary to the principles of natural 
justice to condemn someone unheard and to disregard the rule of law which is 
a fundamental principle of any democratic state.
The normal convict serving a jail sentence received better treatment 
than the detainee. Whereas a convict could receive visitors on specified days 
with freedom to communicate in writing with those outside prison, the 
detainee was kept incommunicado unless the Minister’s written permit was 
obtained first. The convict knew the specific period within which he was to 
serve his sentence, but the detainee was held at the President’s wishes. The
293For example, in 1968 Joseph Kassela Bantu after speaking in his constituency against Nyerere’s 
policies, was immediately tried for incitement to murder. On being acquitted by the court he was 
detained under the Preventive Detention Act.
294NYERERE, J. K., p. 6.
295It is said that in 1977 there were about 1,000 people detained without charge in Tanzania while in 
Kenya there were 15 only, For details see The Times, 29th May 1978 and The Economist, 7th June 
1980.
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President could any time vary the status and treatment that the detainee should 
receive. Besides all the legislation required cno publication of detainees’ 
names.’296 It was such loophole that state functionaries took advantage of and 
practised torture of the detainees.
This law was regarded as essential for the protection of the government 
since it could be used to detain dissidents or any one suspected of being a 
potential threat to the government in power. It is our submission that, using the 
Preventive Detention Act as a ‘legal ammunition for the protection of 
power’297 at the expense of individual fundamental rights and freedoms lowers 
the reputation of its users.
In 1985 the Preventive Detention Act, 1962 was amended by Act No. 2 
of 19 8 5 298 following the continued public criticism and the enshrinement of the 
Bill of Rights in the Constitution.299
Detention without trial is also allowed under the Regions and Regional 
Commissioners Act, 1962300 and the Area Commissioners Act, 1962301. The 
Regional Commissioners and District Commissioners were allowed since 
independence to arrest and detain any person for forty-eight hours if they had 
reason to believe such a person was likely to commit a breach of the peace or 
disturb the public tranquillity. The legality of such detention and arrest could 
not be challenged in a court of law since the jurisdiction of the court was 
ousted.
As a result the Regional and Area Commissioners extensively abused 
this power by detaining suspected criminals, persons who resisted self-help 
projects, political ‘detractors’ and even those who refused monetary 
contributions to the ruling party.302 Dr. Nyerere, encouraged the
296HOWARD, R. E., p. 157.
297LUGAKINGIRA, K. S. K., (1990), p. 109.
298The Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1985.
299See the discussion in chapter seven.
300Cap. 461.
301 Cap. 466.
302See the Nyalali Commission Report, op. cit., p. 6.
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Commissioners to extensively use their powers of detention to detain political 
trouble makers. This could be done by renewing the forty eight-hour detention 
periods as often as they could and where necessary to seek presidential 
approval to hold the culprit for longer periods.303
The case of Hamisi Masisi and 6 Others v. R304 illustrates the abuse of 
power under the Act by the Regional Commissioner. In that case the Resident 
Magistrate released the accused persons on bail on various terms. The order 
aggrieved the Region Commissioner of Mara one Joseph Wassira who in 
return made an order that the accused persons be re-arrested and detained 
should the court reject the prosecution’s application for cancellation of bail 
order. Unjustifiably the Resident Magistrate cancelled his earlier order. 
According to him, he decided so in order to avoid a conflict between the 
executive and the judiciary. The High Court found that the Resident 
Magistrate was wrong to succumb to executive pressures and vary or cancel 
his previous order for bail. Mfarila, J., warned the Regional Commissioner that 
re-arresting the accused persons was illegal and abusive of the powers vested 
in him under the Act. The learned judge seriously remarked:
“ ...the Regional Commissioner could not have re­
arrested the accused persons again for the simple 
reason that he would have no powers to do so. Section 
7 (2) of the Regional and Area Commissioners Acts 
(Amendment) Act, 1963 is relevant. The Regional 
Commissioner could only do so if he wished to add to 
his list of illegal and high handed actions. In that 
event appropriate action would be taken against him.”
Continued application of these laws violates the right of appeal which is 
a component of fair hearing as guaranteed by the Constitution.305 It is also 
violation of various international and regional instruments to detain people
303Ibid.
304High Court of Tanzania at Mwanza, Miscellaneous Criminal Cause No. 54 of 1978, unreported.
305Article 13 (6) (a).
86
without trial. It should be noted that the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights is against arbitrary arrests or detention306 and where a person 
has been deprived of his liberty on criminal charge the Covenant requires 
prompt trial by a judicial authority.307 Further, it specifically demands 
treatment with humanity and respect any body deprived of his liberty by arrest 
or detention.308 Similarly the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
1981 prohibits arbitrary arrests and requires a quick trial of the arrested person 
by an impartial court.309
3:1:2:2 Curtailment offreedom o f movement and arbitrary arrest
In 1969 after the Arusha Declaration the Resettlement of Offenders Act, 
196931° was enacted as a means of eradicating crimes from society. Its main 
objective was 'to resettle "habitual offenders" and rehabilitate and re-integrate 
them in society'.311
It empowered the minister responsible for prisons to make a 
resettlement order in respect of any person convicted of a scheduled offence 
by a court.312 A scheduled offence meant any offence under the Witchcraft 
Ordinance, 1928 and any offence covered by the Minimum Sentences Act, 
1963.313 The resettlement orders, made by the minister under this Act, were not 
subject to review by any court.314
This Act subjected the convict to double punishment in that it gave 
power to the minister to punish a person within thirty days, after serving the 
court sentence, by issuing a resettlement order requiring him to leave a place 
of residence of his choice and settle in the designated area popularly known as
306Article 9 (1).
307Article 9 (3).
308Article 10 (1).
309Articles 6 and 7.
310ActNo. 8 of 1969.
31 ^ ee the Nyalali Commission Report, op. cit., p. 14.
312Section4.
313ActNo 29 of 1963.
314Ibid., section 16.
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the settlement centre. The government used this Act to resettle political 
dissidents although the objective of the Act was to rehabilitate and reintegrate 
habitual offenders as a means of reducing the crime rate. Unfortunately the 
Act did not give a definition of habitual offender, and anybody could qualify 
on the simple allegation of being dangerous.
Among the early victims of this piece of legislation were thirty 
Wanyambunda of Mbeya who were detained and finally resettled on the 
allegation of using witchcraft to influence people not to join Ujamaa 
Villages.315 Also the police used this Act to obtain the detention of people 
whom they believed had committed offences but against whom they had 
insufficient evidence to secure a conviction in court.316 It is an offence 
attracting twelve months imprisonment sentence, not to comply with the 
resettlement order.317 The order for resettlement was not affected by the 
imprisonment sentence following the offender's non-compliance but it could 
be carried out on completion of such sentence.
Although the settlers were supposed to be free, the settlement centres 
resembled a minimum security prison.318 Their movements were restricted. 
They could be released and set free by order of the minister319 or when 
pardoned by the President especially during the national holidays.320
Mroso, J., in Samwel Kubeja v. R.,m  underscored the requirement that 
the settlers should be free when living at the centres. He outlawed the attempt 
by the Minister and officers in charge of centres to detain the settlers in 
custody or in prison. The applicant in this case was a person who was served 
with a settlement order. On arrival at Songwe Settlement Centre he was
315 WILLIAMS, D., (1973), p. 196.
316See the Nyalali Commission Report, op. cit,, p. 15.
317Section 13.
318See the case of Samuel Kubeja v. R., High Court of Tanzania at Mbeya, Miscellaneous Criminal 
Application No 15 of 1981, unreported.
319ActNo. 8 of 1969, section 15.
320WILLIAMS, D., (1982), p. 97.
321 [1981] T.L.R. 72.
confined and kept under close guard by armed prison officers. He considered 
that confinement as tantamount to unlawful detention and contrary to the letter 
and spirit of the Resettlement of Offenders Act, 1969. Hence an application for 
the removal of such restrictions. In granting the application Mroso, J., 
remarked:
“It would appear that once a settler is at his centre, he 
should only be subject to the usual conditions of 
residence,...I am of the firm view that the 
confinement in a securely fenced area of the 
resettlement centre to which the applicant has been 
placed and where he is constantly guarded by armed 
prison wardens is unlawful.”
This is an example of a judge standing up for human rights before the 
Bill of Rights was enshrined in the Tanzanian Constitution.
In a bid to lead the country to fast economic development, the 
government found itself taking part in massive violations of individual 
fundamental rights. The enactment of the Human Resources Deployment Act, 
1983322 subjected the people to unwarranted arrests and forced labour. It made 
provisions for the establishment of a machinery to regulate and facilitate the 
utilisation of the human resources available within Tanzania in the best 
economic interest of the nation. The Act aimed at engaging all able-bodied 
persons in productive work following the country’s 'worst economic 
performance since independence.’323 In the early eighties the country was faced 
with scarcity of locally manufactured and imported goods and food rationing 
was inevitable. In order to ensure production the government resorted to 
various means including legislation and use of force especially in agricultural 
sector.
322ActNo. 6 of 1983.
323SHAIDI, L. P., p. 82.
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Under the Act the minister was required to work out a scheme 'for the 
purpose of ensuring that all residents who are capable of working, work more 
skilfully and productively.'324 Furthermore, the minister was also required to 
promote 'full deployment of available human resources' and to establish 
'organs devoted to that purpose'.325 To cap it all, very wide powers were vested 
in the minister to make arrangements for transfer or any other measure which 
would provide for 'rehabilitation and full deployment of persons charged with 
or previously convicted of being idle and disorderly'326 or 'a rogue and 
vagabond.'327 He had the power to take similar measures against anybody 
whom he could identify as 'an unemployed resident'328 especially in the towns. 
In implementing the directives under the Act, local authorities were given 
power to enact bye-laws to that effect and the Regional and Area 
Commissioners supervised the exercise.329
Gross violations of human rights by the authorities under the Act were 
experienced at the implementation level. Many urban dwellers were rounded 
up and randomly detained by the police pending repatriation to their villages 
of origin after spending a number of days in police custody. Self-employed 
people such as tailors, shoe-shiners and other unlicensed informal sector petty 
traders were the main victims of this law. It is said that a considerable number 
of those arrested were later found to be house-wives and students who were 
trying to supplement their income by doing part-time jobs.330 What remained 
unclear was the criterion for distinguishing a 'loiterer' from a self-reliant hard­
working person who instead of being harassed deserved support and assistance 
from the government.331 As a result innocent individuals and most of the
324Section4(l).
325Section 5(1).
326Section 26.
327Section 27.
328Section 17.
329LUGALLA, J. L., p. 144.
330On the catastrophes caused by implementation of the Act see SHAIDI, L., p. 86.
331For classification of what was legal and illegal activities in town see LUGALLA, J. L., p. 151.
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unemployed went into hiding to avoid detention, harassment and subsequent 
repatriation.
The colonial government used similar laws to remove the destitute and 
the unemployed from the cities and towns.332 Surprisingly, besides adopting 
colonial authoritarian laws, the independence government enacted another 
similar law giving the State further powers to remove the unemployed after 
criminalising them as ‘idle and disorderly persons.’ It was declared an offence 
which attracted a custodial sentence or fine333 for any unemployed person to 
reside in the town or the city since the government had chosen rural areas for 
all such people. Although the government incurred expense in repatriating 
unemployed town dwellers to their home villages, most o f them returned to the 
city immediately after receiving their food rations and some cash from the 
government to begin a new life. The whole operation and the enabling law 
violated a person's right to choose where to live. Since independence, the 
government of Tanzania has taken individual freedom of choice of 
employment as a luxury which the nation cannot afford.334
It is improper to hold someone criminally liable for his state of 
unemployment in a country like Tanzania where right to work is still a 
nightmare. People are increasingly becoming victims of redundancy and 
graduates are not guaranteed employment after completing their studies. The 
education system is geared towards passing examinations without considering 
any acceptable programme for those who may not perform well. Further, the 
fact that less attention is paid by the government to rural economic structures, 
does not encourage youths to stay in the villages for a living. Indeed the urban- 
based wage employees enjoy a better life than village peasants,335 a factor
332See the Townships ( Removal of Undesirable Persons ) Ordinance, 1944 and the Destitute Persons 
Ordinance, 1923.
333See the Penal Code (Cap. 16), section 176 as amended by the Written Laws (Miscellaneous 
Amendments) Act, 1983 (Act No. 2 of 1983).
334McCHESNEY, A., p. 182.
335LWOGA, C. M. F., p. 64.
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which even today contributes to the inevitable migration of young people from 
rural to urban areas.
Hitherto the police and people’s militia in the post-Bill of Rights era 
arrest people suspected of being idle and disorderly in towns under this law. 
Despite the Nyalali Commission's336 call for its immediate repeal, this Act has 
not been challenged in court and it has given rise to abuse and corruption. The 
street vendors popularly known as Machingas are being harassed, rounded-up 
and their business stalls demolished by local authority special paramilitary 
squads. Threats to repatriate them by force to their home villages are 
repeatedly aired but the government of the day hesitates to do this so as not to 
provide political capital for the opposition parties.
3:1:3 Abolition of political parties and trade unions
It has been mentioned earlier in this work that Tanganyika was a multi­
party state at the time of independence. Initially TANU coexisted with other 
opposition parties, some of whom had been formed immediately after 
independence. These parties appeared strong enough and politically 
determined to compete with TANU the then ruling party. As a result TANU 
used the advantage of being the government in power to suffocate the 
opposition groups in the same way as it had been suppressed by the 
colonialists.337 Eventually the government in power was successful in 
abolishing all opposition parties by officially declaring Tanzania a One-Party 
State338 and TANU was the political party under which all political activities 
were to be conducted. It was a decision of TANU in its annual conference in 
January 1963 that Tanzania should be a one-party State. Dr. Nyerere the then
336The Commission was named after the Chairman Francis Nyalali, C. J. It was appointed by the 
President in 1992 to report on the desirability of Tanzania opting for the multi-party democracy, 
to make recommendations on constitutional changes and on other laws in order to promote 
democracy.
337See MAGUIRE, G., pp. 338-360; PRATT, C., p. 187-188; MLIMUKA, A. K., and KABUDI, P. J., 
pp. 37-39; MWAIKUSA, J. T., (1990), p. 80.
338Interim Constitution, section 3.
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President and Chairman of the ruling party believed that a one-party policy 
was a better basis for democracy. He also believed that by establishing one- 
party policy he could safeguard the nation from disruptive and divisive politics 
which were suspected of being detrimental to the country’s unity and of being 
an obstacle to quick development.339
It was a very big contradiction to think of democracy in terms of one- 
party policy in whose founding no democracy was involved. Such a decision 
was very sensitive in that it marked a turning point from democracy to 
authoritarianism and it affected the rights of the citizens to associate and form 
political parties. Even as a matter of prudence the idea ought to have been 
tested by the people through public debates and discussion before it was made 
law. The people were not consulted nor were other political parties involved in 
making Tanzania a one-party state. It is indeed a distortion of the concept of 
democracy to use undemocratic means in a bid to establish democracy.340 This 
was followed by authoritarian rule and the suppression of dissent, as is 
common in one-party states.341 As Lobulu observed, the very prohibition of 
other political parties was a negation of the right to organise oneself, of the 
freedom of association and it constituted a serious inroad into the freedom of 
expression.342
Not only were the opposition political parties suppressed but also trade 
unionism was curtailed. Following the army mutiny in 1964, Tanganyika 
Federation of Labour (TFL) the autonomous trade union, was banned, for it 
was suspected of having engineered the mutiny. However the truth was that 
the trade union leaders were repeatedly opposed to the policies of TANU 
against workers. As a result Kassanga Tumbo, Victor Mkello and many other 
trade union leaders were detained. While the trade union leaders were in
339KUMAR, U., p. 123.
340ONG'WAMUHANA, K., (1989), p. 72.
341LUGAKINGIRA, K. S. K., (1990), p. 108.
342LOBULU, B. R., p. 82.
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detention, the government hastily introduced a Bill establishing NUTA as the 
sole trade union.343 NUTA was not a trade union in the normal sense but the 
state trade union since it was not autonomous344 and senior officials were 
appointed by the President. Indeed by affiliating the newly formed trade union 
with the ruling party, the state managed to control the working class through 
labour legislation.345 This shows how the government was determined to 
suppress not only opposition political parties but also all forms of opposition 
or dissent.
3:1:4 Arusha declaration and nationalisation
The Arusha Declaration spelt out TANU's policy of socialism and self- 
reliance rooted in equality among people. It preached against the exploitation 
of one person by another and the accumulation of wealth, tendencies that 
would be inconsistent with the aspirations of building a classless society. By 
this declaration of intent, war was waged against poverty with a view to 
building a state of prosperity. Nyerere found it impossible to achieve the 
declaration's objectives without first removing what he considered to be 
'elements of feudalism and capitalism'346 in the country. According to the 
declaration development in Tanzania could be achieved if  the major means of 
production were controlled and owned by the people through their government 
and co-operatives. Following this declaration therefore, all major means of 
production347 were nationalised so that the national wealth might be evenly 
distributed.
From the beginning of his career President Nyerere was against private 
property. The justiciable Bill of Rights, as understood by Nyerere, was
343See National Union of Tanganyika Workers (Establishment) Act, 1964. Act No. 18 of 1964.
344WELCH, C. E., (1978), pp. 650-652
345KAPINGA, W. B., (1985 A), p. 90.
346NYERERE, J. K., p. 16.
347For example banks, import and export trade, land, mineral resources, communication, electricity, 
industries, and other private firms.
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essentially meant to protect private property in a capitalist framework. To him 
it was simply meaningless to extend the concept of human rights in a society 
for which he had already chosen socialism.
The nationalisation policies were carried out without any legal backing 
but they were validated by Parliament later348 when specific pieces of 
legislation were enacted establishing public corporations such as the National 
Bank of Commerce349, the National Insurance Corporation,350 and the State 
Trading Corporation.351
The absence of a legal framework within which the Arusha Declaration 
was to operate coupled with the conflict it posed with the existing laws caused 
enormous implementation problems. Land owned under the deemed right of 
occupancy and other private property such as houses and machinery were 
taken by the government and given to the newly established Ujamaa villages 
without compensating the owner. It was impossible for aggrieved parties to 
obtain redress in the courts. Compensation was not made presumably because 
politicians believed that peasants would use the compensatory money to 
develop other areas of their own thereby 'making the goal of villagisation 
more difficult.'352 The government shielded itself against possible actions 
arising out of nationalisation and many others by enacting the Government 
Proceedings Act, 1967.353 Under that Act a ministerial fiat had to be sought 
before any one could institute a suit against the government or government 
official. So the Minister held his fiat until the matter was time barred or the 
person lost interest or died. There was an extensive use of this law by the 
government to cover those involved in nationalisation whenever they were
348See MWAIKUSA, J. T., (1991), p. 688.
349The National Bank of Commerce (Establishment and Vesting of Assets and Liabilities) Act, 1967 
(Act No. 1 of 1967).
350The National Insurance Corporation (Vesting of Interests and Regulations) Act, 1967 (Act No. 4 
of 1967).
35^ h e  State Trading Corporation (Establishment and Vesting of Assets and Liabilities) Act, 1967 
(Act No. 2 of 1967).
352JAMES, R. W., p. 4.
353 Act No 16 of 1967.
95
sued in their personal capacity. The case of Patrick Maziku v. G. A. Sebabili 
and 8 Others354 illustrates this behaviour. The plaintiff in this case sued the 
Tabora Region Government officials who were involved in the nationalisation 
of his milling machines. In the course of the proceeding the Attorney-General 
applied to be joined as a defendant on the ground that the defendants had acted 
in the course of their duties as government officials. Despite the plaintiffs 
objection and fear that if  the Attorney-General was joined consent would have 
to be sought and there was no guarantee that it would be forth-coming, the 
court granted the application. In the words of Chipeta, J.,:
“ ...it is not for this court to say whether or not 
consent would be forthcoming. The court confines 
itself to the legal procedures in the matter before it. It 
is not open for this court to inquire into the mind of 
the Attorney-General and surmise or direct as to what 
he w ill, or ought to do”
The suit died naturally, for the plaintiff had to seek ministerial fiat first 
and the same was never granted.
For unexhausted improvements made on a land owned under the 
granted right of occupancy compensation would be made. Despite the 
government's commitment to pay full and fair compensation in respect of the 
net value of the assets taken over,355 no compensation was promptly made. The 
government expected to effect compensation by 'instalments'356 out of the 
profits that the nationalized properties would make.357 These injustices pose 
more questions as to the way the Arusha Declaration was implemented 
especially in rural areas. However, Nyerere the founder of this ideology 
seemed to be against the tendencies which denied compensation when he 
observed:
354 High Court of Tanzania at Tabora, Civil Case No. 3 of 1982, unreported.
355See for example Act No. 1 of 1967, section 10.
356See the Acquisition of Buildings Act, 1971 (Act No. 13 of 1971), section 8 (4).
357NSEREKO, D. D., pp. 15-16.
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“By clearing the ground for my use it is clear that I 
am trying to transform this basic gift from God so that 
it can satisfy a human need. Whoever then takes this 
piece of ground must pay me for adding value to it 
through clearing it by my own labour.”358
From the above seemingly firm position taken by Nyerere in relation to 
compensation we would expect him to have supervised the implementation of 
the Arusha Declaration and make sure that ‘fair and equitable compensation 
was given’359 to those whose property was nationalised. By denying the people 
compensation for their nationalized property, nationalisation assumed a 
character of confiscation which is a punitive and retaliatory measure against 
the victims.
3:1:5 Land reform.
After independence the new government retained the colonial Land 
Ordinance, 1923360 together with its concept of 'public land.’361 All public 
lands and rights over it were placed under the control of the President 'for the 
use and common benefit of the natives of Tanganyika.'362 Existing rights over 
land were saved but freehold titles were converted into government leases363 
'for a term, at a rent and subject to development condition.'364 Later, 
government leases were converted into rights of occupancy365 following the 
Arusha Declaration. Conversion of titles was accompanied by definite and 
elaborate provisions about rights over the land in modem sector.
358NYERERE, j. K., pp. 53-54.
359SINGH, C., p. 88.
360Cap. 113.
361 Ibid., section 3 declared the whole of the lands of Tanganyika to be 'public land'.
3 62 Section 4.
363See Freehold Titles (Conversion to Government Leases) Act, 1963. (Cap. 523).
364COLDHAM, S., (1995), p. 228.
365See Government Leaseholds (Conversion to Rights of Occupancy) Act, 1969 (Act No. 44 of 
1969).
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However, the law gave to the President a wide range of powers 
including power to revoke any right of occupancy if in his opinion it was in the 
public interest366 and to refuse compensation if the occupier was 'not ordinarily 
resident in the United Republic,'367 and to acquire any building where in his 
opinion 'it is in the public interest so to do.'368 In this way many houses in 
urban areas were acquired by the government and little compensation was 
made to the owners.
There was no similar attention by way of legislation paid to customary 
land rights in rural areas except for the Customary Leasehold 
(Enfranchisement) Act, 1968369 which enforced the principle of "land to the 
tiller" by enfranchising certain lands held under customary land tenure and 
granting such lands to the tenants. Such omission was not an oversight but an 
intentional move for the independence government like 'the colonial state did 
not want its hands bound by law in relation to the land rights of customary 
land holders. These would be treated administratively.'370 In this kind of 
situation the government was able to deal with such land according to the 
policy that was adopted at any particular time. As Shivji observed:
"The lack of commitment on the part of the state to 
secure and guarantee customary rights subjected 
them to the expediency of administrative policy 
and action."371
Villagisation policy and the way it was carried out stands as an example 
in support of Shivji's finding. This policy followed the Arusha Declaration and 
sought to promote socialism and self reliance by resettling all the rural
366Land Ordinance, Cap. 113, section 10 (2), as amended by Land Laws (Miscellaneous 
Amendments) Act, 1970 (Act No. 28 of 1970) section 7.
367Ibid., section 14C.
368The Acquisition of Buildings Act, 1971 (Act No. 13 of 1971).
369Act No. 47 of 1968.
370See the report of the Presidential Commission on Land Policy ( the Land Commission Report) 
chaired by Professor Issa Shivji, Vol. 1, p. 13.
371SHIVJI,I. G., (1994), p. 5.
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population in planned villages. It was considered as the best way to bring 
about rural development in a socialist manner since people would be living 
together in Ujamaa Villages, making it easy for the government to provide 
them with the necessary infrastructure. Again, there was no legal framework to 
provide guidance during implementation of the policy. The assistance of legal 
mechanisms in the implementation was rejected by Nyerere when he issued a 
policy paper Socialism and Rural Development in September 1967, to guide 
the rural development programme of villagisation,372 This opened room for 
abuse of power and violation of human rights by the party and other State 
functionaries which were involved in the implementation.
People were rounded up and sometimes forced against their will to 
leave their traditional fertile places to join the infertile dry Ujamaa villages 
whose sites were unsuitable for agriculture and human habitation.373 In fact 
some of the land allocated for such villages were confiscated from their 
original occupiers without compensation.374 This happened because the land 
policy never protected the occupier of land under customary rights and no 
sufficient research was conducted before a particular site was chosen for 
settlement. It was no longer optional but compulsory for people to live in the 
government villages375 as clearly illustrated by the magnitude of the force used 
during implementation.376 In this operation the special armed police force 
(FFU), was used to destroy and bum houses that belonged to those people who 
were reluctant to move to the government planned villages. It is said that a 
significant number of people lost their lives in the operation.377
372WILLIAMS, D., (1973), p. 193.
373See MAPOLU, H., p. 120; McCHESNEY, A., p. 186.
374See MVUNGI, S., and MWAKYEMBE, H. G., p. 333.
375See the editorial comments in Daily News, 8th November 1973.
3760n state violence to enforce agricultural change see WILLIAMS, D., (1973), pp. 193-213.
377WILLIAMS, D., (1982), p. 115.
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Nyerere wanted to see the policy being implemented immediately, 
before educating the people about Ujamaa villages since it was crucial and 
urgently needed for rural development. He was quoted saying:
“Full socialism and its full appreciation by the 
peasants will come later, but their enrolment into 
Ujamaa villages must start now as a matter of 
necessity and urgency.”378
Those who attempted to question his decision were branded as trouble 
makers and were often severely dealt with since they opposed ‘the nation’s 
chosen path of development and impede the development of the people.’379 
This mass policy of compulsory villagisation to promote rural development 
was the 'most notable instance of Tanzanian reaction to the divergent strains 
of liberty and authority.'380 In fact even after 197 5381 the law remained vague 
about the rights of villagers.
3:2 Side-stepping the judiciary
Since the government suspected the courts of undermining the efforts 
for quick development, different methods were worked out as devices to get 
rid of possible court actions against the interests of the State. The use of the 
ouster clauses and the establishment of extra-judicial tribunals were the 
government’s favoured methods of avoiding the judiciary.
3:2:1 Use of Ouster clauses and restricting the court’s discretion
An ouster clause in this context is a phrase in a statute which excludes 
or restricts the jurisdiction of the court over a particular matter. The
378See Daily News, 3rd November 1973 as quoted in WILLIAMS, D., 1973, p. 194.
379See The Nationalist, 23rd October 1968 as quoted in MARTIN, R., p. 32.
380RJBAD, J. S., (1973 B), p. 138.
381Following the enactment of Villages and Ujamaa Villages (Registration, Designation and 
Administration) Act, 1975 (Act No. 21 of 1975).
100
government through parliament removed from the court the power to entertain 
certain matters of state interest. This method consolidated the wide powers of 
the executive and protected it from court action in cases of alleged abuse.382
Earlier in this chapter we illustrated the authoritarian nature of the 
Preventive Detention Act, 1962. The President was permitted by this law to 
detain any one without being questioned since the legality of any order made 
under this Act could not be challenged in a court of law.383 Indeed the 
President was given very wide executive powers which enabled him to 
infringe individual fundamental rights with impunity.
Also the court’s jurisdiction was ousted whenever the minister made a 
resettlement order in respect of a person convicted of scheduled offence by a 
court.384 Similarly, when Regional and Area Commissioners detained people 
without trial under the Regions and Regional Commissioners Act, 1962 and 
the Area Commissioners Act, 1962, no court of law could review, quash, 
reverse or interfere with such exercise of their powers. It is interesting to note 
that the court’s jurisdiction was always ousted whenever the executive was 
vested with very wide powers over the people, the exercise of which was 
likely to abuse if  not controlled.385 By ousting the jurisdiction of the court in 
certain matters, it meant the affected parties were left at the mercy of the 
person exercising such powers. It is against the rule of law to treat certain 
matters as special and beyond the court’s jurisdiction or intervention.
The court’s jurisdiction was also ousted by imposing statutory 
restrictions on the traditional discretion of the court especially when 
considering matters of bail and when sentencing offenders. The Minimum 
Sentences Act, 19 6 3 386 restricted the discretion previously enjoyed by judges
382-por a discussion on the use of ouster clauses by the government to side-step the judiciary, see 
WAMBALI, M. K., and PETER, C. M., pp. 139 - 141.
383Act No. 60 of 1962, section 3.
384ActNo. 8 of 1969, op. cit., section 16.
3850ther such laws include: the Economic Sabotage (Special Provisions) Act, 1983, op. cit.; the 
Emergency Powers Act, 1986, op. cit.
386Op cit.
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and magistrates when sentencing convicted persons. The Act made the 
infliction of corporal punishment mandatory for those convicted of scheduled 
offences.387 Although this law was repealed and replaced by the Minimum 
Sentences Act, 1972388 the restrictions on the courts powers were not removed. 
The latter simply removed mandatory corporal punishment for scheduled 
offences and replaced it with increased minimum penalties for property 
offences. The court therefore had no discretion to pronounce lesser punishment 
than the one provided under the Act.
In determining the convict’s appropriate sentence, the courts usually 
considered, inter alia, the needs of the offender and how he could ‘best be re­
integrated into the community.’389 Individualisation in sentencing the offender 
was removed and the court in certain offences could no longer assess the 
offenders’ needs before sentencing him.
There has increasingly been a tendency to deny the courts the 
jurisdiction to grant bail at its own discretion. Matters of bail consideration are 
removed from the court’s jurisdiction just by a statutory provision, specifying 
certain offences as non-bailable.390 Also the court’s discretion to grant bail to 
the accused person is completely ousted if the Director of Public Prosecutions 
certifies in writing that the safety or interests of the United Republic would be 
prejudiced if the accused person was released on bail.391 Indeed, the right to 
bail seems to depend on the discretion of the Director of Public Prosecutions 
rather than the courts, even where such right is not completely removed by the 
statute.
By fixing the minimum sentences and putting restrictions on bail, the 
government seem to have little trust in judges and magistrates in their judicial
387Sections 5 and 11.
388Act No. 1 of 1972.
389WILLIAMS, D., (1974), p. 89.
390For example the Criminal Procedure Act, 1985 (Act No. 9 of 1985), section 148 (5); and the 
Economic and Organized Crime Control Act, 1984 (Act No. 13 of 1984), section 35 (3).
391See The National Security Act, 1970 (Act No. 3 of 1970), section 19.
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functions. It is not clear whether this is a reflection of the government’s 
feelings that the judiciary is undermining its efforts or it is simply an indirect 
way of exercising judicial powers by the executive. It seems the early 
suspicion by the post-independence government is still there even when there 
are no longer foreign judges in the Tanzanian judiciary.
3:2:2 Establishment of extra-judicial tribunals
Unlike the courts of law administrative tribunals have lay composition, 
do not follow strict legal procedures nor are they concerned with legal 
"technicalities''. This has been the main argument advanced by the 
government and advocates of quick justice. Perhaps the only clear reasons for 
establishing such tribunals were the government's distrust of the courts and 
hence the desire to preclude the courts in certain cases of state interest. This 
can be deduced from the words of President Nyerere during the crackdown on 
racketeers and economic saboteurs in 1983 when he addressed the nation thus:
“...I ask magistrates to forgive us if we hesitate to take 
culprits to court of law. At times racketeers have been 
taken to courts where they either receive light 
sentences or have been set free...In the courts 
racketeers could use their ill-gotten money to engage 
lawyers or use that money to twist the law in their 
favour”392
The government thought that persons who were suspected of 
committing certain crimes that affected the national economy were protected 
by the law more than it was necessary, especially during trial. Thus, such 
accused persons' right to secure protection of the law was taken away by the
392See Daily News, 6th April 1983. Also quoted in WAMBALI, M. K., and PETER, C. M., pp. 139- 
140.
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most controversial piece of legislation, the Economic Sabotage (Special 
Provisions) Act, 1983.393
This law was enacted for purposes of controlling and eradicating 
corruption, racketeering, and many other culpable acts not covered by criminal 
law. It was preceded by the government’s declaration of a crackdown against 
suspected economic saboteurs. Following this crackdown which started on 
25th March 1983, people were arrested and detained for months, many for no 
good reason.394 While the suspects were in custody the Bill was hurriedly 
drafted but designed to cover the suspects in custody and it was tabled before 
the National Assembly in April 1983. On the very day it was tabled, there 
were no debate or discussions about it but within minutes it was passed as law 
and assented to by the President on 4th May, 1983 having retrospect effect 
from 25th March, 1983 when the crackdown had started. The whole 
crackdown was tainted with lots of serious irregularities likely to occasion 
injustices if  not very closely controlled. In any case, these irregularities would 
not have passed the court’s scrutiny. Many offences, which were covered by 
other laws, were included in the schedule to the Act as “Economic Offences”, 
and were consequently removed from the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts of 
the land.
All offences under that Act were exclusively triable in a special tribunal 
known as the Anti-Economic Sabotage Tribunal395 consisting of a chairman 
(judge of the High Court), and not more than twelve other presidential 
appointees. The decision of the tribunal was final and conclusive and could not 
be subject to review by any court or person.396 Any person in respect of whom 
proceedings were instituted before the tribunal could not be released out on
393 Op cit.
394Some people were detained for being found in possession of drugs obtained through medical 
prescription.
395Section 5 (1).
396Section 20. Initially the section stated that anybody aggrieved by the decision of the tribunal could 
appeal to the President whose decision was final and conclusive. Two months later the section was 
amended by Act No. 10 of 1983 making the tribunal's decision final and conclusive.
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bail until the proceedings were concluded.397 Under the Act no advocate could 
appear before the tribunal to defend the accused person unless he went as a 
defence witness.398
For the purpose of hearing and determining any matter brought before 
it, the tribunal consisted of three members under the chairmanship of the High 
Court judge and the decisions were based on the majority399 whereby the two 
lay-members could overrule the judge. This happened in the case of R, v. 
Nurumohamed Gulamrasul.m  In this case the accused person was charged 
with the unlawful possession of a elephant's tusks. The lay-members' verdict 
was that he was not guilty and the judge was bound even though he found the 
accused guilty. However, he wrote a comprehensive judgment expressing 
reasons for holding different view from that of the assessors and this led to 
changing the law to the effect that the judge should not be bound by the 
assessors’ verdict in such cases.
The Economic Sabotage (Special Provisions) Act was unique in many 
respects and its retrospective effect was a mockery of the process of criminal 
justice. The persons most affected were the business-men in Kagera Region 
who were detained and their properties especially motor vehicles401 acquired 
by the government. In consequence of the implementation of the Economic 
Sabotage Act many vehicles and other articles related to transport were placed 
in police custody resulting in the stoppage of transport activities in the region. 
In order to alleviate transport problems in the region the government found a 
solution by acquiring the motor vehicles and sending them back on the road. 
They were so acquired through an Act of Parliament and were re-granted to
397Section 4 (4).
398Section 13.
399Section 5 (3).
400 Reported in Daily News, 13th February 1988.
401Most of them being buses, lorries, trucks and tankers.
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the Kagera Region Transport Company which was established following the 
acquisition.402
Others who were unjustifiably arrested and detained by the Regional 
Commissioner in implementation of the law, could be released by the special 
tribunal after trial but the problem was the restoration of their seized property. 
This can be illustrated by the case of John Mwombeki Byombalirwa v. The 
Regional Commissioner and the Regional Police Commander.403 The applicant 
in this case was arrested and a substantial amount of his property worth 
millions of shillings was seized. He was charged with hoarding property 
before a special tribunal and acquitted. The tribunal ordered immediate 
restoration of the property seized or the money realised from the sale of such 
property in case they were already sold. The order was made on 27/08/1984, 
but until 1986 he had received nothing and he filed an application for 
mandamus. During the hearing of the application the State Attorney admitted 
before the High Court that the property was seized but:
“They cannot tell if all the seized property was sold and 
if it was sold they cannot tell how much was realised 
and if  there is any money they cannot tell where it is 
lying5’
Mwalusanya, J., granted the application for mandamus after holding 
that the injustice already done to the applicant were substantial and 
unwarranted.
The Economic Sabotage (Special Provisions) Act came under fire and 
was criticised by the international community for its abuse of the due process 
of law and failure to conform with conventional principles of the 
administration of criminal justice. It was after eighteen months from the
402See the Kagera Transport Assets (Acquisition and Regrant) Act, 1984 (Act No. 1 of 1984).
403High Court of Tanzania at Mwanza, Miscellaneous Civil Cause No. 22 of 1986, unreported 
(reproduced in PETER, C. M., (1997), p. 254).
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effective date that the Act was repealed and replaced by the Economic and 
Organized Crime Control Act, 1984.404 This new law brought about 
fundamental changes in the administration of criminal justice for the suspects 
of economic crimes. However, the Act still contains a catalogue of "economic 
offences", most of them being ordinary criminal offences405 which were 
adequately covered by the Penal Code before they were made economic 
offences.
The National Economic Sabotage Tribunal was replaced by the High 
Court sitting as an Economic Crimes Court and it was presided over by a High 
Court judge with two assessors whose decisions were no longer binding on the 
judge.
Also, the Resident Magistrates Court can now (with the consent of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions) try such offences as an Economic Crimes 
Court.406 Having restored the jurisdiction of the courts the new legislation 
restored also the right of an accused person to have legal representation and 
the right to bail for some offences. Also, convicted persons can appeal, as of 
right, to the High Court and the Court of Appeal.
Other tribunals determined matters of civil nature. Following the 
enfranchisement of customary leaseholds, the government gave power to the 
minister to establish the Customary Land Tribunals for purposes of hearing 
disputes arising out of such enfranchisement.407 The tribunals regarded 
themselves as special organs in enforcing socialism. As a result they 
overturned the court decisions that were made before the tribunals came in 
force408 and the new orders of the tribunal were referred to the court for
404Act No. 13 of 1984.
405For example: hoarding commodities, conveying or having possession of goods suspected of 
having been stolen or unlawfully acquired, cattle theft and stock theft.
406ActNo. 13 of 1984, section 12.
407ActNo. 47 of 1968, section 8.
408JAMES, R. W., pp. 12-13
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enforcement.409As James argues, this embarrassed the judiciary in that the 
court was asked 'to proceed against a party in whose favour it had decided.'410
Labour disputes were removed from the jurisdiction of the court and 
placed under either the Conciliation Board and the Minister411 or the Labour 
Tribunal established under the Permanent Labour Tribunal Act, 1967.412 The 
minister's decision was final and conclusive with regard to any dispute arising 
out of summary dismissal413 and could not be reviewed by any court. Further, 
all trade disputes were subject to compulsory arbitration proceedings at the 
Labour Tribunal whose decision was final.414
The Acquisition of Buildings Act, 1971 gave power to the President to 
establish and appoint members of the Appeals Tribunal where anybody 
aggrieved by the acquisition of his building or the amount of compensation 
might lodge his appeal.415 However, the decision of the Appeals Tribunal was 
final and conclusive, not 'subject to review by any court.'416 The Rent 
Restriction Act also established the Housing Tribunal and the Housing 
Appeals Tribunal to take care of the landlord/ tenant disputes.417 Also the 
decision of the Housing Appeals Tribunal is final and conclusive.418
Arguably the pattern of quasi-judicial tribunals tends to suggest that the 
government ousted the jurisdiction of the court by establishing special 
tribunals in those areas it considered sensitive or Tilcely to cause political and 
social instability’.419 All was engineered by the government’s desire to have
409See Act No. 47 of 1968, section 12.
410JAMES, R. W.,p. 13.
41 ^ e e  the Security of Employment Act, 1964 (Act No. 62 of 1964).
412Act No. 41 of 1967. For a detailed discussion see RUTINWA, B., pp. 1-12
413Act No. 62 of 1964, sections 27 and 28.
414The Labour Tribunal became an Industrial Court under the chairmanship of the High Court judge 
following the enactment of the Permanent Labour Tribunal (Amendment) Act, 1990 (Act No. 3 of 
1990).
415ActNo. 13 of 1971, section 10 (1) and (3).
416Ibid., section 10 (4) and (5).
417Rent Restriction Act, 1984 (Act No. 17 of 1984), section 6(1).
418Section43 (1).
419WAMBALI, M. K and PETER, C. M., p. 140.
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institutions which could be easily controlled in avoiding embarrassments 
caused by the court decisions.
3:3 The reaction of the judiciary
In the wake of these government policies the judiciary found itself 
working in difficult environment. It was not easy for judicial officers to 
dispense justice without fear or favour. To certain extent the judiciary was 
divided in its reaction to the government’s way of implementing its 
development policy. Some judicial officers considered themselves part of the 
institutions through which the government was to achieve its development 
objectives. This section of judicial officers supported the government in all 
ways and could find nothing wrong with most of the policies which obviously 
attempted to erode the independence of the judiciary. It is very unfortunate that 
all three Chief Justices in the post-independence government subscribed to this 
school of thought as reflected in most of their speeches.
3:3:1 The Chief Justices.
Since 1965 the Tanzanian judiciary has been headed by three black 
Chief Justices: Honourable Philip T. Georges from the Caribbean,420 
Honourable Augustine Said421 and Honourable Francis Nyalali422 the 
Tanzanians.
Georges, C. J., turned out to be one of the great supporters of the 
decision to make Tanzania a one-party state and he conducted his campaign in 
public. He approved the argument favoured by the leaders of TANU that 
Tanganyika was a one-party state at the time of independence simply because 
TANU had a landslide win in the early elections. This view comes out clearly 
in his speech:
420March 1965-April 1971.
421May 1971-February 1977.
4221977 to date.
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“Long before that date, of course, Tanganyika had 
been in fact a one-party state. Certainly from 
September 1958 it was clear that no other political 
party could challenge TANU for mass African 
support. By November 1960, 58 out of 71 TANU 
candidates were returned unopposed at an election.
TANU won all the contested seats except one.”423
Although he was quite sure that the idea of one party rule cannot be 
easily separated from authoritarianism, he still considered the Tanganyika one- 
party state to be “unique” and markedly different. According to him, the 
‘freedom to promote political ideas by the formation of political parties’ in 
Tanganyika was ‘unnecessary’ and could well be harmful to national unity and 
national betterment.424 It was in this understanding that he urged the judicial 
officers to become members of the ruling party when he said:
“...it seems to me that the judicial officer should, if  he 
wishes to, become a member of TANU, and that at 
this stage this is perhaps desirable.”425
Arguably for a judicial officer, being a member of TANU, meant 
taking up another oath of allegiance to the ruling party and promoting its 
policies. Here, the judiciary found itself at a cross road since the ruling party 
was increasingly substituting political expediency for legality in running its 
affairs. This conduct, undoubtedly, affected the citizens and the judicial 
officers were required by their judicial oath to do justice according to law. 
Independence of the judiciary was indeed threatened by this practice since 
some judicial officers turned to be excessively enthusiastic about TANU and
423JAMES, R. W., and KASSAM, F. M., p. 10.
424JAMES, R. W., and KASSAM, F. M., pp. 10-11.
425Ibid., p. 28.
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its policies. Later on one had to be a member of the ruling party in order to be 
appointed judicial officer.426
Said, C. J., also happened to be indoctrinated by the policies of TANU 
especially that of Ujamaa. He regarded himself as a person to look after the 
interest of the ruling party's policy of socialism in the judiciary. In order to 
achieve this he assigned to himself, by issuing a circular to all courts in the 
country, exclusive powers in trying all cases, of civil and criminal nature, 
involving Ujamaa Villages. That circular which required magistrates and 
judges to send to the Chief Justice for trial all case files involving Ujamaa 
villages, was not well received by judges for it subjected the judicial officers 
to political considerations. Mwakasendo, J., (as he then was) asked his 
colleagues to ignore the circular since it was not law at all and Parliament had 
not enacted any law governing the establishment of Ujamaa villages427 
However, many subordinate courts complied with the requirement of the 
circular by sending the relevant files to the Chief Justice.
As if this was not enough, the Chief Justice was quoted asking the 
judicial officers to identify themselves with the ruling party by passing 
decisions which did not oppose the party’s progressive idea of Ujamaa. In his 
own words the Chief Justice said:
“Since Tanzania believed in Ujamaa then, the interest 
of many people in land cases should override those of 
some few individuals. The judiciary could not be used 
as a tool to oppose Ujamaa...as citizens and TANU 
members, the courts are bound to further Ujamaa.”428 
(Emphasis added).
426It reached a stage where without being a member of the ruling party one could not get a University 
education.
427For a detailed discussion see WAMBALI, M. K., and PETER, C. M., pp. 135-136. See also 
PETER, C. M., (1987), p. 238.
428See Daily News, 26th September 1972, “Put Ujamaa First”, and discussed in WAMBALI, M. K., 
and PETER, C. M , p. 136.
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In 1978 there was another unfortunate concession to political factors by 
Nyalali, C. J., whereby government policy overrode legality. This is illustrated 
by the case of Ally Juuyawatu v. Loselian Mollel and Landanai Co-operative 
Society Ltd A19 The plaintiffs mining licence was unjustifiably withdrawn and 
given with all his equipment to the respondent Co-operative Society in order to 
promote socialism. When the matter was sub judice the Regional Security 
Committee under the chairmanship of the Regional Commissioner 
unsuccessfully attempted to have the suit withdrawn from the court and 
transferred to be heard by the Committee. Following the failure to transfer the 
file to the Regional Security Committee, pressure came from the Chief Justice 
who wanted the file to be taken to him immediately. The file was urgently 
needed ‘for action to be immediately taken on it by the Honourable Chief 
Justice on instructions o f His Excellency the President o f  the United Republic 
o f  Tanzania.M3° The judge’s chambers were invaded and searched, while he 
was in open court, until the file was found and sent to the Chief Justice. When 
the file was returned to the judge for hearing, he disqualified himself from 
further handling of the case for he felt threatened and prejudiced.
The foregoing account illustrates the response of the three Chief 
Justices to government policy and desire for quick development at the expense 
of individual fundamental rights.431
3:3:2 The courts’ reaction
The impact of the approach of the Chief Justices on the rest of the 
judges and magistrates cannot be over-emphasised. Nevertheless, some of the 
judicial officers went on looking for every possible way of doing justice to
4291979 L.R.T. No. 6.
430Ibid.
431 We note an apparent change of heart by Nyalali, C. J., since the Bill of Rights became part of the 
Constitution. However, as we shall see this has largely not been the case when he is attending to 
matters of state interest. See for example, his interpretation of "freedom of association" in the 
context of the right to form political parties in Tanzania (footnote 708).
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people amidst limitations imposed by the government. To a large extent, the 
judiciary was positivist in attitude and worked within the confines of the little 
space that was left by the law. In other words, the judiciary respected what the 
law stated even if  such law happened to be oppressive or violative of 
individual fundamental rights and freedoms.
3:3:2:1 Reaction to ouster clauses and restrictions
Since the jurisdiction of the court in cases of detention without trial 
was increasingly ousted, courts of law contented themselves with examining 
the procedural aspects, authenticity and propriety of the detention orders or 
warrants without questioning the legality and circumstances which led to the 
issuance of such orders. This is illustrated by the case of Ahmed Janmohamed 
Dhirani v. 7?.432 The applicant was challenging, by way of habeas corpus, his 
detention without trial. As usual, the persons concerned were served with the 
court’s summons requiring them to produce a valid detention order before the 
applicant could be released on bail. After dilly-dallying the Officer in Charge 
Butimba Prison managed to produce a copy of the detention order. Maganga, 
J., (as he then was), after satisfying himself as to the existence of the detention 
order dismissed the application. According to him, although the court was not 
precluded from inquiring into the genuineness of the order but:
“ ...once it is established that an order purporting to 
have been made under the Act is a genuine order, then 
the courts are stopped from further inquiring into the 
circumstances under which the order has been 
made.”433
4321979 L.R.T. No. 1.
433For similar views see Hanif Ali Ladak's case, infra; R.. v. James Mapalala and Mwinyijuma 
Athmani Upindo, High Court of Tanzania at Dar Es Salaam, Miscellaneous Criminal Cause No. 30 
of 1986, unreported.
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This means a court could enquire into the procedural aspects pertaining 
to the order itself without enquiring into the substance. Formal matters (for 
example, names, dates, signatures, public seals, place of deportation, etc.) were 
examined by the court when hearing applications for orders of habeas corpus 
and mandamus. If the detention order or warrant lacked the appropriate 
signature or public seal, or if it mentioned a name other than that of the 
detainee, then it could be held defective. For example in H anif Ali Ladak and 
Another v. Regional Prisons Officer434 the judge was prepared to hear the 
substance of the application for a writ of habeas corpus involving a 
deportation order. We saw in chapter two that any order made under the 
Deportation Ordinance, Cap 38 is not appellable to the Court. However, 
because the second applicant claimed that he had never been known by the 
name which was on the order the court felt bound to examine the merit of that 
contention and if it could be found true then he would be released. After 
conducting an enquiry it was established that the name on the order was also 
the second applicant’s name and Mnzavas, J., (as he then was) remarked:
“It is therefore clear in so far as the law is concerned 
that had it not been for the uncertainty regarding the 
identification of the second application the court 
would have no hesitation in dismissing second 
applicant’s application in the same manner it did in 
respect of the first applicant”
If the order did not state the specific place or resettlement centre where 
the detainee was to be deported to, then under normal circumstances it would 
be defective and ineffective in the eyes of the Court. This happened in the case 
of In Re: Winfred Ngonyani435 In that case the deportation order and detention 
warrant both were found defective by the court for they failed to specify the 
place where the detainee was to be deported to. Thus Biron. J., (as he then
434[1981] T.L.R. 68.
435[1982] T.L.R. 272.
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was) considered such defect as a ‘material irregularity’ sufficient to declare 
the detention unlawful.
Also in the absence of any lawful detention order signed by the 
President the court always ordered immediate release of the detainee from 
custody as occurred in the case of George Washington Maeda v. Regional 
Prisons Officer Arusha:436The applicant was arrested and detained in Arusha 
Remand Prison until his wife filed the application for a writ of habeas corpus. 
The detainee was not told the reason for being detained nor was he taken to 
court to answer any charge. In the course of the proceeding the State Attorney 
conceded that there was no any lawful order signed by the President under any 
of his powers so as to entitle the prison authorities to detain the detainee. The 
Court made an order for his immediate release.
The absence of specific legislation to act as a framework in the 
enforcement of Ujamaa villages and villagisation policy did lead the judiciary 
to repeated intervention. The major problem in the implementation of Ujamaa 
villages policy was the absence of specific body responsible for the task. There 
was no legally created body charged with powers to supervise and take 
responsibility for the exercise in general. Since Ujamaa villages were initially 
not legal personalities, no suit could be maintained against them. The 
respondent in Mbarika Ujamaa Village v. Nyanda Malimi,437 lost the case on 
this ground. He had filed a suit against the Ujamaa Village whose cattle had 
destroyed his crops. The Primary Court awarded him compensation and the 
appeal to the District Court was dismissed. However, on appeal to the High 
Court, Maganga. Ag. J., (as he then was) allowed the appeal among other 
reasons on the ground that:
“ ...there was no evidence adduced in the trial court
that Mbarika Ujamaa Village was a legal entity which
436High Court of Tanzania at Arusha, Miscellaneous Criminal Cause No. 36 of 1979, unreported.
4371975 L.R.T. No. 63.
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could sue and be sued. In the absence of such proof a 
suit could not be maintained against the village.”
That was the situation until 1975 when the Villages and Ujamaa 
Villages (Registration, Designation and Administration) Act438 was enacted. 
However, the court entertained suits involving Ujamaa villages through the 
village chairmen, secretaries or the ruling party in order to redress the 
aggrieved parties.
Whereas the new idea of socialism was very much opposed to private 
property, paradoxically the laws which protected private property in 
Tanzania remained unchanged. As a result, some attempts by the ruling party 
to interfere with private property in order to promote socialism could not be 
tolerated by courts especially when such interference was oppressive and 
unjust. In the case of Lalata Msangawale v. Henry Mwamlima439 the 
appellant’s shamba and all that was planted in it were confiscated to form 
part of the Ujamaa village by order of the District TANU Office without 
compensation. The court held that the appellant was entitled in law to be 
compensated for his efforts invested on that shamba. In his judgment 
Mwesiumo, J., (as he then was), had this to say:
“In this country we still respect the law on individual 
ownership of property and since the appellant had 
invested his labour on that piece of land those other 
people who took it over should have paid him 
compensation...”
The same view was taken by Mnzavas, J., (as he then was), in Laiton 
Kigala v. Mussa Bariti440 when the plaintiff was expelled from an Ujamaa 
village without being compensated for his energy used to clear about 60 acres 
of the village’s plantation. Initially the District Administration declined to
438ActNo. 21 of 1975.
4391979 L.R.T. No. 3.
4401975 L.R.T. No. 40.
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execute the compensation decree since such compensation would have a 
negative ‘political implication’ amounting to opposing the policy of Ujamaa. 
However, the High Court rejected the political expediency as substitute for 
legality and it ordered immediate compliance with the District Court’s order 
for compensation.
3:3:2:2 Interpretation o f harsh legislation
It is clear from some of the decisions of the court that due to the 
authoritarian nature of the Acts which empowered the executive to detain, 
sometimes without trial, strict interpretation was required. It was also apparent 
that there was a great need to restrict application of such harsh laws. In line 
with this thinking was the finding of Mnzavas, J. K, (as he then was), in 
D.P.P. v. Simon Marwa and Abdurahman Seif.441 The accused persons were 
charged with possession of a pistol and several rounds of ammunition. Before 
and during the trial the accused persons were detained under the Preventive 
Detention Act, 1962. The Subordinate Court found them guilty and referred 
the case to the High Court for sentencing given the gravity of the offence. The 
accused persons also appealed against conviction but the appeal was 
dismissed. However, the learned judge believed that sentencing such accused 
persons would amount to punishing them twice for the same offence. He was 
of the opinion that in strict terms the preventive detention amounted to a 
custodial punishment. Having arrived at this conclusion, the judge refrained 
from sentencing them. This finding was quashed by the Court of Appeal on the 
ground that the Preventive Detention Act, 1962 did not create any specific 
offence.442
What the High Court did in this particular case was to express by way 
of interpretation the injustices occasioned by such law which tend to remove
441 High Court of Tanzania at Dar Es Salaam, Criminal Appeals Nos. 17 and 18 of 1984, unreported.
442See D.P.P. v. Simon Marwci and Abdurahman Seif, Court of Appeal of Tanzania, Criminal Appeal 
No. 46 of 1984, unreported.
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the presumption of innocence to the suspect and as a consequence infringing 
the individual fundamental rights and freedom. Unfortunately this approach 
was not followed by the conservative Court of Appeal which did not see the 
obvious punitive nature of the Act.
Other judges could not see any injustice that was likely to be 
occasioned by irregularities in the detention orders and as such found that 
there was no justification for the court’s intervention or for the strict 
interpretation of such harsh laws. The case of Ahmed Janmohamed Dhirani v. 
R443 is an example. The judge, in an application for habeas corpus, was simply 
shown a photocopy of the detention order signed by the Second Vice President 
and bearing no public seal. In spite of such serious irregularities on the alleged 
detention order, like the absence of a public seal, signed by someone else other 
than the President and the failure to produce the original order, the judge was 
satisfied that the detention order was a genuine one. To him the absence of the 
public seal on the order was an irregularity which would not invalidate it. In 
bringing this idea home, the judge said:
“...the order was meant to bear the Public Seal and as 
such the absence of the Public Seal impression can be 
attributed to an oversight...”
Although the Act did not empower any other person but the President to 
make detention orders, the judge presumed that since many laws empowered 
the President to delegate his powers, he must have exercised that power and 
delegated to the Second Vice President the power to issue detention orders 
under the Preventive Detention Act, 1962. Here the judge’s assumption of the 
authenticity of the obviously defective detention order, made him look more 
executive-minded than legal. The Court of Appeal in the same year provided a
443Op cit.
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guidance in the case of Attorney-General v. Lesinoi Ndeinai and Others444 in 
relation to the circumstances when the detention order signed by the Vice 
President could be genuine. The High Court ordered immediate release from 
prison all applicants after the respondents had produced a photostat copy of a 
detention order made under the Preventive Detention Act, signed by the Vice 
President but bearing no Public Seal. The High Court found the order to be 
defective. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the absence of a public seal 
on the detention order was a fatal irregularity making the order invalid, 
because strict compliance with law and procedure was very important before 
one’s freedom could be taken away.
Also, in the case of R. v. The Principal Commissioner o f  Prisons Ex 
Parte Saidi Hilari445 the judge accepted as genuine a deportation order which 
did not specify the place of deportation and was signed three weeks after the 
detention. Although the court held as illegal the detention of the applicant 
before the detention order was signed by the President, it did not order his 
immediate release since the irregularity was cured by the belated lawful 
deportation order. Undoubtedly the judge failed in his duty here as also 
happened in the case of Ally Yusuf Mpore v. R446 where the judge, instead of 
ordering immediate release of the detainee, adjourned the case so that the 
proper detention order signed by the President could be obtained and get 
produced in court after the whole detention had been declared a nullity. The 
applicant was arrested and detained in an intensive campaign to break up the 
syndicate responsible for a fraud transaction in the army involving 60 million 
shillings. It was the President who issued the instructions and signed relevant 
orders for those involved. However, there was no such order in respect of the 
applicant even during the hearing of the application. As the Court delivered the
444[1980] T.L.R. 214.
445High Court of Tanzania at Dar Es Salaam, Miscellaneous Criminal Cause No. 44 of 1979, 
unreported.
446High Court of Tanzania at Dar Es Salaam, Miscellaneous Criminal Cause No. 2 of 1977, 
unreported (reproduced in PETER, C. M., (1997), p. 619).
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ruling letting the applicant at liberty, the respondent asked the court for time to 
produce within hours the detention order signed by the President. In a rather 
bizarre way, the court granted them leave and a few hours later, the order was 
produced. The learned judge rescinded his previous order and the applicant 
remained in detention.
There was a serious failure by the court to perform its duty in James 
Bita v. Idd Kambi447 when the District Magistrate complied with the District 
Party Secretary’s restrictive note requiring him to refer the case to the party 
since the dispute was of a political nature. The appellant was dispossessed of 
his plot of land by the Village Council in dubious circumstances and the same 
was reallocated to someone else. He successfully instituted a suit in the 
Primary Court claiming back his land. When the matter reached the District 
Court on appeal, the magistrate was asked by the District Party Secretary to 
consult the District Party authority before deciding the case. He complied and 
let the Party leadership uphold the Village Council’s decision dispossessing 
the plaintiff. The magistrate after receiving the Party’s decision, adopted it and 
wrote a routine judgment but complained against the unfairness of the 
decision of the Party by which he felt bound. The District Court’s decision was 
quashed by the High Court since Tanzania was not a Banana Republic ‘where 
judges can be dismissed at whims and where judgments are written by 
rulers.’448 The District Court was ordered to hear the appeal on merits.
Another example of the subservient attitude of some of the judiciary is 
provided in Mohammed Ahmed v. R449 where Maganga, J. (as he then was), 
refused to hear an application for habeas corpus filed by a person detained 
during the national crackdown on economic saboteurs. The applicant wanted 
to know why he was arrested and detained. The judge simply appealed to
4470p cit.
448See Re: An Application by Paul Massawe, High Court of Tanzania at Arusha, Miscellaneous Civil 
Application No. 21 of 1977, unreported.
449High Court of Tanzania at Mwanza, Miscellaneous Criminal Cause No. 16 of 1983, unreported.
120
intuition and dismissed the application on the ground that any “fool” knew 
that there was a nation-wide crackdown on economic saboteurs and the court 
had no jurisdiction. At that time there was no law as yet, which ousted the 
jurisdiction of the court to entertain such matters. In fact the judge simply 
relied on the President’s address to the nation that those who were arrested 
during the crackdown would not be taken to court but their cases would be 
heard by a special tribunal. Actually that was the time for the court to question 
the legality of the crackdown and the manner it was carried out and possibly to 
make a ruling on the president’s intention to pass a law which violated human 
rights.
3:3:2:3 Abuse o f power
By and large, the court played a very important role through its 
prerogative power to review various excessive administrative actions by the 
executive. It was in this particular area that a number of judges made a 
significant contribution. Review of administrative actions required a very 
strong and independent judge to redress the injured person since the executive 
was increasingly powerful and in some ways considered itself above the law. 
The police force and prison officers as State functionaries were often used by 
the Regional and District Commissioners in exercise of their powers to detain 
without trial. Sometimes this power was grossly abused and inevitably 
attracted the court’s intervention as illustrated by the case of Abdi Athumani 
and Nine Others v. District Commissioner o f Tunduru District and Three 
Others.450 The businessmen of Somali origin and applicants in this case were 
refused renewal of their business licences on suspicion of taking part in illegal
450High Court of Tanzania at Mtwara, Miscellaneous Civil Cause Nos. 2 and 3 of 1987, unreported. 
See also Ally Lilalcwa v. Regional Police Commander and Regional Prisons Officer, infra; 
Ramadhani Ally Salum v. R.., High Court of Tanzania at Dar Es Salaam, Miscellaneous Criminal 
Cause No. 52 of 1980, unreported; Edward Mlaki and Another v. The Regional Police 
Commander Kilimanjaro Region and the Secretary Regional Security Committee Kilimanjaro 
Region, High Court of Tanzania at Arusha, Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 38 of 1979, 
unreported (reproduced in PETER, C. M., (1997), p. 265).
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dealings in government trophies. As a result, they were served with removal 
orders issued by the District Commissioners under the Townships (Removal of 
Undesirable Persons) Ordinance, 1944. The District Commissioners’ orders 
were quashed by the court since the Commissioners had acted beyond their 
powers by ordering the removal of innocent citizens from their established 
places in order to satisfy political convenience.
Sometimes the court awarded damages against the executive 
particularly the Ward Executive Officers for arbitrary arrests and abuse of 
their powers. For example in Ernest Masola v. Charamba Ngerengere,451 the 
appellant (Ward Executive Officer) was sued for keeping the respondent under 
false imprisonment for seven days. The appellant handed over the respondent 
to the Primary Court messenger who locked him up until when the magistrate 
came from another station after seven days. As the appellant left no reason 
behind the respondent’s detention the magistrate discharged the respondent on 
condition that he reported (regularly) at the court should some complaint be 
made against him. However, the appellant never turned up to make any 
complaint against him. The court awarded him damages. The appeal was 
dismissed by the High Court. Awarding damages was not enough such that 
Lugakingira, J., considered it important to sound a general warning to other 
state functionaries for such unprecedented abuse of power that:
“ ...even a police officer who arrests and detains any 
person for no reasonable cause does so at his own 
risk.”
Given the extent to which abuse of power by the executive was 
increasing, criminal sanctions were also meted out by the court against the 
executive for wrongful confinement. For example in Mzee Selemani v. R452 the
4511979 L.R.T. No. 24.
452[1968] H.C.D. No. 364.
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Divisional Executive Officer was convicted of wrongful confinement and 
abuse of office after arresting and detaining the complainant who went to seek 
a permit to hold a traditional dancing ceremony.453 The Divisional Executive 
Officer considered the complainant’s act to seek a permit as an interruption to 
his business and he ordered his clerk to arrest the complainant. The Primary 
Court sentenced him to nine months imprisonment. On appeal the sentence 
was reduced to three months; otherwise the appeal was dismissed.
It is interesting to note that most of those who suffered penal sanctions 
for abuse of powers were from the villages executives while the District and 
Regional Commissioners survived criminal actions. This could possibly be 
attributed to the protection provided to the latter by a number of laws, which 
protection was not availed to micro-level executives like the Ward Secretaries.
3:4 Executive attitude towards judicial review
The court’s orders and judicial review of administrative actions were 
not well received by the executive since they were interpreted as making the 
executive look powerless. Because the executive considered itself very 
powerful, many court orders which challenged or attempted to limit the 
executive’s powers were avoided or disobeyed with impunity. For example, in 
Ahmed Janmohamed Dhirani v. R 454 the Regional Prison Officer who was 
required to appear in court and produce the detention order or the body of the 
detainee, in an application for a habeas corpus, refused to honour the court’s 
summons on the ground that his title was wrongly addressed. When the court 
made necessary alterations on the summons, again service could not be 
effected since he avoided it by not staying in the office and creating a long trip 
outside the region. The trial judge simply condemned the attitude of the 
Regional Prison Officer which he described as ‘disrespectful to the court’.
453For another conviction see also Josephat Patrick v. R, 1979 L.R.T. No. 22.
454Op. cit. See also Edward Mlaki's case.
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Also, in Re: An Application by Paul Massawe455 the applicant and his driver 
were acquitted by a District Court of a charge of an attempt to export restricted 
goods. The court ordered that all goods be returned to them. However, the 
police acting under the instructions of the Regional Commissioner refused to 
return the goods to the owners and went on selling them as ‘nationalized’ 
goods of a smuggler. This perversity and disregard of established procedures 
under the law by the Regional Commissioner were attacked by the High Court 
and monetary compensation equivalent to the value of the goods illegally sold 
by the Commissioner was ordered.
In some instances the executive used the top police and prison officers 
to defy the court’s orders by issuing instructions that under no circumstances 
should a particular detainee be released. In Ally Lilakwa v. Regional Police 
Commander and Regional Prisons Officer 456 the detainee and others were 
transferred from Arusha Prison to Dodoma by the orders of Prison and Police 
Headquarters in Dar Es Salaam, following an application in court to challenge 
their detention. In fact, according to the submission by the State Attorney there 
was no lawful detention order against the applicant. Also the police officer 
(OCD) told the court that they were under instructions from the Inspector 
General not to release any of the detainees. The detainees were suspected 
bandits and a campaign had been launched in Arusha to combat banditry. 
From the observation of Mnzavas, J., (as he then was), the executive in Arusha 
was repeatedly defying court orders by re-arresting those people whom the 
court released. The court in all this defiance simply lamented and expressed 
its disappointment without taking action, like contempt of court, against the 
executive.457 The law existed under which criminal proceedings could be
455Op cit.
456High Court of Tanzania at Arusha, Miscellaneous Criminal Cause No. 29 of 1979, unreported 
(reproduced in PETER, C. M., (1997), p. 506).
457See for example, R.. v. The Principal Commissioner o f Prisons Ex Parte Saidi Hilari, op cit. The 
applicant was granted bail by the District Court and while out on bail he was arrested and detained 
in prison pending deportation to the unknown. He was detained without any valid detention order 
until after one month when the order signed by President was obtained.
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instituted against such officers but nobody ‘activated’ it. This can be found in 
the words of Mnzavas J. K. (as he then was) in the case of Ramadhani Ally 
Salum v. 7?458 where he puts it clearly that:
. .at a later stage it may be necessary to activate the 
law and institute criminal proceedings against any 
prison officer who aids in the offence of unlawfully 
confining an innocent person”.
The warning followed the complaint made by the detainee in court and 
subsequent failure by the Officer in charge Ulconga Prison to produce any 
legal detention or deportation order duly signed by the President. The detainee 
spent more than six months in detention simply on the instructions of a certain 
government official to the Prison officers that he be detained pending legal 
orders to be signed by the President.
The attitude of the courts towards the executive who defied the courts' 
orders, show how ineffective the judiciary was in protecting the peoples' rights 
against infringement by the state.
3:5 Conclusions
Generally speaking, individual fundamental rights and freedoms had 
small room in the post-independence period. It has been emphasized that the 
post-independence government used the adopted colonial laws in the same 
ways they were used by the colonial regime. In fact the post-independence 
government mixed the use of colonial and new laws depending on the 
objective that was to be achieved. For example following the army mutiny 
Kasanga Tumbo was detained under the Preventive Detention Act, 1962 (new 
law); whereas his colleagues in the labour movement, Victor Mkello and
458Op cit.
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Sheshe Amiri were deported to Sumbawanga (using the Colonial Deportation 
Ordinance). In some instances specific laws were enacted to accompany the 
adopted colonial legislation so as to provide support for the repressive 
government policies.
We saw how the country’s desire for quick development was used to 
justify the government’s authoritarian policies, which to a large extent lacked 
voluntariness, persuasion or participation. It is interesting to note that 
government claimed to respect people’s ideas and participation in making 
decisions about development plans. However, in practice things were totally 
different, since the implementation of government policies was dominated by 
the use of force. Courts of law were required in difficult conditions to do 
justice according to law and their power was very much limited. It only 
remained for a very few bold-spirited judges to give strict construction of the 
statutes which gave wide powers to the executive when the exercise of such 
powers was the subject of complaint in court. Human rights in practice after 
independence and perhaps even today, finds better expression in the words of 
Lugakingira, J., who states that:
“Theoretically as well as constitutionally the liberty of 
the subject is regarded as sacrosanct but executive 
behaviour, aided by an authoritarian political structure 
and enabling repressive laws, has not lived up to the 
ideal. The attitude of the courts has been characterised 
by an ambivalence which reflects the idiosyncrasies 
of the individual actors.”459
It is also worth noting here that applications for prerogative orders were 
filed in court by those few who had access to the extremely limited legal 
services in the country. It was particularly in the prosperous areas of Arusha 
and Kilimanjaro that executive actions were mostly challenged in the courts by
459LUGAKINGIRA, K. S. K., (1990), p. 211.
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the financially able businessmen. Sometimes matters assumed character of a 
row between the court and the executive.460 Indeed the general trend of 
government’s behaviour was highly objectionable and it increased the need to 
incorporate the Bill of Rights in the Constitution.
460See for example Ally Lilakwa's case.
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PART THREE: THE POST BILL OF RIGHTS ERA
CHAPTER FOUR
THE INTRODUCTION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE
CONSTITUTION
Despite the government's refusal, the public continued to demand an 
enforceable Bill of Rights and eventually in 1984 it was enshrined in the 
Constitution. In this chapter we examine the circumstances under which the 
government adopted an enforceable Bill of Rights. We look at the 
government's decision to suspend the justiciability of the Bill of Rights and 
also the attempts to make the enforceability of those rights very difficult. 
Finally, we discuss the contents of the Bill of Rights in the light of what 
people anticipated.
4:1 Background to the introduction of the Bill of Rights in the 
Constitution
Although for a long time the idea to include the Bill of Rights in the 
Constitution was repeatedly rejected by the government, there were 
developments within the country which forced the government to cede to 
popular demands. In 1983 the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the 
ruling party CCM461 initiated the constitutional debates in the country. 
Following the amalgamation of TANU and ASP, the existing Constitution was 
amended to conform with developments that brought into being one political 
party for Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar. Many matters regarding the union 
were unclear and had been subject of severe public criticism, given the fact 
that people of both sides had not been given the opportunity to discuss the
461 TANU and ASP of Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar respectively, amalgamated in 1977 to form 
CCM.
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anticipated union before it came in force. The ruling party therefore, 
considered these constitutional debates a means of saving face.
However, the ruling party (CCM) was determined to control the 
constitutional debates. The NEC provided the terms of reference by publishing 
a manual which proposed the areas in the Union Constitution and the Zanzibar 
Revolutionary Government Constitution on which the debate should focus. 
The said areas were basically five, namely: (a) the President’s powers under 
the Constitution, (b) the strengthening of Parliament, (c) the consolidation of 
the union, (d) the representative character of the National Assembly, and (e) 
the strengthening of the people’s power.462 The enshrinement of a Bill of 
Rights in the Constitution was not one of the tenns of reference proposed to 
govern the debate on the intended constitutional amendments.463 This was a 
deliberate omission since history had shown that the government was against 
the idea of having a justiciable Bill of Rights.464
However, popular debate was not confined within the parameters 
provided by the NEC. In the course of the debate, the people themselves 
initiated a discussion on the need to incorporate a Bill of Rights in both 
Constitutions. Going by the Tanzanian government's tradition, one would have 
expected objections to be made to the introduction of a new area of discussion, 
which was not covered by the terms of reference but that was not the case.
Also, within the NEC itself there were some people who had narrowly 
escaped the national crackdown against so-called economic saboteurs, and 
who were keen to ensure that the abuses of power committed during that 
campaign did not recur. Many of them supported the idea of human rights in 
furtherance of their own economic interests and advanced the argument that 
foreign investors needed property guarantees before they would decide to 
invest in the country. It should be noted that this argument sounded more
462c h a m a  c h a  m a p in d u z i .
463KABUDI, P. J., (1991), p. 272.
464 See the discussion in chapter three.
129
convincing since it carried with it the economic substance which was in line 
with the government's strategy for economic reform and trade liberalisation.465
The people were continually demanding the Bill of Rights through 
newspapers, radio and seminars, the incorporation of a Bill of Rights in the 
Constitution. However, others, especially the executive, opposed the idea by 
advancing the same reasons which the government had always used to reject 
such demands 466
In Zanzibar the debate was intense and the public vigorously demanded 
a Bill of Rights in the Zanzibar Constitution. To the Zanzibaris a Bill of Rights 
in the Constitution would end the prolonged historical oppression imposed by 
the Arab land owners,467 and protect them from the tyranny they had suffered 
under the revolutionary government 468 They felt that they would lose their 
autonomy and be in a danger of being absorbed by mainland Tanzania unless 
their Constitution was amended to incorporate a Bill of Rights. Also 
experience had shown them that it was wrong to bank on the assumption that 
the leader in whose hands people’s rights were placed would always restrain 
himself from abuse of his powers.469
Shivji argues that, taking the Tanzanian tradition, the idea to have a 
Bill of Rights in the Constitution might have been ignored had it not been for 
the Zanzibaris insistence on including a Bill of Rights in their Constitution 
regardless of whether or not one was included in the Union Constitution.470 It 
would have been ridiculous to include a Bill of Rights in the Zanzibar 
Constitution and leave the Union Constitution without any such provisions.
465About other factors that contributed to the government's back-down, see MWAIKUSA, J. T.} 
(1991), pp. 690-691.
466See chapter two.
467PETER, C. M.} (1990), p. 5.
468The Zanzibar’s first Constitution after independence contained a Bill of Rights but it was cancelled 
by the 1964 revolution. Harsh decrees were then promulgated providing for detention without trial 
and confiscation of private property.
469KABUDI, P. J., (1995 B), p. 274.
470SHIVJI, I. G., (1987), p. 132.
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The government, therefore, found itself in a difficult situation to reject further 
the idea of including the Bill of Rights in the Constitution.
Although Tanzania is one of the countries which adopted the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 1981, the government had not 
contemplated seriously the idea of incorporating a Bill of Rights in the 
Constitution until it was caught unaware by the course the debate had taken. 
Since the government had not prepared itself to hit back with the same vigour 
against these demands it had to make some sort of a ‘concession’471 and 
include a Bill of Rights in the Constitution.
4:2 Suspension of the justiciability of the Bill of Rights
Since time was too short to amend all potentially violative laws before 
the Bill of Rights was incorporated in the Constitution, the government 
proposed that its justiciability be suspended. Thus the legislature enacted the 
Constitution (Consequential, Transitional and Temporary Provisions) Act, 
1984 to the effect that:
“No existing law or any provision in any existing law 
may, until after three years from the date of the 
commencement of the Act, be construed by any court 
in the United Republic as being unconstitutional or 
otherwise inconsistent with any provision of the 
Constitution.”472
The foregoing is a tacit admission by the government that there were 
many laws which infringed fundamental rights and freedoms, and that the 
immediate application of the Bill of Rights would lead to many laws being 
declared unconstitutional or inconsistent with the Constitution. Initially no 
reasons were given to the people as to why the justiciability of their
471PETER, C. M., (1990), p. 5; SHIVJI, I. G., (1987), p. 132.
472Section 5 (2).
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constitutional rights was suspended. However, most of them got the 
impression that the government needed sufficient time to put its house in order 
before the Bill of Rights could be enforced. Although the Act could be 
criticised for delaying the enforceability of the people's long-waited rights and 
freedoms, on the other side it could be taken to reflect the government's 
seriousness and commitment to protect individual fundamental rights and 
freedoms. Thus some people could not see any thing wrong with the Act 
which gave to the government sufficient time for taking appropriate action and 
bringing all existing laws into conformity with the enshrined basic rights.
The Chief Justice Francis Nyalali was among the optimists in support of 
the three-year period of grace which the government granted to itself. In the 
view of the Chief Justice, it was imperative for the government to suspend the 
justiciability of the Bill of Rights for a certain length of time, ‘in order to avoid 
chaos and promote constructive change in the legal sector'.473 This also was the 
explanation and the only justification given by the Minister for Justice and 
Attorney-General a few months before the Bill of Rights became justiciable.474
However, the period of three years passed without the government 
making any significant reform of its laws. It was only the Preventive Detention 
Act, 1962475 which was amended.476 The amendments to the Preventive 
Detention Act introduced some changes 477
Perhaps what many people found most objectionable was the 
government's behaviour during the three years when the justiciability of the 
Bill of Rights was suspended. The government behaved as if respecting 
fundamental rights had also been suspended. During that period the 
government issued an order by way of Subsidiary Legislation, the Extinction
473NYALALI, F., p. 4.
474LUBUVA, D, Z., p. 853.
475Cap. 490.
476See Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1985, (Act No. 2 of 1985).
477We discuss these changes in chapter seven, see footnotes 828 and 829.
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of Customary Land Rights Order, 1987478 which was in total conflict with the 
right to private property as enshrined in the Bill of Rights. The Order 
extinguished pre-villagisation customary rights of occupancy in the lands 
confiscated by the government in Arusha region during a country-wide 
operation in the rural areas.479 Later, as the order was challenged in court it 
was incorporated in a statute.480 It was disturbing to see such measures being 
taken by a government which had already expressed commitment to create an 
environment of respect for human rights.
Most disturbing was the Attomey-GeneraTs statement, a few months 
before the expiry of the said three years period of grace. He said that the 
government was not ready to amend or repeal the laws which were 
inconsistent with the Constitution since such repeals or amendments would 
lead to chaos and disruption of the legal system.481 This conflicted with the 
spirit of the Constitution (Consequential, Transitional and Temporary 
Provisions) Act, 1984.
Everything was left in the hands of the judiciary to declare such laws 
unconstitutional whenever the time allowed. The power of the judiciary to 
declare any law unconstitutional was also weakened and made difficult by the 
Basic Rights and duties Enforcement Act, 1994482 and also by the Constitution 
itself through the derogation clauses and claw back clauses. The people felt 
betrayed by their own government to which they had put much trust and 
fundamental basic rights remained simply rights on paper if they could not be 
effectively enforced.
Unlike Tanzania the justiciability of fundamental rights in India was not 
suspended483 although some existing laws were inconsistent with the
478GN. N o. 88 of 1987.
479See a discussion in chapter four about villagisation.
480We discuss about this order in chapter seven.
481LUBUVA, D, Z., p. 853. Damian Lubuva the Attorney-General was later appointed Justice of 
Appeal.
482Act No. 33 of 1994. See for example section 13.
483See The Constitution of India, 1950, Article 32 (4).
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Constitution. The Constitution itself declared void any provision of law that 
was inconsistent with fundamental rights immediately before the 
commencement of the Constitution.484 Also it barred the state from taking 
away or abridging the rights conferred and any future laws made in 
contravention of this clause would be 'void to the extent of the 
contravention'.485 It is not clear why such an idea was not imported by the 
Tanzanian government.
4:3 Contents of the Bill of Rights.486
The government's unwillingness to allow the meaningful realisation of 
the basic rights and freedoms by the citizenry can also be found in the contents 
of the Bill of Rights. By this we are referring to Part Three of Chapter One of 
the Constitution which is about basic rights and duties.
The provisions of Part Two of Chapter One of the Constitution which 
provides for the fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy, 
otherwise known as the guiding principles, are not 'enforceable by any court'487 
but they are fundamental in the governance of the country. The government, 
all its organs and all persons exercising executive, legislative or judicial 
functions have a duty and responsibility to 'to take cognisance of, observe and 
apply' them.488 The guiding principles therefore, 'lay down the path of the 
country's progress towards the allied objectives and aims stated in the 
preamble'489 to the Constitution. They express the rule of law, equality, self 
reliance, democracy and prevention of exploitation as key objectives of the 
government.490 These represent a clear ambition to create a system in which
484Article 13 (1).
48 5Article 13 (2).
486See appendix.
487Article 7 (2).
488Article 7(1).
489 SING, D. K.,p. 181.
490See Articles 8 and 9.
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the government takes responsibility for the well-being of its citizens.491 It is 
this particular part of the Constitution which in addition to declaring the 
national policy, also puts an emphasis on the need to maintain 'the dignity of 
man through full compliance with the provisions of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights.'492
A number of human rights as contained in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, 1948 were adopted by the Tanzanian Bill of Rights albeit some 
were left to be included in the non-justiciable part of the Constitution. It was 
once argued by the present Chief Justice that if the entire Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights was included in the Bill of Rights and be 
justiciable, the country would be thrown into ‘frequent conflicts which could 
undermine national stability’493 because of weak and inexperienced institutions 
to contain constitutional conflicts. This is a common argument used by the 
authoritarian governments in developing countries. To avoid these possible 
conflicts a provision was made such that failure to comply with the guiding 
principles by any state authority or agencies could not constitute a cause of 
action.
Other Commonwealth countries like India494 and Nigeria495, also 
included the fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy in 
their respective Constitutions providing for specific policy goals or long term 
national ideals496 'which are expected to be realised by the government.'497 
Tanzania must have adopted this style from the Indian Constitution. It is Part 
Four of the Indian Constitution that provides for the directive principles of 
state policy. Like in Tanzania, the directive principles under the Indian
491 See Article 11.
492Article 9 (1) (f).
493NYALALI, F., p. 2.
494See the Constitution of India, 1950, Part IV.
495See the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979, Chapter II. See also a discussion in 
READ, J. S., (1979 A), pp. 131-169.
496KABUDI, P. J., (1995 A), pp. 84-95.
497EHINDERO, S. G., p. 46.
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Constitution are not enforceable by any court but the state is under duty 'to 
apply these principles in making laws.'498 we note a different position with the 
Nigerian Constitution which is silent about the enforceability of such directive 
principles. Because the Constitution does not categorically provide for their 
non-enforceability we can rightly conclude that in Nigeria they are enforceable 
like any other provision of the Constitution. As for Tanzania and India it is our 
submission that, although they are not enforceable the courts may not entirely 
ignore them 'but should adopt the principle of harmonious construction and 
should attempt to give effect to both as much as possible'.499
4:3:1 Basic Rights.
These are the fundamental rights and freedoms enforceable in the High 
Court by any person who thinks that his constitutional rights have been 
violated or are about to be violated.500 They include the rights of equality,501 
the right to life,502 freedom of conscience,503 and freedom of work.504 The 
rights of equality covers a wide range of things including equality before the 
law and provisions against: discrimination, torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment, and retrospective legislation. However, unlike the Indian 
Constitution505 the Tanzanian Bill of Rights does not take into account 
discrimination on grounds of sex. Thus discrimination on grounds of sex is not 
included in the attributes of 'discriminatory' treatment as defined by the 
Constitution.506
This part also provides for a fair trial, the right to be heard, and the 
presumption of innocence. The right to life contains articles which provide for
498The Constitution of India, 1950, Article 37.
499 SING, D. K., pp. 179-180.
500Article 30 (3).
50Articles 12 and 13.
502Articles 14-17.
503Articles 18-21.
504Articles 21-24.
505Article 15 (1).
506See Article 13 (5).
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the guarantee of the right to live, the right to personal freedom, the right to 
privacy and personal security, and the right to freedom of movement. 
However, the right to personal freedom can be taken away in certain specified 
circumstances.507
It is very interesting to note that although the Indian Constitution 
provides for protection of life and liberty, yet it accepts prevention detention 
for not more than three months unless the Advisory Board ’has reported 
before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in its 
opinion sufficient cause for such detention1.508
The right of freedom of conscience contains articles that guarantee the 
right to freedom of expression, the right to freedom of religion whereby 
worship and propagation of religion are regarded as private affairs of an 
individual, subject to the relevant laws of the land. Right to freedom of 
association is also guaranteed under this group but subject to the laws of land 
and it includes:
"The right to assemble freely and peaceably, to 
associate with other persons and, in particular to form 
or belong to organisations or associations formed for 
the purposes of protecting or furthering his or any 
other interests.”509
The right of freedom to work has been provided guaranteeing the right 
to work and the right to fair remuneration according to the quality and quantity 
of the work done. It can be argued that the right of freedom to work is a unique 
and significant step taken by Tanzanian government as an attempt to guarantee 
the people that they have the right to work in order to live. This is ‘unfamiliar 
to traditional Bills of Rights in the Western European tradition.’510 However,
507See Article 15.
508The Constitution of India, 1950, Article 22 (3) (b) and (4).
509Article 20 (1).
510KABUDI, P. J., (1995 A), p. 87.
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the right to work has to be read with the constitutional duty of an individual to 
participate in work511.
More significant is the constitutional recognition of the right to acquire 
and own private property. Immediately after independence Tanzania modelled 
itself along socialist concepts of collective ownership of property. That is why, 
as we saw in chapter three, the government nationalised all the commanding 
heights of economy which were formerly privately owned. Ownership of 
private property like houses and motor vehicles was regarded as contrary to 
socialism. Actually those buildings whose value exceeded a certain amount of 
money were nationalised512 and their owners were not adequately 
compensated. The Bill of Rights included the right to acquire and own private 
property thereby preventing a repeat of 1967 when people lost their property 
because of nationalisation. Thus:
“ ...a  person shall not be arbitrarily deprived of his 
property for the purpose of acquisition or any other 
purpose without the authority of law which shall set 
out conditions for fair and adequate compensation.”513
4:3:2 Duties to the society.
Unlike many other bills of rights, the Tanzanian one has another unique 
feature whereby people are subjected to a catalogue of duties and obligations 
to the society while they enjoy the fundamental rights under the 
Constitution.514 The Indian Constitution also has a chapter on the duties of the 
individual to the society.515 In Nigeria the duties of the citizens were 
introduced by the 1989 Constitution and formed part of the fundamental
511 Article 25.
512See the Acquisition of Buildings Act, 1971, section 6 (1) (a).
513 Article 24 (2).
514Articles 25-28.
515 For a discussion on the Indian Constitution and Tanzanian Constitution with relation to the duties 
of an individual to the society, see D.P.P. v. Daudi Pete, infra.
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objectives and directive principles of state policy.516 Thus Part II of the 
Constitution of Nigeria encompasses the duties of the state and the duties of 
citizens. The duties of an individual to the society under the Tanzanian 
Constitution include the duty to participate in work, the duty to abide by laws, 
and the duty to safeguard public property.
Following what is contained in the Preamble to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights it can be argued that the framers of the Tanzanian 
Bill of Rights drew inspiration from the Charter. The Charter was guided by 
the fact that The enjoyment of rights and freedoms also implies the 
performance of duties on the part of everyone.’517 Since an individual lives in a 
community, he owes certain duties to the society in which he belongs. The 
duty of an individual to the society is also reflected in the limitations imposed 
by the Constitution for the better enjoyment of the rights and freedoms by all 
people. That is to say, every one is enjoined to enjoy his rights and freedoms in 
such a way that the rights and freedoms of others or the public interest are not 
prejudiced.518 Tanzania adopted this guidance for its Constitution.
The Bill of Rights provides for the right to work and right to fair 
remuneration but on the other hand it imposes a duty to work. The right to fair 
remuneration for example is a constitutional right but cannot be enjoyed if one 
does not fulfil his duty to participate in lawful and productive work.519 
Everyone is under obligation to participate in work and to observe labour 
discipline. Although forced labour is prohibited,520 certain types of labour are 
cleared of being forced labour including compulsory national service and 
labour required of any person in the event of any emergency or calamity.521
51 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1989, section 24.
517 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981, Preamble.
518See Articles 29 (5) and 30 (1).
519 Article 25 (1) (a).
520 Article 25 (2).
521 Article 25 (3).
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It is the duty of every person to abide by laws,522 to safeguard state and 
communal property and to respect another person’s property.523
4:3:3 Limitations.
4:3:3:lDerogation and clawback clauses
According to Karl Marx, the limitation clauses in all bourgeois 
constitutions tend to destroy the liberty clauses in the same constitutions.524 As 
an amplification to this, Shivji pointed out two basic types of such clauses 
often used by the state as a legal technique to limit the scope within which 
people can enjoy their rights and freedoms. These are ‘clawback’ and 
derogation clauses, serving the following situations:
“Clawback clauses permit restriction of granted rights 
ab initio according to domestic law without 
specifying the circumstances or criteria for such 
limitation. Derogation clauses, on the other hand, 
permit limitation of rights only on the occurrence of 
certain events and then too for a specified period.”525
The Tanzanian Bill of Rights is fraught with limitation clauses. Many 
rights are qualified by phrases like “in accordance with law”, “subject to the 
laws of the land”, “subject to a procedure prescribed by law”, and “without 
prejudice to law.”526 Also derogation from basic rights and freedoms is 
permissible under the Constitution especially during periods of emergency or 
when state security is at stake.527
Article 30 (2) of the Constitution also contains the substance of a 
clawback clause for it validates the laws and acts which violate individual
522 Article 26.
523 Article 27.
524 MARX, C., and ENGELS, F., pp. 235-237.
525SHIVJI, I. G., (1987), pp. 136-137.
526 See Articles 14, 15 (2) (a), 16 (2), 17 (2), 18 (1), 19 (1), 20 (2), 21 (1), 24 (1), 26 (2).
527Articles 31 and 32.
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fundamental rights where such laws or acts protect the public interest, or 
ensure 'the execution of the judgment or order of the court.'
Articles 31 and 32, the derogation clauses, give extraordinary powers to 
the state to detract, in certain circumstances, from its duty to observe and 
respect the individual’s right to life or to personal freedom. This is more so 
during periods of emergency or in ordinary times in relation to those who 
conduct themselves in a manner that endangers national security. However, the 
derogation clause does not allow or authorize the deprivation of any body's 
right to live unless such death is 'caused as a result of acts of war.'528
Arguably, the limitation clauses are not unique to Tanzania but do form 
a common feature in most instruments which provide for human rights. For 
example, the European Convention of Human Rights also has limitation 
clauses in relation to the right to respect for private and family life,529 the right 
to freedom of thought530 and the right to freedom of peaceful assembly.531 
However, unlike the Tanzanian limitations, the European ones state clearly 
that such limitations can be imposed as prescribed by law and should be 
‘necessary in a democratic society \  For example Article 20 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights restricts the right to freedom of expression as 
follows:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression...
(2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries 
with it duties and responsibilities, may be 
subject to such formalities, conditions, 
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by 
law and are necessary in a democratic society, 
in the interests of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety,...(Emphasis added).
52 8Article 31 (3).
529 The European Convention on Human Rights, Article 8.
530 Article 9.
531 Article 11.
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Under the European Convention therefore the restrictions to the 
fundamental rights and freedoms should not only be as a certain law may 
prescribe but also such restriction should be necessary in a democratic society. 
These are the measurements which the courts has to apply when determining 
whether or not a certain right ought to be restricted by law or acts. In Nigeria 
derogation from fundamental rights by law is permissible if  the limitation or 
such law is 'reasonable and justifiable in a democratic society.'532
Likewise the Indian Constitution allows restrictions to basic rights by 
law so far as such restrictions are reasonable. See for example Article 19 (2) of 
the Indian Constitution which provides:
"Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause 1 shall affect the 
operation of any existing law, in so far as such law 
imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the 
right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interest of 
the security of the state..." (Emphasis added).
Thus it is the duty of the court to determine whether or not the 
restrictions imposed by certain laws are reasonable or justifiable in a 
democratic society. However, both the Nigerian Constitution533 and the Indian 
Constitution contain provisions which save and validate the laws that 
potentially take away or abridge the rights conferred. For example, in India 
Article 31A saves any law that provides for acquisition of estates by the state, 
and Article 3 IB validates 83 Acts and Regulations specified in the 9th 
Schedule to the Constitution from being held inconsistent with the 
Constitution. Also, following the 1971 constitutional amendments a provision 
was added saving the laws that give effect to certain directive principles of 
state policy.534
532Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979, section 41 (1) and (2); or the 1989 
Constitution, section 43 (1) and (2).
533The 1979 Constitution, section 40 (2); or the 1989 Constitution section 42 (2).
534The Constitution of India, 1950, Article 31C.
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The Tanzanian Bill of Rights simply restricts the rights by ‘fairly 
vaguely drafted phrases’535 like “in accordance with the law” and “public 
interest”. The courts of law sometimes find themselves in a situation where 
they are forced to speculate the particular public interest that Parliament had in 
mind when passing a particular legislation.536 More interesting, as we shall see 
in chapters five and six, was the Attorney-General’s constant reference to the 
clawback and derogation clauses whenever he was asked to show the 
constitutionality of some offensive laws which happened to be the subject of 
litigation in court.537 To him, laws which were challenged for violating the 
fundamental rights and freedoms, were saved by the clawback and derogation 
clauses and therefore constitutionally valid.
The derogation from basic rights permissible under Articles 30 (2) and 
31 of the Constitution appear to be very wide and general. Taking into account 
all these weaknesses, it has been argued that the Tanzanian Constitution itself 
takes away with one hand that which it has given with the other. Some critics 
have regarded the clawback and derogation clauses in the Tanzanian 
Constitution as rendering the whole Bill of Rights “an empty shell.”538 
However, Mwalusanya, J,, did not agree with this conclusion which he 
considered to have been arrived at, after “superficial reading of the limitations 
and restrictions on the Bill of Rights.”539 Mwalusanya, J., believes that if the 
court plays its anticipated role of protecting the liberty of the individual, even 
the limitation clauses will be construed in such a way that they do not take 
away the rights guaranteed under the Constitution. Others have taken the 
limitation clauses in the Tanzanian Bill of Rights, to reflect the “government’s 
stiff reluctance towards entrenchment of rights and freedoms.”540
535SHIVJI, I. G., (1987), p. 137.
536MWALUSANYA, J. L., p. 32.
537 See for example the submission by Mr. Mima State Attorney in Daudi Pete v. R, and that by Mr.
Masaba Principal State Attorney in D.P.P. v. Daudi Pete, infra.
538MWAKYEMBE, H. G., (1986 B), p. 22.
539 See Chumchua Marwa's case, infra.
540MBUNDA, L. X., p. 156.
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As we shall see in chapter five the Court of Appeal in D.P.P. v. Daudi 
Pete541 laid down strict conditions whereby a law violative of basic rights of 
the individual could be saved by Articles 30 or 31 of the Constitution.
4:3:3:2 Individual rights vis a vis majority rights
The individual lights under the Tanzanian Constitution are limited to 
the extent that they do not prejudice the rights of the majority. This can be 
reflected by the restrictions imposed on grounds of “public interest”, “public 
safety”, “public order”, “right and freedom of others”, “public morality” and 
“interests of defence”. It means that the rights of the majority is a competing 
right when balanced against that of the individual. The rights of the majority 
override the individual rights according to what the limitation clauses attempt 
to suggest. To some academic scholars, this should not be encouraged for it 
may result into “total destruction of the concept of individual rights,”542 and 
courts should make sure that in their interpretation of the limitation clauses 
“rights of minorities are not subjected to the threat of tyranny of the 
majority.”543 While the rights of groups should not be ignored, care must be 
taken so that group interests do not devalue individual interests. The legal 
system therefore has to harmonize the two sets of rights. In order to achieve 
this harmony 'the court has to take into account and strike a balance between 
the interests of the individual and those of the society of which the individual 
is a component.'544
However, a quick survey suggests that the Court of Appeal in Daudi 
Pete's case and Nyalali, C. J's personal views have to a certain extent 
supported the idea that majority rights outrank individual rights. Arguably, no 
matter how widely-worded derogation clauses may be, they cannot be
541 Court of Appeal of Tanzania at Dar Es Salaam, Criminal Appeal No. 28 of 1990, reported in 
[1991] L.R.C. (Const.) 553.
542MBUNDA, L. X., p. 157.
543Ibid.
544 Kukutia Ole Pumbun and Another v. Attorney-General, infra.
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invalidated in so far as they protect the rights of the society vis a vis those of 
the individual.545
Before the Bill of Rights became justiciable, the Chief Justice 
expressed what would be his interpretation of the limitation clauses in case the 
individual rights conflicted with the majority rights. According to him 
whenever there is a conflict between the basic rights or duties of the individual 
on the one hand, and the rights or duties of the community on the other, the 
latter should prevail.546 His reasoning for the paramountcy of rights and duties 
of the community over rights and duties of the individual was that:
“ ...a  community in danger or need puts everybody in 
danger or need, whereas an individual in danger or 
need is alone in danger or need.”547
4:3:3:3 Jurisdiction and enforcement o f rights
The Constitution confers exclusive original jurisdiction on the High 
Court in all matters that relate to the enforcement of individual fundamental 
rights and freedoms.548 This is another limitation on the enforcement of 
individual fundamental rights and freedoms and it “defeats the principle of 
easy access to justice”549 for there are veiy few High Court centres as 
compared to subordinate courts.
As if  that was not enough the government went on to limit the 
enforcement of fundamental rights by enacting the Basic Rights and Duties 
Enforcement Act, 1994.550 This is an Act providing for the procedure for 
enforcement of constitutional basic rights and duties. The government was 
required under the Constitution, to make provision with respect to institution
545 See Daudi Pete's case.
546NYALALI, F., p. 1.
547Ibid.
548Article 30 (3).
549MBUNDA, L. X., p. 158.
550Op cit.
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of proceedings, the powers, practice and procedure of the High Court in 
relation to the hearing of proceedings for enforcement of fundamental rights 
and freedoms.551 However, since the Bill of Rights became part of the 
Constitution in 1984 no such law was enacted until 1995 when the 
controversial Act No. 33 of 1994 came in force. It is controversial in the sense 
that it makes the whole procedure of enforcing fundamental rights and 
freedoms more difficult. It also attempts to make some unusual suggestions as 
to what the court should do instead of nullifying a statute that may be found to 
contravene the Bill of Rights.
The constitution of the High Court for the purposes of hearing and 
determining a petition for the enforcement of fundamental rights and freedoms 
has been set at a quorum of three judges.552 Much as this could be a good idea 
and a reflection of the seriousness attached to constitutional matters, we find 
that it potentially defeats the principles of speedy trial and access to justice. 
Research has revealed that out of eleven High Court centres only Dar Es 
Salaam, Mwanza, and Arusha have more than two judges. This means that for 
the rest of the centres a third judge has to be imported in every petition for the 
enforcement of fundamental rights and freedoms. Given the weak state of the 
country’s economy and the chronic marginalisation of the judiciary in terms of 
funding, such delays are likely to lead to a denial of justice. This is more so 
because extra funding will be necessary to keep such additional judges in 
hotels and paying them allowances. Judges admit that panel cases take a long 
time to finish and experience has shown that it is very difficult to find a time 
that would be convenient to all three judges. It is only a preliminary question 
whether an application is 'frivolous or vexatious' that a single judge can
551Article 30 (4).
552Section 10 (1).
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determine.553 Actually a petition can be dismissed at the preliminary hearing 
level if found to be 'frivolous or vexatious'.554
The decision is by 'the majority of the judges hearing the petition.'555 
For many people the quorum of three judges and the decision to be based on 
the opinion of the majority of judges hearing the petition is regarded as a 
retaliation by the government to Mwalusanya, J's activism and that of a few 
other judges. The limitation clauses which the government hoped to rely on as 
restricting the powers of the court in nullifying various pieces of legislation, 
had proved inadequate. The courts had interpreted those limitation clauses in 
such a way that they could no longer serve the purpose intended. Thus the 
government enacted Act No. 33 of 1994 among other reasons as a device to 
limit the court’s power and an attempt to take away its power to declare any 
law unconstitutional. Section 13 (2) (a) provides:
"the High Court shall, instead of declaring the law or 
action to be invalid or unconstitutional, have the 
power and the discretion in an appropriate case to 
allow Parliament or other legislative authority, or the 
government or other authorities concerned, as the case 
may be, to correct any defect in the impugned law or 
action within a specified period, subject to such 
conditions as may be specified by it, and the law or 
action impugned shall until the correction is made or 
the expiry of the limit set by the High Court, 
whichever be the shorter, be deemed to be valid."
Before the draft Bill was tabled in Parliament, it was first presented to 
the judges of the High Court and Court of Appeal for their opinion. The judges 
opposed this provision and they suggested, among other things, that it should 
be deleted since it interfered with the doctrine of separation of powers and it 
restricted the power of the judiciary by making it play an advisory role to the
553Ibid.
554Section 8 (2).
555Section 10 (2).
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government. However, their views and suggestions were ignored. It would be 
unusual for the court to give Parliament time to amend the statute which the 
court has held unconstitutional. In the same vein we find it objectionable for 
the court to allow government undo the wrongs that were subject of litigation 
instead of redressing the petitioner by granting the orders sought. Justice 
cannot be done where court decisions are reduced to mere advisory opinion 
whenever the government is taken to court. Act No. 33 of 1994 is therefore a 
hindrance to the enforcement of individual rights and freedoms for it 
complicates the process of seeking redress in a court of law.
In sharp contrast is the position in India where jurisdiction for the 
enforcement of fundamental rights is vested in the Supreme Couxt but where 
Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise the same function 
within its local jurisdiction.556 Further the Supreme Court and other courts 
empowered by Parliament can enforce fundamental rights by issuing 
'directions or orders, or writs in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, 
mandamus or prohibition whichever may be appropriate'.557 There is no strict 
form of enforcing basic rights.558
In general the fundamental rights under the Indian Constitution are 
articulate and elaborate as compared to the Tanzanian Bill of Rights. They 
encompass international standards of human rights as set by various 
documents of the United Nations Organisations. In addition they were 
carefully drafted to take care of specific social problems in India like child 
labour,559 the minorities560 and the issue of "untouchability"561 where certain 
people because of epidemic contagious disease or for various other 
discriminatory reasons were regarded as untouchables.
556The Constitution of India, 1950, Article 32 (3).
557Article 32 (1).
558In Tanzania any application for enforcement of fundamental rights has to be by way of a petition.
See Act No. 33 of 1994, sections 5 and 6.
559The Constitution of India, 1950, Article 24
560Article 29.
56*Article 17.
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It is also true that the Bills of Rights in most independence 
Constitutions of Commonwealth Africa were based on the European 
Convention on Human Rights, 1950 as they provided for basic rights.562 In fact 
during negotiations for independence, the minorities in Nigeria successfully 
demanded for comprehensive provisions of fundamental rights into the 
Constitution 'along the same lines as the European Convention.'563 Some 
countries effected changes on these rights after independence to suit particular 
objectives and policies. The amendment made to the Nigerian Constitution in 
1979 bringing about fundamental objectives and directive principles of state 
policy, and also to the 1989 Constitution that introduced the duties of citizens 
provide an example of such countries. It can be argued therefore, that a Bill of 
Rights in the Tanzanian Constitution drew inspiration from India and Nigeria.
4:4 Conclusions
The above discussion has shown how the Bill of Rights finally traced its 
way into the Constitution after being resisted for about three decades since 
independence. It has been emphasized that the government was not willing to 
enshrine the basic rights in the Constitution, but it was overwhelmed and 
forced by the circumstances which were created through popular demands 
during the debates on the amendments of the Constitution. However, the 
provisions discussed above reveal that the government used the Constitution 
itself to take away what the same Constitution had already given as a right. 
The limitation clauses and, in particular, the claw-back and derogation clauses 
in the Constitution, appear to be an obstacle to the enforcement of fundamental 
rights.
Although individual rights and freedoms were solely left in the hands of 
the judiciary as their last hope, some people doubted whether Tanzanian
562See for example the Nigeria Independence Constitution, 1960, sections 17-32.
563ODUMOSO, O, I , p. 123.
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judges would be bold enough to deviate from the positivist tradition and give 
purposive construction to those provisions relating to basic rights and 
freedoms.564 There was a plea by the public urging the courts 'not to pay lip 
services to fundamental rights and freedoms'565 but be bold to hold 'the bull by 
the horns by inquiring as to whether draconian law is really constitutional'566 
and 'feel free to raise their voices against such undesirable statutes.'567 We have 
attempted to show that, 'whether the limitation clauses will foster or restrict 
liberty will depend upon the attitude of the judiciary.'568 This introduced us to 
the idea of having a strong and active judiciary.
Although there were traces of activist judges in the period under study 
the majority was still harbouring the positivist belief that 'it is the function of 
the courts to be conservative, so as to ensure that the rights and duties of the 
individual are determined by the rule of law.'569 In the following two chapters 
we examine whether the performance of the Tanzanian judiciary after the Bill 
of Rights became justiciable demonstrate any change of attitude among the 
judges. We should stress that not all 'rights' have been litigated and therefore 
not all rights are discussed here.
564SHIVJI, I. G„ (1987), pp. 137-138; MBUNDA, L. X., p. 159.
565MBUNDA, L. X., p. 160.
566jDaudi Pete v. R, infra.
567AGUDA, A, T.,p. 157.
568MBUNDA, L. X„ p. 164.
569NEWBOLD, C.,p. 131.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Historically, human rights is a concept which developed ‘to protect the 
citizen from arbitrary and oppressive treatment by the State/570 Unlike most 
other legal rights, human rights are of a high degree of abstraction and, 
because they are so broadly conceived, the manner in which they are 
interpreted, especially by the courts, becomes particularly important.
There are more complaints of human rights violations by the State than 
are levelled against any other individual or organization. The State’s need to 
control its subjects in order to survive, makes it use a variety of mechanisms 
including legislation to limit the extent to which people can exercise their 
rights and freedoms. Tanzania is no exception. The State can, for example, use 
retrospective legislation to make any act a criminal offence, to restrict the right 
to bail, to give powers of arrest, detention, deportation and interrogation which 
are inconsistent with the Constitution. In fact, it is the criminal justice process 
which is affected most when the State takes refuge in legislation as means for 
its survival. The court has to be on the alert and make sure that guaranteed 
rights are not infringed or removed by the State without justification.
This chapter therefore, seeks to examine the judicial responses to 
human rights infringements in the criminal justice process in Tanzania, 
especially in those cases where the State has a particular interest. The 
Tanzanian judicial decisions will be discussed in the light of decisions from 
other Commonwealth jurisdictions and decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights.
570BENNETT, T. W., p. 29. For similar argument see SING, D. K., pp. 17-18.
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5:1 Torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
In setting standards concerning human rights, the United Nations 
Organization has drafted a number of legal documents containing detailed 
provisions. The first one was the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
1948, a document which sets out elementary considerations of humanity which 
should guide the member states. It is clearly stated by the Declaration that:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”571
This was followed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, 1966 which repeated the language of the Declaration but went a step 
further to deal with a specific instance. It prohibits medical or scientific 
experimentation without free consent of the person concerned.572 Tanzania is a 
party to the Covenant but has not acceded to optional protocols sequel to the 
Covenant.573
Further, the United Nations Organization has, through the Declaration 
on Protection from Torture, 1975, declared any act of torture or other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment to be an offence to human 
dignity.574 The prohibition of torture was enhanced by the Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
1984. Although every member state is under an obligation to take effective 
measures to prevent such practice within its jurisdiction,575 Tanzania is not a 
party to this Convention.
571 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, Article 5.
572 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, Article 7.
573Optional Protocol to tire ICCPR establishes the Human Rights Committee to receive and consider 
complaints from individual victims of violations of die rights under the Covenant. Second 
Optional Protocol to the Covenant aims at the abolition of the death penalty.
574UN Declaration on Protection from Torture, 1975, Article 2.
575Ibid., Article 4. See also Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, 1984, Article 2.
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At the regional level, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, 1981 prohibits all forms of exploitation and degradation of man. The 
Charter regards slavery and slave trade as forms of both exploitation and 
degradation of man. It provides that, as a respect of the dignity inherent in a 
human being:
“All forms of exploitation and degradation of man 
particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, 
inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall 
be prohibited.”576
Tanzania is a member of the United Nations Organization and also a 
signatory to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and therefore 
under an obligation to protect human rights at domestic level. The Tanzanian 
Constitution has tried to prohibit torture or inhuman or degrading treatment on 
the lines different from Article 7 of the ICCPR by providing:
13 (6) For the purposes of ensuring equality before 
the law, the state shall make provisions to the 
effect that:
(e) no person shall be subjected to torture or 
to inhuman or degrading treatment.
In general there is no law in Tanzania which overtly allows torture of a 
person by any individual or state functionary. The Police are by law enjoined 
to treat the suspect with humanity and with respect for human dignity, and to 
refrain from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.577 However, there have 
been remarkable incidents of torture of suspects during interrogation at the 
Police Stations. On some occasions, deaths of suspects at the Police Stations
576The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 1981, Article 5.
577See Criminal Procedure Act, 1985, section 55.
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have followed the events.578 On a very few occasions the court has been called 
upon to interpret the law in the context of specific violations of the right not to 
be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.
5:1:1 Corporal punishment and minimum prison sentence.
The Minimum Sentences Act, 1963579 one of the early post­
independence pieces of legislation, made flogging mandatory for certain 
specified offences until it was abolished by the Minimum Sentences Act, 
1972.580 However, corporal punishment was re-introduced in 1989 by Act No. 
10 of 1989581 following the increase in violent crimes. Alongside mandatory 
corporal punishment, the Act also introduced the minimum prison sentence for 
anybody convicted of violent crime. In fact both corporal punishment and 
minimum prison sentence go together in specified offences. The Bill which 
reintroduced corporal punislnnent, was supported by the overwhelming 
majority of the Members of Parliament. They expected that it would deter 
youngsters from engaging in serious criminal acts. Some legislators
suggested that corporal punishment should be administered in public if 
positive results were to be realized and that female offenders should not be 
exempted.582 All this simply signified how disturbing the problem of violent 
crime was in the country. Members of Parliament like members of the public 
believed that the solution for such problems could be found in the deterrent 
effect of a severe sentencing policy.
It is interesting to note that at least one Member of Parliament warned 
the House about the danger of passing a law which contravened the Bill of
578For such incidents see PETER, C. M., (1992), pp. 150-151 and PETER, C. M., (1997), pp. 91-95. 
See also Elias Kigadye and Others v. R., Court of Appeal of Tanzania, Criminal Appeal No. 13 of 
1981, unreported and also footnotes 856 and 857.
5790p cit.
580Act No. 1 of 1972.
581 Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 1989.
582See Daily News, 25 April 1989.
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Rights as guaranteed under the Constitution. However, the Minister for Justice 
and Attorney-General assured the house that corporal punishment would be 
saved by the derogation clauses, Articles 30 and 31, for it was in the interest of 
the public to reintroduce such a punishment so as to curb banditry and robbery. 
Later, the said Minister for Justice and Attorney-General was appointed a 
judge of the Court of Appeal.
The possibility, raised in Parliament, of the Act being held 
unconstitutional materialized in Thomas Mjengi v. R.583 The two appellants in 
this case were charged and convicted of robbery with violence under sections 
285 and 286 of the Penal Code (Cap. 16). They were each sentenced by the 
District Court, to the prescribed minimum sentence of thirty years 
imprisonment and ten strokes of corporal punishment. Aggrieved by both 
conviction and sentence, they appealed to the High Court challenging, among 
other things, the constitutionality of the minimum sentence of thirty years 
imprisonment and corporal punishment. It was the appellants’ advocate’s 
argument that these punishments were inhuman and degrading and therefore 
unconstitutional.
In determining whether a minimum sentence was inhuman and 
degrading, Mwalusanya, J., applied the proportionality test. He had to answer 
the question whether the said sentence was arbitrary, unusual or 
disproportionate to the offence. The proportionality test was the creation of the 
Supreme Court of the United States of America,584 and it was adopted by many 
jurisdiction including the Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea in Morobe v. 
Provincial Government,585 the Zimbabwe Supreme Court when determining 
also the constitutionality of corporal punishment in Ncube and Others v. The
583High Court of Tanzania at Dodoma, Criminal Appeal No. 28 of 1991, unreported (reproduced in 
PETER, C. M., (1997), p. 115).
584See the cases of Weems v. United States (1910) 217 U.S. 349; Tropp v. Dulles (1958) 356 U.S.
86,1. Ed. 630; Furman v. Georgia (1973) 403 U.S. 238.
585[1985] L.R.C. (Const.) 642.
155
State,5*6 and the Court of Appeal of Botswana in The State v. Petrus.587 It was 
from those decisions that Mwalusanya, J., drew inspiration. After being 
satisfied that the disproportionate test was ‘universally recognized and 
accepted’, the learned judge adopted it for use in Tanzania.
The minimum sentences fixed by Act No. 10 of 1989 could not pass the 
proportionality test for they were found to be arbitrary. They made it difficult 
for the court to take into account the factors like the age of the offender, the 
offender’s previous good record, his remorse and the prevalence of the 
offence. Mwalusanya, J., summed up his argument:
“If the courts in Tanzania were allowed to pass a 
lesser sentence i f  special reasons are adduced, then 
that would have been alright and the legislation would 
have been constitutional...”.
Further, the minimum sentence of 30 years imprisonment was found 
disproportionate because in the opinion of the learned judge it was excessive 
or unconscionable even for the offence of armed robbery. It was excessive in 
the sense that it defeated the government ‘s rehabilitation policy by 
incarcerating the prisoner for a period which amounted to life imprisonment. 
As such it went beyond legitimate penal objectives and did not ‘bear rational 
relationship to the accomplishment of penological goals’ to justify its severity. 
The judge opposed the idea that harsh sentences were the only way of fighting 
crime in the absence of other measures such as mass education and good 
policing.
It was also the first case on the constitutionality of corporal punishment 
to come before the courts. As such the judge found it appropriate to make 
regular reference to decisions of other courts in Commonwealth countries in 
Africa, United States of America and also the experience of the European
586[1988] L.R.C. (Const.) 442.
587[1985] L.R.C. (Const.) 699.
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Court of Human Rights in interpreting similar provisions. After being 
persuaded by decisions of the Court of Appeal of Botswana,588 the Supreme 
Court of the United States of America,589 the Eastern District Court of South 
Africa,590 the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe,591 and the European Court of 
Human Rights,592 Mwalusanya, J., arrived at the firm conclusion that corporal 
punishment inescapably fell within the definition of inhuman and degrading 
punishment. He considered these decisions as inspiring and worthy of adoption 
if Tanzania was to keep pace with other countries in the promotion of human 
rights. The learned judge observed:
“Those decisions on the unconstitutionality of 
corporal punishment are examples of the prudent 
application of international human rights norms to 
domestic human rights law. They identify with 
evolving standards of decency and humanity.
Tanzania cannot be left behind in that boat.”593
The European Court of Human Rights in the case of Tyrer v. U. K59A 
back in 1978 had declared corporal punishment inhuman, and degrading 
punishment and hence in violation of Article 3 of the European Convention.595 
This interpretation by the European Court of Human Rights has influenced the 
decisions of courts in certain Commonwealth countries to which Mwalusanya, 
J., also referred. All accepted the reasoning of the European Court of Human 
Rights and arrived at the conclusion that corporal punishment was inhuman 
and degrading punishment. The European Court of Human Rights pointed out 
the circumstances which made such punishment degrading:
^ T h e  State v. Pefrus and Another, [1985] L.R.C. (Const.) 699.
5%9Jackson and Others v. Bishop (1968) 404 F. 2d. 571.
590Queen v. Nortje (1880) I E.D.C. 231 and Queen v. Hans Windvoged and Another (1881) 2 
E.D.C. 98.
591 In Ncube v. The State [1988] L.R.C. (Const.) 442.
592In the case of Tyrer v. U. K. (1978) 2 E.H.R.R. 1.
593See Thomas Mjengi v. R., op. cit.
594(1978) 2 E.H.R.R. 1
595This Article is identical to Article 13 (6) (e) of the Tanzanian Constitution
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“The very nature of judicial corporal punishment is 
that it involves one human being inflicting physical 
violence on another human being. Furthermore, it is 
institutionalized violence, that is... violence permitted 
by the law, ordered by the judicial authorities of the 
State and earned out by the police authorities of the 
State... Neither can it be excluded that the 
punishment may have had adverse psychological 
effects. ”596
In conclusion Mwalusanya, J., had this to say:
. .corporal punishment not only is inherently inhuman 
and degrading, and so unconstitutional; but in addition 
international statements of human rights indicate that 
such type of punishment has become simply 
unacceptable in a civilized and democratic society. The 
weight of international opinion is against corporal 
punishment. It is up to us to remain an island on 
ourselves.”597
On the strength of the foregoing, the mandatory 12 strokes of corporal 
punishment and the minimum sentence of thirty years imprisonment598 were 
declared unconstitutional and void, as they are inhuman and degrading 
punishments prohibited by Article 13 (6) (e) of the Constitution.599
However, some judges are opposed to Mwalusanya, J ’s progressive 
findings as regards the constitutionality of the law prescribing the minimum 
sentence of thirty years for the offence of armed robbery. The same issue was 
raised in the case of Ismail Mgendi Mkurya v. R,600 when the accused person 
challenged the constitutionality of thirty years imprisonment sentence imposed 
on him, for the offence of aimed robbery. The judge admitted that such
Tyrer v. U. K ,  op cit,, para. 33
597See Thomas Mjengi v. R., op. cit.
598Under the Minimum Sentences Act, 1972, as amended by Act No, 10 of 1989.
599Actually the trial magistrate had wrongly sentenced the accused persons to ten strokes each instead 
of twelve strokes as prescribed by law.
600High Court of Tanzania at Dar Es Salaam, Criminal Appeal No. 34 of 1991, unreported.
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sentence was severe but it was a reaction to the realities of the day when armed 
bandits had made life unbearable for the law abiding people.601 He therefore 
thought that the law was constitutional and was saved by the derogation 
clauses, Articles 30 and 31 of the Constitution. In other words, the judge was 
authorizing the infringement of human rights by way of legislation as a 
reaction to certain pressing social problems, like armed robbery. This decision 
is in conflict with the implementation of the norm against inhuman treatment 
or punishment. As a principle of international human rights, even for the 
highest reasons of public interest, ill-treatment is not allowed. That is why the 
European Court of Human Rights in the case of Thomassi v. France602 held 
that the need to fight terrorism cannot justify violations of physical integrity. 
The court stated:
“ ...the undeniable difficulties inherent in the fight 
against crime, particularly with regard to terrorism, 
cannot result in limits being placed on the 
protection to be afforded in respect of the physical 
integrity of individuals.”603
The fight against crime should take into consideration respect for 
individual fundamental rights. The court of law has to ensure that the national 
desire to combat crime does not override the need to respect human lights. It is 
unfortunate that in Ismail MgendVs case the court failed to appreciate the 
length of the term of imprisonment as a factor in determining whether or not 
the punishment is inhuman and degrading. The discussion of the European 
Court of Human Rights in the case of Ireland v. United Kingdom604 associates 
inhuman treatment and degrading treatment with long duration imprisonment.
601There was an increase in armed robbery incidents such as holding up of buses and breaking into 
dwelling houses when this Act was passed by the Parliament.
60215 E.H.R.R. 1.
603Ibid., see para 115.
6042 E.H.R.R. 25.
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While one might focus more on 'physical pain in considering a punishment’s 
inhuman character, and on emotional or dignitary injury when determining 
whether it is degrading, the three categories still clearly show a considerable 
overlap.'605 Perhaps, if  the learned judge in Mgendi’s case had taken the 
trouble to read also the Ireland case he would have arrived at a different 
conclusion.
With these two conflicting decisions of the High Court the position of 
the law is not clear as regards the constitutionality of corporal punishment and 
long imprisonment sentence prescribed by the Minimum Sentence Act. 
Although the Republic appealed to the Court of Appeal against the decision of 
Mwalusanya, J., in MjengVs case, to date the appeal has never been heard 
because the respondent cannot be traced.
5:1:2 Death penalty
The death penalty is mandatory for anyone convicted of murder under 
sections 196 and 197 of the Penal Code. The High Court in Tanzania in the 
case of R. v. Mbushuu Dominic Mnyaroje and Another,606 considered its 
power to interfere with the right to life in this way in the light of the 
Constitutional guarantees. In that case counsel for the accused persons who 
were convicted of murder, challenged the constitutionality of the death 
penalty.
Mwalusanya, J., guided by a 'generous and purposive construction' that 
he generally gave to the constitutional provisions which protect fundamental 
rights and freedoms, arrived at the conclusion that the death penalty was 
inherently a cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment and so was the manner 
it was carried out. He took into account among other things, the appalling 
conditions under which the people on death row were kept and the prolonged
605JANIS, M. W., KAY, R. S., and BRADLEY, A. W., p. 132.
606High Court of Tanzania at Dodoma, Criminal Sessions Case No. 44 of 1991, reported in (1994) 2 
L.R.C. 335.
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mental torture that was caused to them by delays in carrying out executions. 
His attention and concern were drawn also to the mode of carrying out the 
death penalty in a tortuous and cruel manner when he observed:
"There are few cases in which hangings have messed 
up and the prison guards have had to pull on the 
prisoners legs to speed up his death or use a hammer 
to hit his head."
All these factors coupled with the possibility of there being erroneous 
convictions, ineffectiveness of the death penalty in curbing violent crimes, and 
the fact that 'the act of killing in itself is offensive' made the learned judge find 
that such sentence was not in the public interest and therefore not saved by 
Article 30 (2) of the Constitution.607 Further, he considered the views of the 
public about the death penalty:
“I concede that there may be a majority of Tanzanians 
who support the death penalty blindly, and these are 
not enlightened and are not initiated or aware of the 
ugly aspect of the death penalty. Apparently it is so 
because the death penalty is carried out in secrecy.”
In his judgment, Mwalusanya, J., was persuaded by the need to 
implement international human rights instruments, and he was influenced by 
court decisions from other jurisdictions which had opportunity to examine the 
constitutionality of death penalty with view of promoting human rights.608 The 
death penalty was then found to be cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment 
and therefore void 'to the extent of the inconsistency.'609
607The contents of Article 30 (2) are discussed in chapter four.
608por example U. S. A in Furman v. Georgia (1972) 408 U.S. 28; India in Javed Ahmed v. The 
State o f Maharashtra (1985) S.C. 231; West Indies in De Freitas v. Benny [1976] A.C. 239; 
Zimbabwe in Ndlovu v. The State [1988] L.R.C. (Const.) 442; Botswana in The State v. Petrus 
[1985] L.R.C. (Const.) 699.
609See Article 64 (5) of the Constitution.
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However, this judgment did not last long for it was overturned by the 
Court of Appeal in Mbushuu Dominic Mnyaroje and Kalai Sangula v. R.610 on 
appeal by the Republic against sentence and cross appeal by the accused 
persons against conviction. The Court of Appeal was in agreement with 
Mwalusanya, J's finding that the death penalty itself was inherently inhuman, 
cruel and degrading punishment and so was the mode of its execution, and that 
it offended Article 13 (6) (e) of the Constitution. However, in the opinion of 
the Court of Appeal, the death penalty was saved by Article 30 (2) of the 
Constitution because it passed the arbitrariness and proportionality test611 as 
laid down in the cases of D.P.P. v. Daudi Pete612 and Kukutia Ole Pumbun 
and Another v. Attorney-General.613 Mwalusanya, J., had also considered 
this test before arriving at his conclusion, but the Court of Appeal was of the 
view that 'the learned judge seems not to have fully grasped' the import of the 
principles laid down by the test that:
"Whether or not a legislation which derogates from a 
basic right of an individual is in public interest 
depends on first, its lawfulness, that is, it should not 
be arbitrary and second, on the proportionality test, 
that is, the limitation imposed should not be more than 
reasonably necessary."
In his judgment Mwalusanya, J., expressed the view that there was no 
safeguard against the arbitrary exercise of power of clemency by the President. 
The Court of Appeal considered the death penalty to be free from 
arbitrariness, on the grounds that it is the court which makes a decision in a 
murder case by following the rules and that the Presidential prerogative of
610 Court of Appeal of Tanzania at Dar Es Salaam, Criminal Appeal No. 142 of 1994, reported in 
(1995) 1 L.R.C. 216.
61 ^ ee  our early discussion about this rule in this chapter and also chapter seven.
612Op cit.
613Court of Appeal of Tanzania at Arusha, Civil Appeal No. 32 of 1992, reported in (1993) 2 L.R.C. 
317.
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mercy is outside the court process.614 Further, that the law introduces 
safeguards by providing mandatory appeal against death sentence and by 
exempting pregnant women and juveniles.615 However, it admitted that the 
President is not hound by the recommendations of the trial judge or his 
advisory committee when exercising his prerogative of mercy as Mwalusanya, 
J., rightly queried. Arguably the fact that President’s discretion cannot make 
matters worse for the condemned prisoner, does not mean that he cannot 
exercise that power arbitrarily. After all there is always very little information 
as to the way or the criteria on which the President exercises his prerogative of 
mercy.616 Perhaps what remains unclear is the time when due process of law 
for any one charged with murder can be said to have been completed? The 
Court of Appeal also admitted that an innocent person might be executed in 
error, but that would not be arbitrary because it would be a proper decision of 
both trial and appeal courts.
The rules which the Court of Appeal laid down in the cases cited above 
to determine whether a particular law could be saved by derogation and 
clawback clauses, were not free from ambiguity nor could they be applied in 
every case. This is the problem which Mwalusanya, J., encountered in the 
case under discussion. He realised that it was veiy hard to rely on these rules 
in order to do away with death penalty. Nevertheless he attempted, with 
difficulty, to associate death penalty with arbitrariness and excessiveness, the 
necessary elements to be taken into account before any law could be removed 
from the shelter of Articles 30 and 31 of the Constitution, as laid down by the 
Court of Appeal.
614Mwalusanya, J., had expressed possibility of there being arbitrary exercise of power by President 
when pardoning those serving imprisonment court sentence or death sentence.
615It is argued in HATCHARD, J., and COLDHAM, S., pp. 165-166 drat there is a big possibility of 
executing juveniles because of difficulty on the part of the court to establish tire age of die accused 
person. Arguably tiiis possibility is greater in a county like Tanzania where registration of births 
is basically done in urban areas only.
616HATCHARD, J., and COLDHAM, S., p. 169.
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Also, the Court of Appeal considered the aspect of proportionality, 
whether the limitation imposed by the death penalty was more than was 
reasonably necessary to achieve the legitimate object of protecting society 
from wanton killing. The answer was in the affirmative given the gravity of 
the offence as perceived by the Tanzanian society that:
“The society can only discharge its duty of protecting 
the right to life by deterring persons from killing 
others. Tanzania, like many other societies, has 
decided to do so through death penalty.”
As such the court was satisfied that the overwhelming majority of the 
public was in favour of retaining death penalty and that it had been an 
effective deterrent punishment against violent crimes. Here, the Court of 
Appeal did not give conclusive proof that death penalty was a more effective 
punishment than life imprisonment.617 Indeed the decision of the Court of 
Appeal joined hand with the majority of the public whose opinion favoured 
death penalty. The Court of Appeal was not prepared to offend the public by 
deciding against its wishes. This can be deduced from the remarks of 
Ramadhani, J. A., about the reasonableness of the death penalty when he said:
“But the crucial question is whether or not the death 
penalty is reasonably necessary to protect the right to 
life. For this we say it is the society which decides.”
In contrast with this attitude is the Constitutional Court of South Africa 
in State v. Makwanyane and Mchunu618 when considering the 
constitutionality of the death penalty. In his judgment, Chaskalson, P., clearly 
stated:
617For a detailed discussion on this see HATCHARD, J., (1995 B)? p. 192.
618(1995) 1 L.R.C. 269.
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“This Court cannot allow itself to be diverted from its 
duty to act as an independent arbiter of the 
Constitution by making choices on the basis that they 
will find favour with the public”619
The above statement was made in response to the Attomey-GeneraTs 
submission that what is cruel, inhuman or degrading depends upon 
contemporary attitudes within society, and that South African society did not 
regard the death sentence for cases of murder as cruel, inhuman or degrading 
form of punishment.
Other judges agreed with the views expressed in the judgment of 
Chaskalson, P., particularly on the aspect of public opinion. However, some of 
them were not comfortable with his attitude towards public opinion. They felt 
it was unnecessary to say anything at all about it,620 as it would lead to 
criticisms against the court, possibly from the public which for a long time had 
experienced too much savagery and wanton killing.621 Kentridge, J., also 
pointed out that if  public opinion on the issue was clear then it could not be 
entirely ignored. What followed was the campaign, by the retentionists, against 
the abolition of death penalty by the Constitutional Court.622
In principle, the Constitutional Court of South Africa considered the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal of Tanzania but it totally disagreed with its 
attitude of leaving it for Parliament or society to decide whether the death 
penalty was justifiable.623 Here we note the difference in the language of the 
relevant constitutional provisions of the two countries and its effect on the 
interpretation by the court. Whereas the South African Constitution provided 
that it was for the court, and not society or Parliament to decide on the 
justifiability of death sentence by examining the limitations, the Tanzanian
619Ibid., at p. 311.
620See the judgment of Ackermann, J., pp. 338-339.
621See the judgment of Didcott, J., at p. 348.
622See HATCHARD, J., and COLDHAM, S., pp. 161-162.
623HATCHARD, J., (1995 B), p. 195.
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Constitution had no similar provision. Furthermore, the Tanzanian 
Constitution by the derogation clause, vindicates the laws which offend the 
Bill of Rights if they serve the public interest. The Court of Appeal was 
satisfied that the death penalty had passed the test as contained in those rules 
which were developed in Daudi Pete and Kukutia Ole Pumbun and it could not 
be declared unconstitutional.
Another interesting thing in the judgment of the Court of Appeal is the 
warning that it gave to the High Court judge for making references to 
decisions of courts from other countries:
“ ...when it comes to what is reasonably necessary to 
protect the society we have to be extra careful with 
judicial decisions of other jurisdictions...In societies 
where owning a firearm is almost as simple as owning 
a penknife, death penalty might not be necessary to 
protect the public. But societies, like ours, where 
people go to the extent of sacrificing their sleep to 
join vigilante groups popularly known as Sungusungu, 
in order to protect life and property, death penalty 
may still be reasonably necessary”.
Arguably, the statement of the Court of Appeal could be in conflict with 
the previous directive that it issued in the case of Attorney-General v. Lesinoi 
Ndeinai and Others.624 In that case the Court of Appeal directed that in matters 
of inteipretation of the Constitution and fundamental rights, courts should 
always see what courts in other countries have said about same issue. Nyalali, 
C. J., said:
“On a matter of this nature it is always very helpful to 
consider what solution to the problems other courts in 
other countries have found, since basically human 
beings are the same though they may live under 
different conditions.”625
624 Op cit.
625Ibid., at p. 222.
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It can also be argued that by sounding the necessary warning the Court 
of Appeal did not conflict with its previous proposition but it was duty bound 
to clarify its directive which was capable of being misapplied. The implication 
of such warning is that the court should not forget to take local circumstances 
into account also when interpreting constitutional provisions.
5:2 Presumption of innocence and liberty
Under the Constitution every person charged with a criminal offence is 
presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty.626 Also, the Constitution 
provides for the right to personal freedom and protects an individual from 
arbitrary arrest, restriction, detention, exile or deprivation of liberty except in 
a manner prescribed by law or 'in the execution of the sentence or order of a 
court.'627 The courts in Tanzania have in a number of ways succeeded in 
protecting the said constitutional rights and their infringements have 
occasionally been declared unconstitutional. However, there have been 
conflicting judgments of the court on this issue.
5:2:1 Bail. 
5:2:1:1 Statutory denial o f bail.
It was the celebrated High Court decision of Mwalusanya, J., in Daudi 
Pete v. R62% that marked the beginning of judicial activism since the Bill of 
Rights became justiciable. An Act of Parliament was found by the court to 
contain a provision which was in conflict with the presumption of innocence 
of an accused person, guaranteed under Article 13 (6) (b) of the Constitution 
and therefore void. In that case, the accused person was denied bail by the
626Article 13 (6) (b).
627Article 15.
628High Court of Tanzania at Mwanza, Miscellaneous Criminal Cause No. 80 of 1989, unreported 
(reproduced in PETER, C. M., (1997), p. 532).
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District Court under section 148 (5) (e) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1985 
on the ground that the offence he was charged with, (robbery with violence) 
was not bailable. It was alleged that the applicant and three others robbed a 
head of cattle from the complainant by using a gun to threaten violence. Daudi 
Pete, one of the accused persons, being aggrieved by the District Court’s 
finding, lodged with the High Court his application for bail pending trial. The 
court had to consider whether bail for an accused person in Tanzania, is a right 
or a privilege. Section 148 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1985 provides:
(5) A police officer in charge of a police station , or 
a court before whom an accused person is 
brought or appears shall not admit that person to 
bail i f :
(a) that person is accused of murder or 
treason;
(b) it appears that the accused person has 
previously been sentenced to 
imprisonment for a term exceeding three 
years;
(c) it appears that the accused person has 
previously been granted bail by a court 
and failed to comply with the conditions 
of the bail or absconded;
(d) the accused person is charged with an 
offence alleged to have been committed 
while he was released on bail by a court 
of law;
(e) the act or any of the acts constituting the 
offence with which the accused person 
is charged consists of a serious assault 
causing grievous harm or threat of 
violence to other persons, or of having a 
firearm or an explosive.
(f) it appears to the court that it is necessary 
that the accused person be kept in 
custody for his protection or safety;
(g) the offence for which the person is 
charged involves property whose value 
exceeds ten million shillings, unless that
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person pays cash deposit equivalent to 
half the value of the property, and the 
rest is secured by execution of a bond;
(h) if  he is charged with an offence under 
the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance.
The learned judge traced the attitude of the courts during the British 
Colonial era and found that bail was regarded as a right, not a privilege. This 
attitude continued even after independence for the accused person was 
presumed innocent until the contrary was proved. Bail would be refused only 
where there was evidence that to grant such bail would result in a failure of 
justice. After visiting the provisions of the Constitution, decisions of courts in 
other countries and various international and regional instruments on human 
rights, Mwalusanya, J., was of the opinion that the law restricting bail put the 
liberty of citizen at stake and infringed his right to liberty. According to the 
learned judge the law was ‘draconian’.
Counsel for the Republic had submitted that once a particular law has 
been passed by Parliament, it should not be questioned, no matter how harsh or 
severe it might be. In his opinion:
“ ...nobody would disagree with this that the role of 
the Parliament is to make law. They are the 
representatives of the people in their respective 
constituencies... They are thus bound to enact any law 
irrespective of whether or not the same appears to be 
tyrannical or dictatorial in nature. In short the powers 
of the Parliament in making laws are unlimited and 
can’t be questioned by anybody let alone the 
judiciary... Parliament can pass any law irrespective 
of whether or not the same appears to contravene the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights”
In responding to this submission by the State Attorney, the learned 
judge referred to various works by renowned academic scholars like Issa
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Shivji, Sol Piciotto, Huaraka, Wilbert Kapinga, and Luitfield Mbunda. He then 
arrived at the conclusion that 'a dense ideological fog' covered the submission 
and prevented the learned State Attorney from being able to differentiate 
between laws that serve the masses, and laws which serve the immediate 
interests of the state. It was a mistake to argue that every law legitimately 
enacted by the Parliament could not be questioned. As Coldham observed,
(quoting Lord Diplock), ‘it would be a mockery to regard “law” as simply
meaning whatever Parliament enacts’.629
Mwalusanya, J., took the opportunity to send a special message to 
other judges in the country:
“Decisions taken now on the rights of the citizens 
prescribed in the Bill of Rights will have a critical 
effect on the continuing relevance of this institution in 
the future... The judiciary of late may have been 
receiving a bad image of a shady villain and never a
fearless champion of truth and justice. That image
ought to be corrected now. If the judges had hitherto
taken a restrained approach instead of the activist 
approach, they should now change. For the judges to 
be able to capture confidence from the community, a 
whole now package of legal outlook should be 
cultivated which does not abandon standards but 
emphasizes judicial creativity with a social objective 
in mind.”
Having considered the above factors, the learned judge found that the 
whole of section 148 (4) and (5) of the Criminal Procedure Act was 
discriminatory and unconstitutional, that it offended the doctrine of separation 
of powers by taking away judicial discretion in cases of bail and conflicted 
with the presumption of innocence guaranteed under Article 13 (6) (b) of the 
Constitution.
629COLDHAM, s ., (1991), p. 208.
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It was discriminatory in the sense that accused persons were treated 
differently for the same offences when it came to bail consideration, 
depending on the court where the charge was preferred. The fact that there 
were no restrictions on the granting of bail in the Primary Court630 meant that 
the court could grant bail to an accused person charged with an offence which 
involved the threat of violence or serious assault. Such a person could not be 
admitted to bail if  his case was to be tried by the District Court or High Court. 
Thus Mwalusanya, J., was of the opinion that the ‘different treatment rested 
upon no reasonable basis but it was essentially arbitrary and so 
discriminatory.’
In this case and also in subsequent similar applications the reason of the 
state including the clawback clauses in the Bill of Rights became clear. The 
State Attorney submitted that section 148 (5) of the CPA, was saved by Article 
30 of the Constitution, and therefore lawful for being in the public interest and 
on national security grounds.631 However, the court restricted the application 
of such clawback clause to the effect that:
“ ...where in the Constitution it is stated that a 
fundamental right may be restricted Hn accordance 
with the law * it is not enough for the party supporting 
the legislation to be able to point a (law ’ in the sense 
simply of an Act duly passed by the legislature. If the 
Act relied on should itself be declared inoperative as 
violating a fundamental constitutional right, it is not 
‘law. m
Such a well-researched judgment is fascinating to read not only because 
of the author’s creative mind or liberal approach towards human rights 
provisions but also for its educative role. The courts subordinate to the High
630See section 16 of the Primary Courts Criminal Procedure Code ( 3rd Schedule to the Magistrates’ 
Court Act, 1984 (Act No. 2 of 1984)).
63 Similar view was taken by the court when examining die constitutionality of the Deportation 
Ordinance in Chumchua Mai'wa's case, infra.
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Court started citing this binding authority when granting bail to accused 
persons charged with so-called unbailable offences. This decision received a 
warm welcome from the victims of section 148 and the Prison Officers who 
had started complaining of congestion in prisons.
It should be noted that the High Court is not, and never has been bound 
by its own decisions. It is even true to say that individual judges are not bound 
by their own decisions.632 As a result, the progressive ideas of Mwalusanya, J., 
in the case of Daudi Pete did not bind other judges when called upon to 
pronounce on the constitutionality of the law that restricted the right to bail. 
They could conveniently ignore his findings and proceed to make decisions 
which conflicted with his decision.
Other judges who had been ‘nurtured heavily in the positivist 
tradition,’633 could not see how human rights could be infringed by a law which 
restricted the traditional powers of the court to grant bail to accused persons. 
The case of R. v. Peregrin Mrope634 illustrates this view. In this case, the 
accused person was charged with an offence of causing grievous harm 
contrary to section 225 of the Penal Code. This offence involves the use of 
violence and under the provisions of section 148 (5) (e) of the CPA, 1985 the 
accused person was disqualified from being considered for bail. The District 
Court referred to the High Court the accused person’s application for bail 
where an argument that section 148 (5) (e) violated human rights was raised. 
The High Court dismissed the application and found section 148 (5) (e) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act, 1985, constitutional and not contravening the 
presumption of innocence. Msumi, J., stated, inter alia:
“On the question of unconstitutionality, I am of the 
view that section 148 (5) (e) does not contravene the 
provision of Article 13 (6) (b),... Denying bail to
632LYALL, a ., p. 54.
633SHIVJI, I. G., (1987), p. 137.
634High Court of Tanzania at Dar Es salaam, Criminal Cause No. 43 of 1989, unreported.
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accused person does not necessarily amount to 
treating such a person like a convicted criminal”.
The reasoning of Msumi, J., was that the right of an accused person to 
be released on bail was not absolute but could only be enjoyed with necessary 
qualifications. It was in the light of these qualifications that the court in certain 
circumstances refused bail to accused persons. Msumi, J., was of the opinion 
that Parliament, like the courts, could properly deny bail to accused persons by 
way of legislation:
“Both public interest and rational administration of 
justice call for necessary inference that the right of 
accused person to be released on bail must be qualified.
These qualifications may be statutory or in the form of 
court decisions. Provided these qualifications do not 
purport to abolish completely the basic right by 
indiscriminate ban on grant of bail for all types of 
offences, I am of the view that they cannot be held 
ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution”
As we shall see the finding by Msumi, J., that denying bail to an 
accused person did not necessarily amount to treating such a person like a 
convicted criminal, was approved by the Court of Appeal in Daudi Pete.
Even Mkwawa, Ag. J., while considering an application for bail in the 
case of R. v. Iddi Salum625 where the accused person was facing robbery 
charges, associated himself with the views of Msumi, J., and adopted his 
reasoning. In addition, Mkwawa Ag. J., emphasized the need to respect the 
intention of the Parliament when it enacted such a provision which restricted 
the right to bail:
“This section of the Act does not conflict with any 
provision of the Republican Constitution. It is a valid 
law made by the legislature to the exercise of the
635High Court of Tanzania at Dar Es Salaam, Miscellaneous Criminal Cause No. 55 of 1990, 
unreported.
173
legislative power vested in it by the Republican 
Constitution. It is my conviction that a court charged 
with the judicial duty of giving effect to Parliament’s 
intention...ought to construe the law as incorporating 
by necessary implication, words which would give 
effect to such inferred intention and to fail to do so 
would defeat Parliament’s intention.”
According to Mkwawa, Ag. J., there was nothing in the Constitution 
which invalidated the law that imposed ‘a total prohibition on the release on 
bail of a person reasonably suspected of having committed a criminal offence’.
The situation was chaotic especially in the subordinate courts on whom 
the two conflicting High Court decisions/views were binding. It was therefore 
left upon the discretion of the magistrate to choose one of the conflicting 
decisions of the High Court, to grant or to deny bail to accused persons.636 
Whatever side the magistrate opted for, there were High Court decisions to 
support his decision until three years later when the Court of Appeal resolved 
the controversy following government's appeal against the finding of 
Mwalusanya, J., in Daudi Pete's case.
The Court of Appeal of Tanzania in D.P.P. v, Daudi Pete,637 endorsed 
the holding of the High Court but for different reasons, and it was to the extent 
of section 148 (5) (e) only. That particular sub-sub section, according to the 
Court of Appeal, was unconstitutional because it violated the right to personal 
liberty guaranteed under Article 15 (2) of the Constitution and the unnecessary 
restrictions it put on liberty could not enable it to pass a proportionality test. 
The Court of Appeal formulated the rules which provide for a situation where 
a law that violates the rights guaranteed under the Constitution can be saved by 
a derogation clause. This includes a condition that:
636This was confirmed by Mapigano, J,, in R.. v. Francis Haule and Others, High Court of Tanzania 
at Dar Es salaam, Economic Criminal Revision No. 2 of 1990, unreported. The District Court had 
relied on the High Court decision in Daudi Pete and rejected other authorities before granting bail 
to the accused persons who were charged with an offence of illegal possession of guns, one of the 
unbailable offences under the Criminal Procedure Act, 1985.
6370p cit.
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“Any statute which is so broad as to fall partly within 
and partly outside the parameters of the Article would 
not be validated”.
As we shall see in chapter six these rules were elaborated by the same 
court in Kukutia Ole Pumbun's case.
Section 148 (5) raises serious matters of infringement of human rights. 
However, the Court of Appeal found that the High Court judge erred in law to 
frame a wide range of issues which resulted into nullification of the entire 
section. The finding of the Court of Appeal was based on the fact that only 
sub-sub section (5) (e) was properly before the court. Arguably, at that time 
the Court of Appeal’s criticisms were justified in that Mwalusanya, J., 
decision had covered also persons charged with veiy serious offences like 
murder and treason.
Although the matter before the High Court was specifically connected 
with sub-sub section (5) (e) of section 148, the whole of section 148 (5) related 
to denying accused persons bail by a mere charge. We think it was proper for 
the High Court to consider it as a whole, since the entire section violated 
individual right to liberty and removed the presumption of innocence. Further 
more, in a poor country like Tanzania where legal literacy is very low and only 
a very few can afford the services of advocates, the court should use the few 
occasions it has, as Mwalusanya, J., did, to clarify matters of human rights 
instead of taking a narrow view of the issues before it.
It is interesting to note that since then, there have been a series of 
applications in the High Court challenging the constitutionality of various sub­
sub sections of section 148 (5) of the CPA, 1985 as amended by Act No. 13 Of 
1988 which deny bail to accused persons. As a result almost the entire section 
has now been declared unconstitutional. As we shall see later, even the law 
which made the charges of murder and treason unbailable has been declared
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unconstitutional by the Court.638 However, the question remains, how many 
could afford to challenge the constitutionality of those laws restricting liberty?
Mwalusanya, J's decision had restored the court’s power to consider 
bail applications in all cases. In considering bail applications the court hears 
both sides and finally grants or rejects the application after weighing the 
submissions. It means bail could be refused by the court but after the accused 
person had been given chance to reply to the prosecution’s objections. All in 
all such objections by the prosecution should be strong enough to warrant the 
court’s early pronouncement restricting the liberty of the accused person.
The subsequent cases we discuss later, that sought to challenge the 
constitutionality of other sub-sub sections would not have occurred if  the 
Court of Appeal had approved the reasoning of Mwalusanya, J. The Court of 
Appeal seems to have adopted the approach favoured by the government, that 
all laws in violation of the Constitution should be left to operate until 
specifically and successfully challenged in a court of law. As we shall see in 
chapter eight, the government took advantage of the loopholes in the judgment 
and brought back into statute book, the sub-sub section whose immediate 
deletion had been ordered by the Court of Appeal.
Another disturbing aspect of the judgment of the Court of Appeal in 
Daudi Pete ’$ case is the court’s unqualified acceptance of Article 30 which is 
widely worded, as a legitimate means of protecting rights of the majority or 
community as opposed to rights and freedoms of the individual. This could 
easily be misapplied to justify abuses of rights and freedoms by State 
Organs.639 Modem human rights activists as well as progressive judicatures 
have always looked at these derogation clauses with a suspicious eye. There is 
an apparent need for the Court of Appeal to look over and correct some of its 
pronouncements and arguments in Daudi Pete in the interests of human rights.
638See footnote 644.
639SHIVJI, I. G., (1991 A), p. 125.
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Sub-sub section (5) (e) was deleted by the legislature, following the 
decision of the Court of Appeal, but its substance was shifted to sub-sub 
section (5) (a) placing the offence of armed robbery in the same category with 
murder and treason and therefore still unbailable.640
However, five years later Mroso, J., in Ngereza Masai and Loreu Masai 
v. i?.,641 declared also unconstitutional the sub-sub section which made the 
offence of armed robbery unbailable. The appellant in that case was initially 
charged with the offence of robbery with violence and was granted bail. Later 
the charge was substituted to include the particulars of aimed robbery and his 
bail was cancelled by the District Court on the strength of section 148 (5) (a) 
of the CPA, 1985 as amended by Act No 21 of 1991. This was challenged in 
the High Court by the applicant’s advocate for being unconstitutional. The 
learned judge relied on the rules established by the Court of Appeal in Daudi 
Pete’s case and found that sub-sub section (5) (a) as far as armed robbery was 
concerned was not saved by the derogation clause because it contained no 
safeguards against potential abuse. Mroso, J., observed:
“ ...the provisions of section 148 (5) (a) regarding 
armed robbery...are capable of including both the 
persons envisaged, that is those who employ arms in 
the commission of robbery and those who the police 
simply want to deny bail. The provisions do not contain 
any safeguards against such abuse, thus leaving it upon 
for unscrupulous police personnel to easily succeed to 
have accused persons deprived bail by merely alleging 
that they committed armed robbery.”
Following the above reasoning, the learned judge struck out the words 
“armed robbery” from section 148 (5) (a) and declared the offence of armed 
robbery as bailable. According to Mroso, J., he confined himself to armed
640See Act No. 27 of 1991.
641 High Court of Tanzania at Arusha, Criminal Appeal No. 1 of 1996, unreported .
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robbery only, because no arguments were advanced before him regarding 
murder and treason.
In Masai's case two more important things are noted in the 
jurisprudence of human rights in Tanzania, The first one is the purposive 
interpretation that has to be given to the provisions of the Basic Rights and 
Duties Enforcement Act, 1994. As we saw in chapter five, the Act lays down a 
complex procedure for the enforcement of basic rights. It requires a formal 
petition to be heard by a panel of three judges after one judge has examined 
the issues as to frivolous or vexatious motives. However, Mroso, J., interpreted 
the phrase “without prejudice to any other action... ” in section 4 of the Act to 
mean that:
“ ...a  petition is only one procedure for obtaining 
redress and that an appeal against cancellation of bail 
is such “other action” with respect to the same remedy 
being sought by the appellants.”
By this interpretation therefore, redress for the violation of basic rights 
and duties need not necessarily be by way of petition nor is such redress 
restricted to the procedure as laid down under Act No. 33 of 1994.
The second point is the bold way in which the judge departed from his 
previous interpretation of Act No. 33 of 1994. In D.P.P. v. Richard Marco 
Shara and 3 Others.642 Mroso, J., had expressed his doubts whether in view of 
the amendments to the Constitution and the provisions of Act No. 33 of 1994, 
a single judge could competently declare any law unconstitutional and strike it 
out. He believed that a full bench of three judges was mandatory and that such 
power had been removed from a single High Court judge643. However, when 
confronted later with similar issue in Masai’s case, Mroso, J., referred to his 
previous proposition and had this to say:
642High Court of Tanzania at Arusha, Criminal Revision No. 4 of 1995, unreported.
643 See the Tanzanian Constitution, Article 30 (5) as amended by section 5 of Act No, 34 of 1994.
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“On revisiting that ruling I have had serious second 
thoughts and I am now of the firm view that I 
erred.. .1 therefore depart from that ruling”.
What was left by Mroso, J., in Masai’s case did not survive the scrutiny 
by Nchalla, J., in D.P.P. v. Angeline OjareMA whereby the provisions of 
section 148 (5) (a) which removed the right to bail in respect of the offences of 
murder and treason were declared unconstitutional. The accused person, wife 
of an advocate, was charged with the offence of murder under section 196 of 
the Penal Code and was granted bail by the District Court pending committal 
proceedings and trial. The Magistrate found himself bound to observe the 
Constitution and grant bail instead of following section 148 (5) (a) which was 
at variance with the Constitution. Being aggrieved by this attempt the 
prosecution side preferred an appeal to the High Court. After settling the 
position that Subordinate Courts can grant bail in offences which are triable by 
the High Court, Nchalla, J., went on to examine the constitutionality of the 
impugned provision.
The learned judge applied the rules as laid down by the Court of Appeal 
in Daudi Pete’s case that a law which violates individual fundamental rights 
should contain sufficient safeguards in order to be saved by the derogation 
clause. He found that sub-sub section (5) (a) had no such safeguards as 
exhibited by the police’s practice of planting fictitious murder charges against 
people. In a somewhat emotional observation, Nchalla, J., commented:
“ .. .1 pause here for a while and remind myself of the 
complaints one often hears from remand prisoners on 
visits to prisons, that they have been arrested by the 
police and charged with ‘Mauaji ya kupandikiza 
( meaning trumped up murder charges).
644 High Court of Tanzania at Arusha, Criminal Appeal No. 31 of 1996, unreported (reproduced in 
PETER, C. M., (1997), p. 557).
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It is interesting to note that before the accused person was brought to 
court she was arrested by the police in connection with murder of a house girl 
and released out on police bail for about two months. This explained to the 
judge the double standard treatment accused persons charged with murder 
were likely to face under the law in question.
Furthermore, the fact that a charge of murder could be reduced by the 
court to manslaughter, infanticide, mere wounding or assault and that in some 
cases the D.P.P could enter nolle prosequi, militated for the judge’s finding 
that the sub-sub section violated Articles 13 (6) (b) and 15 (2) (a) of the 
Constitution by denying bail to an accused person on the basis of a mere 
charge. Nchalla, J., invalidated the whole of sub-section (5) and went on to 
state the position of the law thus:
“ ...the entire section 148 (5) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, 1985 does not prescribe the requisite 
procedure to enable the courts to reach a judicial 
decision of bail to an accused person in the offences 
and circumstances mentioned in that section... In the 
wake of this protracted non action and silence on the 
part of the law-making bodies in prescribing the 
requisite procedure in question, the courts have given 
decisions which have mutilated the section to such an 
extent that the same is now invalid law incapable of 
application. I so find.”
However, in July 1998 the High Court decision was quashed by the 
Court of Appeal in D.P.P. v. Angeline Ojare645 on ground that 'it was based on 
a nullity.' In their judgement Kisanga, J. A., Lubuva, J. A., and Samatta, J. A., 
criticised Nchalla, J., for affirming the decision of the District Court instead of 
setting it aside.
Giving reasons for their judgment, the Justices of Appeal argued that 
'the trial magistrate had no competence or jurisdiction to hear and decide on
645Court of Appeal of Tanzania at Dar Es Salaam, Criminal Appeal No. 21 of 1997, unreported.
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the constitutionality of section 148 (5) (a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 
which was raised before him.' The learned judges observed:
"When the issue of constitutionality of section 148 (5) 
was raised in the district court, the trial magistrate 
should have proceeded in accordance with the 
procedure laid down under section 9 (1) of the Basic 
Rights and Duties Enforcement Act...Under that 
procedure the magistrate had a duty to refer that issue 
to the High Court for decision."
To the extent of such omission, the Court of Appeal was of the firm 
view that the proceedings in the District Court were null and void and that the 
High Court erred in failing to hold so and instead proceeded 'to uphold a 
decision which was no decision at all.' In their opinion it was 'not necessary' to 
consider the substantive reasoning of the High Court and other grounds of 
appeal for the matter was capable of being disposed of on ground of 
procedural irregularity. It is our submission that this conduct of the Court of 
Appeal is a negative contribution to the young Tanzanian human rights 
jurisprudence in that it makes many issues of human rights remain uncertain.
It is interesting to note that while the appeal was still pending in the 
Court of Appeal, the D.P.P withdrew the charges against Angeline Ojare the 
accused person. This conduct confirms the reasoning of the High Court that 
the impugned provision was wide enough to cover the innocent and therefore 
not protected by Article 30 of the Constitution. It can also be argued that the 
Court of Appeal decision was based on a nullity for already the D.P.P had 
withdrawn the charges against the accused person. Actually there was no case 
at all.
In effect, the Court of Appeal decision quashes the progressive 
interpretation given by Mrosso, J., in Masai's case to the expression "without 
prejudice to any other action...." as used in section 4 of Act No. 33 of 1994.
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According to Mroso, J., an appeal to the High Court is one such other action a 
person may take to enforce his/her infringed constitutional rights. In 
responding to this interpretation which was adopted by Nchalla, J., in Ojare's 
case the Justices of Appeal provided their narrow interpretation of the 
expression that it applies:
"...to situations where an alleged wrong, though 
capable of being redressed as a violation of a basic 
right under the Constitution, the victim of it, 
nevertheless, opts to seek redress under the ordinary 
law. Take for instance, the wrong of unlawful 
confinement. A person who complains of it may, in 
terms of section 4 apply to the High Court for redress 
or institute criminal or civil proceedings under the 
ordinary law."
5:2:1:2 Statutory requirement for cash deposit
Following instances of corruption involving the embezzlement of public 
money by those entrusted to run the day-to-day activities of public institutions, 
and the investment of such money abroad, the government devised a way of 
keeping money within the country while the suspects faced criminal charges. It 
was made a condition of bail for anybody who was charged with offences 
relating to property whose value exceeded ten million shillings, to pay a cash 
deposit equivalent to half the value of that property. This is a condition under 
section 148 (5) (g) of the CPA, 1985 as amended by Act No. 13 of 1988 and 
under section 35 (3) (f) of the Organized Crime Control Act as amended by 
Act No. 10 of 1989. The policy was based on the premise that the suspects 
before the court would have actually stolen the money and it would not 
therefore be a problem for them to deposit half of it.
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The High Court has on a number of occasions declared such a condition 
for bail unconstitutional. In Saidi Ally Kazembe and Another v. R.646 the 
accused persons were charged under the Penal Code with the offence of 
breaking into a house and stealing various items valued at shillings 
15,000,000/=. The District Court admitted the accused persons to bail under 
section 148 (5) (g) of the CPA, 1985 on condition that they effected cash 
deposit of half the value of the property alleged to have been stolen.
They appealed to the High Court against that condition and challenged 
the constitutionality of that law. In examining the constitutionality of that 
condition Mapigano, J., considered its discriminatory aspect and the effect it 
had on the doctrine of separation of powers. He finally arrived at a conclusion 
that section 148 (5) (g) was unconstitutional for violating the principle of 
separation of powers and being discriminatory. It violated the principle of 
separation of powers for 'it seeks to command the court in the manner it should 
exercise its power and how it should decide the matter'. In his view the 
provision 'virtually passes judicial power to the executive' and this Violates the 
spirit and intent as well as the words of Article 4.1647
The judge described it as 'a manifestly stringent provision' hedged with 
discriminatory tendencies which are rooted in 'affording different treatment to 
different persons on grounds of their station in life' and therefore in 
contravention of Article 13 (2) of the Constitution. It was not saved by Article 
30 of the Constitution because it imposed unreasonable restrictions. In 
conclusion Mapigano, J., remarked:
"I simply find it hard to conceive of a reasonable 
restriction necessary or desirable in the interests of 
others, the general public or the nation which is at the
646High Court of Tanzania at Dar Es Salaam, Miscellaneous Criminal Cause No. 41 of 1989, 
unreported.
647Article 4 of die Constitution provides for the separation of powers between the executive, 
legislature and the judiciary.
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same inherently discriminatory on the measure of 
one's station in life"
In Philemon Chatanda v. R.,m  the accused person was charged under 
the Economic and Organised Crime Control Act, 1984 with occasioning the 
loss of shillings 32,900,000/= to National Milling Corporation an authority 
specified by the Act. He was required under section 35 (3) (f) of the Economic 
and Organised Crime Control Act to deposit in cash half that amount in order 
to qualify for bail. This condition was vehemently challenged by his advocate 
on grounds of being discriminatory and removing the presumption of 
innocence.
Chua, J., held the provision unconstitutional for discriminating between 
the poor from the rich. To elaborate his findings the learned judge took the 
example of a poor peasant and rich business-man both facing same charge. In 
his views 'it is almost a foregone conclusion that the peasant will fail to 
deposit' the money and end up on remand 'while the one from the rich class 
will in all probability manage to raise' the required sum.
Also the provision attempted to displace the legal presumption of 
innocence for it created the impression that the accused person 'should have 
benefited and therefore have the ability to deposit millions of shillings in 
court.' However, it should be noted that at that stage the court had heard no 
evidence to establish whether or not the accused person had such benefit. 
Having considered this situation Chua, J., emphasized:
"The court has therefore no moral justification to 
impose what is virtually a punishment on a person 
who may eventually be proved innocent."
The provision was found ultra vires the Constitution and therefore null and 
void.
648High Court of Tanzania at Mbeya , Miscellaneous Economic Criminal Application No. 11 of 1990, 
unreported (reproduced in PETER, C. M., (1997), p. 441).
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In R. v. Ahmed Salehe649 the accused person was charged with unlawful 
possession of government trophies worth shillings 32,256,000/= under the 
Economic and Organised Crime Control Act, 1984, and required to deposit 
half that amount as condition for bail. Kyando, J., drawing inspiration from the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Daudi Pete’s case found the provision 
unconstitutional. The learned judge argued:
"Deprivation of liberty can be properly effected in the 
case of certain circumstances, and subject to a 
procedure prescribed by law...There is no such 
procedure as required by the Constitution in section 
148 (5) (e) Criminal Procedure Act 'or elsewhere' I do 
not see it in section 35 (3) (f) of the Economic and 
Organised Crime Control Act. It follows then, on the 
authority of and principles of the decision in Daudi 
Pete’s case that the provisions of section 35 (3)
(f)...are also violative of article 15 (2) of the 
Constitution."
In general the above discussion shows that the court found the provision 
unconstitutional because it offended a person's right to equality before the law.
However, Mwaikasu, J., in the case of NJcandi Nangale v. R.,650 took a 
totally different view about the constitutionality of the law under discussion. 
He was unable to find in it anything discriminatory or anything which 
interfered with the judicial power of the court, or which displaced the 
presumption of innocence. His attention concentrated on the mischief which 
this particular law came to cure. Finally he found it in line with the provisions 
of the Constitution.
“Courts have always to bear in mind that the same was 
enacted as a continuing serious campaign against
649High Court of Tanzania at Dar Es Salaam, Miscellaneous Economic Sessions Case No. 5 of 1991, 
unreported.
650High Court of Tanzania at Mbeya, Miscellaneous Economic Crimes Application No. 1 of 1991, 
unreported.
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economic sabotage, coming in the wake of increasing 
embezzlements of public funds and property, 
smuggling, valued no longer in thousands but in 
millions of shillings. Yet detection has not been so 
easy... and at times, suspects have disappeared into 
neighbouring countries . It is therefore the combined 
desire to secure the attendance of the suspects to stand 
trial and also to serve as a deterrent to others from 
engaging into such malpractice that such stiff.\ but not 
impossible, bail conditions have been imposed. They 
are therefore, in my view, not discriminatory”.
The same judge was appointed Chairman of the Law Reform 
Commission a few years later. What is interesting in this case is the conflicting 
decisions about two co-accused persons. Nkandi Nangale was jointly charged 
together with one Phillemon Chatanda. He was joined to the charge after 
Chatanda’s bail application651 had been successfully considered on the basis of 
the unconstitutionality of the law that required him to deposit cash. However, 
Nkandi’s application for bail was placed before a different judge who did not 
find any difficulty in writing a conflicting decision from that of his 
predecessor even though the two accused persons were facing the same 
charges. Nkandi’s bail conditions were different from the conditions which 
were imposed on Phillemon Chatanda but the two were jointly charged in the 
same case as co-accused. There is no doubt that public confidence in the 
judiciary is reduced where judges reach conflicting decisions on the same 
issue.
5:2:2 Deportation
The Deportation Ordinance, 1921,652 one of the colonial statutes that 
were retained by the post-independence government, gives power to the 
President to deport any person, whom he considers dangerous to peace and
651This case is mentioned above, see footnote 648.
652Cap. 38.
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good order, from one place to another within the country.653 The President is 
also empowered to detain the deportee in custody or in prison, for any length 
of time until a fit opportunity for his deportation occurs.654 The exercise of 
these powers could not be questioned or appealed against in any court of 
law.655
Freedom of movement is naturally curtailed by detentions, arrests and 
other restrictions which result into deprivation of one’s liberty. The court has 
strictly construed the provisions of law which tend to interfere with this 
freedom by giving extensive powers to the executive. In Chumchua Marwa v. 
Officer In Charge o f  Musoma Prison and the Attorney-General656 the 
President issued a deportation order against one Marwa and 155 others that 
they be deported to Lindi region because their continued residence in Mara 
region was dangerous to peace and good order. However, because of the non­
availability of suitable transport the deportees remained in prison for more 
than five months. This prompted Chumchua, the son of one deportee, to apply 
for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the detention of his father Marwa 
Magori.
Mwalusanya, J., reasoned that although deportation is different from 
detention, it is true that before a person can be deported to a specified place of 
settlement he or she must first be arrested and detained. This interfered with 
individual liberty and placed such deportees within the range of remedies 
provided under the writ of habeas corpus.
The learned judge took the opportunity also to examine the 
constitutionality of that law which appeared to offend the fundamental rights 
and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. To him it was not enough that 
the detention order had been duly signed by the President and bore the
653Ibid., section 2,
654Ibid., section 5.
655Ibid., section 3.
656High Court of Tanzania at Mwanza, Miscellaneous Criminal Cause No. 2 of 1988, unreported 
(reproduced in PETER, C. M., (1997), p. 635).
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required official seal. Although, traditionally the courts could not go beyond 
the formal requirements of the executive order,657 Mwalusanya, J., resisted the 
temptation to opt in favour of a restrictive approach which would undermine 
the Bill of Rights. He was of the view that because the President was deporting 
the deportees 'on grounds of public peace and order' and not 'on national 
security grounds', the provision was not saved by Article 31 of the 
Constitution.
In his assessment the Deportation Ordinance violated the fundamental 
right of equal protection of the law by not containing a provision of a right to 
be heard. It is hard to accept the judge's reasoning on what constitutes equal 
protection of law. Here, the learned judge appears to confuse the right to equal 
protection of law658 and the right to fair hearing.659 Whereas the former is 
directed against discriminatory tendencies by the law in affording privileges or 
advantages to a certain class of people but denying them to others, the latter 
refers to the observance of principles of natural justice during trial and right of 
appeal as integral parts of fair hearing. There was no evidence that the 
Deportation Ordinance accorded any privilege to the detainees by virtue of 
their status, place of origin or occupation.
Thus the Deportation Ordinance which gave powers to the President to 
issue a deportation order while it denied the victim of that order the right to 
challenge it in the court of law,660 was declared unconstitutional by the court, 
for violating the right to a fair hearing by the court of law.661 The situation 
would have been different if the said statute 'provided a mechanism for 
review'. Mwalusanya, J., was of the view that because the Ordinance allowed
657por example in the case of Sekeni Sanga v. The Commissioner o f Prisons, High Court of Tanzania 
at Dar Es Salaam, Miscellaneous Criminal Cause No. 8 of 1984, unreported, after examining the 
propriety of the detention order the learned judge held, that there was 110 basis upon which the 
court could entertain a complaint that die liberty of die appellant had been restricted unlawfully.
658Article 29 (2).
659Article 13 (6) (a).
660Section 3.
661 See Article 13 (6) (a).
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'arbitrary action' against an individual it did not qualify as a statute that aims at 
ensuring that 'the rights and freedoms of the general public are not encroached 
upon by misuse of the rights and freedoms of the individual', so as to be saved 
by Article 30 (2) (a) of the Constitution.
5:3 The Right to a fair trial.
In the Tanzanian Constitution the right to a fair trial both in criminal 
and civil cases is covered under the rights of equality before the law.662 The 
Tanzanian Constitution declares that ‘all people are equal before the law and 
are entitled, without any discrimination, to equal opportunity before and 
protection of the law.’663 The government, for the purpose of ensuring equality 
before the law, is under obligation to make provisions to the effect that:
"every person shall, when his rights and obligations 
are being determined, be entitled to a fair hearing by 
the court of law... and be guaranteed the right of 
appeal or to another legal remedy against the 
decisions of courts of law and other bodies which 
decide on his rights or interests..."664
The Tanzanian Constitution, unlike the regional and international 
conventions,665 does not specifically mention issues like “reasonable time” and 
the “minimum rights of everyone charged with a criminal offence”, as 
important aspects of a fair hearing. However, the courts in Tanzania have 
drawn on the experience of other jurisdictions when dealing with cases which 
required them to interpret the right to a fair trial. The right to a fair trial 
therefore, includes the hearing of a case within reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law, the presumption of
662Article 13.
663Ibid., Article 13 (1).
664Article 13 (6) (a).
665 See the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 6; The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, Article 7; The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 9 (3).
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innocence, adequate time and facilities for the preparation of defence by the 
accused person, and legal representation of the accused person’s own 
choosing.
The High Court in Tanzania has tried to show, through its decisions, the 
importance of the right to a fair trial, if democracy and equality before the law 
are to be promoted among the people. In order to achieve this, the court has 
given puiposive interpretation to the statutes and the provisions of the 
Constitution which relate to fair trial.
5:3:1 Trial of an accused person within reasonable time.
One year before the Bill of Rights became justiciable, Mwalusanya, J., 
stated categorically in the case of Benedict Mashibe and Another v. Attorney- 
General and Another666 that inordinate delays to prosecute criminal cases 
would not pass the constitutionality test after the Bill of Rights became 
justiciable. The learned judge remarked:
“Under Article 15 we have the right to liberty and that 
imports that any protracted and unreasonable delay in 
deciding the fate of an accused person is 
unconstitutional and so this court may order the 
D.P.P., by way of Mandamus to release the accused 
person in default of proceeding with the trial 
immediately.”
These remarks were made by the judge in an application for leave to 
apply for an order of mandamus against the D.P.P. The applicants sought the 
court’s order directing the D.P.P., to comply with his own instructions not to 
prosecute the applicants who were facing a criminal charge. The D.P.P., had 
written a letter to his subordinate to the effect that two applicants appeared not 
to be implicated and that the trial should proceed in respect of the other
666High Court of Tanzania at Mwanza, Miscellaneous Criminal Cause No. 10 of 1987, unreported.
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accused persons. His subordinates did not comply. The application could not 
be granted by the court because the applicants failed to show a particular duty 
which the D.P.P., had failed to perform. However, the court was satisfied that 
where there were protracted and unreasonable delays by the D.P.P., in 
prosecuting an accused person, the court could order him by way of mandamus 
to do so within a specified time, or on default the court might release the 
accused person from further prosecution.
In 1990 the case of Paschal Makombanya Rufutu v. D.P.P667
demonstrated Mwalusanya, J's determination to protect an accused person’s 
rights to a fair trial. In that case the accused applied to the court for orders of 
certiorari and prohibition against the D.P.P. He challenged the decision by the 
D.P.P., of 24/ 8/ 1989 to apply to the Economic Crimes Court for 
adjournment of the case to the next session instead of deciding not to offer 
evidence and enable the accused person be acquitted. The D.P.P., applied for 
adjournment of the case for hearing because he had no witnesses on that day. 
The applicant argued that four years had lapsed since he was charged with the 
offence but his trial has always been postponed due to lack of witnesses. He 
applied to the court to quash the decision of the D.P.P., to continue to 
prosecute him since his trial had been delayed for so long such that it 
amounted to persecution. The court held that the decision of the D.P.P., to 
apply to adjourn the case on 24. 8. 1989 was unreasonable and an abuse of the 
discretion vested in him. Mwalusanya, J., observed that it was one of those 
cases where there had been protracted and unreasonable delay so as to lead to 
the conclusion that the due process of law had virtually broken down and the 
accused had been left to languish without any proper determination of his case. 
The learned judge emphasised that the right to liberty embraces the right to be 
tried within reasonable time. The application was granted and the D.P.P., was
667High Court of Tanzania at Mwanza, Miscellaneous Civil Cause No. 3 of 1990, unreported.
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prohibited from continuing to prosecute the applicant 011 the charges he was 
facing.
In this case Mwalusanya, J., made two important contributions to the 
development of human rights jurisprudence in Tanzania. First, he introduced 
the right to have a case tried within reasonable time, something that was not 
expressly covered by the Bill of Rights in the Constitution. Since the 
Tanzanian Constitution has no express provision to that effect, the learned 
judge extended the construction of the scope of “the right to liberty” under 
Article 15 of the Constitution, to be in conformity with the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights which provide for the right of an accused person to be tried 
within a reasonable time. He assumed that Parliament in enacting the Bill of 
Rights would do nothing that was in conflict with these conventions which 
Tanzania had ratified.
Second, the learned judge shed more light on the possibility of talcing a 
civil action to dispose of a criminal case whose general trend infringes on 
individual fundamental rights, even where other remedies were available under 
the criminal law.668 Here, the court was able to quash and prohibit further 
prosecution of the accused person since his right to be tried within a 
reasonable time had been violated.
Of course, the length of the delay and what amounts to unreasonable 
time would differ from one case to another depending on the peculiar 
circumstances of each case, and very much on the attitude of the presiding 
judge. In this particular case the judge believed that where rights are infringed 
or ‘where fundamental principles are overthrown and where the general 
system of the law is departed from, the judges should be 011 the side of the 
down-trodden’. According to him, ‘it is a disgrace to the lawyers if the human
668p0r example, dismissal of the charge and discharging the accused. However, this would not be a 
bar to further prosecution against the accused person so discharged by the court.
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rights are being swept under Tanzania’s democratic carpet in front of their 
eyes’.
5:3:2 Legal representation
The Tanzanian Constitution does not provide a specific guarantee of the 
right of a person to be legally represented and to be granted legal aid where 
appropriate in criminal or civil cases. However, there is a specific law which 
empowers the “certifying authority”669 to certify that 'in the interests of justice' 
an accused person should have legal aid in the preparation and conduct of his 
defence or appeal.670 This law does not give the accused person a right to legal 
representation but allows the Registrar, 'where it is practicable so to do', to 
assign to the accused an advocate 'for the puipose of the preparation and 
conduct of his defence or appeal' when the certifying authority so requires. 
Only those accused persons facing serious charges671 which are triable by the 
High Court have been enjoying these services as a matter of right.672 Another 
observation is that these advocates are not of the accused persons’ choice but 
are just assigned by the Registrar to offer legal assistance to them.
The High Court stated it clearly in the case of Khasim Hamisi 
Manywele v. R,613 that an accused person facing a serious criminal charge has 
a right to free legal representation, whether in the High Court or in the 
subordinate courts, if  he cannot afford to hire such representation.674 In this 
case the accused was convicted of robbery with violence by the District Court 
and was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment and twelve strokes of corporal 
punishment. At the trial the accused person was not legally represented. On
669For proceedings in the High Court die certifying authority is die Chief Justice or die judge of the 
High Court conducting such proceedings and for proceedings before subordinate courts, the 
certifying authority is the Chief Jusdce.
670See Legal Aid (Criminal Proceedings) Act, 1969, Act No. 21 of 1969, Section 3 (1).
671 Like murder, manslaughter and treason.
672For example die Court of Appeal in Laurent Joseph v. R.. [1981] T.L.R. 351 nullified die 
proceedings in die High Court and ordered a retrial because the accused person had not been 
legally represented during his dial for mmder.
673High Court of Tanzania at Dodoma, Criminal Appeal No. 39 of 1990, unreported (reproduced in 
PETER, C. M., (1997), p. 349).
674The same views were reiterated by die court in Thomas Mjengi's case.
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appeal, Mwalusanya, J., who was conducting the proceedings, granted free 
legal aid to the appellant for he believed that it is really the poor, who need 
most the court’s protection for securing to themselves the enjoyment of human 
rights. In his opinion, justice should not be out of the reach of the poor, and 
those who do not have the means to pay for legal representation in matters 
where their liberty is at stake, must be provided with it at the expense of the 
State. Furthermore, the learned judge was of the opinion that the right to legal 
representation paid for by the State for indigent accused persons is a 
constitutional right incorporated in the right to a fair hearing in Article 13 (6) 
(a) of the Bill of Rights and the right to personal liberty provided in Article 15 
(2) of the Constitution. Finally, the court held that the violation of this 
constitutional right rendered the trial a nullity. The appeal was allowed, 
conviction quashed, sentence set aside and the appellant was released 
forthwith.
Previous court decisions were to the effect that legal representation is a 
right for any one who can afford to pay for it. But the Eastern Africa Court of 
Appeal in the case of Mohamed Salim v. R675 back in 1958 had issued 
guidance on this issue that legal aid for the poor accused person is a right. It is 
disturbing to note that neither the judges nor the members of the Bar made 
reference to this authority. As Mwalusanya, J., observes, both sides have 
“with a calculated conspiracy of silence, buried their heads, in the sand like 
ostriches pretending that they are unaware” of this authority of the Eastern 
Africa Court of Appeal.
For a long time the court has protected the right of those who can afford 
to be defended by counsel and remained unconcerned about poor persons tried 
by subordinate courts. Whenever the accused person was denied the right of 
legal representation by the court, the trial to proceed in the absence of the 
accused person’s counsel, such proceedings could be declared a nullity on
675(1958) E. A. 202.
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appeal. In the case of Alimasi Kalumbeta v. R616 the District Court decided to 
hear the evidence of the witnesses in the absence of the counsel for the 
accused person. There was evidence that the learned counsel had been notified 
of the hearing date by way of telegram. On appeal conviction and sentence 
were quashed on the ground that the trial magistrate denied the accused person 
his right to be represented by an advocate. The case of Alimasi Kalumbeta 
shows that the right to legal representation could be exercised in court only 
after the accused person had hired the services of a lawyer. The court could try 
to be flexible and make sure that the accused person’s counsel was present 
during the trial to defend the interests of his clients. For those who could not 
afford to hire such services, the trial continued without legal representation.
Bearing in mind the scarcity of financial resources and the country's 
economic situation, it might be unrealistic to claim State-funded legal aid for 
all criminal cases. However, Mwalusanya, J., advised the government to 
institute a system of salaried ‘public defenders,’677 which is a less costly 
scheme, for free legal aid to the poor. Just for a start, this should be given as 
of right to indigent accused persons facing serious criminal charges which 
attract long prison sentences, where the accused person is charged with an 
economic crime, where complicated issues of law are involved, and where the 
Republic is represented by a State Attorney.
Knowing that there were many other accused persons who were facing 
trial without legal representation, the learned judge directed all District Courts 
and Resident Magistrate Courts to forward all case files eligible for legal 
representation, as indicated in his judgment, to the Chief Justice who is their 
certifying authority, for consideration as to whether free legal aid should be 
granted to the indigent accused persons.
676[1982] T.L.R. 329.
677This scheme has operated successfully in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Nigeria and U.S.A.
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As for civil cases, Mwalusanya, J., in The National Bank o f  commerce 
v. Vitalis Ayemba,678 considered the right to fair trial an area for liberal 
construction. He allowed para-legal officers679 (“McKenzie Friends”), to 
represent parties to the suit as recognized agents. In that case the plaintiffs 
counsel objected to the appearance of one para-legal officer on behalf of the 
defendant under the pretext of holding special power of attorney. The court 
held that even para-legal officers holding special powers of attorney, have the 
right to be heard by the court as recognized agents even if  the parties 
appointing them are also present in court. There was an earlier Court of 
Appeal decision to the effect that where the party concerned is also present in 
court, a person holding the power of attorney cannot be allowed to have 
conduct of the case.680 The learned judge tried to distinguish the facts of that 
case and those of the one he was attending to. It seems that this was the 
judge’s technique to find a way of expressing his views which would conflict 
with the binding decision of the Court of Appeal.
The reasons for the learned judge’s support of para-legal officers, was 
to help the poor who cannot be legally represented in court simply because 
they cannot afford to pay the high legal costs. This came out clearly in the case 
of Protazi Kutaga v. Asteria Ndyamukama and Another681 where he observed:
“In view of a large illiterate populace that come to 
court to fight for their basic rights, it is in public 
interest that para-legal officers be allowed to appear in 
court... we hope the underprivileged will brazenly 
start to utilize this institution of para-legal officers so 
as to prove that might is not always right.”
678High Court of Tanzania at Mwanza, Civil Case No 37 of 1988, unreported (reproduced in PETER, 
C. M., (1997), p. 375).
679These are retired District Magistrates, and Primary Court Magistrates, some times referred to as 
public writers. They draft legal documents on behalf of laymen and advise litigants or the accused 
persons. Their charges are significantly low and possibly within the reach of a poor man.
680See Naiman Moiro v. N. K, J. Zablon [1982] T.L.R. 274.
681High Court of Tanzania at Mwanza, Civil Appeal No. 115 of 1983 (reproduced in PETER, C. M., 
(1997), p. 372).
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In that case a “public writer” was denied appearance on behalf of the 
applicant by the District Court at the hearing of the application and the judge 
viewed this as a denial of a right to legal representation. In order not to deny 
anybody such right, the judge tried to expound on the extent para-legal officers 
can be allowed to represent litigants in courts. This includes sitting beside his 
client and taking notes in court, quietly making suggestions to the litigant and 
advising him on what to say and do, proposing questions to the litigant, but he 
should not be allowed to address the court by way of making submissions or 
asking questions.
This is a significant extension of the right to legal representation to all 
people including the poor who cannot afford to pay for high costs involved in 
hiring services of lawyers. Practising lawyers viewed this as a step towards 
professional degradation if non-professionals or “Bush Lawyers” could be 
allowed to practise and represent litigants or accused persons in the court. 
Such complaints happen not because of the potentially low standards of justice 
likely to be occasioned by allowing people of sub-standard qualification 'to 
infiltrate into the sphere of legal practice.'682 The main reason is the worry 
about the loss of clients by qualified practising lawyers in the event para- 
professional practice is allowed.
Experience and practice has shown that these para-legal officers, very 
common in Mara region, have not been well received by courts in Tanzania 
due to monopoly of the field by the advocates. In Dar Es Salaam and Arusha 
they are overwhelmed by practising professional lawyers and the community 
regards them as unlicensed “Bush Lawyers”. Further, the amendments to the 
Advocates Ordinance683 introducing a penalty of up to five hundred thousand
682TWAIB, F., "Lawyers and the Availability of Legal Services in Tanzania Mainland", in MOHLIG, 
W. G., (ed.), Law in Africa, Koln; Rudiger Koppe Verlag, 1998, p. 79.
683Cap. 341.
197
shillings for any unqualified person practising as an advocate, have effectively 
undermined the decision by Mwalusanya, J.684
5:3:3 Adequate time and facilities to prepare the defence
The right to a fair hearing encompasses also the guarantee of adequate 
time and facilities to the accused person for the preparation of his defence. The 
accused person is protected against hasty trial but at the same time there is a 
requirement that an accused person must be tried within a reasonable time. It 
means that he should be accorded an opportunity to organize his defence in an 
“appropriate way and without restriction as to the possibility to put all relevant 
defence arguments before the trial court,”685 and to allow him to communicate 
with his lawyer.686 These necessary components of the right to a fair trial were 
carefully considered by the court in the case of Rev. Christopher Mtikila and 
Three Others v. R.,6E1 The accused persons were charged with holding an 
unlawful assembly, and using abusive language in a manner likely to cause a 
breach of the peace. They were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment by 
the trial court.
When the defence case was opened the accused persons’ advocates 
asked for time to prepare their defence. This involved going back to Dar Es 
Salaam to collect some more documentary evidence and getting access to 
documents and photographs that had been seized by the police. The trial 
magistrate rejected the defence application because in his opinion the 
requested documents were irrelevant and not vital to the case. In protest, the 
accused persons declined to defend themselves and the two defence counsel
684See Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 1997 (Act No. 31 of 1997).
685HARRIS, D. J., O'BOYLE, M., and WARBRICK, C., p. 254.
686 See Campbell and Fell v. U. K, 7 E.H.R.R. 165.
687 High Court of Tanzania at Dodoma, Criminal Appeal No. 90 of 1992, unreported (reproduced in 
PETER, C. M., (1997), p. 665).
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withdrew from the case. However, the trial magistrate went on to write a 
judgment and convicted the accused persons to whom he had denied the 
chance to prepare their defence. The trial magistrate did not only dismiss the 
defence application, but he went as far as to choose the line of defence for the 
accused persons that the only defence available to them was whether the 
abusive words were spoken or not.
On appeal the High Court quashed the conviction and the sentence on 
the ground that ’when the court denied the accused persons the chance to 
prepare their defence without restrictions, it also denied them a fair trial', 
which is both a statutory and constitutional right. Mwalusanya, J., found that 
the refusal by the trial magistrate to allow the accused persons access to the 
documents they required for their defence, was a fundamental defect which 
could not be cured by a retrial. Thus they were released and set free.
5:4 Conclusions.
This chapter has demonstrated how the courts in Tanzania have 
interpreted the Constitution with regard to laws which potentially violated the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights relating to the criminal justice process. We 
have seen that between the High Court and the Court of Appeal, the former has 
shown some activism in protecting individual fundamental rights. 
Mwalusanya, J., Lugakingira, J, (as he then was), Mroso, J., Mapigano, J., and 
Nchalla, J., were prominent in demonstrating judicial protection of individual 
fundamental lights. However, some of the High Court judges are not confident 
enough to declare a law unconstitutional for they think doing so might 
interfere with the legislature’s province. As a result, there have been different 
conflicting decisions of the High Court about the same issues, depending on 
the attitude of the presiding judge. In that kind of situation, it was left for the 
Court of Appeal to provide guidance as to what should be the position of the 
law. Unfortunately, the Court of Appeal has taken too long to clarify such
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conflicts and more often than not has relied on technicalities rather than 
substance.
Our discussion in this chapter has shown the Attorney-General’s regular 
reference to the derogation clause in the Constitution, as saving every law that 
was challenged in court for being violative of fundamental rights and 
freedoms. It is interesting to note that in every case where the court declared a 
particular law unconstitutional, the Attorney-General opposed the argument 
that it was unconstitutional. This explains the government's inaction towards 
the laws whose amendment/repeal was recommended by various bodies, for 
being in conflict with the Constitution.
It is also interesting to note in Daudi Pete’s case Mwalusanya, J., 
referred to various works by academic experts. This is a new practice among 
Tanzanian judges. Traditionally, a considerable number of judges in Tanzania 
had the tendency to ignore works by academicians believing that such works 
are too hypothetical and fit for teaching only. This new development ought to 
be maintained if  human rights jurisprudence is to be developed in Tanzania.
It can be argued that, whatever little has been done is a step forward, 
for a judiciary which had no experience in matters of human rights. However, 
the decisions and reasoning of the Court of Appeal in criminal cases seem to 
frustrate the activist High Court judges. Would the approach be different in 
civil cases?
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CHAPTER SIX
REACTION OF THE COURT TO CIVIL ACTIONS.
Since the Bill of Rights became justiciable in 1988, certain people have 
instituted civil claims to enforce their fundamental rights guaranteed under the 
Constitution. On some occasions the court deliberated constitutional 
guarantees on its own initiative even where the parties had not pleaded any 
particular right. A variety of issues have been subject of judicial attention by 
the High Court and a few of them reached the Court of Appeal.
This chapter attempts to show how the judiciary has responded to 
claims of a civil nature which aimed at enforcing fundamental rights and 
freedoms. We try to find out from the decisions of the courts whether the 
attitude of the judiciary in civil claims has been different from the one we 
observed in the criminal justice process. In this regard special attention is paid 
to the Court of Appeal’s decisions, for it is the highest and final court in the 
country and therefore placed in a position to influence the development of the 
law.
6:1 Discrimination.
The promotion of equality and protection against discrimination on the 
basis o f 'race, sex, language or religion' has been high on the United Nations 
agenda688and one of the purposes of the Organization of African Unity is 'to 
promote international co-operation, having due regard to the Charter of the
688See the United Nations Charter, Article 1 (3).
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United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.'689 Also the 
United Nations and the Organization of African Unity have promoted specific 
international agreements in order to fight against racial discrimination and 
discrimination against women.690 All member states signatory to the 
conventions, Tanzania being one of them, have to signify their consent by 
translating the spirit of these documents into municipal law. Tanzania’s 
seriousness was manifested by the enshrinement of the Bill of Rights in the 
Constitution to the effect that, 'all persons are equal before the law and are 
entitled, without any discrimination, to equal opportunity before and protection 
of the law.'691 Discrimination on grounds of 'race, place of origin, political 
opinion, colour, occupation or creed' is prohibited under the Tanzanian 
Constitution692 but discrimination on grounds of sex is not specifically referred 
by the Constitution. However, the court of law has on several occasions been 
asked to give this particular provision a purposive interpretation and to enable 
women, to benefit from its presence in the Constitution.
Shortly before the Bill of Rights became justiciable, Munyera, J., in the 
case of Peter Byabato v. Pastory Rugaimukamu,693 and later in Gabriel Valery 
v. Birungi Balilemwam  held Haya customary law unacceptable for its 
discriminatory character whereby females were treated as inferior to their male 
counterparts when it came to the inheritance and disposition of clan land. In 
both cases the male clan members were challenging the rights of female heirs 
to sell clan land in the light of the provisions of Local Customary Law
689Charter of the Organization of African Unity, Article 2 (e).
690International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1966; 
International Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 1979; 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 26; African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, Article 18 (3).
691 Article 13 (1).
692Article 13 (5).
6930p cit.
694Op cit.
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(Declaration) (No. 4) Order, 1963.695 Thus the learned judge was invited to 
interpret the relevant provisions of the Declaration which provide:
Rule 20.
Women can inherit, except for clan land, which 
they may receive in usufruct but may not sell.
However, if there is no male of that clan, women 
may inherit such land in full ownership.
Rule 31.
If there is only one child, he will inherit all the 
property but if  the child is female she cannot 
inherit family land which she is allowed to use for 
life without selling it.
However, during the same period when the justiciability of the Bill of 
Rights was under suspension the Court of Appeal in Rukuba Nteme v. Bi Jalia 
Hassan and Gervase Baruti696 and also in Haji Athumani Issa v. Rwentama 
Mututa697 clarified in a definite way the position of law in relation to the sale 
o f clan land by women. In these two cases, the High Court judges had held that 
females could inherit and sell clan land like their male counter parts, but the 
Court of Appeal overturned these decisions.
Nyalali C. J., in Rukuba Nteme felt it was premature to examine and 
invalidate Rule 20 of the Rules of Inheritance in the light of the Bill of Rights. 
He was of the opinion that the court could exercise the power to invalidate any 
customs or enactment, that are contrary to human rights and freedoms 
embodied in the Constitution, after the expiiy of the period of suspension. 
Much as it is true to say that the courts' power with regard to the enforcement
6950p cit.
696Court of Appeal of Tanzania at Mwanza, Civil Appeal No. 19 of 1986, unreported.
697Court of Appeal of Tanzania, Civil Appeal No. 9 of 1988, unreported.
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of human rights was held in abeyance from 1984 until March 1988, the Court 
of Appeal in this case was not barred from expressing its views about the 
discriminatory character of the impugned rule of inheritance. However, no 
criticism of the rule was made by the court.
Although the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Haji 
Athumani Issa came after the expiration of the period during which the 
justiciability of the Bill of Rights was suspended, Kisanga J. A.., let the 
discriminatory Haya customary law prevail over the Bill of Rights just because 
the constitutionality of any law could not be challenged in the course of an 
appeal by an appellate court, and that when the lower court determined the 
issue the Bill of Rights was still under suspension. The best he could do was to 
remind the parties of the procedure that the aggrieved party had to follow if 
he/she felt that his/her rights under the Constitution were infringed. That is, to 
file a petition in the High Court under Article 30 (3) of the Constitution. This 
attitude is exactly what Shivji referred to as positivist tradition of the 
Tanzanian courts, especially the Court of Appeal, 'hanging on the thin 
technical strings' in order to avoid declaring a particular law invalid.698
Furthermore, the learned Justice of Appeal suggested that 'rules of the 
court'699 must first be enacted under Article 30 (4) of the Constitution before a 
citizen can file a petition to enforce his rights under Article 30 (3) of the 
Constitution. In other words, the justiciability of the Bill of Rights was once 
again suspended, this time by the court, until such time as rules of the court 
would be enacted. This means, if the statement of Kisanga, J. A.., was to be 
given weight, no one could legally file any petition challenging the 
constitutionality of any law until 1995 when the Basic Rights and Duties 
Enforcement Act, 1994700 came in force.701
698SHIVJI, I. G., (1987), p. 137.
699Rules of procedure that regulate both die institution of proceedings and the powers of the court to 
hear petitions.
700 Act No. 33 of 1994.
701 About this law see our discussion in chapter four.
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Eventually, in the case of Bernardo Ephrahim v. Holaria Pastory and 
Another702 discrimination of women by the laws of inheritance, on account of 
their sex was declared unconstitutional. In that case, a woman one Holaria 
Pastory sold to Gervazi Kaizilege a non-clan member, the clan land that she 
had inherited from her father by a valid will. The sale was nullified and 
declared void by the Primary Court as females under Haya customary law 
have no power to sell clan land. The Primary Court’s finding was in 
accordance with rule 20 and 31 of the Local Customary Law (Declaration) 
(No. 4) Order, 1963,
On appeal the District Court took judicial notice and applied the Bill of 
Rights which had been newly enshrined in the Constitution, and rejected the 
old proposition which denied female clan members same rights as male clan 
members, to inherit and sell clan land. Hence an appeal to the High Court.
In his well-reasoned judgment Mwalusanya, J., was of the opinion that, 
because Tanzania has ratified a number of international and regional 
instruments which prohibit discrimination based on sex, it should always be 
ashamed to fall below the standards and principles proclaimed therein. The 
learned judge was aware of the then existing binding decisions of the Court of 
Appeal on the issue, that females in the Haya community did not have the right 
to sell clan land.
Nonetheless, Mwalusanya, J., invoked the provisions of the 
Constitution (Consequential, Transitional and Temporary Provisions) Act703 
which allow the court with effect from March, 1988 to construe the existing 
law, including customary law 'with such modifications, adaptations, and 
exceptions as may be necessary to bring it into conformity with the provisions' 
of the Bill of Rights. He found Rule 20 of the Rules of Inheritance being 
discriminatory of females, and therefore inconsistent with Article 13 (4) of the
702 High Court of Tanzania at Mwanza, Civil Appeal No. 70 of 1989, reported in [1990] L.R.C.
(Const.) 757.
703Section 5 (1).
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Tanzanian Constitution, a finding based on factors such as (i) the intention of 
Parliament to do away with all oppressive and unjust laws of the past; (ii) 
women's liberation; and (iii) the previous decisions of the Court of Appeal 
about the issue, being in conflict with the provisions of the Constitution and 
therefore not binding on him.
The case of Bernardo Ephrahim modified Rule 20 of the Rules of 
Inheritance such that males and females have now equal rights to inherit and 
sell clan land and the rule which entitled females to have usufructuary rights 
only, with no power to sell the land they inherit was declared void and of no 
effect. This time no appeal was preferred to the Court of Appeal which had 
previously represented part of the judiciary which was not ‘bold enough to 
upset the customary law’.704 It is at this stage that a significant difference of 
attitude between the Court of Appeal and the High Court is clearly noted.
The statement by Kisanga, J. A.., in the case of Iiaji Athumani Issa that 
no petition for enforcement of fundamental rights could be entertained unless 
specific law providing for the enforcement procedure was enacted, was 
subsequently ignored by judges. Mwalusanya, J., in Bernardo Ephrahim's 
case was very diplomatic to regard that statement as an obiter dictum. He went 
further to construe the language of Article 30 (4) as being permissive and 
therefore allowing petitions to be filed without rales having been made for the 
purpose.705
It is therefore apparent, the Court of Appeal has repeatedly frustrated 
the efforts of certain active High Court judges who viewed the discriminatory 
Haya customary law of inheritance as unsuitable for a democratic society 
based on the principle of equality before the law.
704MIGIRO, R. M., (1991), p. 362.
705COLDHAM, S., (1991), p. 205.
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6: 2 Freedom of association, peaceful assembly and participation in 
national public affairs.
The idea of freedom of association and peaceful assembly is concerned 
with the right to form groups or organizations pursuing particular objectives. 
This will include, for example, the right to form and join political parties or 
trade unions, and assembling in order to discuss the affairs of that particular 
group or organization. This is a special aspect of freedom of association, for it 
enables individual citizens through their organizations to participate in the 
public affairs of the nation. In Tanzania, with the incorporation of the Bill of 
Rights in the Constitution, freedom of association was made a constitutional 
right.706
Ironically Article 20 of the Tanzanian Constitution guaranteed the
freedom of association when the Bill of Rights was incorporated therein, but
there was no right to form political parties for Tanzania was a one-party
state.707 Lawyers had started questioning how the Bill of Rights could operate
amidst conflicting provisions of the same Constitution which guaranteed the
freedom of association, and at the same time barred the formation of political
parties. However, the worries which occupied the lawyers’ mind about these
conflicts and contradictions, were not shared by Nyalali, C. J. The Honourable
Chief Justice could not see how a provision which made Tanzania a one party
state, could create inconsistencies in the Constitution. In the public lecture
thwhich he delivered to the University of Dar Es Salaam Law Society on 5 
September, 1985, the Chief Justice was of the firm view that the right to form 
political parties was not included in the freedom of association under one party 
state:
706Article 20.
707 Articles 3 and 10 of the Tanzanian Constitution, established die one party state and declared CCM 
die sole political party in die United Republic. It was die Eighdi Constitutional Amendment Act, 
1992 ( Act No. 4 of 1992) that brought about multi-party democracy by amending and deleting 
the provisions diat were in conflict widi die freedom of association.
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“ ...the freedom of association guaranteed by Article 
20 (1) does not include any freedom to form political 
parties apart from Chama Cha Mapinduzi established 
by the Constitution itself’.708
In 1992 multi-party democracy, replaced the one party state in Tanzania 
following the 8th amendments to the Constitution.709 However, the 
government imposed many restrictions on the registration of political parties 
and this constitutional right turned to be a right exercisable at the wish of the 
state. The restrictions on registration of political parties brought about by the 
Constitutional amendment and the Political Parties Act, 1992710 included two- 
stages registration whereby eveiy political party was required to satisfy the 
conditions for provisional registration first and full registration would be at a 
later stage upon fulfilling other conditions within a specified period.711 Any 
political party whose policy advocated 'the breaking up of the union' or 
carrying on 'political activities exclusively in one part of the United Republic' 
did not qualify even for provisional registration.712 Full registration was not 
possible unless a particular political party had its leaders drawn from Tanzania 
mainland and Zanzibar and also had 'obtained not less than two hundred 
members' from at least ten regions of the United Republic including at least 
two regions of Zanzibar.713 Without fulfilling these conditions a political party 
risks rejection or cancellation. It is interesting to note that the law stated in 
unequivocal terms that CCM the ruling party was not to be affected by these 
conditions. Instead it 'was deemed to have been fully registered as a political 
party' and a certificate of registration was issued to that effect.714 It was under 
these circumstances that some political parties were refused registration. As a
708NYALALI, F., p. 5.
709See Act No. 4 of 1992.
710ActNo. 5 of 1992.
71 Section 8.
712Section 9. See also Article 20 (2) of the Constitution.
713Section 10.
714Section 7 (2).
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result people were forced to affiliate with any of the registered political parties 
in order to participate in national public affairs. These restrictions and perhaps 
coupled with other reasons, prompted Rev. Christopher Mtikila, a human 
rights campaigner cum political activist to institute a civil suit against the 
Attorney-General in the famous case of Rev. Christopher Mtikila v. Attorney- 
General,715 questioning the constitutionality of such restrictions.
In that case the petitioner asked the court among other things, to declare 
unconstitutional and void the provisions of the Political Parties Act, 1992716 
which inhibited the formation of political parties; the provisions of the Local 
Authorities (Elections) (Amendment) Act, 1992717 which rendered it 
impossible for independent candidates to contest presidential, parliamentary or 
local council elections unless they were sponsored by a registered political 
party; the provisions of the Police Force Ordinance, 1953718 and the Political 
Parties Act which made it necessary for permits to be obtained in order to hold 
meetings or organize processions.
Earlier on, the Attorney-General had successfully expressed his 
objection against the case being presided over by Mwalusanya, J., merely 
because of his reputation for human rights activism. In fact in the earlier case 
of Rev. Christopher Mtikila and Three Others v. R.,1]9 Mwalusanya, J., had 
declared unconstitutional the provisions of the Police Force Ordinance which 
gave power to the police to prevent private as well as public meetings. The 
issue of freedom of peaceful assembly was settled in that case. Following the 
objection that was mounted by the State Attorney, Mwalusanya, J., 
disqualified himself from presiding over the case, and the Chief Justice 
assigned it to Lugakingira, J., for hearing.
715High Court of Tanzania at Dodoma, Civil Case No. 5 of 1993, reported in [1996] 1 CHRLD, p. 11.
716 Act No. 5 of 1992.
717 Act No. 7 of 1992.
718 Cap 322.
7l90p cit.
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After hearing both sides, Lugakingira, J., held that the requirement for a 
permit under the Political Parties Act, 1992 infringed the right to freedom of 
peaceful assembly and procession and was therefore unconstitutional and that 
'the freedom was rendered more illusory by the fact that the power to grant 
permits was vested in the District Commissioners who themselves were cadres 
of the ruling party'. Further, he declared and directed that it should be lawful 
for independent candidates, along with candidates sponsored by political 
parties, to contest presidential, parliamentary and local council elections, 
notwithstanding Articles 39, 67, and 77 of the Constitution as well as section 
39 of the Local Authorities (Elections) Act 1979 as amended by Act No. 7 of 
1992 that candidates should be members of and sponsored by registered 
political parties. This finding was solely based on generous and liberal 
approach that was given to the provisions of the Constitution which on the one 
hand entitle eveiy citizen to participate in the government of the country, 
without necessarily being a member of any political party720; and yet on 
another, bars the citizens from running for office unless they are members of 
certain political parties whose sponsorship they must secure first.721 In that 
kind of situation where a provision of the Constitution establishing a 
fundamental right appeared to be in conflict with another provision in the 
Constitution, the principle of 'harmonization1 had to be called in aid by the 
judge. The principle maintains that 'the entire Constitution has to be read as an 
integrated whole, and no one particular provision destroys the other but each 
sustain the other'.
The learned judge was prepared to identify himself with human rights if 
an attempt to maintain balance and giving 'effect to all the contending 
provisions' of the constitution was not possible, as verified by his remarks:
720 See Articles 21 (1) and 20 (4).
721Articles 67 (1) (b), 77 (3) (a), and 39.
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“ .. .the court is enjoined to incline to the realization of 
the fundamental rights and may for that purpose 
disregard even the clear words of a provision if  their 
application would result in gross injustice”.
Lugakingira, J., spent some time expounding 011 the subject of locus 
standi in the context of constitutional litigation. The common law concept of 
locus standi which requires the litigant to have sufficient interest in the 
outcome of the case, has been a thorn, in the fresh of human rights activists in 
many jurisdictions. Earlier, the State Attorney asked the court to dismiss the 
petition on the ground that the petitioner had no greater personal interest in the 
case than that of the general public. The State Attorney’s litany of preliminary 
objections centred on the assumption that the petitioner had no locus standi 
The learned judge took the opportunity to put it across that the principle would 
not apply in cases which aimed at enforcing constitutional rights. Such cases 
were considered by the court to be of the nature of public interest litigation and 
their origin was found in public law as distinct from private law. He 
emphatically observed that:
“In matters of public interest litigation this court will 
not deny standing to a genuine and bona fide  litigant 
even where he has no personal interest in the matter”.
In arriving at this conclusion Lugakingira, J., took into account the 
development of the doctrine in India, Canada and England, particularly the 
decision in IRC  v. National Federation o f Self-Employed and Small Business 
LtdJ21 In that case the court remarked that it would be grave in the system of 
public law if  people ‘were prevented by outdated technical rules of locus 
standi from bringing the matter to the attention of the court to vindicate the 
rule of law and get the unlawful conduct stopped.’723
722(1981) 2 All E.R. 93.
723Ibid., at p. 107.
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Finally, he interpreted the provisions of the Constitution724 to cater for 
both personal and public interest litigation. He was of the firm opinion that it 
was not necessary to rely on foreign precedent in order to trace the doctrine of 
public interest litigation for ‘it is already with us in our Constitution’. 
However, he emphasized that standing would always be granted on the basis 
of public interest litigation where the petition is bona fide  and evidently for the 
public good and where the court can provide an effective remedy. This 
decision has not been overturned by the Court of Appeal and we take it to be 
the position of the law currently obtaining, as far as actions to enforce 
constitutional rights are concerned.
Perhaps the question would be, how many people/organisations have 
made use of this precedent to institute actions on the basis of public interest 
litigation? As far as we are aware, there has been none on record. The culture 
of apathy and silence, stemming from fear and ignorance, coupled with 
poverty, have immensely contributed to the state of complacency, that we 
experience today among the Tanzanians. It is important that the people should 
be educated about their rights and the need to enforce them without any 
element of fear. Other factors, like availability of resources, may then follow.
The question of the constitutionality of the restrictions on the formation 
of political parties, was intentionally left out by the judge because the same 
issue was pending before the Court of Appeal in the case of Rev. Christopher 
Mtildla and The Democratic Party v. Attorney-General and the Registrar o f  
Political Parties,125 and it involved the same parties. The appellant’s political 
party was refused full registration by the Registrar of Political Parties. When 
the appellants challenged the constitutionality of the Act which gave the 
Registrar such arbitrary powers, his application was dismissed by the High 
Court.
724Articles 26 (2) and 30 (3).
725Court of Appeal of Tanzania at Dar Es Salaam, Civil Appeal No. 28 of 1995, unreported.
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Unfortunately, the Court of Appeal was not prepared to approach the 
appeal from the constitutional or human rights point of view. Instead, the 
Justices of Appeal relied on the principles of natural justice, that the Registrar 
of Political Parties reached the decision of refusing the appellant’s party full 
registration without hearing the appellant. That was the basis for allowing the 
appeal. It should not be forgotten that the burning issue in the High Court was 
the constitutionality of the impugned law, but nothing was said about it by the 
Court of Appeal. Accordingly the order of the Registrar of Political Parties 
refusing to grant full registration to the appellant’s party was quashed, and the 
court made the following order:
“ ...we return the matter to the said Registrar and 
order that he should deal with the appellant’s 
application in accordance with the principles of 
fairness and justice.”
This turned to be an empty decree. The court was unnecessarily 
cautious when it failed to order the Registrar to issue full registration to the 
applicant’s party, and yet made a finding that there was a violation of the 
principle of natural justice. It is tempting to say that the Court of Appeal was 
complying with the traditional practice, which requires it to issue an order of 
mandamus commanding the decision maker concerned to decide the matter 
afresh in accordance with the law, whenever an administrative decision is 
challenged by way of a prerogative order. However, in some similar instances 
the Court of Appeal had gone beyond the level of issuing commands to the 
decision maker to reconsider the matter afresh in accordance with the law. For 
example, in the case of Patman Garments Industries Ltd. v. Tanzania 
Manufacturers Ltd726 the Court of Appeal nullified the decision of the 
Commissioner for Lands, but never returned the matter to him to be considered
726[1981] T.L.R. 303.
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afresh in accordance with the law, to determine who was the lawful owner of 
the plot in dispute. Instead, the Court of Appeal itself after considering the 
merits of the case, reached a decision on the substantive issue and declared the 
plaintiff the lawful owner of the plot in dispute. We would have expected it to 
do the same in the case of Rev. Mtikila. To date, the appellant’s political party 
remain unregistered.727
6:3 The right to work.
Before the enshrinement of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution there 
was no right to work, and for Tanzania, that was one of the colonial 
legacies.728 When the Bill of Rights was incorporated in the Constitution, the 
right to work was unequivocally made a fundamental human right.729
It was on these grounds that Mwalusanya, J., in the case of Augustine 
Masatu v. Mwanza Textile Ltd730 held unlawftil the termination of the 
plaintiffs employment by the defendant, after the Minister had ordered that 
he be reinstated. The plaintiff had successfully appealed to the Minister for 
Labour against his dismissal from work. The Minister used his powers under 
the Security of Employment Act, 1964731 to order that the plaintiff be 
reinstated. However, the employer used the option provided under traditional 
construction of section 40A (5) of the Act to terminate the plaintiffs 
employment, by giving him full terminal benefits instead of reinstatement.
727In order to qualify to contest parliamentary bye-elections in Ludewa Constituency, following the 
mysterious death of Horace Kolimba, Rev. Christopher Mtikila whose party was refused full 
registration, sought sponsorship by another political party CHADEMA of which he was not a 
member.
7280n  the use of legislation by both the colonial and the post-independence governments, to remove 
the right to work, see MIHYO, P. B., pp. 14-15. See also the decision in I. M. Mahona v. 
University o f  Dar Es Salaam, [1981] T.L.R. 55, where the court held that an employer had a right 
to refuse to reinstate an employee and instead terminate his services with full terminal benefits.
729Article 22.
730High Court of Tanzania at Mwanza, Civil Case No. 3 of 1986, unreported (reproduced in PETER, 
C. M., (1997), p. 173).
731 Act No. 62 of 1964.
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Aggrieved by the employer’s act, the plaintiff filed a suit asking the court to 
order him comply with the Minister’s order of reinstatement.
The issue before the court was whether the right to work is a reality or a 
fiction in Tanzania of today. Mwalusanya, J., applied a liberal construction to 
the provision of the Security of Employment Act which encroached on the 
worker's ordinary rights. He finally held that the Security of Employment Act 
did not in clear language, confer upon an employer the right to terminate the 
services of an employee, when there was an order of reinstatement. According 
to Mwalusanya, J., if  this particular legislation removed the right to work then 
it stood a chance of being declared unconstitutional and void when the Bill of 
Rights became justiciable. It should be noted that this decision came just a few 
months before the Bill of Rights became justiciable.
On appeal by the employer, the Court of Appeal in Mwanza Textile Ltd. 
v. Augustine Masatu732 relied on a technicality to overturn the High Court 
decision. It was held that the High Court had no power to try the suit, because 
the employee was not challenging the ministerial decision made as a result of 
breach of principles of natural justice, or in excess of jurisdiction; but was 
claiming damages against the employer for his failure to reinstate him in 
employment despite the Minister’s order to that effect. We think the employee 
enjoys the right under the Security of Employment Act to enforce the 
Minister’s decision of reinstatement by instituting a civil suit in the Court of 
law, as he did.733 The Court of Appeal decision was not the final word as far as 
the jurisprudence of the right to work was concerned.
When the Bill of Rights became justiciable, Mwalusanya, J., in the case 
of Obadiah Salehe v. Dodoma Wine Company Ltd .734 reiterated his previous 
proposition in M asatu’s case and laid down a clear position in Tanzania. In
732Court of Appeal of Tanzania, Civil Appeal No. 8 of 1988, unreported.
733See sections 41 and 42.
734High Court of Tanzania at Dodoma, Civil Case No. 53 of 1990, unreported (reproduced in PETER, 
C. M., (1997), p. 181).
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that case, the plaintiffs employment was terminated and his appeal to the 
Conciliation Board dismissed on merits. His further appeal to the Minister for 
Labour was dismissed on the ground that the proceedings by the Conciliation 
Board were a nullity for they were lodged out of time. He then filed a suit in 
the High Court challenging the decision of the Minister. The learned judge 
went through the previous decisions of the High Court and Court of Appeal, 
which interpreted section 40A (5) of the Security of Employment Act to mean 
that the employer had an option to refuse to reinstate the employee. Such 
decisions included the one in Mahona’s case where the court held that the 
option also applied where a court ordered reinstatement and the employer 
opted to refuse to reinstate the employee. Having considered the effects of 
those decisions on the Tanzanian community, Mwalusanya, J., stated what we 
regard to be the law obtaining today:
“ ...in giving the employer the option not to reinstate 
an employee, the provision negates the constitutional 
right of an employee of ‘the right to work’ as 
provided in Article 22 (1) of our Constitution. There 
is no valid reason as to why an employee should be 
discontinued from working, when a court of law has 
found that he committed no offence or irregularity.”
The learned judge used his power under the Constitution 
(Consequential, Transitional and Temporary Provisions), Act735 to construe 
section 40A (5) of the Security of Employment Act, as modified so as to bring 
it into conformity with the Bill of Rights. The impugned law could not be 
saved by Article 30 (2) (b) of the Constitution for it was broadly drafted 
encompassing even innocent employees who committed no offence at all. 
Such law, therefore, could not be justified as being in the public interest.
735Section 5 (1).
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The issue of the right to work was also examined by the High Court in 
the case of Timothy M. Kaare v. Mara Industrial Co. Ltd. (MICO) and 
Another,736 The plaintiff in that case complained against his compulsory 
retirement on reaching the alleged age of 55 years. His argument was that he 
was unlawfully and arbitrarily retired by the employer since at the material 
time there was no scheme on when to retire employees. The Staff Regulations 
were also silent and there had been no previous compulsory retirements of that 
nature. He felt that he was being victimized and he asked the court to order his 
immediate reinstatement. Mwalusanya, J., granted the declaration that the 
plaintiff was still a lawful employee of the defendant union. Further he 
emphasized the need to respect the ‘Right to Work’:
“That right should not be tampered with lightly except 
under clearly stipulated provisions of the law. That is 
a basic tenet of every country aspiring to build a 
socialist society as is the case with Tanzania. And 
surprisingly even in capitalist countries the right to 
work is a phenomenon that is greatly honoured...”
Finally, the court held that the defendant had interfered with the 
plaintiffs right to work, a fundamental human right, without rhyme and 
reason. The position in Tanzania today is as Lord Denning., said in Lee v. The 
Showman’s Guild o f  Great Britain737 that 'a man’s right to work is just as 
important to him as, if not more important than, his rights of property.’738 
These developments have effectively guaranteed and served the purpose of 
enabling employees to secure their livelihood with certainty. The right to work 
therefore, with its aim of securing the possibility of continued employment, is 
necessary for the survival of the working class in Tanzania. The judiciary have 
now realized this, albeit belatedly. Since the decision in Obadiah }s case has
736Higli Court of Tanzania at Mwanza, Civil Case No. 30 of 1986, unreported.
737(1952) 2 Q.B. 329.
738Ibid., at p. 343.
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not been overturned by the Court of Appeal, we hope that it will continue to 
represent the law.
6:4 The right to fair remuneration.
The right to work goes hand in hand with the right to fair remuneration. 
After introducing the right to work, the Tanzanian Constitution goes on to 
emphasize that 'every person who works is entitled to just and favourable 
remuneration.'739
This particular right was tested for the first time by the court in the case 
of W. K. Butambala v. Attorney-General740. In that case the applicant, who 
was an Advocate of the High Court, was assigned the conduct of three Legal 
Aid criminal session cases. When the trial ended the learned advocate applied 
to Mwalusanya, J., the trial judge, to have his fees, in respect of the three 
criminal session cases, assessed and paid. Under the Legal Aid (Criminal 
Proceedings) Act, 1969741 the fees payable for each case ranged between 
Shillings 120/= and 500/=742. That amount appeared to be outrageously small. 
This prompted Mwalusanya, J., to take the initiative in setting the legal 
machinery in motion. He construed that particular provision of the law so as to 
bring it into confonnity with the Bill of Rights which required 'favourable 
remuneration' to a person depending on the 'quantity and quality of the work 
done'.
The amount prescribed by law as an advocate’s remuneration in all 
legal aid criminal cases is payable from the general revenue of the United 
Republic. The State Attorney also conceded that the amount was not 
reasonable nor proportionate to the quantity of the work done. However, he 
was convinced that the statute took into account the prevailing poor economic
739Article 23.
740High Court of Tanzania at Mwanza, Miscellaneous Criminal Cause No. 50 of 1990, unreported.
741 Act No. 21 of 1969.
742 Ibid., section 4 (2).
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conditions of the country, and was therefore saved by the derogation clause as 
being in the public interest.
Mwalusanya, J., reasoned that judges were aware of the economic 
conditions in the country and their decisions in assessing the remuneration of 
advocates would take into account the economic position of the country. They 
would use their good sense to strike a balance in making such assessment and 
avoid awarding unreasonably large sums which might cripple the economy. He 
further suggested that:
“If the government fears the abuse of the discretion by 
the judges, then it should take the initiative of revising 
the fees payable by enacting a new law”
According to Mwalusanya, J., the term “public interest” is a vague and 
unsatisfactory term, for it may mean ‘political expedience or that which is best 
for the common good of the community’. The learned judge resisted the 
assumption that the rights of the majority outweigh the rights of individuals. 
To encourage that approach would weaken the individual rights enshrined in 
the Bill of Rights. To him, when the courts have to weigh the various 
competing public interests, then the public interest in the doing of justice 
should be paramount and each case should be treated according to its merits:
“When the court is called upon to balance the public 
interest in the need to pay advocates reasonable sums 
as against public interest in the protection of the 
coffers of the government, the result must inevitably 
depend on the facts of each case.”
As for this particular case, the learned judge was of the view that justice 
would be done if  the advocates were paid reasonable amount of money for the 
work done. He was mindful of the fact that much as many would like legal aid 
to the poor to continue, it should be at a cost that the government can afford.
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Following this reasoning he construed section 4 of Act No. 21 of 1969 
so as to bring it into conformity with the provisions of the Bill of Rights. He 
deleted the worthless amount mentioned in that section and modified it to read:
“An advocate in legal aid cases shall be entitled to be 
remunerated according to the quantity and quality of 
the work done as assessed by the certifying 
authority”.
The Attorney-General was aggrieved by the decision of the High Court 
and referred the matter to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal in 
Attorney-General v. W. K. Butambala743 overturned the decision of the High 
Court on procedural grounds. Makame, J. A.., did not consider the substance 
of the reasoning of Mwalusanya, J., since the appeal was capable of being 
disposed of on a procedural irregularity. By implication the Court of Appeal 
agreed with the finding of Mwalusanya, J., as to the inadequacy of the sums 
prescribed by law as remuneration payable to advocates who are assigned legal 
aid criminal cases. This is found in the post-script statement of Makame, J. A.., 
where he remarks:
“By way of post-script we desire to add that the fees 
payable under section 4 of the Legal Aid (Criminal 
Proceedings) Act No. 21 of 1969 may be grossly 
inadequate and out of date. We think something 
positive must be done unless the public philosophy is 
that the service the advocates render under the law are 
intended to be the classical dock briefs of some 
jurisdictions”.
Makame, J. A.., overturned the decision of the High Court because 
Mwalusanya, J., proceeded suo motu to construe section 4 of Act No. 21 of 
1969 as modified, without any formal complaint being presented to him. It was 
the learned trial judge who initiated the proceedings by instructing the
743 Court of Appeal of Tanzania at Mwanza, Criminal Appeal No. 37 of 19991, reported in [1992] 
L.R.C. (Const.) 495.
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Registrar to fix the hearing date after serving the Attorney-General and one 
Butambala advocate notice of his intention. So it was the trial judge who made 
W. K. Butambala an applicant and the Attorney-General as a respondent in 
that case, otherwise there was no formal application or complaint by any 
aggrieved person. That was considered undesirable as the warning of 
Makame, J. A.., indicates:
“ ...our Constitution is a serious and a solemn 
document . We think that invoking it and knocking 
down laws or portions of them should be reserved for 
appropriate and really momentous occasions.. .it is not 
desirable to reach a situation where we have 
‘ambulance courts’ which go round looking for 
situations where we can invalidate statutes”.
The Court of Appeal, for the reasons indicated above, was of the 
opinion that the learned trial judge had improperly raised the issue of 
constitutionality and that there was no legitimate occasion for him to do so.
The decision of the Court of Appeal raises some important issues of 
judicial activism and the extent to which it can be exercised. In this particular 
case the learned trial judge expressed intention to exercise his powers under 
section 5 (1) of Act No. 16 of 1984 and to construe section 4 of Act No. 21 of 
1969 as modified. He did not sit alone in his Chambers but he notified the 
Attorney-General to come and argue for his side as respondent and one 
Butambala as applicant. Both sides were given the chance of being heard. It 
should be noted that the government had categorically stated that all laws 
would continue in operation despite their inconsistency with the Constitution 
unless declared void by the court. The steps taken by Mwalusanya, J., could be 
an expression of the active role that the judiciary has to play in protecting 
individual fundamental rights. The need for such activism is underlined by the 
level of passivity among Tanzanians at large. This case could be an example.
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If an advocate who is much more knowledgeable can allow the infringement 
of his rights until the court intervenes suo motu, then what of a lay person who 
is ignorant of the existence of those rights?
The same issue was the subject of judicial determination once again in 
N. I. N. Ng'uni v. Judge In charge High Court Arusha and the Attorney- 
General744 before a quorum of three judges, Mapigano, J., Mchome, J,, and 
Rutakangwa, J. The petitioner was suspended by the judge in charge Arusha 
High Court centre from practising as an advocate following his refusal to take 
legal aid briefs assigned to him. Although he denied these allegations, he 
maintained that 'the fee payable to an advocate under sub-section (2) is so 
inadequate as to constitute an infringement of the right to a just and favourable 
remuneration given to every person under Article 23 (2)', Thus in March 1998 
the learned judges declared unconstitutional this particular provision on 
grounds that 'it provides for unjust and unfavourable remuneration to the 
advocates who render services under the Act'.
Before arriving at this conclusion, the court took into account the 
provisions of various international and regional instruments that Tanzania has 
acceded to, and which are a replica of article 23 (a) of the Constitution. Also 
the learned judges were guided by 'comparative case law from foreign courts 
and international Bills of Rights', and the principles745 set by the eminent 
jurists who attended the judicial colloquium at Bangalore, India in 1988, 
regarding the interpretation and application of human rights provisions.
As in Butambala1 s case, the court here found the remuneration 
prescribed to advocates under the section 'incredibly small', as expressed by 
the judges' comment:
744High Court of Tanzania at Arusha, Miscellaneous Civil Cause No. 3 of 1993, unreported.
745That a Constitution should receive a broad and purposive construction, that a Constitution should 
be given a construction which infuses fundamental rights provisions with life, and that restrictions 
to fundamental rights should be strictly construed.
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"...judicial notice has to be taken of the fall of the 
shilling in value. That amount cannot now buy even a 
pair of plastic slippers."
Since the law says in clear language that an advocate is to be 
remunerated for his services, the court interpreted this to mean that 'he is to 
receive a just and favourable remuneration, according to the quantity and 
quality of the work he has done.' Having given this interpretation, the learned 
judges concluded:
"We are satisfied that section 4 (2) denies him such 
remuneration and, therefore, infringes his basic 
light."
Two important points are worth noting in this case. First, unlike in other 
previous cases, the Attorney-General did not contend that the impugned law 
was saved by the claw-back clause (Article 30 (2)). Second, the court found 
the Attorney-General guilty of neglect of duty, an inference drawn from his 
failure to take action so as 'to bring Act No. 21 of 1969 into conformity with 
the basic rights provisions of the Constitution.'
6: 5 The right of access to justice.
The right of access to a court is one of the guarantees of the right to a 
fair trial in both criminal and civil cases. However, the question of whether the 
hearing is fair may not be thought of if there are, at the outset, problems in 
gaining access to the judicial process.746 Thus, in order to have a trial there 
should be access to the court.
Under section 6 of the Government Proceedings Act, 1967747 as 
amended by Act No. 40 of 1974,748 before a suit was filed against the
746FARRAN, S., p. 147.
7470p cit.
748Govemment Proceedings (Amendment) Act, 1974.
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government it was necessary to obtain the consent of the Minister for Justice 
first. The requirement of ministerial fiat was abused and it could be 
conveniently applied to frustrate genuine claims against the government or its 
officials. Even where the people avoided such requirement by instituting suits 
against government officials in their personal capacity the Attorney-General 
always applied to be joined as a party, not with intention of protecting the 
government’s legitimate interests but to frustrate the plaintiffs claim.749 . For 
example in the case of Patrick Maziku v. G, A. Sebabili and 8 Others750 the 
government was not a party to the original suit which was against six 
government servants and two others who were involved in the implementation 
of the nationalization of milling machines in Shinyanga. The State Attorney 
asked the court to join the Attorney-General as a co-defendant, because the 
government servants had acted bona fide  in the course of their duties, and their 
actions were actions of the government. The court was persuaded by the State 
Attorney’s submission and the Attorney-General was therefore joined as a co­
defendant in the suit. The case then had to collapse for the plaintiff was 
directed by the court to comply with the statutory provisions relating to suits 
against government. In other words, the plaintiff was directed to obtain first 
the ministerial fiat, if  he was still desirous of pursuing his case to which the 
government was now a party.
The same tactics were employed by the government in the case of 
Jacob K . Makangaru v, G. Kindamba.751 The plaintiff in that case had sued 
the Principal of Musoma Folk Development College claiming damages 
following his eviction from college quarters. Then the Attorney-General 
successfully applied to be joined as a party to the suit. Subsequent to joining 
the Attorney-General as a party to the suit, the State Attorney submitted that
749For a detailed discussion on this see PETER, C. M., 1992, p. 157). See also SHIVJI, I. G., (1990 
B), p. 401.
750Op cit.
751 High Court of Tanzania at Mwanza, Civil Case No. 45 of 1988, unreported.
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the suit was incompetent for the plaintiff had to submit his plaint to the 
Minister first for the requisite consent before the court could entertain it. 
Again, the plaintiffs case collapsed at that stage. The trial judge simply 
lamented the frustrating and depressing state of affairs on the plaintiffs side 
bearing in mind the fact that it was the government itself which applied to be 
joined, and yet after being joined as a party the same party wanted the plaintiff 
to obtain consent. What is surprising in this case is the judge’s failure to apply 
the Bill of Rights, which had just become justiciable, to do justice to the 
plaintiff. The plaintiff also never challenged the constitutionality of such fiat 
but expressed worries about the future of his petition once the Attorney- 
General was joined. Access to justice was curtailed if  a suit involved the 
government or its officials.
Where the court was presided over by a bold spirited judge like 
Samatta, J. K., (as he then was) in Rev. Christopher Mtikila v. The Editor, 
Business Times and Augustine Lyatonga Mrema,152 such an application by the 
Attorney-General was rejected. In that case the plaintiff sued one local 
newspaper and the Minister for Home Affairs in his personal capacity for 
defamation. The minister had uttered defamatoiy words to the effect that the 
plaintiff was plotting to kidnap him using foreign mercenaries. Those 
defamatoiy utterances were published and circulated by “Business Times” the 
local newspaper. The government tried to apply to be joined as a party to the 
suit with a view to using the ploy of the requirement of a ministerial fiat since 
the minister’s utterances were made in the course of his duty. However, the 
learned judge held that it was not necessary for the government to be joined as 
a co-defendant.
One of the most creative steps taken by the High Court of Tanzania in 
its interpretation of the Articles of the Constitution on fundamental rights has 
been its ruling in the case of Peter N g ’omango v. Gerson M. K. Mwangwa
752High Court of Tanzania at Dar Es Salaam, Civil Case No. 47 of 1992, unreported.
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and Another753 that the requirement of a ministerial fiat to sue the government 
was unnecessary, unconstitutional and void. In that case the plaintiff instituted 
a suit against the Principal of Mpwapwa Teachers College for malicious 
prosecution and defamation. The Attorney-General, through third party 
proceedings, applied to be joined as a co-defendant on ground that the 
Principal had acted in his capacity as a government official. After being joined 
as a co-defendant, the Attorney-General raised a preliminary objection to the 
effect that the suit was incompetent, for want of consent of the Minister for 
Justice as required under the Government Proceedings Act since the 
government was now a party to the suit. The plaintiff argued in reply that such 
requirement was unconstitutional and ought to be declared void.
Mwalusanya, J., explored the provisions of the Constitution and could 
not find any Article in support of such requirement. Instead, the requirement 
for ministerial fiat was an overt assault on the constitutional right of a fair 
hearing by the court. The learned judge adopted the interpretation by the 
European Court of Human Rights in the case of Golder v. U.K15A that the right 
to be heard includes the right of an individual to have free access to the court 
to file a suit for a remedy. His views found support in many Commonwealth 
jurisdictions like neighbouring Uganda,755 Northern Ireland756 and Canada 
which had earlier held that the requirement of a ministerial fiat was 
unconstitutional and void, in that it purported to deprive an aggrieved party of 
the protection of the law. Further, Mwalusanya, J., was of the opinion that the 
requirement was not saved by the derogation or claw back clauses in the 
Constitution because it allowed the arbitrary exercise of power, it was 
unreasonable and too broadly drafted. He could cite a number of instances
753High Court of Tanzania at Dodoma, Civil Case No. 22 of 1992, unreported (reproduced in PETER, 
C. M., (1997), p. 309).
7541E,H.R.R 524.
755Shah v. Attorney-General [1970] E.A. 523.
756 Macauley v. Minister for Posts and Telegraphs [1966] I.R. 345.
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where the grant of consent had been delayed until after the complainants or 
key witnesses had died. In the light of all this, the learned judge remarked:
“I see no compelling social need to have restriction to 
sue the government, whereby the rights of citizens are 
marginalised and emasculated.”
The decision of Mwalusanya, J., was approved by the Court of Appeal 
in Kukutia Ole Pumbun and Another v. Attorney-General.151 The appellant 
unsuccessfully sought from the minister the necessary fiat to sue the 
government. He decided to file an application challenging the constitutionality 
of such requirement. His application was dismissed by Munuo, J., for lack of 
consent on the grounds that the impugned provision was constitutional simply 
because it was enacted by Parliament. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, 
Kisanga, J. A.., described the High Court as holding a ‘superficial way of 
dealing with the issue’ for:
“It is one thing for a provision of the law to be 
properly or validly enacted by competent legislature, 
but quite another for it to be constitutional; the two 
are not the same.”
The Court of Appeal held that the requirement violated the basic human 
rights to have unimpeded access to the court and that section 6 of the 
Government Proceedings Act, 1967 was void.
Further, the Court of Appeal found that the law was not saved by the 
derogation clause on public interest as it failed the test laid down in Daudi 
P ete’s case. Also the court took opportunity to elaborate the rules that it had 
previously set in Daudi Pete. Thus:
7570p cit.
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"...a  law which seeks to limit or derogate from the 
basic right of the individual on grounds of public 
interest will be saved by Article 30 (2) of the 
Constitution only if it satisfies two essential 
requirements; First, such a law must be lawful in the 
sense that it is not arbitrary. It should make adequate 
safeguards against arbitrary decisions, and provide 
effective controls against abuse by those in authority 
when using the law. Secondly the limitation imposed 
by such law must not be more than is reasonably 
necessary to achieve the legitimate object. This is 
what is also known as the principle of proportionality.
The principle requires that such law must not be 
drafted too widely so as to net everyone including 
even the untargeted members of the society. If  the law 
which infringes a basic right does not meet both 
requirements, such law is not saved by Article 30 (2) 
of the Constitution, it is null and void. And any law 
that seeks to limit the fundamental rights of the 
individual must be construed strictly to make sure that 
it conforms with these requirements, otherwise the 
guaranteed rights under the Constitution may easily 
be rendered meaningless by the use of the derogative 
or clawback clauses of that very Constitution”.
The law was held arbitrary for it made no provisions for safeguards 
against abuse and it left the minister to exercise that power without any 
control, and in cases where consent was refused there was no provision for 
appeal.
6:6 The right to acquire and to own property
The right to acquire and to own property is explicitly provided for under 
Article 24 (1) of the Constitution. The Constitution prohibits arbitrary 
deprivation of private property 'without the authority of the law which shall set 
out conditions for fair and adequate compensation'.758
758Article 24 (2).
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However, there was an attempt by the government to take away the 
right to own property when customary land rights were extinguished by way of 
legislation.759
The attempt was vehemently challenged in Lohay Akonaay and 
Another v. Attorney-General.160 In that case the petitioners were dispossessed, 
during villagisation campaign, of the land they had lawfully acquired and 
cultivated since 1943. Their land was re-allocated to Kambi ya Simba Ujamaa 
Village without compensation. In 1987 the petitioners successfully sued in the 
Arusha Resident Magistrate's Court for recovery of their land. They 
repossessed their land in 1990 but then the government had passed GN. No. 88 
of 1987 followed by Act No. 22 of 1992 extinguishing customary land rights 
within specified areas. In effect the petitioners could be driven out of their 
customary lands thereby circumventing the court decision. Despite lawful 
recovery of the land the petitioners were threatened with eviction consequent 
to the enactment of Act No. 22 of 1992.761 Thus they challenged this particular 
legislation on ground that it was inconsistent with the provisions of the 
Constitution and it violated their basic rights.
Munuo J., declared Act No. 22 of 1992 unconstitutional for, among 
other reasons, it violated the right to own property 'by denying the petitioners 
the right to keep possession of their deemed rights of occupancy and what is 
worse, denying the petitioners compensation.'
The Act was also attacked for being discriminatory by dispossessing a 
section of the people of their legally protected rights and affording the same 
protection to another section of the population.762 The learned judge observed 
that:
759See the discussion in chapter seven about Regulation of Land Tenure (Established Villages) Act, 
1992 (Act No. 22 of 1992)
760jjigh Court of Tanzania at Arusha, Miscellaneous Civil Cause No. 1 of 1993, reported in (1993) 4 
L.R.C. 327.
761We discuss this legislation in chapter seven.
762See also MVUNGI, S., and MWAKYEMBE, H. G., p. 335.
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“It is reverse discrimination to confiscate the 
petitioners deemed right of occupancy and reallocate 
the same to some other needy persons because by 
doing so the petitioners are deprived of their right to 
own land upon which they depend for their 
livelihood.”
However the Court of Appeal in Attorney-General v. Lohay Akonaay 
and Another763 was of a different view. Nyalali, C. J., held that Act No. 22 of 
1992 was not discriminatory in that it did not discriminate people on the 
ground of their national origin, race, colour, political opinion or station in 
life764 the meaning provided by Article 13 (5) of the Constitution.
Nonetheless the Court of Appeal approved the view held by Munuo, J., 
that customary rights in land are real property protected by the provisions of 
Article 24 of the Constitution and that 'deprivation of customary rights of 
occupancy without fair compensation was prohibited by the Constitution'. 
However, according to Nyalali, C. J., fair compensation differs from one case 
to another for 'in some cases a re-allocation of land may be fair compensation'. 
The Court of Appeal emphasized that compensation is not confined to 
unexhausted improvements:
"Where there are no unexhausted improvements, but 
some efforts has been put into the land by the 
occupier, that occupier is entitled to protection under 
Article 24 (2) and fair compensation is payable for 
deprivation of property"
The Court of Appeal was satisfied that ’sections 3 and 4 of Act No. 22 
of 1992 which provide for the extinction of customary rights in land and 
prohibit the payment of compensation with the implicit exception of
763Court of Appeal of Tanzania at Arusha, Civil Appeal No. 31 of 1994, reported in (1994) 2 L.R.C. 
359.
764p0r a full analysis of the reasoning of the Court of Appeal see COLDHAM, S., (1995), pp. 240- 
241.
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unexhausted improvements only violate article 24 (1) of the Constitution and 
therefore null and void. However, it was made clear that the finding had no 
effect on the villages which were listed in the Schedule to the Government 
Notice No. 88 of 1987,765 which included the area in dispute. The reasoning 
rested solely on ground that:
"The customary rights in land in those listed villages 
were declared extinct before the provisions of the 
Constitution, which embody the Basic Human Rights 
became enforceable in 1988...and since the provisions 
of Basic Human Rights are not retrospective, when 
Act No. 22 of 1992 was enacted by the Parliament, 
thei*e was no customary rights in land in any of the 
listed villages of Arusha Region".
It is hard to accept the reasoning of the Court of Appeal on the effect of 
the Bill of Rights on offending laws enacted or rules made before the Bill of 
Rights became justiciable. By the reasoning of the Court of Appeal it is only 
laws enacted after the Bill of Rights became justiciable that can be affected or 
declared unconstitutional for violating the rights guaranteed under the 
Constitution. It should be noted that even the provisions of the Government 
Proceedings Act, 1967 which the Court of Appeal itself declared null and void 
in the case of Kukutia Ole Pumbun for violating the basic human right of 
unimpeded access to the court were enacted in 1967 before the Bill of Rights 
was made part of the Constitution.
The submission by the appellant that the trial judge erred in law by 
holding the entire Act unconstitutional instead of confining striking down only 
the four offending sections was found to have merit. The Court of Appeal 
reasoned that 'where the unconstitutional provisions of a statute may be 
severed leaving the remainder of the statute functioning, then the court should
765This particular Government Notice is discussed in chapter seven.
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uphold the remainder of the statute and invalidate only the offending 
provisions.'
6:8 Conclusions.
The discussion in this chapter has basically examined the reaction of the 
Court towards civil claims, related to the enforcement of fundamental rights. 
There have been very few cases of this nature and this paucity can be 
attributed to ignorance and to the economic hardship people are experiencing 
in the country. Most people cannot afford to hire the expensive legal services 
involved in civil litigation. We saw how the High Court attempted to remove 
the common law requirement of locus standi and allow public interest 
litigation for claims enforcing fundamental rights and freedoms. However, due 
to ignorance and poor communications, people have not made use of the 
opportunity that was opened up by the court.
In those few cases which reached the courts, the High Court has 
attempted to effect meaningful realization of basic rights and freedoms. In fact 
very few civil cases of this nature reached the Court of Appeal, most of them 
ended at the High Court level. For the case of Kukutia Ole Pumbun which 
reached the Court of Appeal there was an impressive approach and the State 
was involved as a party.
We noted also the efforts which were made by few individuals to have 
their rights protected by seeking redress fi*om the Court. Such litigious 
individuals include Rev. Christopher Mtikila who could speak and do what 
many others hesitated to do. He could not let his right to freedom of 
association be infringed but he was not certain of the outcome in the event that 
he filed a suit in court. Although he might have been expected to file his 
petition in the High Court at Dar Es Salaam where he lived, he travelled to 
Dodoma High Court where he lodged his petition. There could be many 
reasons for so doing but the paramount one was that he wanted his case to be
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heard by Mwalusanya, J., whose approach to human rights issues was well 
known. This fact was also admitted by Mwalusanya, J., when interviewed by 
the author. At that time Mwalusanya, J., was stationed at Dodoma High Court 
Centre. As we saw, the State’s objections made him disqualify himself from 
presiding over the trial.
The move by Rev. Mtikila is capable of many interpretations. One of 
them could be that people have no confidence in some of the judges because of 
the way they interpret the provisions relating to individual fundamental rights. 
This reaction by the public may not be a compliment to the Tanzanian 
judiciary, nor is it healthy to the future of human rights in the country.
To a large extent human rights activism has been Mwalusanya, J ’s 
‘crusade’ with a little support from a few other judges.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO JUDICIAL DECISIONS
As we saw in the preceding discussion, the judiciary has interpreted 
various laws in the light of the provisions in the Constitution which guaranteed 
individual fundamental rights. Certain laws were declared unconstitutional for 
they violated the rights that the Bill of Rights came to protect. On some 
occasions the courts ordered the immediate deletion of such laws.766 In fact the 
courts made a wide range of orders most of which touched the government's 
interest.767 As far as the courts were concerned, they had fulfilled their role and 
it was for the government to respond to the substance of such court decisions.
This chapter is essentially concerned with the government’s reaction to 
those court decisions which protected individual fundamental rights. We shall 
explain and analyse the different forms of government response to judicial 
decisions and consider the ways in which they could affect the future of human 
rights protection in Tanzania. In some cases the government amended the law 
as ordered by the court and in other cases it ignored the court orders. This 
chapter therefore seeks to examine the nature and style of amendment of laws 
and other methods that the government adopted in responding to the court’s 
decisions. Most of the reactions by the government were extensively reported 
in the local newspapers and even abroad.
7:1 Ignoring the court decisions
The court decisions were ignored by the government in two different 
ways. First, the government could choose to be indifferent to court orders by 
remaining silent and not taking any appropriate steps. Such inaction by the
766See for example the decision of the Court of Appeal in Daudi Pete's case.
767We discuss various court decisions in chapters five and six.
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government could be considered a negative reaction. Secondly, on a number 
of occasions the government exhibited reactionary tendencies and expressed 
openly its resentment of court decisions.
7:1:1 Government’s inaction.
Due to the binding nature of court decisions, it was expected that the 
government would be bound by the interpretation given by the court, 
concerning the laws which violated individual fundamental rights but 
remained unrepealed. The people thought that by leaving it to the judiciary to 
consider such laws and to determine the extent they infringed the rights 
guaranteed under the Constitution, the government was serious and sincere. It 
was also their hope that the government would take immediate action as soon 
as the court delivered its final judgment. However, as things turned out to be, it 
may take longer than people expected for the government to take meaningful 
steps.
The decision of the High Court in Bernardo Ephrahim v. Holaria 
Pastory and Another768 can be taken as an example. The Haya customary law 
which barred female heirs from disposing of the clan land but allowed the 
male counterparts to do so, was declared void for being discriminatory.769
That was a ruling in respect of one provision of the Customary Law 
Declaration Order and it was delivered in 1989. There was no appeal to the 
Court of Appeal against that decision. To date, the Declaration has not been 
amended to bring it into conformity with the decision of the court and the 
Constitution. It is almost ten years now since the court made the decision but 
the government has not taken effective measures. Perhaps the government is 
doing some necessary preparation for the change of law of succession in 
general. If  this is the case, it is our submission that it has taken too long and
768Op cit.
769See footnote 702.
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increasingly people are losing patience. Past experience has shown that it is 
not safe, for a country like Tanzania, to rely only on court precedents without 
any backing from specific legislation. There are two main reasons for this 
hypothesis.
First, there was no appeal to the Court of Appeal whose decision would 
be binding on the High Court and all subordinate courts. This means that , 
since one High Court judge is not bound by a decision of another High Court 
judge, there may occur a situation whereby another judge may wish to differ 
with the interpretation of Mwalusanya, J., in Bernardo Ephrahim 3s case. That 
kind of situation is likely to happen and would bring confusion to the existing 
approach now taken by courts when attending to such issues, as set by 
Mwalusanya, J.
Second, it should be noted that since there was no appeal against the 
decision of Mwalusanya, J., the Couit of Appeal has had no chance to 
examine this issue. Past experience has shown that it may not be right to 
assume that the Court of Appeal would uphold the findings of Mwalusanya, J., 
in Bernardo Ephrahim1's case. The position of the Court of Appeal 011 this 
issue before the Bill of Rights became justiciable remain opposed to the 
finding of Mwalusanya, J.770 We cannot therefore be certain as to change of 
attitude of the Court of Appeal after the Bill of Rights became justiciable. The 
possibility is there that, if  a similar issue came up in another case, the Court of 
Appeal might strike down the celebrated decision of the High Court in 
Bernardo Ephrahim.
In fact the Customary Law Declaration Order contains a number of 
discriminatory rules of inheritance which treat female heirs as inferior to their 
male counter parts. For example, male heirs are entitled to the biggest share 
irrespective of their ages compared to what female heirs get.771 Since this has
770See footnotes 696 and 697.
771 GN. No. 436 of 1963, rule 26.
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never been the subject of litigation in court and no judicial pronouncement has 
ever been made about it, it is still a valid law, even though discriminatory. 
From the above exposition there is no doubt that the rules under the 
Declaration ‘discriminate against women and afford them limited rights to 
inheritance’.772 Further, the court cannot exhaustively declare unconstitutional 
all laws that infringe on fundamental rights. Such laws and customs are many 
and the court by tradition does not, on its own initiative, set the legal 
machinery in motion unless formally asked by the aggrieved party.773 It is hard 
to imagine a length of time that the court may have to take in examining all 
laws which potentially infringe on individual fundamental rights. Arguably, 
allowing such laws to continue discriminating against women and depriving 
them of their rights is contempt of basic rights guaranteed under the 
Constitution. It should be remembered that under the Tanzanian Constitution 
women have a right to be treated equally with men.774
The government *s inaction is also expressed by its response to the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Bi Hawa Mohamed v. Ally 
Sefu115. The Court of Appeal interpreted section 114 of the Law of Marriage 
Act, 1971776 as including housewifery duties in the list of factors to be taken 
into account by the court when determining the contribution by spouses to the 
acquisition of matrimonial property. Before the decision of the Court of 
Appeal, there were conflicting decisions by the High Court about this issue. 
Most of the High Court judges were of the view that housewifery duties did 
not constitute a contribution to the acquisition of the matrimonial assets. As a 
result, on a number of occasions housewives left the court empty handed after
772MIGIRO, R. M., (1991), p. 367.
773Mwalusanya, J., was bitterly criticised by the Court of Appeal in W. K. Butambcila's case and his 
decision overturned when he attempted to decide on a matter that had not been formally presented 
to him.
774See Articles 12 and 13.
775Court of Appeal of Tanzania at Dar Es Salaam, Civil Appeal No. 9 of 1983, unreported 
(reproduced in PETER, C. M., (1997), p. 398).
776ActNo. 5 of 1971.
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divorce proceedings. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was delivered in 
1983 but to date section 114 remains intact as it used to be without any 
legislative clarification to make it conform with the court’s decision. Much as 
the Court of Appeal decision would be loved for its liberal stand, we cannot
forget that the Court of Appeal is not bound by its own decision. This poses
one important question as to what would be the fate of this decision if the same 
issue reaches the Court of Appeal once again, attracting a panel of full bench. 
We are not questioning the constitutionality of section 114 but it is desirable to 
make it clear that no other interpretation can be given to it. As Mtengeti- 
Migiro concluded:
“In the absence of a legislative clarification/ 
amendment, the celebrated judgment in the case of Bi 
Hawa could be a short term gain. This is because the 
issues at stake still depend on judicial activism, and
what a particular judge considers to be public
policy.”777
The worries expressed by the above quotation are not limited to the case 
of Bi Hawa or matrimonial proceedings only. In fact it is not safe to let human 
rights rely solely on judicial activism. This is tantamount to taking a gamble 
on individual rights instead of providing for their protection and guarantee as 
the Constitution requires. It is not clear why the government does not amend 
or repeal or clarify its laws so as to bring them to conformity with the relevant 
judgments of the court. By complying with the court decisions the 
government will make its laws certain and express definite acknowledgement 
of the prevalence of human rights in the country.
This behaviour by the government is not consistent or uniform, as we 
shall see later in this work. In a number of cases where its interests were 
threatened, the government has exhibited immediate response to court
777MIGIRO, R. M., (1990), p. 526.
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decisions by amending the impugned laws. However, in others as discussed 
above it took a low profile or remained indifferent. The criterion upon which 
the government based its decision in sele’cting court decisions to be complied 
with and others worth total rejection is not clear. When the government was 
called upon through court decisions to bring into effect important changes in 
certain legislation or practice and yet nothing was done, there might not be a 
better explanation to that than being an expression of its unwillingness to 
comply with the finding and order of the court.
7:1:2 Open resistance by the government.
When we refer to the “government ” our attention is essentially focused 
on the executive policy-making body of a state. This body is constituted of 
individual high-ranking people with the power to control the affairs of a state. 
It would include the President, Cabinet Ministers, Regional Commissioners, 
District Commissioners and other executive who hold related positions. Any 
statement or act by any of them is considered to be that of the government. It 
is this group which we take to represent the government in this study.
It was common when the Bill of Rights was not yet made part of the 
Constitution to hear court orders being flouted by the executive. That was the 
experience which accompanied most of the orders of habeas corpus, certiorari 
and mandamus.778 The court in many such cases ordered the immediate release 
of the complainants due to the illegality of their respective detention. 
However, as they left the judges’ chambers or the court rooms they were re­
arrested and transferred to various distant prisons in the country.779 This 
prompted Mnzavas, J. K. (as he then was), to complain about such behaviour 
by the state on the grounds that the freedom of the just man was worth little to
778See Hie discussion in chapter seven.
779 For a detailed account of these events see the exposition by Mnzavas, J.K., (as he then was), in 
Ally Lilakwa's case.
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him, if he could be ’arrested and held even when a court of law had found him 
innocent and ordered his release.'780 The learned judge directed that:
“No matter how politically charged an issue may be, 
legal process has a part to play and the law must be 
followed”.
All these comments by the learned judge were not persuasive enough 
to the government nor did they have any effect on the position of the 
government towards the detainees. Apart from disregarding court decisions, 
the government attempted also to pre-empt anticipated court orders as was the 
situation in Attorney-General v. Lesinoi Ndeinai and Others1*1 Just one day 
before the High Court delivered a ruling invalidating the detention of the 
applicants, the government swiftly detained them under the provisions of the 
Deportation Ordinance. They were initially detained under the Preventive 
Detention Act, 1962. The government appealed against the decision of the 
High Court while the applicants were still in detention pending deportation. 
Even when the Court of Appeal upheld the High Court decision the detainees 
were not released. The government had opted for what can be described as 
guerrilla tactics against the court decision. Similar tactics were employed by 
the Zimbabwe government in relation to the anticipated decision of the court 
against death penalty by hanging in the case of Chileya v. The State.1*2 While 
the constitutionality of the mode of executing death penalty was being 
contested in court, the Constitution was amended to state specifically that the 
death penalty by hanging could not be held to be in contravention of the 
Constitution.783
780Ibid.
781 Op cit.
782 SC. 64/ 90, unreported. The case is briefly discussed in HATACHARD, J., and COLDHAM, S., p. 
170.
783 Zimbabwe Constitution, section 15 (4).
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The matter took a rather terrifying dimension when judicial officers 
could be punished for having decided against the government’s wishes. One 
magistrate in Shinyanga was detained after granting bail to Kassela Bantu, the 
government critic, who was facing a murder charge. It was a fictitious charge 
of murder which aimed at silencing Kassela Bantu by locking him up. This 
argument finds expression in the government’s reaction to his acquittal by the 
High Court after the trial.784 He was immediately detained under the 
Preventive Detention Act despite his innocence and acquittal by the court.785
The executive in Tanzania was very strong and to a large extent there 
was a feeling that it was above the law, and that is why it could flout court 
orders with impunity. When the Bill of Rights was enshrined in the 
Constitution, people expected a change of attitude by the government towards 
court orders. However, there was no remarkable change of attitude by the 
government and most of its responses to certain judicial pronouncements 
remain highly objectionable.
When Lugakingira, J., in Rev. Christopher MtiJdla v. Attorney- 
General786 ordered that no permit from District Commissioners would be 
required any more for political parties to hold public meetings, the initial 
reaction by the government left the people flabbergasted. The Minister for 
Justice and Constitution told the press conference immediately after the 
judgment was delivered that the government did not recognize the order of the 
court. Further, the minister maintained that as far as the government was 
concerned, political parties were by law required to seek permits before 
holding any public meeting, the decision of Lugakingira, J., notwithstanding. It 
was unfortunate that such a regrettable reaction came from the Minister for 
Justice and Constitution, a lawyer by profession.787 Under normal
784 R. v. Joseph Kassela Bantu [1970] H.C.D. No. 170.
785See the discussion in LEGUM, C., and DRYSDALE, J.
7860p cit.
787At that time Samuel Sitta was the Minister for Justice and Constitution.
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circumstances the Minister for Justice was expected to advise and guide the 
government as to the acceptable steps to be taken in such a situation where the 
government was not satisfied with the decision of the court. It is interesting to 
note that no appeal was preferred to the Court of Appeal in this case by the 
Attorney-General, but the government simply resorted to a highhanded means 
of defeating justice.
The people of Kigoma were the first to face the wrath of the state when 
the CHADEMA political party, in accordance with a court order, attempted to 
hold a public meeting without seeking a permit from the District 
Commissioner. They were beaten up by the police and the assaults left many 
casualties. It took government a long time to come to terms with this 
particular court order. Later political parties were simply required to give 
notice to the District Police authorities for the purposes of maintaining peace 
and order during the intended public meetings.
Disobedience of court orders by the government seem to have assumed 
a character of an institutionalized practice among the executive when the 
President also took part. In one unusual instance, the President ordered the 
immediate restoration of property of the District Council that was auctioned in 
execution of the court decree. The Hai District Land Officer was sued by a 
group of people for damages after removing the building materials from their 
construction sites. The order to remove those materials came from the District 
Commissioner. The Resident Magistrate Court Kilimanjaro Region entered 
judgment for the plaintiffs. This was followed by execution of the decree 
which involved attachment of the District Council’s motor vehicles. Since the 
property attached belonged to the ‘public’, the President ordered their 
immediate restoration and blamed the court for failing to defend the interest 
of the majority.788 This unprecedented intrusion and disobedience of the court
788This event was reported by many local newspapers including the ruling party newspaper Vhuru, 
10111 August 1996.
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order by the President was attacked by the members of the legal profession but 
the President never apologized or regretted his actions. According to the 
President the interest of the majority overrode the rights of the individual or 
the minority.
If  this practice is encouraged the concept of individual rights will 
become an illusive dream. That is why the court was reminded of its 
interpretation role to make sure that ‘the rights of minorities are not subjected 
to the threat of the tyranny of the majority, lest they render the rights and 
freedoms illusory.’789 In any case, the President’s personal convictions did not 
constitute a legal warrant for him to disobey and interfere with the order of the 
court.
When the head of state becomes involved in actions which undermine 
the rule of law then his aides and other state functionaries follow suit. For 
example, shortly after the said President’s intrusive order, the police force was 
reported as having continued evicting small scale miners from Bulyankulu 
mines in Kahama District despite the court order that required the government 
to let the miners continue with their activities until their claims were settled in 
court. The High Court in Tabora had granted the injunction following the 
request from the miners that the mining contract between the government and 
one company, KMC, did not include compensation for the small scale 
miners.790 Further, the villagers and small scale miners’ complaints related to 
violation of their constitutional fundamental rights which suit could only be 
heard by the High Court with a quorum of three judges.791 Mchome, J., granted 
the injunction sought so as to maintain the status quo until the matter was 
determined. However, the villagers were evicted by the police from their 
traditional place of residence so as to give way to the newly licensed mining 
company, the court order notwithstanding.
789MBUNDA, L. X.} p. 157.
790See The Guardian Newspaper, 26th August 1996. See also Nipashe Newspaper, 26th August 1996.
791See Act No. 33 of 1994, section 10.
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Also in 1992 the government used the police (FFU) to forcibly evict 
junior doctors from their residences at Muhimbili Hospital after they went on 
strike for a couple of days demanding improvements in their working 
conditions. The eviction took place irrespective of the court injunction which 
barred the Hospital administration from carrying out such eviction until the 
matter was finally determined by the court.792 The government dismissed the 
junior doctors from employment following that strike and incarcerated them at 
Ukonga Prison pending repatriation to their respective places of origin. The 
same government made a U-turn when the Prime Minister ordered their 
reinstatement after the unprecedented demonstration by the hospital staff at the 
State House.793
In many cases, the government used police cover to flout the court 
orders.794 It is still common in Tanzania to see accused persons being re­
arrested on court premises whenever they are granted bail against the wishes 
of the government. In one incident the Regional Police Commander Dar Es 
Salaam ordered that those accused persons who were out on bail while charged 
with violent crimes be re-arrested. He did so to express government’s 
dissatisfaction with the way the court was handling those cases.795 If defiance 
of court orders is allowed to continue then the courts attempt to fulfil its role in 
protecting individual fundamental rights will be effectively undermined.
7:2 Amendment of laws.
Following the court’s nullification of certain provisions of law, the 
government in some instances felt obliged to take action and show concern 
over the findings of the court. The main action taken by the government
792See Joseph J. Masika and Others v. Muhimbili Medical Centre, Resident Magistrate Court of Dar 
Es Salaam atKisutu, RM Civil Case No. 16 of 1992, unreported.
793 It was rumoured around that die demonstration was engineered by the students from the University 
of Dar Es Salaam who mobilized the hospital staff within a short time and the government was 
caught unaware.
794See for example the case of Ally Lilakwa.
795See Nipashe Newspaper, 3ld December 1996.
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related to the amendment of impugned laws. Most amendments turned to be 
the source of more controversy as they frustrated a meaningful realization of 
the fundamental rights and freedoms. It is tempting to say that the government 
used the legislature to frustrate the rare examples of judicial activism in the 
country. This temptation is brought about by the government’s attempt to 
amend the nullified laws contrary to the conventional legislative principles and 
also by the motive that surrounded the amendments.
7:2:1 Amendment of nullified laws.
Any law declared by the court as a nullity is void and ineffective. In 
other words, nullification of a certain law by the court has the effect of 
cancelling that particular law and taking away its legal validity. Unless the 
nullifying order is set aside by a superior court, the legislature cannot legally 
attempt to modify it for it is dead and non existent. The High Court in 
Chumchua Marwa v. Officer In charge o f Musoma Prison and the Attorney- 
General,196 declared the Deportation Ordinance, unconstitutional and therefore 
null and void. In responding to this decision of the court, the government 
hastily amended the nullified law by including the provisions which attempted 
to make it look constitutional.797 The said amendment brought some changes 
to the Ordinance but arguably not enough was done to make it constitutional. 
The Ordinance could apply to Zanzibar following the amendments798 and the 
deportee was given right to challenge the legality of the Deportation Order in 
the High Court.799 Further, the deportee could be represented by an advocate in 
court during such proceedings.800 Also the changes include the establishment 
of an Advisory Committee to the President composed of a chairman and two
7960p cit.
797See Deportation (Amendment) Act, 1991, (Act No. 3 of 1991).
798Section 4.
799Section 5.
800Section 6.
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members appointed by the President and two by the Chief Justice.801 The 
President is required to refer to the Committee eveiy deportation order made 
under the Ordinance and the grounds thereof. Following the reference by the 
President, the Committee is required to advise him whether the deportation 
order should be continued, rescinded or suspended. However, a seemingly 
good idea was completely negated by a clause in the provision that the 
President was not bound by the advice of the Committee.
Having examined the Ordinance and its subsequent amendment as a 
whole the Nyalali Commission was of the opinion that it was by punishing 
the offender according to the laws in the courts of law rather than detaining 
him without trial, that the rule of law was strengthened in any democratic 
society. On the strength of this argument the Deportation Ordinance as 
amended by Act No 3 of 1991 was still found unconstitutional by the 
Commission and its immediate repeal was recommended.802
The amendment of the nullified laws came under attack from various 
scholars and members of legal profession. All criticisms of the Deportation 
Ordinance and its subsequent amendment were concluded by a 
recommendation like that of Nyalali Commission that its immediate repeal 
was absolutely necessary. To date the impugned law like many others is still in 
force despite all these criticisms.
7:2:2 Amendment and enactment of laws to defeat justice.
People have on a number of occasions witnessed controversial 
amendments to various laws and the enactment of new objectionable laws 
following certain court decisions. In effect such a reaction by the government 
is aimed at defeating justice.
801 Section 11.
802See the Nyalali Commission Report, Vol. 3, p. 5.
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7:2;2:1 Enactment o f new laws.
The background against which the Regulation of Land Tenure 
(Established Villages) Act, 1992803 was enacted demonstrates the 
government’s reaction to the decisions of the court through legislative means 
as pre-emptive. During the villagisation programme the people of Arusha 
region were brutally displaced and their pastoral land was taken away by the 
government without compensation.804 Then large tracts of land which were 
taken away from these pastoralists were given to the Ujamaa Villages and 
some to one State Corporation (NAFCO) for large scale wheat fanning.805 
From 1980 there was a series of cases by the people particularly pastoralists806 
challenging the legality of the alienation and claiming back their land which 
had been taken away from them by force. The courts awarded the damages 
sought and declared the Ujamaa villagers trespassers.807 In Mulbadaw Village 
Council and 67 Others v. National Agricultural and Food Corporation 
(NAFCO)m% the High Court awarded general damages to the plaintiff after 
finding the defendant a trespasser in the plaintiffs' land.
Although the Court of Appeal overturned the decision of the High 
Court by recognizing the right of NAFCO in the occupation of the land it also 
recognised the right to be compensated. However, in this particular case the 
Court of Appeal limited compensation to the very few villagers who had 
established the existence of property rights before their land was allocated to 
NAFCO.809 So there were many cases pending in the courts and some had 
reached the enforcement stage. When the Bill of Rights became justiciable,
803Act No. 22 of 1992.
804The effect of Villagisation is discussed in chapter three
805On tire effect of government policies on pastoral communities see MWAIKUSA, J. T., (1993), pp. 
144-163.
806Legal Aid Committee of the Faculty of Law University of Dar Es Salaam represented the 
complainants.
807SHIVJI, I. G., (1994), pp. 6-10.
808High Court of Tanzania at Arusha, Civil Case No. 10 of 1981, unreported (reproduced in PETER, 
C. M., (1997), p. 228).
809See National Agricultural and Food Corporation v, Mulbadaw Village Council and Others, Court 
of Appeal of Tanzania at Dar Es Salaam, Civil Appeal No. 3 of 1985, unreported.
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many more such cases were anticipated. The Prime Minister Joseph Sinde 
Warioba swiftly issued Government Notice No. 88 of 1987,810 extinguishing 
the pre-villagisation customary rights of occupancy within the areas in Arusha 
region as specified in the schedule to the order. This subsidiaiy legislation was 
not effective enough to take care of the government's interests in the region 
that were threatened by the rate of court decrees to be executed and more such 
suits that were being instituted. Five years later the government considered 
bringing in a law that protected its interests in a much broader way than the 
former that merely extinguished customary land rights. The Prime Minister’s 
Order, therefore, was replaced by the Regulation of Land Tenure (Established 
Villages) Act, 1992 (Act No 22 of 1992).
Looking into what the Act provided for, there is no doubt it was 
puiposely passed to nullify the already existing court's judgments and to pre­
empt others that would have required the government to compensate all those 
whose land was taken away during the villagisation campaign. Pre- 
villagisation customary rights therefore were extinguished 'in order to remove 
the legal basis of the former customaiy rights owners dispossessed by the 
villagisation and who were claiming their lands in courts.'811 That is why it was 
specifically effective only to those areas established as a result of villagisation 
policy.812
The Act went on to prohibit compensation payable only on account of 
the loss of any right or interest in or over land that had been extinguished.813 It 
also prohibited institution of proceedings 'in any court or tribunal in relation to 
the extinction of any right under' the Act.814 In order to terminate all existing 
proceedings relating to such rights the Act provides:
810Op cit.
811SHIVJI, I. G,, (1994), p. 11.
812Act No. 22 of 1992, section 3 (1) and (2).
813Section4.
814Section 5 (1) (a).
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"any suit or other proceeding to which this section 
applies which shall have been instituted in or remitted 
to any court or the tribunal before the commencement 
of this Act shall forthwith be terminated."815
Also the court's jurisdiction in all proceedings under the Act was 
ousted. The same was vested in the special land tribunals and the decision of 
the Minister for Land on appeal, was final and conclusive, not to be reviewed 
by any Court.816 With this trend, is it not hue, to use the words of Simon 
Coldham that:
“ ...the attitude of the government to the courts 
remains, as it has been since independence, 
profoundly distrustful.”817
This extraordinary piece of legislation was criticized from inception as 
a Bill, for depriving the people of their property rights and it was described as 
a “monstrous” decree.818 It is interesting to note that the Bill was tabled shortly 
before a Presidential Commission on Land Policy had submitted its report. The 
Commission was chaired by Professor Issa Shivji who was embarrassed by the 
government’s action to table a Bill which virtually contradicted his report. His 
report had not been read yet and because he did not want to be associated with 
that Bill Shivji issued a press release disassociating the Commission’s 
proposals from the Bill.819 Actually the Bill was strategically tabled to coincide 
with the time when the Commission’s report was presented.
Back in 1963 the government had started using legislative means to 
overrule the decisions of the courts when the High Court awarded a huge sum 
of money to Chief Marealle being damages for loss of his office as Chief. 
Chief Marealle of Moshi instituted a civil suit against the government
815Section 5 (1) (b).
816Sections 6, 7 and 9 (2).
817COLDHAM, S., (1995), p. 242.
818See TENGA, R. W., pp. 95-100.
819COLDHAM, S., (1995), p. 238.
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following the abolition of the offices of chiefs in Tanganyika. As the court 
awarded him the damages sought, the government swiftly enacted The Chiefs 
(Abolition of Office: Consequential Provisions) Act, 1963 with a retrospective 
effect. The Act prohibited the institution of any suit for damages arising from 
the abolition of the office of chiefs. It also stayed such suits that were pending 
in court and execution of Marealle’s court decree was left to the discretion of 
the President.820 After his retirement Julius Nyerere the first President of 
Tanzania and the one who engineered that particular legislation made a 
dramatic U-tum and recalled "the value of chiefdoms."821 Chief Thomas 
Marealle described it as hypocrisy 'to recall the goodness of something he 
deliberately undermined thirty years ago.'822
The government adopted a similar course when it enacted Act No. 22 
of 1992 as a response to court’s decisions that awarded compensation and 
damages for the loss the people suffered during the villagisation campaign.
In the same category is the Basic Rights and Duties Enforcement Act, 
1994.823 We saw in chapter four how the said Act complicated the process of 
seeking redress in court by limiting the enforcement of fundamental rights. As 
a reaction to the decisions of activist judges, the Act made it mandatory that 
only a quorum of three judges could preside over the proceedings for the 
enforcement of fundamental rights. It seems the government was not happy 
when a single judge declared a certain law unconstitutional. In order to 
minimize the possibility of many laws being nullified, it was provided that the 
decision should be based on 'the opinion of the majority of the judges hearing 
the petition.'824 Since there were very few activist judges, the government was 
pretty sure that very few laws would be declared unconstitutional by the court 
when constituted of three judges. In an attempt to take away the court’s power
820See MARTIN, R., p. 57; MWAIKUSA, J. T., (1991), p. 686.
821See The Guardian Newspaper, 26th September 1997.
822Ibid.
823 Op cit.
824Section 10 (2).
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to declare any law unconstitutional, the Constitution was amended to include a 
provision that instead of declaring any law unconstitutional the court should 
give time to the Parliament 'to correct any defect in the impugned law or action 
within a specified period,'825
Since 1995 when the Act came in force, there have not been any 
specific formal petitions to challenge it. However, the High Court has recently 
interpreted its provisions in other cases involving the violation of fundamental 
rights. The interpretation given by Mroso, J., in Ngereza Masai's case and the 
one by Nchalla, J., in Angeline Ojare’s case826 are very encouraging. Both 
judges interpreted the provisions of Act No. 33 of 1994 as not necessarily 
limiting the enforcement of fundamental rights to formal petitions capable of 
being heard by a quorum of three judges only. Formal petitions were just one 
procedure for obtaining redress among many other ways which did not require 
a quorum of three judges. They were satisfied that a single High Court judge 
could competently preside over any matter as an appeal in which an individual 
sought to enforce his fundamental rights. The government’s reaction to this 
liberal interpretation is not known yet for the matter is still sub judice in the 
Court of Appeal. As the Court of Appeal has not given its judgment the current 
High Court interpretation represents the law.
7:2:2:2 Amendment o f existing laws
The government was reluctant to initiate changes in its laws to bring 
them in conformity with the Bill of Rights. The only law amended by the 
government during the period when the Bill of Rights was under suspension 
was the Preventive Detention Act, 1962. It was amended by the Preventive 
Detention (Amendment) Act, 1985827 in order to conform with the changes 
brought about by the Bill of Rights.
825Article 30 (5). See also Act No. 33 of 1994, section 13 (2).
826We discuss both cases in chapter five.
827Op cit.
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The amendments gave a detained person right to challenge in the court 
of law the legality of his detention.828 Further, it required the immediate release 
of a detained person if  he was not informed of the grounds for his detention 
within fifteen days. Previously the Act did not apply to Zanzibar, but the 
amendment extended its application also to Zanzibar.829 The rest of the Act 
which concentrated enormous power over the rights and freedoms of people in 
the hands of the President was left intact. Having considered the issue of 
detaining people without trial the Nyalali Commission decided that the entire 
Act was still unconstitutional and that its repeal was long overdue.830
The rest of the laws were amended as a negative reaction to the court 
decisions. In some instances the Constitution itself could not escape such 
amendment by the government . The event which followed the decision of 
Lugakingira, J., in Rev. Christopher Mtikila v. Attorney-General831 illustrates 
the executive's firm view that a court of law should not decide against the 
government. As we discussed earlier in chapter six, the government was not 
content with the decision of Lugakingira., J., when he allowed private 
candidates not sponsored by any political party to run for election. Instead of 
exhausting the legal machinery by appealing to the Court of Appeal, the 
government rushed to use the legislative means to nullify the court's decision. 
The Article providing for qualifications for presidential candidacy832 which the 
learned judge had interpreted in the light of the right to participate in national 
public affairs833 and as allowing private candidates to stand for election, was 
amended. A legislative clarification of the right to participate in national 
public affairs was made by adding a sub article to Article 39 to the effect that 
'nobody will qualify to be elected President unless he is a member of and
828 Section 5.
829Section 10.
830The Nyalali Commission Report, Vol. 3, p. 3.
831High Court of Tanzania at Dodoma, Civil Case No. 5 of 1993, unreported.
832Article 39.
833Article 21
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sponsored by a political party.'834 The court decision which granted Rev. 
Christopher Mtikila and perhaps many others, the right to stand for elections 
without necessarily being sponsored by any political party, was overridden.835 
This could be an expression of the government’s reluctance to allow people a 
meaningM realization of their fundamental rights and freedoms. On the other 
hand it is a direct disrespect of the decisions of the court and the whole 
transaction is nothing but an attempt to ‘undermine the Constitution by 
constitutional means. ’836
Zimbabwe had similar experience when the Supreme Court in Catholic 
Commission fo r  Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe v. Attorney-General837 set 
aside the death sentences and substituted them with sentences of life 
imprisonment on grounds that inordinate delays to execute the prisoners 
amounted to subjecting them to torture and inhuman treatment contrary to the 
spirit of section 15 (1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.838 Instead of 
approving the decision of the court, within weeks the government responded 
by enacting the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act, 1993.839 The 
Amendment Act 'retrospectively exempted the death penalty from the scope of 
section 15 (l).'840
When Mwalusanya, J,, in Daudi Pete’s case declared unconstitutional 
section 148 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1985 for taking away the judicial 
discretion to grant bail to accused persons charged with certain offences, the 
first reaction from the government was to lodge an appeal with the Court of 
Appeal. Three months before the decision of the Court of Appeal was given, 
the Minister for Home Affairs was critical of the High Court’s decisions which
834Article 39 (2). See also Act No. 34 of 1994, section 4.
835In our interview with Lugakingira, J. A., he expressed die view that the way the government 
reacted to his judgment in Mtikila's case 'amounted to striking it out'.
836 A phrase used in HATCHARD, J., (1995 C), pp. 21-35.
837 (1993)4 SA 239. It is also reported in (1993)2 L.R.C. 279.
838The prisoners had spent between four to six years on death row.
839Act No. 13 of 1993.
840HATCHARD, J., (1995 C), p. 23.
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nullified some of the laws which, according to him were good and useful. He 
was addressing the Members of Parliament at a seminar when he described the 
court’s action as “frustrating government’s efforts” to fight against crimes.841
When the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of Mwalusanya, J., but 
on different grounds and ordered that the offending provision be struck out of 
statute books, the government simply shifted the contents of the nullified 
sub-sub-section to another sub-sub-section of the same provision. The offence 
of armed robbery was then joined to the list of more serious offences of 
murder and treason which were not bailable and the paragraphs of section 148 
(5) were renumbered.842 In actual fact there was no compliance with the order 
of the Court of Appeal but simply the government’s manipulation of its 
legislative influence to pre-empt the decision of the court.
What followed thereafter was very interesting. The court’s response to 
the government’s reaction was not directly confrontational but an expression 
of dissatisfaction and protest. After the Court of Appeal in Daudi P ete’s case 
had set the position of law as regarded matters of bail for the offence of armed 
robbery, the courts in general seem to have ignored the government’s 
subsequent attempt to bring back the nullified provision. Although the Act No. 
27 of 1991 brought back the denial of bail for any one charged with the 
offence of armed robbery, in practice courts accepted the submissions often 
made by advocates to the effect that the decision of the Court of Appeal in 
Daudi Pete's case was binding on them. It means that courts relied on the 
directive of the Court of Appeal that the they had discretion to grant bail to 
persons accused of armed robbery in accordance with the law as it existed 
before.
The High Court judges expressed their protest at the government’s 
reaction by declaring unconstitutional also the sub-subsection in which the
841See Daily News, 31st January 1991. See also MWAIKUSA, J. T., (1991), pp. 696-697.
842The Criminal Procedure Act, 1985, section 148 (5) (a) (as amended by Act No. 27 of 1991).
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government put the contents of the sub-subsection whose deletion was ordered 
by the Court of Appeal. Only offences of murder and treason remained 
unbailable for a long time without court's intervention.843 It was Nchalla, J., in 
Angeline Ojare’s case who declared unconstitutional the whole of paragraph 
(a) of section 148 (5) and made the offences of murder, treason and armed 
robbery bailable, Act No. 27 of 1991 notwithstanding. Nevertheless, in some 
cases the High Court judges have hesitated to give progressive interpretation 
of such laws. A seemingly firm stand taken by some judicial officers when 
reacting to the government's reponse, may provoke a confrontation between 
the executive and the judiciaiy. It will all depend on the attitude of the 
executive to court decisions.
7:3 Conclusions
It has been demonstrated in this chapter that the way in which the 
government has been responding to the court decisions raises one fundamental 
question, whether there can be a meaningful realization of basic rights in 
Tanzania. The executive seems to distrust the judiciary especially when 
matters of state interest are subject of judicial determination. This distrust by 
the government was manifested in its reaction to various court decisions. The 
government on a number of occasions decided to act contrary to the decisions 
of the court. In effect this practice undermines the integrity of the judiciary and 
the rule of law. Arguably this could be another indirect expression of the 
government’s reluctance to allow a meaningful realization of the Bill of 
Rights. That is why Mwaikusa argues that although the government conceded 
later to the demands for the Bill of Rights, ‘it would be sheer romanticism to
843See the decision by Bubeshi, J., in Donati Jacob Mrema and Another v. Attorney-General, High 
Court of Tanzania at Dar Es Salaam, Criminal Appeal No. 28 of 1992, unreported. See also the 
decision by Mroso, J., in Ngereza Masai's case.
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think that the demand was conceded to solely out of a genuine commitment of 
the regime to respond positively to the interests of the people.’844
Although the government has occasionally been heard advocating 
transparency, accountability and the rule of law, in practice this seems to be 
mere lip service. It has been amply demonstrated that the government has 
several times shown little or no respect for the courts. It is our submission that 
if the government can disrespect the court orders then it clearly excludes itself 
from being committed to uphold justice, and as a result the judiciary becomes 
ineffective in protecting basic rights.
We have also tried to show how the legislature was used by the 
government to frustrate the courts' efforts to protect individual fundamental 
rights. The legislature has been used to enact laws that cannot be compatible 
with democracy and the newly enshrined Bill of Rights.845 More alarming is 
the fact that these offending laws were enacted after the Bill of Rights had 
come into force. Courts should continue developing more progressive ideas in 
the country's human rights jurisprudence irrespective of the government's 
negative response. There are signs of optimism in that more progressive court 
decisions continue to clear the way for a meaningful realisation of individual 
fundamental rights.
844MWAIKUSA, J. T., (1991), p. 690.
845 For example the Regulation of Land Tenure (Established Villages) Act, 1992.
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PART FOIJR: CONCLIJSTONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
This study set out to examine the role played by the judiciary in 
protecting human rights in Tanzania. It also endeavoured to appraise the 
attitude of the executive as well as legislative attempts to put the idea of 
human rights into practice. This chapter is about our interpretations and 
understanding of the role played by the judiciary in protecting human rights in 
Tanzania, in the light of what we have expounded. After a careful exposition 
of the human rights jurisprudence in Tanzania, we now attempt to make some 
concluding remarks about the approach/attitude of both the judiciaiy and the 
government. We shall examine the possible causes for such attitude and their 
effects before suggesting various measures for reform.
8:1 Observations and conclusions
In this work we have traced and examined the performance of the 
judiciary from colonial period to date. An attempt has been made to show how 
difficult it was for colonial governments to observe human rights, as the idea 
was in opposition to colonial intentions. In order to achieve what they set out 
to do the colonial governments in Tanganyika allowed the executive to 
perform judicial functions.846 Indeed the administration of justice was 
characterised by a racial divide and two parallel court systems were 
established. The indigenous people, known as “natives” had their own court 
system staffed by administrators who had no legal training. Non-Africans were
846See the discussion in chapter one.
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subject to a different court system staffed by professionally trained judicial 
officers. In that kind of situation justice to the indigenous people could only be 
done when the decision of the court would not conflict with the interests of the 
colonial master. We recall from chapter two how the idea of human rights, as a 
predominant constituent of good government, could not be extended to the 
colonies.
Although the colonial government was attacked by the nationalist 
leaders for not respecting human rights, ironically the independence 
government exhibited no significant difference. They opposed the 
enshrinement of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution and the judicial review 
of administrative action was the only recourse available in Tanzania.
We have demonstrated in chapters two and three how the independence 
government became increasingly autocratic by rejecting the popular demands 
for a Bill of Rights. Perhaps Dr. Nyerere genuinely believed that an 
enforceable Bill of Rights in the post-independence Constitution would 
immobilise government action and hamper economic development.847 
However, the intended economic development could not be achieved and the 
failure to observe human rights produced undesirable consequences as most 
government policies turned out to be disastrous. The villagization programme 
was one such objectionable policy. It is interesting to note that most of such 
villages collapsed with time and institutions that were nationalised have been 
resold to private individuals under the new policy of privatisation.
What happened in Tanzania and perhaps elsewhere in the world is 
enough to support the argument that denial of human rights is a more 
expensive engagement than observing them. A considerable amount of 
resources were injected into the mobilisation of security forces and other 
coercive instruments of the state to carry out various exercises which involved 
the negation of human rights. The judiciary was deliberately marginalised and
847See KIBWANA, K., p. 43.
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the executive was made extraordinarily strong. Also most of the judicial 
officers were positivists and conservative. These factors prevented effective 
judicial control.
Almost thirty years after independence the Bill of Rights was eventually 
made part of the Constitution. However, as detailed in chapter four, this was 
preceded by some resistance on the part of the government. The strong 
executive was not ready to let its powers be encroached on by the Bill of 
Rights. This is the interpretation we give to the contents of the Bill of Rights 
and the limitations thereof.
We saw in chapters five and six a dramatic change in terms of attitude 
by some members of the judiciary after the Bill of Rights came in force. 
Executive actions and a number of statutes were nullified by the court for 
conflicting with the fundamental rights that were guaranteed under the 
Constitution. The High Court was leading in that activism while the Court of 
Appeal adopted a more cautious approach especially in those cases where the 
government was a party or had a direct interest.
The reaction to the court decisions by the government has been largely 
negative. The response from the government, as expounded in chapter seven, 
to a number of the court decisions prompted the argument that the government 
enshrined the Bill of Rights in the Constitution simply for public relations 
reasons. On this score Kivutha Kibwana correctly concludes that ‘African 
governments, more often than not pay lip service to human rights because aid 
donors make it a conditionality explicitly or implicitly for development aid.’848 
It is therefore not recognised by the government that adherence to human 
rights is a condition without which no significant economic developments can 
be achieved by the country. Thus most of African governments maintain 'a
848IbicL, p. 44.
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position where they can leisurely pick and choose which human rights-and the 
measure-they will allow citizens.’849
Tanzania is no exception. It has carefully restricted through various 
means the realization of individual fundamental rights. To a considerable 
extent the government has maintained this policy even after the Bill of Rights 
became enforceable.
8:1:1 The sufficiency of the Constitution in safeguarding human rights
Essentially the idea of human rights as perceived today carries a 
message that outlines the rights of citizens and duties of the state. Thus 
fundamental rights secured to the individuals are limitations on state power. 
Sing argues that fundamental rights in the Constitution 'are not meant to 
protect persons against the conduct of private persons' since 'private action is 
sufficiently protected by the ordinary law of the land.'850 Its purpose is to 
protect the citizens' fundamental rights and freedoms against encroachments 
by the government. In this task the Constitution plays a very important role 
for it is the one which establishes the principles on which a state is governed. 
If a Constitution of a state provides for fundamental rights, then that particular 
state commits itself to respect fundamental rights. This commitment finds 
expression in the government’s general behaviour when running its day-to-day 
activities. It is therefore not enough to enshrine individual fundamental rights 
in the Constitution without creating a good environment for their realisation. 
The Constitution by itself is not a sufficient means in safeguarding human 
rights since the state can still manipulate it to undermine the rights which the 
same Constitution attempts to guarantee. The Tanzanian Constitution and the 
limitations in the provisions of the Bill of Rights may provide a clear example. 
It would all depend on the way the Constitution has been framed.
849Ibid.,p. 45.
850SING,D. K., pp. 17-18.
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The Tanzanian Constitution therefore, does not give sufficient 
assurance to the citizens that legislature and government would be bound to 
observe fundamental rights written into the Constitution. At best they look like 
mere declarations of intent which could be departed from by any future 
legislature. This is illustrated by the government’s repeated attempts to amend 
the Constitution in response to various court decisions.
It was a very significant step in the history of human rights in Tanzania, 
when for the first time the Bill of Rights was made part of the Constitution 
after being resisted for about three decades since independence. However, it is 
one thing to have a constitutional recognition of these rights and it is another 
thing to be able to realise them. It seems the government satisfied only one 
aspect of popular demands for a Bill of Rights. Although the Bill of Rights 
was enshrined in the Constitution, the government used the same Constitution 
to frustrate their meaningful realisation. This was achieved through use of 
limitation clauses, particularly the claw back clauses and derogation clauses.851 
By and large individual fundamental rights as contained in the Tanzanian 
Constitution could be exercised only to the extent prescribed by law. Here is 
the problem. Arguably, this could mean that enjoyment of fundamental rights 
can be restricted by any law no matter how disagreeable such limitations might 
be.
The unusual thing with the Tanzanian Constitution is that it saves all 
laws otherwise void for being inconsistent with the Constitution. This unusual 
attempt contradicts a long established principle that any law inconsistent with 
any provision of the Constitution should be void and of no effect to the extent 
of such inconsistency. Clearly, this could be another way of rendering the Bill 
of Rights ineffective.
However, in order to reduce the harshness of the claw-back clauses and 
the derogation clauses, we saw the Court of Appeal in Daudi Pete’s case and in
85Article 30.
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Kukutia Ole Pumbun’s case laying down three conditions which the 
“prescribed law” must fulfil first in order to be protected by the derogation 
clause.852 The government was definitely not impressed by these restrictions 
imposed by the Court of Appeal's interpretation.
Also the Constitution prohibits all acts of torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment,853 and the police are enjoined by law to treat the suspects 
with humanity and to refrain from cruel or degrading treatment.854 However, 
the police and other state agencies, like the Central Intelligence Unit, still use 
such practices in order to secure confessions from suspects during 
interrogation resulting in serious consequences and even deaths.855 In all these 
events the police escaped prosecution for none of the tortured persons was 
bold enough to take legal action against the officers responsible. Past record 
has shown that the courts are unsympathetic to police officers who are brought 
to justice after inflicting torture on suspects. The case of R. v. Godfrey James 
Ihuya and Three Others856 is illustrative. The accused persons in this case were 
jointly charged with murder. They had tortured, during interrogation, the 
persons suspected of murdering the witch-doctors in Mwanza and Shinyanga 
regions. The torture culminated into the deaths of two suspects.
It was established in court that the male suspects had their testicles tied 
and pulled, strip naked and beaten up, pepper put into their prepuce, injected 
with methedrine by a medical doctor857 and urged to confess that they had 
committed murders at different places. This was done by the Senior Police and 
State Security Officials. Actually all suspects had been either previously 
discharged or acquitted for lack of evidence. The court found the accused
852See the discussion in chapters five and six.
853Article 13 (6) (e).
854 See die Criminal Procedure Act, 1985, section 55.
855See our discussion in chapter five, footnote 578.
856High Court of Tanzania at Mwanza, Criminal Case No. 8 of 1980, unreported
857A Medical Doctor was specifically brought from Bugando Hospital by die torturers to administer 
that particular substance to the suspects to force them speak and confess.
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persons guilty of manslaughter and sentenced each of them to seven years 
imprisonment.
Little education on the part of police detectives and lack of facilities for 
investigation has immensely contributed to the increase in practices of torture 
of suspects at the police stations. Also to a certain extent the Law of Evidence 
Act, 1967 has encouraged these practices by allowing the production in court 
of illegally obtained cautioned statement of the accused person as evidence 
against him. O f course, the court can reject such statement when it is 
established that it was not voluntarily made. However, such illegally obtained 
evidence (like the accused person's cautioned statement made after being 
tortured) cannot be rejected by the court where it leads to the discovery of the 
stolen property. Furthermore, the Criminal Procedure Act, 1985 allows the 
court to admit any illegally obtained evidence where it believes and is satisfied 
on a balance of probability that admission of such evidence would be of 
specific and substantial interest to the public, without unduly prejudicing the 
rights and freedom of any person.858
Arguably this provision of the law potentially condones torture, by 
making it possible admission of the illegally obtained evidence, simply 
because it is on public interest. Thus, the police and other state functionaries 
are tempted and indirectly encouraged to inflict torture upon the suspects in 
order to obtain pleas from them.
The above discussion illustrates the insufficiency of the Constitution in 
safeguarding human rights if the government and its functionaries are not 
willing to respect these constitutional rights. Arguably the government's 
reaction to various court decisions expresses a serious lack of commitment to 
promote individual fundamental rights. It is therefore not enough to have a Bill 
of Rights laid in the Constitution if realisation of such rights is technically 
frustrated and effectively defeated in various ways.
858The Criminal Procedure Act, 1985, section 169 (1) Proviso.
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Moreover, if people themselves are not aware of what their rights are 
and are not able to enforce them, it cannot serve any meaningful purpose to 
have a Bill of Rights in the Constitution. In Tanzania very few people are 
aware of the possibility of suing the government or its organs for any reason 
especially when it exceeds the permitted limits of its power.859 Many people 
are ignorant and not well informed about their substantive rights. Women, for 
example, very rarely include claims for maintenance, division of property or 
custody of children in their petitions for divorce, unless legally represented.860 
In a country like Tanzania where the executive has for so long accumulated 
too much power it may not be easy to install confidence among the citizenry. 
The thirty years that the people spent without a Bill of Rights in the 
Constitution did a great damage to people’s way of reacting to abuses by the 
state. This also explains the paucity of human rights cases in many High Court 
centres.
It was discovered during our field study that Mtwara High Court centre 
had not heard a single human rights case largely because of people’s 
ignorance. In describing the magnitude of people’s ignorance in the area, the 
then only resident advocate in the township John Kumwembe, regrettably cited 
the common practice whereby baskets of coconuts were taken to the policemen 
upon releasing persons they detained for days without any good cause. Instead 
of opening suits for malicious prosecution or wrongful confinement861 against 
the police responsible, the people assemble to thank the otherwise culpable 
police for such release. Legal literacy is a necessary foundation for the future 
of human rights in Tanzania. Although higher legal fees involved in litigation 
has also contributed to the scarcity of human rights cases in some areas, for 
Mtwara region it was attributed mainly to ignorance. The account given by
859KAPINGA, W. B„ (1990), p. 57
860WANITZEK, U., p. 263.
861por example under the Criminal Procedure Act, 1985, section 51 (2). See also LUGAKINGIRA, 
K. S. K., (1986), p. 4.
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Kumwembe (advocate) that despite his extraordinary low charges he was 
under-employed for people did not use his services, is illustrative. It is 
therefore an indisputable fact that the overwhelming majority of Tanzanians 
can hardly afford the services of an advocate at even very moderate fees.
Indeed, as Mwaikusa observed, the decision by the government to leave 
the offending laws unrepealed was not a healthy one, for the majority of the 
affected people might not be aware of their rights to seek redress from the 
court.862
8:1:2 The effectiveness of the judiciary in the protection of human rights
We saw significant efforts made by a few judges, particularly in the 
High Court, in giving a generous interpretation to the provisions which relate 
to human rights. This is the only way the judiciary can meaningfully protect 
human rights. Unfortunately most of Tanzanian judges have been very slow to 
shift from the traditional conservatism in which they were trained. This also 
explains the paucity of court decisions which promote human rights.
Judges’ conservatism and pro-state attitudes in post-independence 
Tanzania has been the subject of many criticisms by scholars who viewed it as 
“uninspiring”.863 Shivji made a general observation that judges in Tanzania 
'even the best of them argued, reasoned and judged in terms of what the rules 
meant (interpretation and construing) rather than giving law the kind of 
integrity it deserved.’864 Lawyers in Tanzania doubted from the beginning, 
whether the judiciary would not be handcuffed by the limitation clauses in the 
Constitution. To them, the Tanzanian judges were not bold enough to look at 
the general spirit behind fundamental freedoms and strike down any law which 
negated that spirit. The main reason for such doubts was their past experience 
with the court as one scholar observes:
862See MWAIKUSA, J. T., (1990), p. 94.
863MWAKYEMBE, H. G., (1986 A), p. 26.
864SHIVJI, I. G., (1987), p. 117.
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“The evidence from the past suggests that the 
Tanzanian judiciary has been nurtured heavily in the 
positivist tradition and would hang on an even thin 
technical string to ensure that no law passed by the 
legislature is declared invalid.”865
The discussion in this study has shown that the lawyers’ worries were 
very well founded. The Tanzanian judiciary led by the Court of Appeal has 
largely maintained its conservative and pro-state attitude866 except in few High 
Court cases. For example Mwalusanya, J., and Lugakingira, J (as he then 
was), maintained consistency in their activism. Others like Samatta, J. K (as he 
then was), Mapigano, J., Mroso, J., Mchome, J., and Munuo, J., have on some 
occasions exhibited liberalism in interpreting various provisions. However, the 
majority of judges of the High Court and those of the Court of Appeal, have 
been unnecessarily cautious in responding to human rights issues boldly, in 
favour of the underprivileged and oppressed. This attitude prompted one critic 
to draw a conclusion that Those few High Court judges who take an activist 
role seem to have taken the bull by the horns.’867
At one time Mwalusanya, J ’s activism could be best understood as a 
human rights crusade. Other judges regarded it as Mwalusanya, J ’s personal 
interest. Actually during our field study some judges expressed resentment 
about Mwalusanya, J ’s activism. This attitude is worrying, and perhaps one 
might be tempted to ask for how long would Mwalusanya, J ’s “human rights 
crusade”868 survive. In January 1997, Mwalusanya, J., was retired on health 
grounds after being bed-ridden for two years recovering from a stroke. If  at all 
it was Mwalusanya, J ’s personal human rights crusade then his retirement 
would mark the end of judicial activism in Tanzania. We hope that the
865Ibid.,p. 137
866PETERj c  m>3 (1992), p. 139.
867Ibid.
868SHIVJI, I. G, (1991 A), p. 122.
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emergence of Nchalla, J.,869 is not only a tribute to Mwalusanya, J’s dedication 
but also good news to the people and all human rights activists. Others like, 
Mapigano and Mrosso are approaching the retiring age. Lugakingira's recent 
appointment as Justice of Appeal has been received with mixed feelings by 
human rights activists. Some saw it as a tribute to human rights jurisprudence 
in the country but others regard it as the government's deliberate move to 
frustrate effective judicial liberalism for two main reasons. First he would be 
sandwiched by the conservative judges since the decision of the Court of 
Appeal is that of the majority. Secondly his appointment came when he was 
preparing himself to retire
The words of Kisanga, J. A.., that the Court of Appeal is ultimately 
responsible for keeping the country’s laws in a state of readiness to cope with 
the changes which are constantly taking place in the society,870 are 
encouraging. However, the practice and statements of the Court of Appeal are 
diametrically opposed to these views. We saw, for example, in the case of 
Mbushuu Dominic Mnyaroje the Court of Appeal rejecting the importation of 
decisions from other jurisdictions on the issue of the death penalty.
The Court of Appeal has occasionally frustrated the sporadic efforts of 
the High Court to give purposive interpretation to provisions of the law that 
relate to fundamental rights and freedoms in Tanzania. A meaningful 
realization of human lights in Tanzania, like elsewhere, will depend on the 
attitude of the judiciary towards the infringements and violations of peoples 
rights by the state, in any way. As Mwaikusa remarked, cif  the courts are timid 
and always humble themselves before executive authorities, then there is the 
danger of unlawful exercise of public power continuing without straint.’871
Sometimes the judiciary considered itself ineffective when its efforts to 
protect individual fundamental rights were frustrated by the government’s
869See D. P. P. v. Angeline Ojare, op cit.
870See KISANGA, R. H., p. 24.
871MWAIKUSA, J. T., (1990), p. 99.
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reaction. Unless the government stops its attempts to undermine the court 
decisions the judiciary cannot effectively protect the rights that are guaranteed 
under the Constitution. While the Tanzanian judiciary is essentially positivist 
and conservative there is yet another problem caused by the government’s 
retaliation to the rare activist court decisions which aim at protecting the 
individual fundamental rights. In fact the judiciary has not received proper co­
operation from the government in this crusade.
8:1:2:1 Marginalisation o f the judiciary.
Since independence the judiciary in Tanzania has been considered 
unimportant and insignificant in the development of the country. As a result 
judicial functions could be discharged also by various tribunals and many 
other quasi-judicial bodies as well as by the courts. Since it was easier for the 
powerful executive to influence/interfere with the decisions of the tribunals 
than the court decisions, much emphasis was put 011 the tribunals. That was 
one of the reasons for not having a strong judiciary after independence. It 
reached a stage where the ruling party leaders all over the country assumed 
judicial functions by conducting proceedings in their offices and presiding 
over a number of cases between individual citizens, and passing decisions to 
that effect. The judiciaiy was marginalised in terms of everything including 
funding, and emoluments. This also contributed to a wide spread of corruption 
in the judiciary, the fact which was admitted by the Presidential Commission 
011 the Causes of Corruption in Tanzania,872 otherwise known as the Warioba 
Commission. Today the situation has not changed except for judges’ salaries 
which have recently been adjusted. However, the adjustment of judge’s salary 
made him the lowest paid when compared to the adjustment made to the salary 
of the Cabinet Ministers, Regional Commissioners and the Members of
872See the Warioba Commission's Report, pp. 199-237.
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Parliament. Previously the judge’s salary, although small, was higher than that 
of the said senior government leaders as illustrated by the Table below.
A comparison of salaries between judges and selected public 
officers 1990-1997 (in Tanzanian Shillings)
Title 1990/1 1991/2 1992/3 1993/4 1994/5 1995/6 1996/7
Minister 21,065 23,670 27,860 27,860 44,000 121,970 494,000
Regional
Commissi
oner
20,585 23,670 27,220 27,220 43,625 121,405 470,000
Deputy
Minister 17,810 n.a 23,595 23,595 42,625 88,995 462,000
Member of 
Parliament 14,500 16,740 19,250 19,250 40,638 77,640 450,300
High
Court
Judge
21,730 24,900 28,740 28,740 43,395 98,790 412,000
Sonrc.e:Report o f A Special Advisory Committee to the Chief Justice on How 
to Combat Corruption in the Judiciaiy, 1996. Also reproduced in 
LUGAKINGIRA, K., (1996).
Politicians are highly paid when compared to the judicial officers. At 
the Magistracy level the situation is appalling. The salary of a Ward Secretary 
is veiy far higher than that of a Primary Court Magistrate, a District 
Magistrate, a Resident Magistrate and even a District Registrar in charge of a 
High Court Zone.873 The government has increasingly paid little attention to 
judicial problems caused by underfunding. However, the High Court was 
relatively looked after compared with subordinate courts which barely receive 
the government’s attention. The executive see law as text not as institution and 
the need for a good environment for its enforcers is not considered important. 
To them the question of access to justice is not a priority.
Our field study revealed that advocates and other private individuals, 
possibly those having interest in the outcome of various cases pending in
873LUGAKINGIRA, K. S. K., (1996), p. 17
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court, are common financiers of day to day court’s activities. They provided a 
wide range of things including stationery, fuel and sometimes transport for 
judicial officers when visiting the scenes of the crimes or disputed areas in 
land cases.874 It reached a stage where the United States Agency for 
Intemationational Development (USAID) offices in Dar Es Salaam donated to 
the Dar Es Salaam Resident Magistrate Court some stationery from its own 
stock. This fact could be established by the emblem of the United States of 
America and huge letters of the name of that Organisation conspicuously 
stamped on every sheet. Court's proceedings and judgments were written on 
those papers. It was not clear whether the United States of America had taken 
up the responsibility of running the Tanzanian judiciary or it was just a 
generous donation to keep the business of the court going.
Such a marginalised judiciary cannot meaningfully and effectively 
protect human rights. For example, during the constitutional debates at 
Karimjee Hall in June 1998, the Chief Justice publicly admitted that judges fail 
to decide against the government because they fear risking further slashing of 
the judiciary's budget in retaliation by the government.875 If the availability of 
the basic tools of work like papers on which to write proceedings and 
judgments, file covers, or even court rooms constitute a serious problem, 
justice is threatened for justice delayed is justice denied. All this, coupled with 
their miserable salaries have significantly contributed to the rapid growth of 
corruption in the judiciary especially in the Magistrates’ courts thereby 
threatening the role of the judiciary in protecting human rights.
To a considerable degree corruption among judicial officers puts the 
independence of the judiciary at stake. There is no doubt that an independent 
and impartial judiciary is essential for the effective protection of human rights. 
However, this cannot be achieved by merely including safeguards in a
874For more effects of underfunding the judiciary see LUGAKINGIRA, K. S. K., (1996), p. 13.
875See Mcijira Newspaper, 8th June 1998.
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Constitution which superficially offer the judicial officers security of tenure. 
There must be a deliberate move by the government to provide good 
environment for the independence of the judiciary in its wide perspective. Also 
there must be a desire on the part of the executive to respect the independence 
of the judiciary and a manifestation of that desire in appropriate form.
8:1:2:2 Ignorance.
The possibility of ignorance of matters of human rights among judicial 
officers cannot be ruled out. The nine months training for Primary Court 
Magistrates, most of them rising from court clerks, is too short a period to 
produce a person worthy of such an office in terms of knowledge and other 
professional skills. Most Primary Courts’ Magistrates and District Magistrates 
know nothing about human rights since their training did not specifically cover 
these issues. Resident Magistrates were relatively better trained especially 
those who had had a chance to study Constitutional Law during their 
undergraduate studies. However, most of them are ignorant of the basic 
elements o f international human rights. There has not been any system to 
ensure the availability of law books or journals nor have there been seminars 
or workshops to update them. It is interesting to note that even the binding 
decisions of the High Court and the Court of Appeal are not known to 
magistrates for there haven’t been any published law reports in the country 
since 1983. Because of a lack of paper only a limited number of duplicated 
copies of the judgments of the High Court and Court of Appeal could be found 
at the High Court centres’ libraries during our field study. For a legal system 
which is based on precedent, it is imperative that the decisions of superior 
courts reach the subordinate courts on whom they are binding.
The High Court judges, the judicial officers charged with responsibility 
for enforcement of Bill of Rights, seem to know little about human rights. A 
considerable number of them have never attended any course, or seminar on
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human rights since they were appointed judges. As most o f them were early 
graduates of law after independence, their training never included subjects like 
human rights, and Jurisprudence as a subject was optional. The idea of 
international human rights developed significantly when most Tanzanian 
judges had left University or were just about to complete their studies. Further, 
Tanzania acceded to various human rights instruments when most of 
Tanzanian judges were already at work. In addition, they had no chance to 
enforce/promote human rights as the government resisted their being enshrined 
in the Constitution until 1985.
All this underlines the importance of a special training for Tanzanian 
judges before they are called upon to adjudicate on matters of human rights. 
The judiciary did not use that period of three years during which the Bill of 
Rights was suspended, to prepare its officers to cope with the new situation. 
Seminars, or workshops for judicial officers would have increased their 
awareness or changed their attitudes and their approach to human rights issues.
As a result when the Bill of Rights became justiciable judges could not 
distinguish, in their interpretation, between the ordinary laws of the land and 
the provisions which relate to human rights. That is why some judges were shy 
to take a stand on issues of human rights and declare the offensive laws void.
Even after the Bill of Rights became enforceable the judiciaiy never 
took such initiative to update its officers on the development of the idea of 
human rights. Our field study has revealed that a large number of judges know 
very little about various key international human rights instruments. They have 
never read them, not to mention the possibility of not having heard of them 
either. There is no systematic arrangement to keep them informed of human 
rights developments in other jurisdictions. The Law Reports of 
Commonwealth has tried to communicate, among other things, the 
development of human rights jurisprudence in various Commonwealth 
countries. However, the Tanzanian judiciary has not benefited much from this
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publication because of financial hardship. Due to under-funding it has been 
hard for the Tanzanian judiciary to press an order for being supplied with such 
useful law reports. The only updated information available to the Tanzanian 
judiciary is the one supplied by the Commonwealth Judicial Journal that does 
not require monetary subscription.
This also may explain the background for the positivist and 
conservative attitude of Tanzanian judiciary. The criticism mounted by judges 
of the Court of Appeal in the case of Mbushuu Dominic Mnyaroje and Another 
v. i?876 against Mwalusanya, J ’s style, of dividing his judgment in sub­
headings, illustrates the extent Tanzanian judges were out of touch with the 
rest of the world. In their own words:
“ ...we commend the learned trial judge for his 
unexcelled industry in his exploration of the human 
rights literature. However, we would also like to point 
out that the style he has used in writing the judgment, 
dividing into parts and sections, with headings and 
sub-headings, is unusual. That style is more suited for 
a thesis than for a judgment”
Perhaps, if the learned judges had been exposed to reading the Law 
Reports of Commonwealth877 and many other judgments of various 
jurisdictions,878 they would have realised that Mwalusanya, J., was not the 
only one nor was he the first judge to plan his judgment in sections and sub­
headings. In fact the style of dividing a judgment in sub-headings helps the 
reader to appreciate the issues that the judgment tries to solve. Arguably this 
could be one of the indicators of a judge’s initiative and creativity as opposed
8760p cit.
877See for example the judgment of CHASKALSON, P., in State v. Makwanyane and Another 
(1995)1 L.R.C. 296. He divided his judgment, into sub-headings (legislative history, contentions 
of parties, effects of disparity in die laws governing capital punishment etc).
878For example judgments of die Supreme Court of die United States of America.
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to conservatism which simply sticks to old traditions. In character therefore, 
the Tanzanian Court of Appeal is essentially a conservative body.
The few Tanzanian judges who were able to cite in their judgments 
decisions from other jurisdictions, obtained them through personal initiative 
and contacts. When interviewed by the author, Mwalusanya, J., made it clear 
that his friends within and outside Tanzania kept him informed of various 
developments in human rights by sending to him relevant books and 
interesting court decisions from different jurisdictions. He regularly attended 
international conferences, seminars and workshops on human rights, an 
opportunity many other judges did not have as invitations were addressed to 
him in person. Having been exposed to such opportunities Mwalusanya, J., 
was able to translate his knowledge into comprehensive high quality 
judgments reminiscent of research papers.
The judiciary has now acknowledged its ignorance of the whole concept 
of human rights. A two weeks course on constitutionalism attended by twelve 
senior judges of the High Court and the Court of Appeal in Ireland,879 is an 
acknowledgement of the fact that judges were insufficiently equipped with the 
necessary tools to be able to protect human rights. Their course programme 
covered constitutional governments in Africa, international law and human 
rights, doctrine of separation of powers, the role o f the judges, judicial review 
of legislation and conflict of law. On completing the course, many looked 
fascinated and expressed optimism and a change of attitude towards matters of 
human rights. The plan was that similar courses would be conducted in the 
country for the benefit of those judges who did not go Ireland. However, to 
date such courses have not yet been organised.880
879The course was conducted at the School of Law, University of Dublin, Trinity College from I0t!l- 
21st March 1997. It was attended by nine High Court judges and three Court of Appeal judges.
880It is interesting to note that some of the tutors in that seminar came from Tanzania.
274
8:1:3 Absence of effective civil organisations.
The Tanzanian government has since independence used the colonial 
Societies Ordinance881 to restrict the formation of civil organisations in the 
country. Under the Societies Ordinance all civil organisations like other 
societies have to be registered first in order to run their activities. The 
government through the Minister for Home Affairs and the Registrar of 
Societies retains the discretion to reject any application for registration and 
even to cancel such registered organisation. Further, there are no registries 
outside Dar Es Salaam. The procedure to get the organisation registered and 
the bureaucracy involved discourages people from forming civil organisations. 
Those few which secure registration after such endurance, they are closely 
monitored in such a way that mere suspicion of a political inclination on the 
part of any particular organisation may lead to it being de-registered. This is 
exactly what happened to the women's society (BAWATA). Since its birth on 
6th May 1995 BAWATA was suspected by the government of supporting the 
opposition and getting involved in political issues. By 17th September 1997 its 
activities were suspended and conditions imposed that its constitution be 
amended. This was followed by threats from the government and notice of 
cancellation of that organisation. However, the leaders went to court and 
obtained an injunction restraining the government from de-registering or 
interfering with the activities of BAWATA pending hearing and final 
determination of the constitutional petition.882 A petition for enforcement of 
basic rights in which BAWATA question the constitutionality of the Societies 
Ordinance and the power exercisable thereunder is yet to be heard for it 
requires a quorum of three judges.
881 Cap. 337.
882See Baraza la Wanawake Tanzania (BAWATA) and Five Others v. Registrar o f  Societies and Two 
Others, High Court of Tanzania at Dar Es Salaam, Miscellaneous Civil Cause No. 27 of 1997, 
unreported.
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Organisational initiatives including students organisations883 were 
suppressed unless backed by the ruling party.884 The government is until now 
suspicious of such societies. That could be one of the main reasons why there 
have not been effective civil organisations (non-governmental organisations) 
to assist in exerting pressure or influence upon the government whenever 
matters of human rights are at stake.
In order to avoid government control and possibly be free from 
arbitrary de-registration, some organisations have decided against registration 
under the Societies Ordinance. Instead, the Companies Ordinance, 1932885 
which is significantly free from state intervention has provided an alternative. 
The Legal and Human Rights Centre Limited presently under the 
Chairmanship of Lugakingira, J., is illustrative. It operates under the auspices 
of the Tanzania Legal Education Trust (TANLET) established by a group of 
legal aid activists of the Faculty of Law University of Dar Es Salaam.886 The 
law lecturers realised that the Legal Aid Committee of the Faculty of Law 
could not be used to champion civil rights against the state without facing 
undue pressure from the authorities.887 Thus TANLET, an independent private 
organisation, was established under the Trustees Incorporation Ordinance as a 
better means of fighting the abuse of human rights by the state.
TANLET offered itself as the legal organisation under whose auspices 
the activists for multi-party democracy hosted their rallies and mobilised the 
masses before government conceded to their demands. In response the
883For a detailed discussion about suppression of student’s organisations by the government see 
PETER, C. M., and MVUNGI, S., pp. 157-159
884See SHIVJI, I. G., (1981), p. 22.
885 Cap. 212.
886In our interview with Dr. Mvimgi Seng'ondo one of the Centre's Directors we were told that apart 
from die threats posed by de-registration it would have taken diem years to register TANLET and 
LHRC under die Societies Ordinance.
887It is said that die Legal Aid Committee was forced by the government through die University 
audiority to wididraw legal representation it had granted to Shariff Hamad die government 
dissident who was alleged to have been found in possession of government secret documents and 
against whom criminal charges were preferred. Shariff Hamad is the former Chief Minister of 
Zanzibar.
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government banned TANLET and for more than two years the organisation 
existed under the protection of the court injunction given in The Board o f  
Trustees TANLET v. Attorney-General888 The case was withdrawn following 
the success of the democratic movement which made Tanzania a multi-party 
state.
The centre's main objective is to 'create legal and human rights 
awareness among the general public and in particular the underprivileged 
sections of society through legal civil education and the provision of legal 
aid.'889 Due to lack of funds the centre has been unable to sustain the 
programme for mass education890 and to a certain extent attention has been 
paid to a few cases involving pastoralists' rights over land in Arusha.891
The centre was registered under Cap. 212 as a non-profit making 
company limited by guarantee and not having a share capital. The move taken 
to register the Legal and Human Rights Centre as a Limited Company under 
the Companies Ordinance is indicative of how desperately people needed civil 
organisations. Despite government’s attempts to restrict their formation and to 
suffocate the already existing ones, still people could find other ways of 
promoting these organisations.
In Namibia for example, civil organisations have effectively played the 
role of a human rights watchdog. The Legal Assistance Centre, an NGO in 
post-independence Namibia, has immensely contributed to the development of 
the human rights culture and a more just society by promoting access to justice 
through legal aid and public interest litigation. The Centre established in 1988 
has engaged in researching and advocating legal reforms where required and
888High Court of Tanzania at Dar Es Salaam, Miscellaneous Civil Cause No. 29 of 1991, unreported.
889See the Memorandum of Association of Legal and Human Rights Centre, Article 4 (a).
890The Centre receives funds from the Canadian Universities for Overseas (CUSO).
891 For example Yoke Gwaku and 5 Others v. National Agricultural and Food Corporation (NAFCO) 
and Gawal Wheat Farm Ltd, High Court of Tanzania at Arusha, Civil Case No. 52 of 1988, 
unreported; and Ako Gembul and 10 Others v. The National Agricultural and Food Coiporation 
(NAFCO) and 3 Others, High Court of Tanzania at Arusha, Civil Case No. 12 of 1989, 
unreported.
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has promoted grassroots legal education and finance has never been a 
problem.892
Perhaps, if there were vibrant and effective human rights civil 
organisations in Tanzania like in Namibia, significant protection of human 
rights would be realised. After Lugakingira, J., in MtiJdla’s case removed the 
barrier put by a condition of locus standi in cases for the enforcement of 
fundamental rights, one would expect a series of cases instituted by such 
organisations under the auspices of public interest litigation. Regrettably there 
were none, simply because human rights civil organisations had not been 
effectively established and the existing few focused on relief distribution as 
local funnels for international aid.
After being disappointed by the way the government was using funds 
donated by foreign countries for various projects, the donor countries changed 
their policies and decided to channel some of their funds through Non- 
Go vemmental Organisations. This gave rise to the emergence of such 
organisations. In fact most of them were elite organisations not emerging from 
people’s needs and were not related to human rights. They were largely 
established by individuals for private gain. As a result they could not be relied 
upon to bring any infringement of human rights to the attention of the courts.
Economic constraints and ignorance curtail people from presenting their 
grievances when their fundamental rights are infringed upon. The High Court 
realised these barriers and waved the condition of locus standi but people and 
civil organisations do not make use of it.
Free civil organisations and interest groups do form an important 
component of a democratic government and they act as watchdog of individual 
fundamental rights.893 Alongside the active role to be played by the judiciary, 
significant internal protection of human rights in the country therefore depends
892For an account of both the Centre’s performance and achievement see, LEGAL ASSISTANCE 
TRUST AND HUMAN RIGHTS TRUST, Eighteen Month Report (July 1995 - December 1996).
893See MWAIKUSA, J. T., (1996), p. 81.
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far more on the activities by human rights civil organisations. Where 
infringement of the rights is seen or reported they quickly take appropriate 
actions including exerting pressure upon the government and even instituting 
civil suits in court on behalf of the affected victims. Civil societies would 
represent the people's struggle 'organised against domination by the state, 
against denial of civic and political rights in the name of development.'894 
Absence of such groups therefore, has negatively affected the development 
and protection of human rights by the courts in Tanzania.
From what has been highlighted we can rightly conclude that there is 
much still to be done for the judiciary to protect human rights effectively in the 
country. While the Tanzanian judiciary cannot deny being largely conservative 
we note also remarkable activism especially from few High Court judges. 
Prospects for a better and more activist judiciary increase with time as more 
judges change their attitudes towards human rights issues, following exposure 
to the outside world. However the High Court judges’ efforts to protect human 
rights may simply serve as a short-term gain if  the Court of Appeal maintains 
its conservatism to issues of a human rights nature. Concerted effort by Courts 
of all levels is imperative for a meaningful protection of human rights by the 
judiciary in Tanzania.
All in all, judging from the entire exposition in this work and the survey 
we have made in chapters six and seven, there is an immediate need forjudges 
in Tanzania to change and take a liberal and activist role instead of being 
conservative and positivist when interpreting provisions which relate to 
individual fundamental rights. If this principle cannot be adopted then the role 
of the judiciary in protecting human rights in Tanzania may be doubtful and 
uncertain. As matters stand now, traces of conservative and pro-state judges 
portray a negative image of the Tanzanian judiciaiy and its role in protecting 
human rights.
894TAMBILA, K. I , p. 40.
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We believe that the government also has to play a key role in the 
protection of human rights. Other institutions like the judiciary and civil 
organisations may assist the government to achieve this objective.895 This 
means that the executive in Tanzania has to change its attitude towards 
individual fundamental rights ‘otherwise the much feared conflict between the 
judiciary and the executive will be rather difficult to avoid5.896
8:2 Proposals and recommendations for reforms
The general discussion in this work has shown that the judiciary in 
Tanzania cannot effectively protect human rights if, among other things, the 
majority of judicial officers maintain a conservative positivist tradition and an 
attitude of self-restraint when interpreting domestic laws that relate to 
fundamental rights and freedoms. We have also observed that some necessary 
preconditions for a meaningful protection of human rights by the judiciary 
have to be fulfilled by other two organs of the state, the executive and the 
legislature. The executive’s behaviour and response to court decisions in 
matters of human rights nature shows the need for a change of attitude if the 
government is seriously committed to protect individual fundamental rights. 
Without changing its attitude towards the decisions o f the court the 
government may inevitably attract unnecessary conflicts between the judiciary 
and the executive.
Having observed the unsatisfactoiy state of affairs among the three 
organs of the state with respect to human rights, this thesis makes some 
recommendations and proposals for reform.
895CLAUDE, W, E., p. 555.
896MWAIKUSA, J. T., (1991), p. 698.
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8:2:1 Judicial activism
We consider that the judge’s interpretation of the law should uphold 
rather than destroy the individual civil liberties.897 Many people in the world 
are now aware of the need for human rights protection and the judiciary is the 
main focus of their hopes. In Tanzania like elsewhere in the world, judicial 
activism is an important condition for the enforcement of individual 
fundamental rights. It is more important for Tanzania since the government 
has not created a good environment for realisation of the Bill of Rights and it 
is the judiciary that has to nullify relevant laws that infringe 011 individual 
fundamental rights. There is a call for an urgent shift from the traditional 
positivist attitude that has dominated the Tanzanian judiciary, to a liberal and 
activist approach.
It is noted that 'parliament cannot legislate for all time'898 and, in many 
parts of Africa, particularly one-party states, parliaments are weak 
institutions.899 This also supports the view that the development of law in 
Tanzania would largely depend on the flexibility of judges in adopting liberal 
interpretation. As Justice Holmes remarked;
"Whoever hath absolute authority to interpret any 
written or spoken law, it is he who is truly the 
lawgiver, to all intents and purposes..."900
Judges in Tanzania, therefore, play a negative role when they deny 
people justice by maintaining rigid and positivist approach particularly in 
issues of a human rights nature. Such an approach has increasingly been 
criticised by all people interested in social justice. Judges should not fear to 
make decisions even on political or weighty matters of state for by being so
897See DENNING, Lord., p. 188.
898LUGAKINGIRA, K. S. K., (1986), p. 9.
899Althongh Tanzania is practicing multi-party democracy, die opposition is still weak and vulnerable 
with very few parliamentary seats.
900Quoted in COOMARASWAMY, R., p. 3.
281
timid they relinquish their oath and judicial function.901 They should not fear to 
decide sensitive matters for fear of encroaching on the political province. As 
Justice Bhagwati of the Supreme Court of India observed, 'every constitutional 
question concerns the allocation and exercise of governmental power and no 
constitutional question can, therefore, fail to he political.'902 The holding of the 
Supreme Court of Namibia in Government o f the Republic o f  Namibia and 
Another v. Cultura 2000 and Another903 explains how constitutional 
provisions should be interpreted and the reasons thereof:
“A Constitution is an organic instrument...It must 
broadly, liberally and purposively be interpreted so as 
to avoid the ‘austerity of tabulated legalism’ and so as 
to enable it to continue to play a creative and dynamic 
role in the expression and achievement of the ideals 
and aspirations of the nation, in the articulation of the 
values bonding its peoples and in disciplining its 
government.”904
For a considerable length of time since independence the Tanzanian 
government has attempted to suffocate the judiciary and to prevent judges 
from taking an activist approach. Now that the Bill of Rights has been 
enshrined in the Constitution, judges should feel free to apply it. They should 
liberally make legal and policy pronouncements instead of restricting 
themselves to the traditional role of simply applying the law already made. 
Backlash from the executive should not warrant the abdication of the 
responsibility to enforce the commands of the Constitution by the judges 
whenever the government attempts to take away the fundamental rights.905 
Judges should not be afraid of making decisions that do not find favour with
901 See the judgment of Wilson, J., in Operation Dismantle v. The Queen [1986] L.R.C. (Const.) 421 
at p. 440.
902Dissolution Case, 3 SC 1977, p. 660.
903 (1994) 1 SA 407.
904 Ibid., at p. 418.
905MWALUSANYA, J. L., p. 33.
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the government to which they owe their existence. However, at the same time, 
they must be careful not to be seen to usurp the function of Parliament.
Since the Tanzanian judiciary has little experience in cases of human 
rights, it should be prepared to leam horn decisions of other jurisdictions that 
have had opportunity to attend to such matters. There are many significant 
benefits on the part of domestic courts for maintaining links with the 
international human rights jurisprudence. As Chief Justice Gubbay rightly 
observed:
“ ...domestic courts have to construe domestic 
legislation in conformity with the developing 
international jurisprudence of human rights because, a 
judicial decision has greater legitimacy and will 
command more respect if it accords with international 
norms that have been accepted by many countries, 
than if it is based upon the parochial experience or 
foibles of a particular judge.”906
As the findings in chapter five and six have shown, attempts to cope 
with the developing international jurisprudence of human rights have been 
started by very few judges of the High Court. Unfortunately, Mwalusanya, J., 
(as he then was) who pioneered the group retired in January 1997 for health 
reasons. The number of progressive judges within the human rights context is 
alarmingly low and most of the decisions of the Court of Appeal have 
exhibited overcautiousness. Being the highest appellate court whose decisions 
cannot be overturned by any court, the finality of its decisions effectively 
determine the development of human rights jurisprudence in the country. This 
court has been accused of conservatism and frustrating the efforts of the High 
Court in protecting human rights.907 Although the Court of Appeal has 
occasionally made some progressive decisions in the jurisprudence of human
906GUBBAY, a . R., (1990), p. 999.
907See SHIVJI, I. G., (1991 A), p. 125; PETER, C. M., (1992), pp. 139, 147.
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rights in Tanzania, it has consistently failed to interpret the law in favour of the 
underprivileged or oppressed when the state was involved. Claims and 
allegations of conservatism commonly levelled against the Court of Appeal 
may seriously damage the reputation of such highest institution of justice if 
they are completely ignored and the relevance of such a court could be 
questioned. As Mr. Justice Bhagwati the former Chief justice of India 
observed:
“.. .political legitimacy of a modem judiciary becomes 
questionable if  it fails to make a substantial 
contribution to the issue of social justice.”908
Perhaps the Supreme Courts of Zimbabwe and India could be taken as 
models of the highest appellate courts whose decisions have always aimed at 
protecting civil liberties and not destroying them. The Tanzanian Court of 
Appeal could benefit from such institutions including the European Court of 
Human Rights that has had long experience in human rights cases and it could 
possibly adopt its interpretation of various articles. The Court of Appeal 
should be more concerned with justice than with technicalities and be able to 
show the fundamental relationship between law and justice. As Georges, C. J., 
carefully remarked;
"...the judiciary must seek to establish confidence 
itself - not by any abandoning of standards, but by 
showing its competence, by understanding the needs 
of the community and using its knowledge to help in 
formulating a body of law which will assist in their 
satisfaction." 909
What has been done by the court so far is too little, though promising, 
given the extent people were denied enforcement of their fundamental rights
908BHAGWATI, p . N.} (1986), p. 65.
909JAMES, R. W., and KASSAM, F. M., p. 81.
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since independence. More has to be done particularly by the Court of Appeal 
and new methods should be devised so as to bring justice within the reach of a 
common man. The Supreme Court of India by way of creative interpretation 
has made a procedural innovation through "social action litigation" and 
consequently ’made the judicial process readily accessible to large segments of 
the population which have so far been priced out of the legal system.'910 Judges 
in Tanzania should be innovative to meet new challenges posed by the people's 
desire for realisation of fundamental rights and freedoms. There is an urgent 
need for creative interpretation by judges in order to bring justice to socially 
and economically disadvantaged. Too much judicial restraint turns the 
judiciary into a political instrument or indeed an institution that looks after the 
interests of the state. As Upendra Baxhi rightly observed:
"Between judicial restraint and the support of the 
status quo, there is a very thin line of difference, 
particularly in third world societies, whose governing 
elites are still apt to see the state as their private 
property."911
8:2:2 Strengthening the judiciary
Traditionally the executive in Tanzania has been very powerful. 
Elsewhere as in Britain the executive has also been very powerful but equally 
powerful are the legislature and the judiciary, the institutions charged with the 
task of imposing restraint on the executive. Such institutions in Tanzania were 
'inhibited by the ever dominating executive.'912 This argument finds expression 
in the government's persistence to oust the jurisdiction of the court in a number 
of cases, and vesting it in the tribunals even after the enshrinement o f the Bill
910BHAGWATI, P. N., (1987), p. 20.
911BAXI, U., p. 111.
912MWAIKUSA, J. T., (1996), p. 77.
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of Rights in the Constitution.913 Arguably, this reflects the government's 
continued distrust in the judiciary since independence. The effects of 
substituting such tribunals for the courts of law have been amply discussed in 
chapter three. Much as we appreciate the need for such tribunals it is our 
submission that their decisions should be subject to judicial intervention when 
necessary by way of review or appeal. A weakened judiciary cannot 
effectively stand up for people's rights. The judiciary should be strengthened 
and its confidence in performing its day-to-day activities has to be increased. 
This can be done if  attention is paid to a number of factors that for a long time 
have contributed to the unsatisfactory state of the judicial function. In this part 
we attempt to point out some of such factors and also we suggest the attention 
that has to be paid to each of them.
8:2:2:1 Appointment o f judges and the Chief Justice
There is a need to look again at the power to appoint judges and the 
procedure thereof. Judges of the High Court in Tanzania are appointed by the 
President after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission.914 The 
President consults the Chief Justice before appointing judges of the Court of 
Appeal.915 However, the law does not state that the President is bound by the 
recommendations of the Judicial Service Commission or of the Chief Justice. 
This means the President can make his own proposals to the Commission or to 
the Chief Justice and he can as well ignore their advice and proceed with his 
own choices.916 The danger posed by this kind of unchecked power vested in 
the President is not imaginary but real. He is potentially free to use this 
loophole to bring into the judiciary a group of judges who he believes would
913See the discussion in chapter seven about the effect of Act No. 22 of 1992.
914Article 109 (2).
915Ibid., Article 118(3).
916Article 37 (1) provides: . .except where he is required by this Constitution or any other law to act
in accordance with or upon the advice of any person or authority, in the exercise of the functions 
of his office the President shall act in his own discretion and shall not be obliged to follow the 
advice tendered by any other person”. (Emphasis added)
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not decide against his interest, thereby defeating the idea of the judiciary being 
the protector of fundamental rights. Second, although there may be enough 
constitutional safeguards for judges’ security of tenure, some might feel that 
they owe their existence to the government, or to the President for that matter, 
and therefore hesitate to disappoint him. It is our submission that the President 
should be bound by the recommendations of the Judicial Service Commission 
in relation to appointment of judges of the High Court and of the Court of 
Appeal when he is in disagreement with the recommendations of the Chief 
Justice.
The fact that the Chief Justice is appointed by the President without 
consulting anybody917 supports the existing common understanding that the 
Chief Justice is personally indebted to the President. It also makes the office of 
the Chief Justice more political than legal for he holds this position at the 
pleasure of the President and can be removed any time. All this would perhaps 
explain the controversial pro-state attitude that the Chief Justices have shown 
since independence as discussed in chapter three. In order to make the 
judiciary more independent and to create a good environment for the 
protection of individual rights, the office of the Chief Justice should be 
democratized instead of being one of the Presidential appointments. We 
therefore subscribe to the view that judges and magistrates be allowed to vote 
and select the Chief Justice from a list of contesting judges.918 They have 
successfully been doing so in electing a Chairman for the Judges and 
Magistrates Association and his secretariat. If adopted this method would 
potentially remove the possibility for the Chief Justice feeling duty-bound to 
defend the interests of the state at the expense of individual rights.
917Aiticle 118 (2).
918See ONG'WAMUHANA, K., (1981), p. 264.
287
8:2:2:2 Availability o f legal literature and law reports
Any legal system which is essentially modelled along the principle of 
stare decisis cannot effectively operate if the decisions of superior court(s) are 
not known to the lower courts or even to themselves. Under this doctrine the 
decision of a court is an authority or binding precedent both for the court itself 
and for all lower (subordinate) courts in subsequent cases where the very point 
is again in controversy. In the Tanzanian case, decisions of the Court of 
Appeal are binding on the High Court and all subordinate courts, whereas 
decisions of the High Court are binding on subordinate courts only. Decisions 
of both Court of Appeal and High Court are the only ones reported in the law 
reports as precedents. It is therefore important that decisions of superior 
courts binding on the lower courts are communicated to the latter. The 
conventional way of communicating these decisions is to publish the law 
reports on regular basis.
The latest law report in Tanzania was published in 1982 three years 
before the Bill of Rights became part of the Constitution. To date there have 
been no serious attempt to improve the situation and make judges, magistrates, 
advocates and other members of the legal profession aware of various 
decisions of the High Court and the Court of Appeal. Perhaps the effect of 
underfunding is more felt here where even the processing of copies of 
judgments becomes a problem due to the lack of paper and other stationery. 
This kind of situation raises one fundamental question as to how could judges 
and magistrates in Tanzania avoid making conflicting decisions about the 
same matter. It is highly possible for a judge in Tanzania to make a decision 
which conflicts with others without even mentioning them due to his 
unawareness of their existence. In fact ‘departures from previous decisions are 
less frequent than conflicting decisions.’919 This could be a threat to the future 
of human rights, if  courts are not consistent in their decisions and if obsolete
919LYALL, A., p. 55.
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law might form basis of decisions simply because a particular judge or 
magistrate was unaware of the true legal position. Some of the allegations of 
corruption levelled against judicial officers stem from conflicting decisions of 
the courts and the unpredictability of the outcome of the cases. If  a legal 
system based on precedents cannot have the decisions of superior courts 
published, it can hardly claim to do justice to its people.
Decisions of the Court of Appeal and High Court should be made 
available also to every District Police station. Duplicate copies of binding 
decisions of the Court of Appeal and High Court should be regularly made and 
distributed to all court centres not as providing an alternative to law reports but 
being an emergency and temporary solution to the problem while preparations 
for law reports are underway.
If the Tanzanian judiciary does not want to be out of touch with the 
outside world, it must be prepared to spare some money on buying law reports 
from other countries and international law journals or periodicals. High Court 
libraries should have such sources of materials for judges, magistrates and 
other members of the legal profession to update themselves about various 
important issues affecting their work. It is important that a judicial officer 
becomes aware of the trend of development of human rights issues in other 
jurisdictions. Also, members of the judiciary should be able to present their 
ideas and contribute to certain debates by writing articles from the practical 
point of view. This could be a learning process. Regrettably this role has been 
left to the academicians only. There are very few articles by judges that get 
published after being presented in seminars or workshops.
High Court libraries should be improved in terms of reference books 
and other legal literature. Every High Court Centre has a library. With the 
exception of Dar Es Salaam High Court Library the rest do not qualify for 
such a name. They are not libraries at all, but mere rooms with a few very old 
reading materials. No meaningful research can be conducted in these libraries
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that lack even some of relevant statutes commonly applied by judges. During 
our field study, we were surprised to learn that at some High Court centres 
there were no copies of the Basic Rights and Duties Enforcement Act, 1994.920 
Some judges and District Registrars were honest enough to tell us that they 
had never seen it before. This law is necessary for the enforcement of 
individual fundamental rights as it provides the procedure for enforcement of 
constitutional basic rights and duties, and jurisdiction of such matters is vested 
in the High Court only. It was very unfortunate that the people who were 
supposed to enforce that particular law had not even seen it.
It seems that every judge was forced by circumstances to have his or 
her own collection of statutes, books and some law reports in order to avoid 
embarrassments at work. While it may be difficult, given the country’s limping 
economy to have a high standard library at every court, justice should not be 
compromised by economic excuses that seem to justify the marginalisation of 
the judiciary. Every High Court centre should have an updated library where 
judges, magistrates and other members of the legal profession can do their 
research. It may seive little purpose to equip the Dar Es Salaam High Court 
library only while the rest remain in a shambles.
8:2:2:3 Research assistants
Alongside the exercise to update the High Court libraries there should 
be a deliberate move to provide each judge with at least one law graduate as 
his research assistant. A research assistant to the judge would be involved in 
doing research about the various issues requiring the judge’s decision. He 
would present to the judge the findings of his research and leave the rest to the 
judge to decide. At least the judge would have detailed information about the 
subject before him such as the views of various people of high standing, 
decisions from other countries and the debates, if  any, that surround that
920Op cit.
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particular issue. Any decision arrived at after such review of existing literature 
would definitely be different in all respects from the one based on simple logic 
and common sense.
Second, judges are very few but they are supposed to hear so many 
cases and at the same time write judgments after doing research. As a result no 
significant research is being done by judges who, for the most part, resort to 
writing routine judgments. This may not be healthy for the future of human 
rights. With the use of research assistants most of the research work otherwise 
done by judges would be done by people specifically employed to do research 
and judges would supplement such research when necessary in the course of 
writing the judgment.
In the same vein, we propose that each judge of the Court of Appeal 
write his own judgment instead of leaving everything to one of the presiding 
three judges to write the judgment of the court and the rest to concur.921 We 
are not saying that judges should necessarily write dissenting judgments. They 
may all arrive at the same conclusion, but it may be on different grounds. Our 
concern here is about the reasoning of the judges as a contribution to the 
growing human rights jurisprudence in the country. It is our submission that 
writing such independent judgments could enable each judge to express his 
views and attitude to human rights.
8:2:2:4 Staff training
Since ignorance of the concept of human rights among judicial officers 
is apparent, it is important that the judiciary includes in its plans special 
training for judges and magistrates about the subject. Such a deliberate move 
would have been taken, with foresight, during the period when justiciability of 
the Bill o f Rights was under suspension. However, the process of justice is a
921 We are aware of the arguments against separate judgments, but we think the advantages of seperate 
judgments outweighs the disadvantages.
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continuous one and the judiciary should always look forward to improving its 
performance. We are of the opinion that the Tanzanian judiciary can improve 
its performance on cases of human rights if they have sufficient knowledge of 
what they are to adjudicate upon.
Regular seminars, conferences and workshops about human rights 
should be conducted by the judiciary specifically forjudges and magistrates.922 
This will effectively expose judicial officers to the whole concept of human 
rights, and development in the international human rights jurisprudence. 
Decisions of courts from other jurisdictions may be discussed with a view to 
considering how best they can be adopted to benefit the Tanzanian 
community. It is through this kind of training that the political and economic 
motives behind certain legislation can be examined in the light of human rights 
jurisprudence and related developments outside Tanzania.
Study tours for judges and magistrates should be organized by the 
judiciary on a regular basis to expose them to other jurisdictions having more 
experience in human rights matters. This will help the judicial officers to 
update their knowledge and also see for themselves the way other courts 
handle cases of a human rights nature.
We have consistently recommended that the training be accorded to 
both judges and magistrates although the latter group is not directly involved 
in deciding cases of human rights, for two reasons. First, experience has shown 
that most judges are appointed from Resident Magistrates.923 Moreover, 
Principal Resident Magistrates are commonly appointed to discharge the 
functions of judges by way of extended jurisdiction. In this capacity, Resident
922It is interesting to note that following the Warioba Commission Report on the sources of 
corruption in the judiciary a three weeks seminar about the aspects of corruption, ethics, 
democracy and law was organised by die judiciary specifically for Primary Court Magistrates. 
Most of them had never before attended any seminar or conference. See Dar Leo Newspaper, 9th 
January 1997.
923This practice has been criticized for turning judgeship into promotional grade from magisterial 
stage instead of being an appointment. See die Warioba Commission Report, and also 
LUGAKINGIRA, K. S. K., (1996)
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Magistrates can hear cases for the enforcement of individual fundamental 
rights like any High Court judge. Second, the magistrates’ courts deal with 
more cases of human rights nature in their day-to-day activities than the High 
Court, since the administration of justice is largely about the determination of 
rights. Although the magistrates' courts by law cannot interpret the 
Constitution, they can apply it.924 Knowledge of the concept of human rights is 
therefore imperative for any judicial officer irrespective of his or her grade.
As a long term plan, the judiciary should include a course on human 
rights in the training of Primary Court Magistrates and District Magistrates.925 
Under a seemingly impressive new scheme of training judicial staff in 
Tanzania, a nine months course otherwise taken by Primary Court Magistrates 
will be a qualification for Court Clerks. A two years Diploma course in law 
previously taken by District Magistrates becomes the qualification for Primary 
Court Magistracy and the District Magistracy cadre is phased out. This means, 
therefore, law graduate magistrates will sit in the District Courts. To achieve 
these objectives a special Institute for Judicial Staff has been set up at Lushoto 
in Tanga region. However, its opening has suffered repeated postponement for 
more than three years because of lack of funds.
If  effected, the scheme would raise the level of education of Primary 
Court Magistrates and the bar on advocates appealing in that court would 
consequently be removed. There has been no appropriate training to equip 
Primary Court Magistrates with enough tools to enable them to discharge such 
high responsibilities.926 For quite a long time there have been complaints from 
different comers against the exclusion of advocates from Primary Courts.927 
The old view that advocates would take advantage of the magistrates’
924See for example Bernardo Ephrahim's case.
925The Tanzanian judiciary runs a two years Diploma course in law and a nine months training for
Primary Court magistrates at IDM Mzumbe.
926See the Report of the Judicial System Review Commission, Government of Tanzania, 1980, pp.
108-110.
927READ, J. S., (1971), p. 317.
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ignorance may have no force if their level of education is raised. It is our 
submission that the presence of advocates in Primary Courts would be of great 
assistance to magistrates in the process of administering justice at the lower 
level. It should be noted that Primary Courts are many in number and closer to 
the people than any other court in the country.928 Like superior courts, Primary 
Courts attend to a wide range of cases including sensitive matrimonial disputes 
whereby the rights of couples on divorce are determined.929 Further, all courts 
adhere to the adversary system whereby opposing parties contend against each 
other before the judge or magistrate who plays the role of an umpire in the 
proceedings. This requires legal representation, particularly in matrimonial 
proceedings because ‘the ordinary lay person would not be able to efficiently 
present the facts according to the highly sophisticated rules of evidence.’930
The promotion of justice at the lower level by way of raising 
qualifications for Primary Court Magistracy and District Court Magistracy is 
likely to take very long before producing meaningful results. The whole 
attempt may still fail to promote justice if the role of assessors in the 
administration of justice at the Primary Courts level is not reconsidered. The 
assessors should play an advisory role to the Primary Court magistrate like the 
role they play to the High Court judge. This means that the Primary Court 
decision should no longer be based on the majority but on the presiding 
magistrate after taking into account the assessors' opinions. The assessors do 
receive allowances but there have been complaints against the government for 
keeping them at work without paying their allowances for many months. It 
should be noted that a Primary Court decision is passed by a quorum of two 
assessors against one magistrate. It is improper to base the decision on the
928Until January 1998 there were 970 Primary Courts, 87 District Courts, 21 Resident Magistrate 
Courts, 11 High Court Centres, and 1 Court of Appeal.
929See Magistrate’s Court Act, 1984, section 18. See also Law of Maixiage Act, 1971, (Act No. 5 of 
1971) section 76.
930WANITZEK, U., p. 256.
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majority of lay people whose tenure is not secure and regard this as the 
decision of the court.
For judicial officers holding a degree in law, there should be a 
deliberate move to upgrade their knowledge by encouraging them to pursue 
post-graduate studies. There is such a strategy in Zambia whereby every year 
at least two members of the judiciary (judges and magistrates) go to the United 
Kingdom for a Masters degree in law. One important course they have been 
taking, among others, was about human rights in developing countries. This 
could be a good plan for the future of human rights in the country.
It is also very important that the Faculty of Law University of Dar Es 
Salaam includes a course on human rights in the undergraduate programme. 
Anybody aspiring to join the judiciary 011 completing his studies should take 
this course which may remain optional to others. A condition of taking human 
rights subject could also be extended to those intending to seek employment 
from law enforcing institutions such as the police and the Attorney-General's 
Chambers or anybody intending to practise law in the United Republic of 
Tanzania.931
8:2:2:5 Allocation offunds and judicial officers' welfare
The judiciaiy cannot effectively promote justice if it is marginalised and 
underfunded. When the judiciary is compelled by circumstances to accept 
donations from independent sources other than from the government in order 
to run its business, its independence is seriously threatened. This enables 
opportunistic individuals to take advantage of the situation by expressing 
concern over the court's financial difficulties through "generous" donations. 
The possibility of the court being influenced by such conduct and therefore 
feel morally bound to reciprocate the generosity cannot be over-emphasized.
931111 the United Kingdom all undergraduate law students who intend to practice law in England and 
Wales must take Property Law and Equity courses.
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As a result seeking justice from a marginalised judiciary becomes an illusion 
imagination especially when one party has better financial means. Enough 
funds should be allocated to the judiciary in order to ran its activities.
It is high time the government starts considering seriously the 
remuneration of judicial officers. By judicial officers we refer to magistrates 
and judges. Until now the government has shown some concern over the 
judge's remuneration but forgotten the magistrates who are very close to 
people and attend to more cases when compared to judges. In fact there are 
more complaints of corruption and miscarriages of justice against magistrates' 
courts than against the High Court. The reasons that the government took into 
account in considering a judge's remuneration should be the same for 
magistrates in that both groups discharge the same function, the administration 
of justice. An admission by the Minister for Justice that 'judicial officers are 
undeipaid and they lack incentive'932 expresses the threat facing the 
independence of the judiciary in Tanzania. In order to be independent the 
judiciary should be placed in a position whereby its officers can work without 
fear or influence. This is to say the judicial officers' working environment 
should also favour the intended independence.
8:2:3 The Executive and human rights
8:2:3:1 Ratification of international instruments
Arguably, the government's thinking about human rights could also be 
demonstrated by its readiness to accede to relevant international instruments 
and carrying out the obligations involved. Tanzania has ratified some of the 
United Nations key instruments on human rights but failed to ratify others.933 It
932See Mtanzania Newspaper, 12th January 1996.
933Those not ratified include Optional Protocol to die International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
aiming at die abolition of deatii penalty, Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory
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is unfortunate that the latter are the ones that would specifically express the 
country's commitment to observing human rights. They relate to the party 
state's willingness to allow the United Nations Human Rights Committee to 
consider complaints by individual citizens. They also relate to the country's 
commitment to abolish death penalty, torture and other cruel or degrading 
treatment. These instruments should also be acceded to.
Furthermore, the obligation placed on every party state, to submit 
periodic reports to the appropriate UN bodies on the progress made and 
measures taken to implement the provisions of the instruments934 should be 
fulfilled. Tanzania, like many other African states, has delayed and sometimes 
failed to meet this obligation despite a number of reminders sent to it by 
relevant Committees.935 For example a report whose submission to the Human 
Rights Commission936 remained due since 1993, was sent in October, 1997 to 
be discussed by the Commission in July 1998. In any case such a report would 
be out of date. There could be many reasons behind this failure but probably 
the main one is 'lack of political will on the part of government'937 especially 
when there is nothing positive to be reported.
It is also our submission that the substance of all international 
instruments signed by the government should be translated into domestic 
legislation in order to make them enforceable by municipal courts.
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
934See for example, article 44 of the Convention on the Rights of die Child; article 16 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and article 9 of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination.
935For statistics of the African states' failure to fulfil this obligation as required by the various 
international human rights instruments they have acceded to, see HATCHARD, J., (1994), pp. GI­
GS. See also UN Doc. CERD/C/251: 27 January 1994.
936Under article 40 of the ICCPR.
937HATCHARD, J., (1994), p. 63.
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8:2:3:2 Attitude to court decisions and the offending laws
Any democratic government cherishing the rule of law should show 
great respect for the decisions of the court. It is in such an environment that the 
court can fairly and freely dispense justice without fear of backlash from the 
executive.938 The judges become frustrated and discouraged by the 
government’s attitude towards the judicial functions as exhibited by its 
reactions that attempt to undermine the court’s decisions.
The need for a change of attitude by the executive is apparent and we 
regard it as essential for the future of human rights in Tanzania. There can only 
be change of attitude if the executive and state functionaries express their 
willingness to respect individual fundamental rights unreservedly. If the 
executive continues flouting court orders, the country may find itself in a state 
of lawlessness and disorder. This conduct would in effect lead to authoritarian 
tendencies and the collapse of the rule of law, thereby encouraging people to 
take law in their hands. The government, therefore, should stop reacting to 
decisions of the court in the way it has been doing.
It is our submission that despite the government's intention to leave all 
offending laws unrepealed until challenged in court, the need to repeal or 
amend them is increasingly becoming urgent as days pass. This is because 
people have realised that it may take too long to clear off such laws by 
instituting formal petitions in court, given the barriers surrounding the 
institution of such petitions. Indeed the number of cases seeking to enforce 
fundamental rights and freedoms in court would not reflect the extent to which 
these rights are being violated.939 The government must bear in mind the 
people's low income and their incapacity to meet the legal fees involved. Thus 
deliberate steps should be taken to amend and repeal all laws containing
938PETER, C. M., and BIELWEGEN, R. M , p. 395.
939For example, the government has persistently harassed the private news media and banned many 
local newspapers when they reported against it but none of them went to court. It should be noted 
that under Article 18 (2) of the Constitution local private media has the constitutional right to keep 
the citizens 'informed of the developments in the country and in the world.'
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provisions inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. This would demonstrate the 
government's seriousness and commitment to promote individual fundamental 
rights.
The government should respond to the recommendations made by the 
Nyalali Commission about a list of forty offending laws that have increasingly 
become the subject of public concern. The government has for so long 
expressed its unwillingness to amend them for fear of disrupting the legal 
system.940 We maintain that it is unsatisfactory to retain on the statute book 
laws that infringe the rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The government 
acted irresponsibly by remaining inflexibly determined not to effect the 
required amendments.
The government should stop reacting to situations by rushing to 
introduce more laws that infringe on individual fundamental rights.941 It is our 
submission that law, like any other state policies in Tanzania, has to aid the 
process of development, if development is seen in terms of democracy, 
people's freedom and participation in deciding crucial matters that affect their 
lives, human dignity, as well as social and economic well being. It was a 
disservice to human rights for the government to enact the Emergency Powers 
Act, 1986942 during the period when the justiciability of the Bill of Rights was 
under suspension. Under this Act the President and the Regional 
Commissioners as well as the District Commissioners have been given wide 
powers of arrest and detention without trial. According to the Constitution943 it 
is only the President who has the power to declare a state of emergency 
thereby suspending the exercise of individual fundamental rights and 
freedoms.944 However, the Emergency Powers Act, 1986 allows the President
940See LUBUVA, D. Z., p. 853,
941 For example we saw that Act No. 22 of 1992 was enacted extinguishing customary land rights in 
some areas four years after the Bill of Rights became justiciable.
9420p cit., sections 5 to 18.
943Article 32.
944Article 31 (1).
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to delegate to the Regional and District Commissioners or to any other 
authority945 what the Constitution considers exclusive powers of the 
President.946 This is overtly unconstitutional. The only consolation is that since 
this law came into force no state of emergency has ever been declared in 
Tanzania.
8:2:3:3 Amendments to the Constitution
The Tanzanian Constitution is still unsatisfactory and needs some 
changes. This Constitution has suffered from almost yearly amendments and 
has almost lost certainty, the basic character of a grundnorm. It is a document 
patched together to suit the desire of the government in power. Arguably, a 
'Constitution which is subject to frequent amendment may retain little or no 
respect and become an ineffective guardian of fundamental rights and rule of 
law'.947 The enshrined Bill of Rights has also suffered amendments. It is our 
submission that the provisions relating to individual fundamental rights and 
freedoms require special protection. As John Hatchard rightly observes, unlike 
other constitutional provisions, such provisions should 'not be amended at the 
convenience of government'.948
In fact the government should entrench the provisions relating to 
fundamental rights and freedoms in such a way that any amendment to the 
Constitution becomes of no effect so far as it attempts to diminish or detract 
from the spirit of the Bill of Rights.949 In this way we could prevent 
occurrences like the one when the government amended the Constitution to 
frustrate the order of the court that allowed private candidates to stand for any 
political election without necessarily being nominated by any political party.950
945See Act No. 1 of 1986, section 5.
946Article 32.
947A point emphasised in HATCHARD, J., (1995 C), p. 21.
948HATCHARD, J., (1991), p. 97.
949This approach is taken by the Namibian Constitution, 1990, section 131.
950See Rev. Christopher Mtikila v. Attorney-General, op cit.
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Alongside the entrenchment of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution 
there should be a deliberate decision to remove the claw back clauses that 
attempt to take away with one hand what the Constitution gives with another. 
While we are not claiming that the fundamental rights and freedoms should be 
without limitations, we are equally unimpressed by the extent to which 
individual rights have been limited in the Tanzanian Constitution, making 
them almost impossible to realise. The problem lies with the restrictions 
attached to individual fundamental rights which remain effective provided they 
are being imposed “according to law” or as “prescribed by law”, or “subject to 
the relevant laws of the land.” It should be noted that such blanket saving of 
offending laws could make the whole Bill of Rights in the Constitution 
nugatory. It is a common practice to limit the extent to which people can enjoy 
fundamental rights and freedoms. Indeed there are such limitations in the 
European Convention on Human Rights but they are always being followed by 
an important clarifying phrase “and necessary in a democratic society”.951
Such a provision enables the court to examine whether the limitations 
imposed by a particular law are necessary in a democratic society as well as 
whether it is in the interest of the public to allow them. This is not the case 
with the limitations in the Tanzanian Constitution. They have been saved in so 
far as they are backed by the law of the land. It is on these grounds that we 
submit that the Constitution is in an unsatisfactory state and should be re­
written to include at eveiy limitation clause “and necessary in a democratic 
society.,.”, a very important phrase for the future of human rights.952
Also the provisions of Article 30 (2) of the Constitution should be re­
examined for they appear to be so general that if used improperly could cover
951See for example Article 9 (2) which provides: “Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall 
be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessaiy in a democratic 
society in the interest of public safety, for die protection of public order, health or morals, or for 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.
952For a discussion about die procedure to be followed in drafting a new democratic Constitution see 
SHIVJI, I. G., (1991 B), pp. 89-91; and JUMA, I. H., pp. 393-401 .
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virtually every law no matter how much it infringes upon guaranteed rights 
and freedoms. The Attorney-General has repeatedly used this particular 
provision in his defence to justify every law that was being challenged in the 
court of law for infringing upon fundamental rights and freedoms under the 
Constitution.953 This shows how such a provision can potentially take away 
otherwise guaranteed rights and freedoms.
The need to re-write the Constitution by first seeking views of the 
people and of interest groups is apparent taking into account the country’s 
dramatic shift from one-party state to multi-party democracy. Although the 
government in power is opposed to having a national convention to discuss the 
new constitutional structure that is being demanded by the opposition, we 
submit that the Constitution should originate from the people themselves in 
order to be respected as a grandnonn. People’s views should be taken into 
account when drafting the Constitution. It is this kind of Constitution that 
cannot be amended on arbitrary grounds for it is the fundamental law of the 
country and the source of all legitimate power. People want to have a 
permanent Constitution in the real sense, free from regular amendments, and 
they should be given the opportunity to participate fully in making it.954 It is 
our submission that making and amending the Constitution should not be made 
one of the Parliament's regular functions. Any changes to the Constitution, 
except those related to the entrenched fundamental rights, should be preceded 
by a national referendum requiring say a seventy-five percent affirmative 
vote.955 The national convention after conducting a referendum perhaps would 
be a desirable forum for making a new Constitution since all political parties, 
trade unions, students' organizations, religious organizations and many other
953See our discussion in chapter seven.
954Between 1977 and 1995 the Constitution was amended 11 times and despite the recommendation 
by the Nyalali Commission that a new Constitution be written with full public participation, it was 
subsequently amended 5 times without involving the public.
955For analysis of more alternative approaches as safeguard against tire erosion of fundamental rights 
by means of Constitutional amendments see HATCHARD, J., (1995 C), pp. 25-27.
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civil organizations with diverse interests would be represented in the 
discussion.
8:2:4 Human Rights Commission and civil liberty organisations
The Human Rights Commission has been described as 'an important 
institution which assists individuals in enforcing the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights and promotes the observance and awareness of its provisions among all 
people'.956 Since the Bill of Rights became part of the Constitution, people 
have demanded the establishment of such an institution but the government's 
response remains unimpressive. We submit that the future of human rights in 
Tanzania requires the establishment of a Human Rights Commission tasked 
both with the promotion and the protection of individual fundamental rights.957 
In other countries the Commission has been given the duty to investigate the 
infringement of these rights and it assists complainants to secure redress by 
representing them in court or providing them with financial support necessary 
for instituting proceedings in a competent court.958
Although the Tanzanian human rights histoiy is different from that of 
South Africa and relatively better than the rest of East Africa, we still hold the 
view that the proposed Commission would discharge similar functions to those 
of its South African counter-part in addition to other obligations. For example, 
it could undertake research and education programmes to promote respect for 
and observance of human rights in the country,959 and also make 
recommendations to the relevant organs for reform. This would include 
surveying Tanzanian legislation and reporting to the government all laws it
956RAUTENBACH, I. M., p. 145.
957Such an institution is referred to in HATCHARD, J., (1998), p. 2, as "New Breed Human Rights 
Commission", different from that whose mandate is largely restricted to dealing with anti- 
discrimination issues.
958See the Constitution of die Republic of South Africa, 1993, (Act No. 200 of 1993), section 116 (3).
9590n  how die Uganda Human Rights Commission has fulfilled tiiis obligation see HATCHARD, J., 
(1998), pp. 23-25.
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considers to be in conflict with the Constitution and other international human 
rights laws.
We are aware of the controversy arising out of the Commission's 
exercise of powers,960 but our previous evaluation of the performance of the 
Tanzanian judiciary supports the view that protection of human rights should 
not be exclusively left to the courts. As John Hatchard has observed:
"Despite increasing judicial activism in 
Commonwealth African countries, there still remains 
the prospect of judges observing self-limitations that 
insulate them from dealing with troubling issues with 
human rights dimensions. In addition, the cost, delays, 
procedural complexities and strict rules of evidence 
make it impractical to expect the couit to act alone as 
'guardians of human rights'."961
We emphasize that the enforcement of the decisions of a Commission 
would be better left to the courts in order to avoid constitutional and 
procedural problems noted earlier.
The Tanzania Human Rights Commission could also play the role of a 
safeguard on the power of the President to declare the state of emergency.962 
Presently the National Executive of the ruling party and the National 
Assembly have to hold a joint meeting within fourteen days from the date of 
the proclamation of the state of emergency to consider the situation, and 
determine whether or not to pass a resolution approving such proclamation by 
'two thirds of all the members of the meeting'.963 Such a safeguard may not be 
effective in Tanzania where the National Assembly is dominated by a single 
party. It is our submission that the Human Rights Commission could fulfil this
960This is a serious constitutional issue facing the Uganda Human Rights Commission which 
functions almost like a court of law while the manner of its establishment contravenes the 
constitutional provisions relating to die establishment and staffing of courts.
961HATCHARD, J., (1998), p. 18.
962For other responsibilities of a "new breed" Commission see HATCHARD, J., (1998), pp. 25-28.
963Article 32 (3).
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role better because of its independent and wide-ranging representative 
character.964
It is not clear whether the Permanent Commission of Enquiry965 is 
specifically taking up the role of the Human Rights Commission or whether 
the demands for such institution are still being ignored by the government.966 
In any case, our discussion in chapter three expresses the view that the 
Permanent Commission of Enquiry does not merit the job. Since its creation it 
has functioned as a mere investigatory body that reported its findings to the 
President.967 The promotion of human rights cannot be attained simply by 
investigating alleged infringements without the power to take appropriate 
action. At best the Permanent Commission of Enquiry could be left to deal 
with what one critic describes as 'administrative justice,'968 covering 
complaints by individuals who claim to have suffered injustices at the hands of 
a government official.
The absence of effective civil liberties organisations has also 
contributed to the unsatisfactory state of human rights in Tanzania. We 
propose that the right to organise special interest associations such as civil 
liberties organisations, trade unions, professional or other organisations should 
be encouraged and protected by the law. Presently the law discourages the 
formation of such organisations by putting barriers and restrictions to their 
formation as well as the wide discretionary powers vested in the Minister for 
Home Affairs to register or de-register any such organisation. The threat by the 
government to de-register BAWATA969 explains how the atmosphere in
964This means that the appointment procedure would involve die broad-based representation of social 
groups and would take into account die need for suitably qualified Commissioners.
965The Tanzanian Ombudsman.
966During our interview with Hon. Kingunge Ngombare Mwiru, Minister of State in die Prime 
Minister's Office responsible for government policy and information, we were told tiiat the 
government was planning to improve on the performance of die PCE by giving it more powers.
967The Human Rights Commission would be constituted of independent appointees enjoying good 
conditions of service but accountable to the Parliament.
968HATCHARD, J., (1991), p. 99.
969See chapter seven for a discussion about die government's attempt to de-register this organisation.
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Tanzania has for a long time since independence been unconducive to the 
formation of independent special interest civil organisations.970 Such civil 
organisations would play the role of pressure groups and also function as a 
watchdog of human rights infringements by the state. They would presumably 
get support from the Legal Aid Committee University of Dar Es Salaam971 and 
TAMWA (Tanzania Media Women Association) and TAWLA (Tanzania 
Women Lawyers Association) that offer free legal services to women and 
children victims of domestic violence.
8:2:5 Access to justice
8:2:5:1 Legal representation
Because of ignorance and poverty many violations and infringements 
of individual rights are not being taken to court. It is quite essential to have 
legal representation in cases for enforcement of individual fundamental rights 
for the subject itself is highly technical and requires a clear knowledge of law. 
In the absence of legal representation such petitions may be very difficult for a 
layman to conduct. Due to the technicalities involved a petition could be 
dismissed at the initial stages when the court examines the preliminary issues 
whether the petition is frivolous or vexatious. As Lugakingira, J., observed, in 
Rev. Mtikila's case an ordinary man cannot articulately argue constitutional 
matters. These factors have generally compelled the people to contain their 
complaints against the violation of fundamental rights and freedoms. Legal aid 
should be made available to people who seek to enforce their rights that are 
being infringed. This can be done by assigning every private advocate a 
specific number of legal aid cases every year. He should be required to take
970pOr a detailed account of suppression by die Tanzanian government of die right of association see 
WELCH, C. E., (1978), pp. 639-656.
9710n  die perfonnance of Legal Aid Committee see KAPINGA, W. B., (1985 B), pp. 179-194.
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them with utmost professional ability and to give a report to the assigning 
authority.
Legal representation should also be guaranteed to any one facing a 
serious charge that attracts the death penalty, life imprisonment, or a minimum 
sentence of fifteen years imprisonment. The government should establish a 
system of salaried 'public defenders' to work together with the existing system 
of'public prosecutors'. This would be a little bit costly but it would remove the 
perception that the government is more concerned with obtaining convictions 
than doing justice. The Directorate of Legal Aid therefore has to be established 
to offer legal aid in criminal and civil cases in Subordinate Courts, High Court 
and Court o f Appeal.972 The importance of this system in the administration of 
justice had been seen and recommended to the colonial government in 1933 by 
a special commission that observed:
"We recommend that the defence of accused persons 
at all levels be undertaken by public defenders. We 
regard this matter as one of great importance, and we 
urge that every effort be made to initiate some such 
system at the earliest moment"973
8:2:5:2 Enforcement o f basic rights and duties
The government should make it easier for the people to enforce the Bill 
of Rights. According to the law currently obtaining in Tanzania, it is only the 
High Court that has original jurisdiction over cases for the enforcement of 
individual fundamental rights. However, in Tanzania like in many other 
African states, judges for various reasons are very few in number974 and there
972r e a d , j. S., (1971), p. 311.
973See Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Administration of Justice in Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanganyika Territory in Criminal Matters, London, May 1933 (Cmnd 4623), p. 69.
974READ, J. S., (1979 B), p. 158. Up to March 1998 there were 7 Court of Appeal judges, 29 High 
Court judges, 112 Resident Magistrates, 178 District Court Magistrates and 476 Primary Court 
Magistrates.
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are therefore very few High Court centres in the country. During our field 
study we found the judge in charge of Mbeya High Court Centre overwhelmed 
by a big number of cases filed at his station where he had been the only judge 
for the past nine months. Since he had nobody to assist him, all fresh civil 
cases were being scheduled for a couple of months ahead pending the coming 
of another judge.
It is our submission that the number of judges should be increased in 
order to deal with the heavy case load. This also could provide enough time for 
judges to reflect on fundamental issues of constitutional inteipretation and this 
would consequently have effect on the quality or style of their reasoning. Also 
magistrates of all levels should be increased to provide a solution to the 
seemingly chronic problem of delay and to make justice more accessible. The 
number of Primary Court magistrates, for example, is incredibly low compared 
to the number of Primary Courts in the country.975 This means that some 
Primary Court magistrates attend to more than one station.
If senior Resident Magistrates can be appointed to exercise extended 
jurisdiction we do not see any sound reason why as magistrates they should 
not have jurisdiction over cases for the enforcement of individual rights. 
Magistrates are more numerous than judges and so are the magistrates' courts 
and they are therefore closer to people than the High Court. It is our 
recommendation that jurisdiction for enforcement of fundamental rights be 
extended also to Magistrates of senior grade. Without serious attempt to make 
legal forums more accessible ‘people at whom the fundamental rights were 
aimed will be in no position to act on them.’976 This attempt should go 
alongside a deliberate campaign for mass education about human rights.
The common law doctrine of locus standi should not apply to cases for 
the enforcement of fundamental rights. Under this doctrine only a person who
975See footnotes 928 and 974 for comparison between tire number of magistrates and die number of 
courts.
976BENNETT, T., p. 47.
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has suffered specific legal injury or whose rights has been violated can bring 
action in court for judicial redress. As a matter of principle the doctrine was 
declared by Lugakingira, J,, inapplicable in matters where a person seeks to 
enforce his basic rights under the Constitution.977 However, there has never 
been any statutory recognition of the court's progressive finding and no civil 
organisation has ever applied it to institute a public interest litigation suit on 
behalf of any person whose rights were violated. Perhaps this is the case 
because the Court of Appeal has not expressed its views about it in that there 
was no appeal against the decision of Lugakingira, J. In India the Supreme 
Court went as far as allowing institution of a suit by way of an open letter 
addressed to it or any organisation bringing to the attention of the court any 
injustice being perpetuated.978 The law currently obtaining in India is that 
'where a legal wrong or a legal injury is caused to a person or to a class of 
persons by reason of violation of their constitutional or legal rights, and such 
person or class of persons is by reason of poverty or disability or socially or 
economically disadvantaged position unable to approach the court for relief, 
any member of the public or social action group acting bona fide  can maintain 
an application in the High Court or the Supreme Court seeking judicial redress 
for the legal wrong or injury caused to such person or class of persons.'979 The 
government of Tanzania should, by way of legislation, remove the condition of 
locus standi for cases of fundamental rights and allow civil organisations to 
sue on behalf of the affected persons by way of social action or public interest 
litigation.
Advocates also as officers of the court must play an active role by 
offering interpretations that compel judicial action in a way likely to produce 
social justice. Members of the legal profession therefore should take a more 
active role and tell the court what the people of Tanzania, as a changing
977See Rev. Christopher Mtikila v. Attorney-General, op cit.
978See People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union o f  India (1982) SC. 1433.
979BHAGWATI, P. N., (1987), p. 24. See also ibid.
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society, need. They too should he accessible to the people. It means, therefore, 
advocates' fees should not be too high for the ordinary person. Without 
removing this barrier legal representation will remain far beyond the poor 
man's reach and consequently give rise to injustices.
If  these reforms are carried out, it is likely that the country's human 
rights record will be improved after more than thirty years since independence. 
A serious undertaking by the government to improve its human rights record is 
very important now that the country is undergoing economic reforms. Foreign 
and local investors would be attracted by such reforms which effectively 
guarantee security of property and business undertakings. Once investors are 
attracted by the country's business environment, jobs would be created and 
consequently the problem of unemployment would be alleviated. Without 
improving the country's human rights record, the on-going campaign for 
economic reform would be far from producing the desired results. The 
proposed reforms would considerably restore confidence within the state and 
its institutions and also improve the country's international image. There is 
room for optimism on this score but every person and every organ of the state 
must play their part.
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Appendix : Bill of Rights980 
CHAPTER ONE
PART III
BASIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES 
The Rights of Equality
12. (1) All men are bom free, and are all equal.
(2) Every person is entitled to recognition and respect for his dignity.
13. (1) All persons are equal before the law and are entitled, without any
discrimination, to equal opportunity before and protection of the law.
(2) No legislative authority in the United Republic shall make any 
provision in any law that is discriminatory either of itself or in its effect.
(3) The civil rights, obligations and interests o f every person and of the 
society shall be protected and determined by competent courts of law 
and other State agencies established in that behalf by or under the law.
(4) No person shall be treated in a discriminatory manner by any person 
acting by virtue of any law or in the discharge of the functions of any 
State office.
(5) For the purpose of this section the expression discriminatory means 
affording different treatment to different persons attributable only 
mainly to their respective descriptions by nationality, tribe, place of 
origin, political opinions, colour, creed or occupation whereby persons 
of such description are subjected to disabilities or restrictions to which 
persons of another such description are not made subject or are 
accorded privileges or advantages which are not accorded to persons of 
another such description.
(6) For the purposes of ensuring equality before the law, the State shall 
make provisions-
980This is an unofficial translation by the United Nations Electoral Secretariat in Tanzania made 
shortly before the 1995 elections.
311
(a) that every person shall, when his rights are being
determined, be entitled to a fair hearing by the court of 
law or other body concerned and be guaranteed the right 
of appeal or another legal remedy against the decisions 
of courts of law and other bodies which decide on his 
rights or interests founded on statutory provisions;
(b) every person charged with a criminal offence shall be
presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty;
(c) no person shall be punished for any act which before its
commission was not defined as such offence, and no 
penalty imposed for any criminal offence shall be 
heavier than the penalty in force at the time the offence 
was committed;
(d) every person is entitled to respect for the dignity of his
personal equality and shall not be deprived of such 
dignity save in accordance with the procedure permitted 
by law in execution of the sentence or order of a court in 
respect of a criminal offence of which he has been found 
guilty;
(e) no person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment.
The Right to Life
14. Every person has a right to live and subject to law, to protection of his 
life by the society.
15. (1) Man's freedom is inviolable and every person is entitled to his 
personal freedom.
(2) For the purposes of protecting the right to personal freedom, no 
person shall be subject to arrest, imprisonment, restriction, detention, 
exile or deprivation of his liberty in any other manner save in the 
following cases
(a) in certain circumstances, and subject to a procedure
prescribed by law; or
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(b) in the execution of the sentence or order of a court in 
respect of a criminal offence of which he has been 
convicted or upon reasonable suspicion of his having 
committed a criminal offence.
16. (1) The human person and the dwelling of each person are inviolable 
and for that purpose every person is entitled to respect to his person, his 
private and family life, his home and his private correspondence.
(2) For the puiposes of affording protection to the right to privacy and 
personal security in accordance with this section, the State shall make 
provisions imposing limitations to that protection, being limitations 
designed to ensure that the enjoyment of the said rights and security by 
any individual shall not be prejudice to the provisions of this section.
17. (1) Every citizen of the United Republic is entitled to freedom of 
movement and residence, that is to say, the right to move freely within 
the United Republic and to reside in any part of it, to leave and to enter 
into it, and immunity from expulsion from the United Republic.
(2) Any lawful act or law made for the purpose of:-
(a) imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of 
freedom of movement, and to subject him to restriction or 
arrest; or
(b) imposing restrictions on the exercise of movement so as 
to:-
(i) execute sentence or court order; or
(ii) to secure the fulfilment of any obligations imposed 
by law on that person; or
(iii) to protect the interest of the public in general or 
any specific public interest of a category of the 
public, such an act or law shall not be or be deemed 
to be inconsistent with this section:
The Right of freedom of conscience
18. (1) Subject to the laws of the land, every person is entitled to freedom 
of opinion and expression that is to say, the right to freely hold and
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express opinions and seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
through any media and regardless of frontiers, and freedom from 
interference with his correspondence.
(2) Every citizen has the right to be kept informed of developments in 
the country and in the world which are of concern for the life of the 
people and their work and of questions of concern to the community.
19. (1) Every person is entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and
option in matters of religion.
(2) Subject to the relevant laws of the United Republic, the profession, 
practice, worship and propagation or religion shall be free and a private 
affair of an individual; and the conduct and management of religious 
communities shall not be part of the functions of the State.
(3) References in this section to a "religion" shall be construed as 
including references to a religious denomination, and cognate 
expressions shall be construed accordingly.
20. (1) Subject to the laws of the land, every person is entitled to freedom
of peaceful assembly, association and public expression, that is to say, 
the right to assemble freely and peacefully, to associate with other 
persons and in particular to form or belong to organizations or 
associations foimed for the purposes of protecting or furthering his or 
any other interests.
(2) Notwithstanding the conditions prescribed in sub-section (1), it shall 
be illegal to register any political entity which for reasons of its 
Constitution or policies
(a) intends to promote and defend the interests of:
(i) creed or any religious association;
(ii) any tribal association at places of origin, colour or gender;
(iii) a certain part of the territory of the United Republic
(b) defends the dissolution of the United Republic;
(c) consents to or advocates the use of violence or 
confrontation as a means of achieving its political 
objectives;
(d) defends or intends to conduct its political activities in one 
part of the United Republic;
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(e) bars its leadership from being elected periodically and 
democratically.
(3) Parliament may enact legislation prescribing provisions to ensure 
that political parties are cognisant of the limits and criteria specified in 
the provisions of sub-section (2) regarding the freedom and the right of 
people to associate and assemble.
(4) Subject to relevant laws of the land, it is prohibited to force a person 
to join a political party or an organisation or to raise an objection to the 
registration of a political party for reasons of its ideology or philosophy.
21. (1) Subject to the provisions of sections 5, 39 and 67 of this 
Constitution and the laws of the land relating to electing and being 
elected, or appointing and being appointed to participate in the 
government of the country either, every citizen of the United Republic 
is entitled to take part in the government of the country either directly 
or through freely chosen representatives, in accordance with the 
procedure provided by or under the law.
(2) Every citizen has the right and freedom to participate effectively in 
decision-making on matters which affect him, his livelihood or the 
nation.
The Right to Work
22. (1) Eveiy person has the right to work.
(2) Every citizen shall be entitled to access on equal terms to every 
office and every function under the State.
23. (1) Every person without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay 
for equal work and , accordingly all citizens working according to their 
ability shall be entitled to receive remuneration according to the 
quantity and quality of the work done.
(2) Every person who works is entitled to just and favourable 
remuneration.
24. (1) Subject to relevant laws of the land, every person has the right to 
own or hold any property lawfully acquired.
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(2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (1), a person shall not be 
arbitrarily deprived of his property for the purpose of acquisition or any 
other purpose without the authority of the law which shall set out 
conditions for fair and adequate compensation.
Duties to the society
25. (1) Labour alone creates the material wealth of human society, and is
the source of the well-being of the people and the measure of human
dignity. Accordingly, every person is obliged:-
(a) to voluntarily and honestly participate in lawful and 
productive work; and
(b) to observe labour discipline and strive to achieve the 
individual and communal production targets required or 
prescribed by law.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-section (1), there shall be no 
forced labour in the United Republic.
(3) For the purposes of this section, and in this Constitution generally,
no work shall be deemed to be forced labour, compulsory labour or
inhuman services, if that work, subject to any law is:-
(a) any labour required to be undertaken in consequence of a 
sentence or order of a court;
(b) any labour required of members of a disciplined force in 
pursuance of their duties as such;
(c) any labour required of any person which is reasonably 
necessary in the event of any emergency or calamity 
threatening the life or well-being of the society;
(d) labour or service which forms part of:-
(i) normal social service or other civic obligations for 
the well-being of the society;
(ii) compulsory national service provided by law;
(iii) the national endeavour at the mobilization of 
human resources for the enhancement of the
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national social and economic survival, and ensuring 
progress or advancement of national productivity.
26. (1) Every person is obliged to comply with this Constitution and the 
laws of the United Republic.
(2) Eveiy person is entitled, subject to the procedure provided by the 
law, to institute proceedings for the protection of the Constitution and 
legality.
27. (1) Every person is obliged to safeguard and protect the natural 
resources of the United Republic, State property and all property jointly 
owned by the people, as well as to respect another person's property
(2) All persons shall be by law required to safeguard State and 
communal property, to combat all forms of misappropriation and 
wastage and to run the economy of the nation assiduously, with the 
attitude of people who are masters of the fate of their own nation.
28. (1) Every citizen of the United Republic has the inalienable and 
inviolable right and duty to defend, protect and promote the 
independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of the nation.
(2) Parliament shall enact appropriate laws to facilitate the service by 
the people in the disciplined forces and in the defence of the nation.
(3) No person shall have the right to acknowledge or sign an act of 
capitulation, nor to accept or recognise the occupation or division of the 
United Republic or any part of its national territory and, subject to this 
Constitution and any other law, no person shall have the right to prevent 
citizens of the United Republic from fighting against an enemy who has 
launched an attack upon the country.
(4) The offence of treason as defined by law shall be the gravest crime 
against the United Republic.
General Provisions
29. (1) Every person resident in the United Republic shall be entitled to
enjoy the basic human rights, and share in the result of the discharge by 
every person of his duty to society, which rights and duties are set out 
in sections 12 to 28 of this part of this Constitution.
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(2) Every person resident in the United Republic shall be entitled to be 
afforded equal protection under the laws of the United Republic.
(3) No citizen of the United Republic shall be accorded any rights, 
privilege or advantage by virtue only of his status, place of origin, 
occupation or creed.
(4) No law of the State shall confer any right, status, privilege or 
advantage to any citizen of the United Republic by virtue only of his 
status, place of origin or descent.
(5) For the purposes of better enjoyment by all persons of the rights and 
freedoms specified in this Constitution, eveiy person shall so conduct 
himself and his affairs as not to prejudice the rights and freedoms of 
others or the public interest.
30. (1) The rights and freedoms whose basic content have been set out in
this Constitution shall not be exercised by any person in such a manner 
as to occasion the infringement or termination of the rights and 
freedoms of others or the public interest.
(2) It is hereby declared that no provision contained in this Part of this 
Constitution, which stipulates the basic human rights, freedoms and 
duties, shall be construed as invalidating any existing law or prohibiting 
the enactment of any law or the doing of any lawful act under such law, 
making provision for-
(a) ensuring that the rights and freedom of others or the 
public interest are not prejudiced by the misuse of the 
individual rights and freedoms;
(b) ensuring the interests of defence, public safety, public 
order, public morality, public health, rural and urban 
development planning, the development planning, the 
development and utilization of mineral resources or the 
development or utilization of any other property in such 
manner as to promote the public benefit;
(c) ensuring the execution of the judgment or order of a court 
given or made in any civil or criminal proceedings;
(d) the protection of the reputation, rights and freedoms of 
others or the private lives of persons involved in any court 
proceedings, prohibiting the disclosure of confidential
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information, or the safeguarding of the dignity, authority 
and independence of the courts;
(e) imposing restrictions, supervision and control over the 
establishment, management and operation of societies and 
private companies in the country; or
(f) enabling any other thing to be done which promotes, 
enhances or protects the national interest generally.
(3) Where any person alleges that any provision of this Part of this 
Chapter or any law involving a basic right or duty has been, is being or 
is likely to be contravened in relation to him in any part of the United 
Republic, he may, without prejudice to any other action or remedy 
lawfully available to him in respect of the same matter, institute 
proceedings for relief in the High Court.
- (4) Subject to the other provisions of this Constitution, the High Court 
shall have and may exercise original jurisdiction to hear and determine 
any matter brought before it in pursuance of this section; and an Act of 
Parliament may make provision with respect to-
(a) the procedure regulating the institution of proceedings 
under this section;
(b) the powers, practice and procedure of the High Court in 
relation to the hearing of proceedings instituted under this 
section;
(c) ensuring the more efficient exercise of the powers of the 
High Court, the protection and enforcement of the basic 
rights, freedoms and duties in accordance with this 
Constitution.
(5) Whenever it is alleged that a legislation enacted or an action taken 
by the Government or any other authority revokes or terminates the 
rights, freedoms and basic duties specified in sections 12 to 29 of this 
Constitution, and the High Court is satisfied that the relevant law or 
action is null and void due to the extent it contradicts the Constitution 
or contrary to the Constitution and the High Court considers that the 
prevailing situation or the welfare of the society requires so, instead of 
expressing that the law or action is null and void, it shall have the 
authority to give time to the Government or any other authority to 
modify the alleged legislation or action in question within a period
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specified by the High Court provided that the shortest possible period is 
taken into account and that the legislation or action shall have the force 
of law until when the modifications shall be effected.
Extraordinary Powers of the State
31. (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 30 (2), an Act of
Parliament shall not be invalid for the reason only that it provides for 
the taking, during periods of emergency, or in ordinary times in 
relation to individuals who are believed to be conducting themselves in 
a manner that endangers or compromises national security, of measures 
that derogate from the provisions of sections 15 and 15 of this 
Constitution.
(2) No measures referred in subsection (1) shall be taken in pursuance 
of any law during any period of emergency, or in ordinary times in 
relation to any person, save only to the extent which they are necessary 
and justifiable for dealing with the situation that exists during the period 
of emergency or in ordinary times dealing with the situation created by 
the conduct of the individual in question.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize the 
deprivation of any person of the right to live except in respect of death 
caused as a result of acts of war.
(4) In this and the following sections of this Part "period of emergency" 
means any period during which the proclamation of a state of 
emergency made by the President in the exercise of the powers 
conferred on him by section 32, continues in force.
32. (1) Subject to this Constitution and to an Act of Parliament in that
behalf, the President may proclaim the existence of a state of 
Emergency in the United Republic or in any part of it.
(2) The President may proclaim the existence of a state of emergency 
only if-
(a) the United Republic is at war; or
(b) the United Republic is in imminent danger of invasion or 
involvement in state of war; or
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(c) there is actual breakdown of Public Order and public 
safety in the United Republic or in any part of it to such 
an extent as to require the invocation of extraordinary 
measures to restore peace and security; or
(d) there is a clear and present danger of an actual breakdown 
of public order and public safety in the United Republic or 
any part of it which cannot be avoided except through the 
invocation of the extraordinary authority; or
(e) there is an imminent danger of the occurrence of some 
disaster or natural calamity threatening the community or 
a section of the community in the United Republic; and
(f) there is some other kind of public danger which clearly 
constitutes a threat to the State or its continued existence.
(3) Where a state of emergency is proclaimed in relation to the whole of 
the United Republic, or in relation to the whole of Mainland Tanzania, 
or Tanzania Zanzibar, the President shall forthwith transmit a copy of 
the Gazette containing the proclamation to the Speaker of the National 
Assembly who shall after consultation with the Leader of Government 
business in Parliament, within a period of not more than fourteen days 
from the date of proclamation, convene a Parliamentary meeting to 
consider the situation and determine whether or not to pass a resolution, 
supported by votes of two thirds of all members of the meeting, 
approving the proclamation of the state of emergency issued by the 
President.
(4) Parliament may enact legislation making provision regarding 
situations and procedure whereby certain persons in charge of the 
functions of Government in specified areas in the United Republic may 
request the President to exercise powers under this section in relation to 
any of those areas where there is an existence of any of the situations 
specified in paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of subsection (2) and such 
situation does not extend beyond the boundaries of such areas; and for 
providing in exercise of executive power during the period of 
emergency.
(5) A proclamation issued by the President under this section shall 
cease to have effect:-
(a) if it is revoked by the President;
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(b) if fourteen days elapse from the date of proclamation 
without there being passed the resolution stipulated in 
sub-section (3);
(c) after the elapse of a period of six months from the date of 
the proclamation; save that a meeting of the National 
Assembly may, before the expiry of the period of six 
months, extend the period of operation of the 
proclamation from time to time for further periods of six 
months by a resolution passed by not less than two-thirds 
of all the members of that meeting;
(d) at any time when the meeting of the National Assembly 
revokes the proclamation by a resolution supported by not 
less than two-thirds of all the members.
(6) For the avoidance of doubts in relation to the interpretation or 
application of this section, it is hereby declared that the provisions of 
any Act of Parliament and of any other law, dealing with the declaration 
of a State of Emergency provided for under this section shall apply only 
to that part of the United Republic where any such emergency exists.
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